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THE WORKS

OF

THE MOST REVEREND

WILLIAM MAGEE, D.D.,

LORD ARCHBISHOP OF DUBLIN:

NOW FIRST COLLECTED AND PRINTED FROM THE AUTHOR'S CORRECTED COPIES:

COMPRISING,

DISCOURSES AND DISSERTATIONS

ON THE

SCRIPTURAL DOCTRINES

OF

ATONEMENT AND SACRIFICE;

HIS PUBLISHED SERMONS, AND VISITATION CHARGES.

WITH

A MEMOIR OF HIS LIFE,

BY

THE REV. A. H. KENNEY, D.D.,

RECTOR OF SAINT OLAVE'S, SOUTHWARK; FORMERLY DEAN OF ACHONRY; AND FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN.

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CONTENTS OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

Page

I. MEMOIR OF ARCHBISHOP MAGEE, by the Rev. A. H. Kenney, D.D. ix

II. DISCOURSES AND DISSERTATIONS ON THE ATONEMENT AND SACRIFICE . . . lxxxi

Dedication to the Right Hon. W. C. Plunket . . lxxxiii

Prefatory Address to the Students in Divinity, in the University of Dublin lxxxv

Advertisement to the Second Edition xci

Advertisement to the Third Edition xcii

Advertisement to the Fourth Edition xciii

Discourse I.—On 1 Cor. i. 23, 24 1

Discourse II.—On Heb. ix. 22 28

Illustrations and Explanatory Dissertations . . . 45

No. I.—On the Pre existence of Christ, and the species of arguments by which this article of the Christian Doctrine has been opposed 47

No. II.—Unitarian objections to the *religious observance of stated days* 59

No. III.—On the importance of the doctrine of Redemption . 61

No. IV.—Pardon not *necessarily* consequent upon Repentance 62

No. V.—The sense entertained by mankind of the *natural* inefficacy of Repentance, proved from the history of Human Sacrifices 65

No. VI.—On the *multiplied operation* of the Divine acts . . 86

No. VII.—Deistical reasoning instanced in Chubb . . . 86

No. VIII.—On the consistency of *Prayer* with the *Divine immutability* 90

No. IX.—On the granting of the *Divine forgiveness* through a *Mediator or Intercessor* 93

No. X.—On Unitarians, or *Rational Dissenters* . . . 97

No. XI.—On the distinction between Unitarians and Socinians 99

No. XII.—On the *corruption* of man's *natural* state . . 101

2066974

Page

No. XIII.—On the *misrepresentation* of the doctrine of *Atonement* by *Unitarians* 112

No. XIV.—On the *disrespect of Scripture* manifested by *Unitarian* Writers 113

No. XV.—On the *Heathen notions of merit* entertained by *Unitarians* 116

No. XVI.—On Dr. JOHN TAYLOR's scheme of *Atonement* . 118

No. XVII.—The doctrine of *Atonement falsely* charged with the presumption of pronouncing on the *necessity* of Christ's death 123

No. XVIII.—On the mode of reasoning, whereby the *sufficiency of good works without mediation* is attempted to be defended from Scripture 126

No. XIX.—The *want of a discoverable connexion* between the means and the end, *equally applies to every Scheme of Atonement* 130

No. XX.—On the Scripture phrase of *our being reconciled* to God 132

No. XXI.—On the true *distinction* between the *laying aside our enmity* to God, and *being reconciled* to God . . . 135

No. XXII.—On the proofs from Scripture, that *the Sinner is the object of the Divine displeasure* 135

No. XXIII.—Instance from the book of Job, of *Sacrifice* being *prescribed, to avert God's Anger* 138

No. XXIV.—On the Attribute of the DIVINE JUSTICE . . 139

No. XXV.—On the *text in John*, describing our Lord as *the Lamb of God*, which taketh away the sins of the world . 140

No. XXVI.—On the meaning of the word PROPITIATION in the New Testament 143

No. XXVII.—On the *texts* describing Christ's death as a SACRIFICE FOR SIN 144

No. XXVIII.—On the word ΚΑΤΑΛΛΑΓΗ translated as *Atonement* in Rom. v. 11 157

No. XXIX.—On the *Denial* that *Christ's death* is described in Scripture as a SIN-OFFERING 158

No. XXX.—On the *sense* in which Christ is said in Scripture to have DIED FOR US 159

No. XXXI.—On the pretence of FIGURATIVE ALLUSION in the Sacrificial terms of the New Testament 163

No. XXXII.—Arguments to prove the *sacrificial language* of the New Testament *figurative*, urged by H. TAYLOR and DR. PRIESTLEY 165

No. XXXIII.—On the sense entertained generally by all, and more especially instanced amongst the Jews, of the NECESSITY OF PROPITIATORY EXPIATION 165

Page

No. XXXIV.—On H. Taylor's objection, of the *want of a literal correspondence* between the Mosaic sacrifice and the death of Christ 189

No. XXXV.—On the arguments by which it is attempted to prove the passover not to be a sacrifice . . . 192

No. XXXVI.—On the meaning of the word translated atonement, in the Old Testament 207

No. XXXVII.—On the efficacy of the Mosaic atonement, as applied to cases of moral transgression 215

No. XXXVIII.—On the vicarious import of the *Mosaic sacrifices* 227

No. XXXIX.—On the *imposition of hands* upon the *head of the victim* 236

No. XL.—On the *sufficiency of the proof* of the propitiatory nature of the Mosaic sacrifices, independent of the argument which establishes their *vicarious import* . . . 244

No. XLI.—On the *divine institution of sacrifice*, and the *traces* thereof discoverable in the *heathen corruptions of the rite* . 244

No. XLII.—On the *Death of Christ*, as a true propitiatory sacrifice for the sins of mankind 254

No. XLIII.—On the *inconsistency* of the reasoning whereby the *death of Christ* is maintained to have been but figuratively *a sacrifice* 310

No. XLIV.—On the *nature* of the sacrifice for sin . . 311

No. XLV.—On the *effect* of the doctrine of *Atonement*, in producing sentiments *favourable to Virtue and Religion* . . 312

No. XLVI.—On the supposition that *sacrifice originated in* Priestcraft 314

No. XLVII.—On the supposition that the *Mosaic sacrifices originated* in human invention 315

No. XLVIII.—*Sacrifices* explained as gifts by various writers 324

No. XLIX.—*Sacrifices* explained as federal rites . . 326

No. L.—Bishop Warburton's Theory of the *Origin of Sacrifice* 331

No. LI.—The supposition that *sacrifices originated* in gifts *erroneous* 332

No. LII.—On the *date* of the *permission of* animal food to man 333

No. LIII.—On the divine origin of language . . . 342

No. LIV.—On the *natural unreasonableness* of the *Sacrificial rite* 356

No. LV.—On the *universality* of Sacrifice 357

No. LVI.—On the *universality* of the notion of the expiatory virtue of Sacrifice 359

No. LVII.—On the *objections* against the supposition of the divine institution of sacrifice 360

No. LVIII.—On the sacrifice of Abel as evincing the *divine institution* of Sacrifice 367

Page

No. LIX.—On the *history* and the *book* of JOB . . . 370

No. LX.—On *Grotius's* strange *misconception* of the nature of *Abel's sacrifice* 437

No. LXI.—On the *difference* in the divine reception of the *sacrifices* of CAIN and ABEL 441

No. LXII.—On the true meaning of the phrase, ΠΛΕΙΟΝΑ ΘΥΣΙΑΝ attributed to the *Sacrifice of Abel* . . . 444

No. LXIII.—On the nature and grounds of the FAITH evidenced by the *Sacrifice of Abel* 451

No. LXIV.—On the probable TIME AND OCCASION of the *institution of Sacrifice* 454

No. LXV.—On the true interpretation of the passage Gen. iv. 7, containing *God's expostulation with Cain* . . . 458

No. LXVI.—On the *comparison* between the *sacrifice* of ABEL and that of CHRIST 467

No. LXVII.—On the nature of SACRIFICE BEFORE THE LAW; tending to show its *confinement to animal sacrifice*, except in the case of Cain 468

No. LXVIII.—On the DISPROPORTION between the effects of the *Mosaic* and the *Christian Sacrifices* 470

No. LXIX.—On the CORRESPONDENCE between the *sacrificial language of the Old Testament*, and that employed in the *New* to describe *Redemption by the Death of Christ:* and the original adaptation of the former to the subject of the latter 475

Postscript to Number LXIX.: on BOLINGBROKE and HUME . 497

MEMOIR

OF THE LATE

MOST REVEREND WILLIAM MAGEE,

ARCHBISHOP OF DUBLIN.

BY

ARTHUR HENRY KENNEY, D.D.,

RECTOR OF ST. OLAVE'S, SOUTHWARK; FORMERLY DEAN OF ACHONRY;
AND FELLOW OF TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN.

MEMOIR,

ETC.

WILLIAM MAGEE, Archbishop of Dublin, author of the celebrated work on the Atonement, was born on the 18th of March, 1766. He was son of John Magee, the second son of William Magee, who possessed a landed property in the county of Fermanagh, near Enniskillen. The Archbishop's grandfather, William, had seven sons, each of whom enjoyed an independent property. The family were of ancient respectability. Their ancestors settled in Ireland in 1640; and were steady loyalists.

The father of the Archbishop, who, like each of his six brothers, was remarkable for a handsome personal appearance, and for activity, lost a leg at the age of about sixteen years, in consequence of an accident. In leaping over a wide ditch, he alighted on the hidden stump of a tree, which occasioned an injury to his foot; and, from unskilful surgical treatment, it became necessary to amputate the leg above the knee. After his father's death, finding it inconvenient to attend to agri-

cultural pursuits, he sold his property, embarked the produce in the linen business, and became an extensive linen or yarn merchant. He married Miss Jane Glasgow, a lady remarkable not only for her prepossessing appearance, but for her fine intellectual endowments, with a property of about five hundred pounds a-year. This interesting and excellent lady lived to a late age, enjoying what, with pious gratitude to Heaven, she often called "one of the greatest earthly blessings—the best of sons," in her beloved child William, who was afterwards Archbishop of Dublin.

Her husband was unhappily induced to become security (to a great amount) for some persons who afterwards failed for a very large sum, and (as it was considered) fraudulently. They fled from the country. Mr. Magee surrendered his property in payment of the great demand upon them. Their creditors allowed him but one hundred pounds per annum for himself and his family, with which very reduced income he went to reside in the town of Enniskillen. He had four sons, and the same number of daughters. Of his sons, William alone lived to the age of maturity.

A remarkable prediction to one of the boys, of his death, and of the death of two of his brothers, in their early childhood, is perfectly well attested. It was often spoken of by their mother. One morning, when her child Nathaniel came down stairs to breakfast in a new dress, (his first change from petticoats,) she expressed her wish that he should have health to wear his new clothes. The young child replied, "Mamma, this is the last suit you will ever get for me." On her inquiring what his reason was for saying so, he an-

swered, "Mamma: I shall die soon, I was told it." She replied, "My dear child, you were dreaming." "I do not know whether I was dreaming or not," said he; "but I saw an angel that told me last night I must die soon, and that Dan and John Henry will die too." Some months afterwards he was seized with the small-pox. During his illness he frequently requested his mother not to grieve for him, as he was going to be happy; and having called his brother William to him, he earnestly said to him, "Be kind to poor mamma, when my brothers and I shall be dead." The three children died in the course of eight days. And never was a dying injunction fulfilled more faithfully than the death-bed charge of the interesting child Nathaniel to his excellent brother William. Never was there a kinder or a tenderer son to both his parents, from his early childhood, and unremittingly, than the great man was, who is the subject of this memoir. In after life, his father, mother, and sisters resided under his affectionate care until death removed his parents. One of his sisters was married to the Rev. Dr. Grier, author of a learned answer to the Roman Catholic Bishop Milner, and of other works; another was married to a gentleman from Scotland, of good family and connexions.

Having in childhood survived his three brothers, he became at that very early age the chief hope of his parents. Even then he showed signs of talents of a superior order, and of the most amiable and noble dispositions. He was a small and delicate child, with a very fair complexion, eyes remarkably sharp and brilliant, but with a soft expression, and a countenance of striking intelligence and animation. At five years of

age he was sent to receive the first rudiments of education from Dr. Tew, who kept a school in Enniskillen. After he had been some time at this school his mother became uneasy at the change of her lively child's aspect. The sprightly and joyous expression had left his countenance, and he had become dispirited and silent. One day he returned home more dejected than usual, with his eyes swollen, and traces of weeping on his cheeks. To her anxious inquiry respecting the cause, he replied, "It is nothing",—and several times repeated this reply; thus in his childhood showing a disposition, of which in mature age he was a bright example, of avoiding any remark to the prejudice of another. The writer of this memoir had for many years the happiness and honour of knowing the distinguished man who is the subject of it. For a number of years immediately preceding that of his death, he knew him intimately; and never has he known a man who appeared to take more pleasure in speaking to the credit and honour of others, or who more uniformly avoided uttering a word to detract from the character of any one. He had individual rivals: and in his zealous and conscientious discharge of duty he was exposed to the party hostility of a numerous body. In the heat of party feeling, some made him the object of their sarcasm and raillery. But often as the writer of these observations has heard others remarking, in his presence, on the attacks which were made upon him, never did he hear a word of unkindness spoken by the Archbishop against any of his adversaries. Joy beamed in his animated countenance, while he praised, as it was his delight to do, the good conduct of others. But,

to return to the period of this memoir, from which his generous reluctance in his childhood to answer even his mother's question, occasioned this digression.

After continued pressing, Mrs. Magee prevailed on her child William to acknowledge the cause of his dejection. He was depressed at finding it impossible for him to advance in his education, as even then he was exceedingly anxious to do. "I shall never get on," said he, "at my present school." Farther urgency was used to induce him to confess the reason, which was this:—the schoolmaster was accustomed to doze while boys were saying their lessons to him; and often, when he suddenly awoke, he called young William Magee, and directed him to act as their instructor. "Go Willy," he used to say, "teach these boys; or hear that class." This became so very frequent, that the child found the greater part of his time at the school occupied in labouring to teach others, some of them dull, some much older than himself, and reluctant to receive his instruction.

Mrs. Magee requested her husband to remove their son to the endowed classical school at Enniskillen, of which Dr. Noble was then head master. But William's father thought him much too young for such a school, where there was not a boy who was not several years older than he was. At length, his spirits becoming more depressed, and his health evidently suffering, his father consented to make the change which he so much desired. And when he was informed that "the wish of his heart was granted," the child's joy knew no bounds,—he leaped and bounded about the room in delight. His features, which had expressed

anxiety and painful feeling, relaxed. Soon the brilliancy of his eyes returned. He recovered his appetite, which he had lost. Again, he became the animated sprightly boy, cheering his home with his joyous liveliness.

The children of freemen of Enniskillen were admitted, of right, into the great endowed school of that town; and young William Magee entered it, on the foundation. Being a day-scholar, he continued to enjoy the benefit of the religious instruction of his father, who was a remarkably pious man, and of the fond care of his mother.

When he had been about a year and a half at Mr. Noble's school, his uncle, the Rev. Daniel Viridet, (his mother's half-brother,) took him to reside with himself, in order to finish his education, together with that of a young gentleman named Rutledge. The friendship which ensued between the two boys lasted throughout their lives. As they advanced in years, Mr. Rutledge always continued ardent in his admiration of the qualities of his friend.

But even an earlier and not less enduring friendship than this had been formed by young William Magee. The house in which his parents resided at Enniskillen, and in which he was born, was adjoining to that in which the birth of William Conyngham Plunket, afterwards Lord Chancellor of Ireland, took place: Mrs. Magee and Mrs. Plunket were extremely intimate; and often when the latter was leaving home for a few hours, she has carried her infant William Plunket to Mrs. Magee, and consigned him to her care. At such times it not unfrequently happened that the crav-

ings of the two infants were relieved from the same breast. So early was that connexion commenced, which with the first dawn of reason produced a friendship growing with their years, and in their maturer age strong almost beyond example. The difference of their sentiments in politics, though with reference to religion, could not abate their mutual attachment. Yet these two great men were very unlike each other. In moral tone of feeling there was indeed a resemblance. And each was pre-eminently gifted with mental powers. Each appreciated the extraordinary talents and the moral worth of the other. The affectionate and unchangeable firmness of friendship formed by the Archbishop in his childhood for his young companion, (a friendship then heightened by his loss of his brothers,) showed itself throughout their lives under all circumstances: and their interchange of sentiments was a main source of the happiness of both. That such unbroken attachment should always subsist between two persons who in after life differed so widely on political subjects nearly connected with religion, and on which each felt so deep an interest and took so conspicuous a part, might appear surprising, but for the binding nature of very early and intimate friendship formed long before any difference of sentiment has arisen, between those who admire and delight in the pre-eminent talents and strong moral feelings of each other. In the intercourse between the Archbishop and his dear friend Lord Plunket, any, even the least, excitement of dissension ever was avoided. In later life, these two great men agreed never to name politics

in their confidential and domestic communications with each other.

Of the anecdotes of the Archbishop's childhood, which showed those excellent dispositions for which throughout his whole life he was remarkable, one or two more may here be mentioned. His feelings were extremely acute and easily excited, but he was always particularly averse from anger. If any irritation was at any time produced in his mind, it quickly passed away. He never *let the sun go down upon his wrath;* and, with all his quick sensibilities, few human beings were more strangers to wrath than he. When he was about six years of age, Colonel Irwin, then candidate in the protestant interest for the County of Fermanagh, met him walking in a street of Enniskillen. Attracted by the fine intelligent countenance of the child, the Colonel inquired of him what were his name and family. And after some further questions, struck with his manner, his liveliness, and early understanding, expressed a wish to know more of him. "If you had a vote, my fine little fellow," said Colonel Irwin, "to whom would you give it?" The child replied immediately, not knowing who the person was to whom he spoke, "To Colonel Irwin." "Then," said the Colonel, "will you wear Colonel Irwin's colours?" and having taken him by the hand he led him to the place where the orange cockades were distributed. Young William Magee fastened one in his hat, and marched through the streets to his home, delighted. But he soon after heard with the utmost disappointment, that Colonel Irwin had given up the contest. "The coward!" ex-

claimed the child in his excitement: and he tore the cockade from his hat. But almost immediately afterwards, with perfect calmness, he sat down to his book. A few minutes had passed, when a friend coming in on a visit to his father, said to him, "Willy: your friend Colonel Irwin has given up: what do you say to that?" Already the expression of irritation had quite disappeared from the child's face. He looked up mildly at the speaker, and said, "Sir, I am at my book." And another word to Colonel Irwin's disadvantage could not be extracted from him.

From his earliest age he was remarkably tender and considerate towards the poor, and treated them with respect. When he was a young boy, having come in from school wet and cold, he went into the kitchen, where he sat down on a small stool to dry and warm himself before the fire. A poor beggar woman (as is not unfrequently the case in Ireland) came in. Squalid and low as her appearance was, the kind and generous child immediately sprung from his seat: "O ma'am, take this seat," said he. The poor woman was astonished, and replied, "Don't *ma'am me*, my dear!" But the little boy's conduct on the occasion indicated the kind and dignified disposition, for which he was remarkable throughout his whole life.

The boy William Magee advanced rapidly under the kind tuition of his uncle the Rev. Mr. Viridet. And when he entered the university, the generous friendship of this good man was strikingly shown. He saved his nephew's father from any occasion of expending for his son's education a part of the small allowance which had been left for the family by the grandfather's cre-

ditors. All the charges, for young William's entrance into the university of Dublin, for his education there, and for his residence as a student, were punctually paid by his uncle Mr. Viridet. He even gave to his nephew the same allowance which was fixed for young Mr. Rutledge, who entered as a fellow commoner on the day of William Magee's entrance as a pensioner; the 30th of June, 1781. They entered under the tuition of the Rev. Richard Stack, D.D., toward whom the Archbishop, throughout his college course, and afterwards while Dr. Stack lived, felt great affection, esteem, and gratitude. And well were those sentiments deserved by that kind hearted and excellent man. He was proud of the honourable distinction which his pupil young Magee speedily obtained in the university, he was charmed with his talents and manners, and still more by his amiable dispositions, and conceived a particular affection for him. Nothing could exceed the zeal with which he instructed his young pupil and encouraged his diligence. And the efforts of one of the kindest and best of tutors were well rewarded by the advancement of his pupil to the highest honours of the university.

Not only was Dr. Stack eminently fitted to encourage a pupil in diligence and to improve him in learning, but also to excite and confirm each generous and good feeling. To an overflowing benevolence of heart he united an engaging simplicity of mind. He had a refined taste. He was a zealous admirer of every thing truly honourable and noble: and his religious feelings were fervent. He who writes this memoir cannot touch on the memory of that kind and excellent man

—that sincere and ardent friend—without being affected. He was one of his last pupils in the university. He was admitted to his particular friendship: and he must ever remember him, even as a grateful son might cherish the memory of an affectionate father. Dr. Stack's friendship for an esteemed pupil was not of a transitory kind. More than twenty years elapsed from his retirement from the university on a college benefice, when he sent to the writer of these pages the last memorial of his friendship, not long before his pious spirit was called away to the better world. Will the reader pardon this short digression, prompted by affectionate gratitude?

From the commencement of his college course, young William Magee distinguished himself preeminently. He obtained all the college honours. Study was to him what amusement is to most others. He pursued it with avidity and delighted in it. His lively and agreeable manners, and his amiable dispositions, rendered him a general favourite of all who knew him.

He took his first degree (that of B.A.) with the highest distinction, in October, 1785. And within three years after, (June, 1788,) he was elected a fellow. He pursued the very laborious study required for answering for a fellowship in the College of Dublin, with the greatest zeal. A tendency of blood to his head made it dangerous for him to stoop very long, and therefore he placed his book on a raised desk, and sometimes sat before it with his head erect, but more usually stood, finding that thus the unpleasant tendency affected him less. Yet even so he generally passed the whole day in study, while he was in the course of pre-

paration to be examined for a fellowship. Often, after intense reading from an early hour of the morning, with scarcely any intermission until ten at night, he has gone out for recreation and exercise to a ball; and afterwards having returned from the dance has resumed his study: a very rare instance of zeal in diligence. Happily all this extraordinary exertion did not impair his health. But his constant habit at that period of his life, of standing while at study, with his head erect, produced an effect which was visible throughout his after life. The very erect appearance of his figure, and position of his head, were ever afterwards remarkable: so that his person, which was scarcely of the middle height, seemed to exceed it.

From the early religious lessons received from his pious father, from the precepts and example of the good Dr. Stack, and (under the divine blessing) from his own disposition, he ever shunned profligate society and conduct. His companions, and still more his friends in the university, were of the most respectable and most moral description. On account of his liveliness and wit he was always what may be called "the life of the company" where he was. But such were his moral feeling and pure taste, that he never uttered a jest which was not conformable to the feelings of delicacy and religion; for this he was remarkable in his youth, and in later years the writer of this memoir has often admired the innocence and simplicity of his extraordinary and agreeable wit. Disposed to the utmost cheerfulness, he made others happy in his society. His was not the *laughter in which the heart is sorrowful.* His never was the wit that carried any sting with it.

Amongst the many traits which adorned his character, were his never forgetting a kindness, and rarely remembering an injury. His feeling of gratitude for a favour, however small, never faded. Toward his excellent uncle Viridet he retained to the last hour of his life the utmost gratitude and affection, and as his advancement in life enabled him, he proved those feelings by multiplied acts of kindness. His first care after he obtained a fellowship, was to repay to his uncle the whole expenses which his education and living at the university had caused. But so far was he from speaking of his acts of duty and kindness, that this would never have been known to any of his family but for some papers which were found after his death. After the decease of his uncle, he never could name him without tears in his eyes, and he always took peculiar pleasure in detailing the numerous instances of his kindness to him. Possessed, through his talents and exertions, of means to do so, he repaid all the kindness twenty-fold to his uncle's widow and her orphan children, who were all daughters. And at his death he left in his will to those of them who survived, a child's portion.

Mr. Magee's election to a fellowship was highly honourable. His answering was admirable, and amongst the candidates against whom he succeeded was one of great talents, Mr. Miller[a].

Mr. Magee was so great a favourite with all who

[a] This highly talented and distinguished man was elected a fellow in the following year, and became one of the most eminent of the fellows. He retired on a college benefice and the head mastership of the great school of Armagh, and is the author of several very able works; particularly of four admirable volumes of "Lectures on the Philosophy of Modern History," &c.

knew him, that the joy of his friends and acquaintances on his election to a fellowship was extreme. The following instance may serve to exemplify the feeling. Young Mr. Cleghorn (then, or soon afterwards, a respected physician) was commissioned by Miss Plunket, an elder sister of Lord Plunket, (the anxiety of all whose family on the occasion was peculiarly great,) to bring to her house as quickly as possible the tidings of the result of the election. Miss Plunket was confined to her bedchamber by a violent rheumatic attack, which seemed to have disabled her from moving without assistance. She requested Mr. Cleghorn, in case of William Magee's success, to give a loud knock at the hall door; but if the election should terminate otherwise, to bring the "disastrous news" without letting her know when he came or when he left the house. The announcement from the College Chapel that Magee was the fellow was received with acclamations, and Mr. Cleghorn ran with his utmost speed through the streets, crying out "He has got it! he has got it!" He gave the appointed signal at the hall door, knocking with all the strength of his arm, and being instantly admitted he rushed up stairs; but, to his amazement, he was met on the first landing-place by Miss Plunket. In her excess of joy on hearing the loud and longed-for knock at the door, she forgot her pains and her illness, and actually ran from her room to the landing-place, where she met young Mr. Cleghorn, and in her delight at the news embraced the welcome messenger.

Soon after his election he went to Enniskillen to visit his beloved father and mother. He was met at some distance from the town by a number of persons of

all ranks, many of whom remembered him when a boy. The horses were taken from the carriage in which he was, and some of the crowd exultingly drew him into the town, which on the night of that day was illuminated. He was invited to Lord Enniskillen's, who kept open house for three days, "that," as his lordship said to him, "all your friends may have a slice of you."

It was the wish of Mr. Viridet, and of many of young Mr. Magee's friends, that he should be called to the bar. They judged that his splendid talents must raise him very high in that profession. His own preference was for that of the church, but yielding to their urgency he endeavoured to obtain a *lay* fellowship. He failed, however, in procuring it, principally in consequence of the resistance of the then provost, Mr. Hutchinson, who was at the time not friendly toward him[a].

Happily for the cause of religion, the dispensation was refused, and, under a gracious Providence, William Magee was ordained, who lived to be one of the brightest ornaments of the church, and one of the most powerful vindicators of the Christian faith. The denial of the dispensation, which, in their human shortsightedness, his friends then so much regretted, led to his being pre-eminently distinguished in the highest order of the prelacy, to his giving to the world the invaluable work on the ATONEMENT, to his promotion of the welfare of souls by his eminent spiritual services, and to his bearing witness to the divine truth through his life and to his death, as a zealous and faithful steward of the

[a] There had been very strong differences between Provost Hutchinson and the greater part of the fellows, amongst them Dr. Stack, the tutor and friend of Mr. Magee.

mysteries of our redeeming God. He was ordained in the year 1790, and preached his first sermon in the church of St. Peter's, at Drogheda.

In the same year (1790) Mr. Magee formed the matrimonial connexion which he ever after considered to be the happiest event of his life. In April of that year he became acquainted with Miss Moulson, a young English lady then on a visit to her friends in Dublin. She was in her eighteenth year, and remarkable for the engaging liveliness of her artless manners; possessed eminent virtues, and mental acquirements of a very high order. She was of a most respectable and very old family in Cheshire, whose ancestors had come from Normandy with William the Conqueror. Her mother was sister to the highly distinguished Dr. Perceval, of Manchester. On the death of Miss Moulson's father, Dr. Perceval had supplied with the utmost care the loss which his sister and her four orphans (a son and three daughters) had sustained, and Miss Elizabeth Moulson received from his anxious and affectionate tuition, such improvement as might be expected in a person of her teachableness and superior talents, instructed by such a teacher. She was on a visit with her friends in Dublin when Mr. Magee formed her acquaintance. Female education at that time in Dublin was generally of a light and superficial kind, and the superior mental acquirements of Miss Moulson, together with her amiable qualities and engaging manners, naturally made the stronger impression on Mr. Magee. He anxiously sought the society of this highly gifted and accomplished young lady, and the result of the continuance of their acquaintance was a mutual attachment.

This excellent lady (for excellent she really was) became the wife of Mr. Magee, and was worthy of her admirable husband. In her education by her eminent uncle, Dr. Perceval, the love of truth and of every virtue was early and most strongly inculcated, while all that was fitted to enlarge her mind and cultivate her understanding was steadily pursued. Dr. Perceval took particular pleasure in imparting useful information to the young mind, and he delighted in giving instruction to his talented and amiable niece, Miss Elizabeth Moulson. To that distinguished and good man she and her husband, Mr. Magee, (who after his marriage became intimate with him) were most affectionately attached. And after his decease they cherished his memory with gratitude and love, and instilled the same sentiments into the minds of their children.

Never was there a happier marriage than that of Mr. Magee with this highly gifted and accomplished lady. Deeply impressed with the inestimable value of true religion, and with the vast importance of communicating sound instruction to the young, she uniformly encouraged his zeal in the prosecution of his theological studies, in the discharge of all his clerical duties, and in the execution of his office as a tutor in the university.

Mr. Magee was distinguished by the most brilliant talents and penetrating judgment; by a quickness of perception very rarely equalled, perhaps never exceeded; and, at the same time, by an indefatigable patience and diligence of investigation. In the College of Dublin, of which, for many years, he was the great and admired ornament, those endowments raised him to the highest position in literary eminence. The

charms of his lively, innocent, and instructive conversation rendered his society delightful, and the warm sincerity of his friendship became a subject even of proverbial as well as reverential remark. The patience which, notwithstanding the extraordinary quickness and brilliancy of his genius, he showed in the investigation of truth, was also to be observed in his communication of instruction, and was strikingly remarkable in the manner in which he listened to the observations of those who conversed with him. The apparently unwearied courteous attention which he paid to those who were speaking to him, was often a subject of surprise and just admiration. And it has been truly said of him, that, delightful as he was in conversation while speaking himself, he was also peculiarly engaging from his kind and candid attention to the remarks of others. His popularity and influence in the university advanced year after year, until they almost eclipsed those of any of the other fellows. Even the provost, whose station conferred on him extraordinary powers, was quite inferior in real influence to Dr. Magee; although one of those who held the provostship during the established celebrity of this great man's character, (Dr. Hall, afterwards Bishop of Dromore,) was peculiarly qualified by pleasing manners, as well as eminent talents, to conciliate general regard and esteem. Dr. Magee was ever ready and zealous to support genius and merit. Often was the student, in his literary labours, cheered and animated by the kind visit and encouraging conversation of this considerate and engaging man: often were his drooping spirits raised, his heart consoled, his hopes supported, and his course to useful eminence

directed and confirmed, by him who was the most active protector of talents and merit in others, as he was himself pre-eminently the brightest example of both which graced the university.

But the charming amiabilities of his character were principally to be seen under his domestic roof. He was one of the tenderest and best of husbands, of fathers, of sons. His great respect as well as affection for his wife was such that he took peculiar pleasure in asking and following her advice; which, however, was never obtruded on her part, for her strong attachment to him was blended with the utmost deference. Their family became numerous. Of sixteen children, twelve survived them. Though remarkable for parental tenderness, he was strict in correcting his children's faults. And as their years advanced they remembered even his corrections with gratitude, and recollected with filial affection the force which on such occasions he had evidently put on his feelings.—The following instance out of many may exemplify this, and is of an interesting nature. Having strongly reproved one of his daughters, during her mother's confinement, for a fault which had been reported to him, he was disappointed at finding that the child did not give such an indication of grief as a fond father's severe rebuke might naturally have produced. He expected to see tears falling from her eyes: but he observed her struggling as if to suppress the feelings of sorrow which such correction was calculated to excite in the child's breast; and at the moment he supposed that her conduct proceeded from obstinacy. He expressed his surprise to her that she did not feel his reproof more deeply. "Ah! papa,"

said she, continuing the struggle with her feelings, "I would cry, and cry very much, but I am afraid mamma might hear me crying, or see my tears; and then poor mamma would cry too!"—He clasped his child in his arms, dissolved in tears himself. It was the last occasion he ever had to reprove her. The excessive tenderness he shewed for her, while he pressed his child to his heart, and the father's tears fell on his daughter, made such an impression on her, that she never again gave him cause to find any fault with her. That tender embrace of her weeping parent was ever after cherished in her memory with devoted gratitude and affection. Still she takes a melancholy pleasure in relating that instance, amongst many others, of the paternal fondness of him whom all his children have united in describing as one of the most attached of fathers. In their early childhood it was his constant habit and delight, after dinner, to be surrounded by them, when in his lively, innocent, and playful manner, he told them stories about good and bad children: endeavouring thus to train up their almost infantine minds in the ways of rectitude. And when they became more advanced in years, though they were still in their childhood, he took the utmost pleasure in having them all assembled at his table at the family dinner, looking at them, one after another, with a countenance beaming with joy and paternal affection.

Toward his own parents, he was an example of the most devoted filial duty. In 1797, nine years after he obtained his fellowship, and about seven from the period of his marriage, he was advised by Dr. Plunket (elder brother of his friend Mr. Plunket, afterwards

Lord Chancellor of Ireland) to take a residence in the country, a few miles from Dublin, on account of the tendency of blood to his head, to which he had long been subject, and which had been increased by study and confinement. He engaged a handsome country place near Rathfarnam, about four or five miles from Dublin. There were two houses on the demesne. In one of these he fixed the residence of his wife, himself, and their growing family of children; and he appropriated the other to his parents and his sisters. But he was as a parent to them all in tender care and protection. There, after an undeviating course of filial duty and love, he attended the death-bed of his pious and aged father; who in his last hours was consoled by the affectionate and anxious care of this admirable son; and died blessing God for having given him such a child, and praying fervently that *he* also might have, when he should need such consolation, a child to act a similar part for him.

After his father's death, he took his mother and sisters to reside in his own house. And in his fond and anxious care of his mother, when her infirmities of age and loss of sight were approaching, there was an interesting moral beauty. His tender attentions to her were those of the most attached daughter. Those only who have witnessed them (said one who had often observed them with delight) can truly judge of them. He was the comfort as he was the pride of her widowed heart. She lived until a short time before he was appointed Bishop of Raphoe, (in 1819,) and thanking God for the blessing He had given her in such a son, she said on her death-bed, that throughout his whole

life he had never given her one moment's uneasiness, but for his health. Surely it cannot be otherwise than interesting and useful, to record such instances of the Christian virtues and graces, in one of the most powerful defenders of the Christian faith, and one of the brightest ornaments of the Protestant church and prelacy.

Mr. Magee's income as a junior fellow in the college of Dublin became very considerable, on account of the number of pupils who were committed to his care, in consequence of his distinguished talents and high character. And he received a handsome fortune with his wife. Thus he was enabled to support his own increasing family in a style of great respectability, while he abundantly supplied the great deficiency in his beloved father's income, and generously attended to the calls of charity.

On the 29th of May, 1791, Mr. Magee preached in the College Chapel on the restoration: having selected for his text the first verse of the fifteenth psalm. On the fly leaf of the sermon he left this remarkable memorandum:—"This was the first sermon I ever wrote. I had been ordained in the preceding year. The wild opinions of Paine were at this time widely and zealously disseminated, and had been eagerly embraced by many of the collegiate body, even by some amongst the fellows. . . . . I had many conflicts with some of them on this subject in those days of peril; and to such men some allusions in this sermon were intended to apply. Sept. 5th, 1812." Mr. Magee had always joined with those into whose society and friendship the circumstances of his early life had brought

him, in those just principles of liberty and patriotism in which the generous mind naturally delights. But he was ever most strongly averse from any tendency to licentiousness, anarchy, or revolution; and at the period to which we now refer, when Mr. Fox declared his view of the principles of the Whigs, and Mr. Burke published his appeal against that view, to former decisive documents, Mr. Magee felt strongly that truth was on the side of Mr. Burke; and he was deeply sensible of the awful danger of those principles, which, with the earlier proceedings of the French revolution, were finding too much favour in Ireland. From his boyhood he had loved the British constitution and the established church. He was ardently attached to Protestantism. Men of talents were prized by him, and he was pleased with their society. He could forget difference of opinion in the gratification of such intercourse. With respect to the dearest and most cherished of all his friends, (Lord Plunket,) he felt satisfied, not only that this distinguished man was as truly attached to the British constitution as he was himself, but also that he loved the church establishment not less than *he* did. He looked upon his most valued friend, Mr. Plunket, as seeking to obtain political concessions to the Roman Catholics for the purpose of strengthening the interests of Protestants by making the Romanists their friends. He did not concur in Mr. Plunket's proposed method of effecting this object. But he ceased to contend the point with his friend, to whom he was ardently attached; and gladly avoided the topic of dissension. It was also his strong persuasion, that further experience would change Mr.

Plunket's views; that time would correct what he considered to be the excess of generous compassion on the part of his friend toward those whom that friend looked upon as suffering oppression and injury.

About the year 1797, it became Mr. Magee's duty to preach the Donellan[a] Lectures in the College Chapel. His subject was that of prophecy, especially connected with the advent of the Saviour. On this occasion he commenced a work on the seventy weeks of Daniel, which he intended to publish with notes. This subject grew out of his Donellan Lectures, but he set aside this proposed work on account of his anxious desire to oppose the progress of Socinianism. He preached his two celebrated sermons on the Scripture Doctrine of Atonement and Sacrifice in the chapel of the College, the one on Good Friday, in 1798, and the other on Good Friday, 1799; and they were first published in 1801.

Mr. Magee was elected a senior fellow on the third of March, 1800, and continued to be the most popular and influential governor[b] of the College until his resignation of his fellowship in 1812. In a fortnight after his being chosen a senior fellow, he was elected to the professorship of mathematics, in the discharge of which office he displayed abilities not inferior to those which distinguished him in every other branch of literature. As mathematical examiner[c] for a fellowship, he delighted all who heard him and who understood the subject, by the brilliancy which he threw over the examin-

[a] Sermons for which a lady of that name had bequeathed a legacy.

[b] The governing members of the College of Dublin, are the Provost and seven Senior Fellows.

[c] The examination (which extends to most of the sciences) is public, and always attended by a very numerous audience.

ation even in that science. Such was the effect of his quick perception of analogies, and his fine taste.—After a college life of one and thirty years, the most highly distinguished and honourable of any upon record in the University of Dublin, he retired in 1812, accepting two college livings, that of Kappagh in the county of Tyrone, and of Killyleagh in the county of Down. On his leaving the scene of his long continued and splendid exertions, the members of the Historical Society[a] and the scholars[b] paid him a compliment of which there was no example, neither has any similar instance since occurred. They sent addresses to him, accompanied by a large silver vase and a handsome tray. This unprecedented mark of respect and affection from the students of the university affected him deeply.

A commission of dilapidation was to have been issued upon the glebe house of the parish of Killyleagh, but Dr. Magee took upon himself the whole expense of the repairs rather than suffer any demand to be made upon the provision left by his predecessor for the widow and her orphans. True, that predecessor had been his old friend and tutor, Dr. Stack: but the kind and liberal successor would probably have shown similar consideration for the widow and orphans of another. His generous care of his dear predecessor's family extended much farther.

In his new situation as a parish minister at Kappagh, his zeal and fidelity were admirable. He had ever

[a] A society composed of a great part of the senior students; especially of the more eminent.

[b] Senior students who had obtained Scholarships, of which there were seventy.

been most truly strict in his observance of the sabbath; but not only did he take delight in the fulfilment of his sabbath duties in church, as rector of that considerable parish, but he formed Sunday schools for poor persons, at his own house; and on every day of the week he visited his poor parishioners at their houses, not only attending to their spiritual wants, but supplying their temporal necessities.

By a most judicious management he made this his charity very extensively beneficial. He purchased blankets, meal, and potatoes in large quantities, and therefore at a cheaper rate, for careful distribution. He had a very large boiler provided in his house, in which abundance of soup was prepared for the poor, from meat which he also purchased for them. He generally deputed a beloved daughter[a] to have the gratification of distributing blankets and other gifts of charity. The willing messenger was dispatched with her charitable treasure on a jaunting car, upon which the many intended presents were piled up. Such was this great man's life in his country parish.

In 1811 or 1812, the prime minister, Mr. Perceval, who had read and appreciated his celebrated work on the Atonement, who admired his character, and had a high personal esteem for him, would have made him Bishop of Oxford, but that he found the unprecedented appointment from the College of Dublin to that see likely to give dissatisfaction to many leading persons in the Oxford University. Still, the objectors admitted

[a] From her obliging information, as well as from his own knowledge of the excellent man described, has the writer of this memoir derived the particulars which it contains.

the pre-eminent talents and distinguished claims of Dr. Magee.

But another individual—one of most exalted rank and in whom the nation felt the deepest interest, also read the celebrated work on the Atonement, and was so impressed with a sense of its great value, as to conceive a particular anxiety for the promotion of the author. The Princess Charlotte of Wales, young though she was, read the admirable work, and had judgment to appreciate it. It is known, on unquestionable evidence, that she not only spoke of the work with the warmest praise, but said that if ever she were on the throne, the author should be a bishop. Her Royal Highness added some very strong expressions showing the confidence she felt in his judgment and extraordinary talents. To the peculiarly favourable sentiments of the Princess Charlotte toward the author of the work on the Atonement, may perhaps truly be ascribed the very marked attention shown on several occasions to the Archbishop by George the Fourth. This especial attention of his Majesty to the excellent prelate was continued to his Majesty's latest opportunity of showing it.

The connexion between Dr. Magee and his cherished friend Mr. Plunket, and the successful efforts which the zeal of his friendship caused him to make in order to promote that eminent man's return to Parliament for the University, unquestionably prevented his promotion in Ireland for a considerable time. A strong party, very much opposed to Mr. Plunket, had then great influence at the seat of government there, and some of this party prevailed, for a time, in closing the door of promotion against Mr. Plunket's great friend

and supporter, Dr. Magee. The prime minister, however, of England, (Mr. Perceval,) felt so strongly his high professional claims, that he communicated his desire to the Lord Lieutenant (the Duke of Richmond) to give him preferment, in such terms, that His Excellency felt himself obliged to comply. Unquestionably the difficulties which had been raised against him with the Lord Lieutenant, were occasioned by and founded on his zealous support of Mr. Plunket's return for the University. To the ardour of his friendship for that distinguished man, whose talents he admired, and whose moral worth he loved, he generously sacrificed his own high promotion. Whether a question may or may not be made, "Should Dr. Magee have refused to support Mr. Plunket, because he differed from him on the important question of concession to the Roman Catholic demands?" this at least is certain; that his support of him was most disinterested and generous, the result of an ardent, honourable, and virtuous friendship, which had subsisted from their childhood; which had grown with their growth and strengthened with their strength; a friendship which had every circumstance connected with it that was calculated to carry human friendship to the utmost height—but that the friends differed upon one great political question.

By the support of Mr. Plunket for the representation of the University, Dr. Magee for a considerable time barred the door of high professional promotion against himself. Even when the Lord Lieutenant received from the prime minister the strong communication in favour of Dr. Magee's preferment, which, His Excellency felt, was not to be resisted, the promotion which he

gave him was unquestionably quite below those high professional claims which were so generally and justly ascribed to him. About the year 1814, the bishopric of Ossory becoming vacant, Dr. Fowler, Archdeacon of Dublin, was appointed to that see, Dr. Saurin, the Dean of Cork, to the archdeaconry of Dublin; and the great author of the work on the Atonement, transcendently the brightest ornament of his country's university, admired for his manners, and loved for his virtues, celebrated throughout the empire for his talents, was placed *third* in the list. He was appointed to the deanery of Cork by the Lord Lieutenant, who disposed of his living of Killyleagh.

Dr. Magee continued to hold the deanery of Cork for about four years, at the end of which time, through his great celebrity in England as a divine of pre-eminent talents who had rendered a vast service to the cause of religion and the established church, he was promoted to the see of Raphoe. In Cork he exerted himself in every way in the faithful discharge of his various duties. To all the charitable establishments he shewed the most anxious attention. As a preacher, in the cathedral and in other churches, he was followed by crowds, yet no man less courted popularity in preaching. He had none of that *mannerism* which often attracts the multitude. His sermons might be characterized as solid gospel truth, strongly and most plainly enforced in simplicity and sincerity.

The very confined situation of the deanery house of Cork disagreed with his health; and notwithstanding the hospitable kindness for which the gentry of Cork have been remarkable, and the high respect and ad-

miration felt there for Dean Magee, he became depressed, and unable to enjoy society as he formerly did.

During his residence in Cork he was involved, for the first time, in a personal contest with popish authorities. This was occasioned by his opposition to certain alleged claims of Roman Catholics in the churchyards of the establishment. Roman Catholic ecclesiastics (numerous in Cork) were much surprised and excited; as an erroneous opinion had prevailed, that his attachment to his friend Mr. Plunket was cemented by concurrence of sentiment on what was called "The Roman Catholic Question." The popish press in Cork assailed him; but the attacks were vain; nothing could be said in disparagement of his great name, as a divine of the purest morals, eminent for every private virtue. The resource was to charge him with his father's having been engaged in a low mechanical trade; which was false; and if it had been true, could have been no disgrace to him, while his filial deferential duty and love, to the last moment of that father's existence, would thus have reflected on him yet a greater degree of honour.

He was even represented as now sacrificing friendship and integrity to the prospect of worldly advancement: a charge, as absurd as it was untrue. The opinion of his great professional claims had previously become so strong in the minds of the highest authorities in state as well as church, in England, that his promotion to the episcopal bench was decided on; this decision was made without reference to the Roman Catholic question. It was felt, that the author of the great work on the Atonement—that author, eminent as he

was for every private virtue and the strictest fidelity in the discharge of all his clerical duties, gifted with transcendent talents, and adorned with the most engaging manners—ought to be advanced to the prelacy. These were the grounds upon which the determination was formed to raise him to the bench. His taking the part which he felt that his duty required him to take respecting the burial grounds, on the occasion here referred to, could not have aided his promotion: while, by exciting the anger of Roman Catholic authorities, it might have created opposition to his intended advancement from some quarters possessed of influence. And at that moment it would probably rather have abated than increased the desire for his elevation, in the mind of that authority which had the principal if not the sole power of recommending his appointment to the prelacy. The Earl of Liverpool, then prime minister, though opposed to political concession to the Roman Catholics, was known to be extremely anxious that nothing which could possibly be avoided should be done to irritate them; and he had already decided on the promotion of the distinguished Dean Magee, entirely on the grounds which have been mentioned.

Dr. Magee's ever active support of Mr. Plunket for the representation of the University of Dublin, always proceeded from the most ardent, disinterested, virtuous friendship: to that friendship, interwoven with his heart from his childhood, increased and strengthened and rendered indissoluble by a life of the most intimate society, and the mutual admiration of pre-eminent talents, of moral excellence, and of all that is most agreeable and amiable in the domestic circle—to that generous

friendship Dr. Magee unquestionably did repeatedly sacrifice the prospect of promotion. But he never sacrificed his friendship. The sincerity and warmth of his friendship was proverbial amongst all who knew him well; and he, whose uniform conduct made this impression upon the mind of every friend he had, (and perhaps no man ever possessed more,) would not have been false to the oldest, most dear, and cherished friend of his heart. After the period when the popish press, in the bitterness and blindness of anger, made the false and absurd charge against him, he was found still supporting his friend Mr. Plunket for the university; for though he was no longer one of its members, his influence there continued. The recollection of his engaging manners, and his warm friendliness of heart, and a pride in his great talents and acquirements, still rendered him more influential in the university, than any other individual; and still he continued to use that influence unchangeably for his friend.

The excellent Bishop Barrington, (then Bishop of Durham,) describing to the writer of this memoir the impression made on him by the conversation of Dean Magee, with whom the bishop was in the habit of intimacy, used these words:—"I have often heard and admired Mr. Pitt, but while I am listening to my friend Dean Magee, I feel that if I were to shut my eyes I could fancy that Mr. Pitt was speaking."

Not long before his removal from the deanery of Cork, Dr. Magee, one of the best of sons, paid his last duties to his dying—to his departed—mother. He was appointed to the see of Raphoe in 1819; and here, as in each former station, he was most active and faithful.

In this diocese an unusual number of college benefices are situated, and he found amongst the rectors some of his old companions and friends, with whom he had long associated in the university. Here he had the gratification of renewing his affectionate intercourse with the two Doctors Ussher, brethren not only by birth, but in Christian virtues, and with the excellent Dr. Joseph Stopford, (who might well be designated, by the title given by Mr. Grattan to a clergyman of similar character, Mr. Dunn,)—"that meek spirit of the gospel."

The renewal of such associations, in his calm and dignified retirement, with his attached family, was delightful to Bishop Magee. He was warm and cordial in his affectionate conduct to his dear old friends, gracious and kind to all his clergy, but most strict in his requirement of their attention to their sacred duties. In dispensing his liberal and judicious charity to the poor, he was ever aided by his admirable wife and his elder children. Under their superintendence, and by means of his generous donations, the religious education of the children of the poor was greatly promoted and extended; and the people's gratitude and attachment toward him became after some time so strong, that on his return to Raphoe after an absence, the inhabitants of the town expressed their joy by an illumination.

His charge[a] to the clergy of that diocese excited universal admiration amongst the friends of the established religion and church. It was every way worthy of a Christian bishop, and of the talents and virtues of its distinguished author.

[a] Published for Cadell, in 1821.

The tenderness and piety of Dr. Magee may be illustrated by the following anecdote. During the prevalence of severe typhus fever (in 1817) in Dublin, where he then was, he went from one infected house to another, administering to the bodily and spiritual necessities of the afflicted. In one of his visits he found a man in great misery, who had once been in very comfortable circumstances, and had been educated in the University of Dublin. This sufferer had no attendant but his wife, who was so weak that she was scarcely able to assist him. They could not afford to keep a servant. The afflicted gentleman was Mr. Trotter, formerly private secretary to the celebrated Charles James Fox. Dr. Magee found him in almost the lowest state of destitution. To this interesting sufferer his visits were constant. He administered to all his wants. He used to sit on his sick bed-side, assisting him with the attention of a nurse, wetting his parched lips, raising his drooping head, and, above all, imparting the consolations of religion, and pointing out the way of salvation. His benevolent efforts appeared to be blessed by God to the sufferer, whose spirit in a few weeks afterward was called away: the attention of his sympathizing and pious visitor having been unremittingly continued to the last moment of his life.

Amongst the admirers of the great talents displayed by Dr. Magee, no one was more ardent than the respected Bishop of Elphin, (Dr. Law, himself distinguished also by mental powers,) brother of the late Lord Ellenborough, and of the Bishop of Bath and Wells. The Bishop of Elphin was well acquainted with Mr. Plunket (afterwards Lord Chancellor). And a short conversation be-

tween them to the following effect, was related as having occurred when Dr. Magee was a senior fellow of the university. The Bishop of Elphin observed to Mr. Plunket, that he was "surprised" that his friend, Dr. Magee, had not been made a bishop. Mr. Plunket naturally replied, that, on account of the pre-eminent talents and services, moral worth, and high character of his friend, the appointment would be most just and proper. The Bishop then assigned as the reason of his "surprise,"—that on the credit of such an appointment, a government might well afford to nominate whom they pleased to a number of succeeding vacancies. About seven years afterward Dr. Magee's elevation to the bench took place.

But though in previous times there might have been too much colour for the remark of the Bishop of Elphin to some extent, a very improved system was adopted at the period of that appointment. The great man who is now prime minister, was then, at an unusually early age, chief secretary for Ireland. Dr. Magee, finding his health suffering very much from the very close air of his deanery at Cork, wrote to Sir Robert Peel, communicating his wish for a removal to another situation. It would appear that Dean Magee's request extended only to a change to more open air, and to being brought nearer to his other benefice; his distance from which, while he attended his duties at Cork, he often regretted. It was referred to in the following terms in a note from Sir Robert Peel, which was found among the Archbishop's papers after his death. The note from Sir Robert Peel (dated September 4, 1819,) stated that he "had received an inti-

mation that the ecclesiastical arrangements rendered necessary by the death of the Bishop of Clogher" (Dr. Porter) "were completed, and that it had been determined to prefer him" (Dean Magee) "to the see of Raphoe."—"My compliance with the wish which you have done me the honour to express to me," (continued Sir Robert Peel in his note,) "has been thus rendered superfluous, by a nomination which has placed on the bench of bishops in Ireland the ablest of her scholars and divines."

The Lord Lieutenant (Earl Talbot) communicated to Dean Magee his nomination to the episcopal bench, in the following terms.

"Dear Sir,—It is with very sincere pleasure that I have to communicate to you, that the British government has most cordially concurred in my recommendation of your being made the new Bishop. I trust that I may be allowed to congratulate myself upon having had the good fortune to be the medium through which your promotion has been effected; as I am certain that no other appointment could give such general satisfaction, or so essentially serve the best interests of our religion."

A few years before his appointment to the see of Raphoe, where otherwise he would have passed the three happiest years of his life, he had the affliction to observe the decline of his beloved wife's health. She was attacked by an illness, the progress of which, however, was slow. After twelve years of trial to them both, it put an end to her valuable life, causing as deep affliction to him, as ever the loss of a beloved partner gave to the widowed heart of her surviving husband.

While Bishop of Raphoe, he took great pleasure in having his esteemed old college friends (the Doctors Ussher, Dr. Joseph Stopford, and Rev. Mr. Maturin) as his guests; and in affectionate conversation with them on the various occurrences of their former days of college companionship. But from their much valued society he had a higher pleasure than this. They were all men of talents, eminent acquirements, and true piety; and the interchange of sentiments on the great subjects of religion and the church, was peculiarly gratifying to the Bishop and to them.

But to all the clergy of his diocese he was remarkably kind. The mildness and delicacy, but at the same time good effect, with which he conveyed reproof, when reproof was necessary on account of any clerical neglect, may be judged of from the following anecdote. He was in the habit of going to the divine service in various churches of his diocese, and witnessing the manner in which the sacred duties were attended to by the several clergy. On one occasion, finding that the clergyman was absent from his church on Sunday morning, he performed the whole of the duty himself, and signed the book containing the names of preachers. The clerk, not knowing who he was, and observing the signature, "W. Raphoe," informed the clergyman of the church that "a Rev. Mr. Raphoe" had officiated for him. The clergyman immediately desired to see the signature of the preacher, and recognised the handwriting of his bishop. He became exceedingly uneasy, and proceeded on the next day to the episcopal residence, expecting a very severe reprimand. But he was received and treated with courtesy, and invited to stay to dinner. Not one of the Bishop's family, except

himself, was aware of this clergyman's neglect. He returned home in the evening deeply impressed with the great kindness of the Bishop, who hoped that the delicate reproof which he had already implied would be effective. And the kind Bishop was not mistaken. That clergyman felt the Bishop's conduct to him as he ought; and he never again gave occasion for his receiving any reproof from him.

When George IV. visited Dublin, in 1821, (about two years after the nomination of Dr. Magee to the bishopric of Raphoe,) his Majesty appointed him Dean of the Viceregal Chapel at the Castle. The Bishop wished to decline the appointment, on account of the distance of his see from Dublin; and he expressed this wish. But the King replied, "We can bring you nearer." An intention had been entertained to appoint Dr. Magee to the bishopric of Meath, when it should be vacant: and when the King used the above words, the decease of the aged prelate of Meath was thought to be very near. To this it was supposed that his Majesty alluded.

Men often look with an eye of jealousy, or with some degree of unkindness, upon those whom they consider as fixed on to be successors to their appointments. But such was not the case with the Bishop of Meath (Dr. O'Beirne). He had for a considerable time thought the nomination of Dr. Magee to his see when vacant to be most highly probable. And such was his admiration of Dr. Magee, that he looked to his succeeding him with peculiar pleasure. He cultivated the most friendly intimacy with him, and frequently spoke to him of improvements which he was making at the episcopal residence, which he "hoped would contribute afterwards

to the comfort and enjoyment of his friend," Dr. Magee. He lived, however, to be suffragan to his friend, when the latter became Archbishop of Dublin.

On the second Sunday after the King's arrival in Ireland, the Bishop of Raphoe received a command to preach before his Majesty. He preached on the text, "What must I do to be saved?" Within a few minutes after the commencement of the sermon, the King rose from his seat, came forward in the royal pew, and stood leaning on his sword, his eyes fixed on the preacher. His Majesty continued thus standing for an hour, listening with the deepest attention, until the sermon was ended. In a few days afterward, the Bishop received from the Lord Lieutenant (Earl Talbot) a note in the following terms.

"The Cottage, Phœnix Park, Sept. 4th.

"My dear Lord,—I lose no time in informing your Lordship that the King, before his departure yesterday, commanded me to express to you in the strongest terms his Majesty's unqualified admiration of the sermon which your Lordship preached before his Majesty on Sunday last; and to convey to you the King's gracious desire that it may be published. To such a testimony of distinguished approbation it would be presumptuous in me to add any thing from myself; but I must be permitted to assure your Lordship, that his Majesty could not have imposed upon me any commands which I should have more pleasure in obeying.

I have the honour to be,

My dear Lord,

Your Lordship's faithful humble servant,

TALBOT."

But the admirable preacher thought very humbly of his own sermons, though all others who heard them considered them as excellent. He was in general averse from having them printed; and even on this occasion offered an excuse. With the exception of his two celebrated discourses on the Atonement, scarcely any of his sermons have been printed. It was his custom, for many of the latter years of his life, to preach for an hour. His preaching was always attended by crowds; and notwithstanding the length of his sermon, not one in the congregation appeared to be fatigued. During his discourse, even the very young persons present seemed to be free from lassitude. There was a peculiar awakening animation in his manner, a nervous strength in his style, a plainness in his language most intelligible to every one, and an interesting and awful importance in his matter, which kept up universal attention. Yet (as was stated) this most able and effective preacher, thus followed, listened to, and admired, thought very humbly of his own sermons.

While the Bishop of Raphoe was in Dublin in 1822, the death of Dr. Broderick, Archbishop of Cashel, a most amiable and respected prelate, took place. Bishop Magee estimated his Christian virtues most highly, and had a particular friendship for him. In consequence of the decease of this good prelate, the Marquis Wellesley sent for Bishop Magee, and offered to him the vacant archbishopric. But he declined the offer, informing His Excellency that he was very happy in his see of Raphoe, and that he felt that he was very useful there. While he was sitting with the Lord Lieutenant, a dispatch arrived from London. The

Bishop rose to depart; but Lord Wellesley requested him to be seated, saying, "there may be some news which you would like to know." The dispatch really grieved him, for it was found to announce the death of the Archbishop of Armagh, Primate Stuart, to whom he was much attached. The Lord Lieutenant handed over the Earl of Liverpool's letter to him, which was in these words; or to this effect.—"The King wishes Dr. Magee to be appointed primate; but it is better to do what is useful than brilliant." And the prime minister added his advice, that Bishop Magee should be recommended for the Archbishopric of Dublin, and the Archbishop of Dublin, Lord John Beresford, translated to Armagh. The Lord Lieutenant then asked, "What say you, my Lord?" The Bishop replied, "I desire to do whatever may be best for the interests of the church." "Then," said Lord Wellesley, "you will have the kindness to write to the Archbishop of Dublin, to apprise His Grace of this arrangement." Dr. Laurence, Regius Professor of Hebrew in the University of Oxford, was selected for the see of Cashel.

On the night of that day, the Bishop of Raphoe received a second communication from the Lord Lieutenant, desiring his immediate return to the castle. On his arrival, his Excellency mentioned to him his having received a second dispatch from Lord Liverpool, stating that it might not be desirable to place Bishop Magee in such close connexion with the university as his appointment to the see of Dublin must involve. (The Archbishop of Dublin and the Vice-Chancellor of the University being the two Visitors.) The Lord Lieutenant appealed to the Bishop for his opinion, and

his answer was, "If I am not deemed trustworthy, leave me where I am; I do not desire a change." The Lord Lieutenant immediately replied, "Well, well, forget this: and let things remain as we fixed them." On the next day the Bishop executed the direction to acquaint the Archbishop of Dublin with his translation to Armagh, and Dr. Laurence with his appointment to the see of Cashel. He announced to Lord John Beresford His Grace's translation to the primacy, in a kind and friendly note, expressing his wish and hope that the church in Ireland might long enjoy the benefit of his superintendence, and complimenting His Grace on his beneficial direction of the diocese of Dublin.

The news of Bishop Magee's elevation was received as unwelcome intelligence by his family: and he so well knew their happiness at his see of Raphoe, and his feelings so fully concurred with theirs, that his letter only required their acquiescence, as in an arrangement of Providence, under which he hoped to be instrumental in rendering more service to the established religion and church, which he felt to be his paramount duty.

The arduous duties of Archbishop of Dublin were rendered more onerous, by the diocese having suffered for nearly twenty years the great disadvantage of having an Archbishop (Dr. Cleaver) who was afflicted with the grievous malady of mental derangement. During so great a length of time Archbishop Cleaver had been incapacitated from the duties of the see, and the Archbishop of Cashel usually acted as his coadjutor. But the additional burden of the heavy duties of the see

of Dublin were too oppressive for that prelate, whose health and strength were delicate; and Lord John Beresford had been but a short time in that archbishopric. Under such circumstances, pressing indeed were the duties of the new Archbishop.

His zeal and fidelity in reforming irregularities which had grown up during the twenty years of Archbishop Cleaver's lamentable illness, which Lord John Beresford had not yet time to correct;—the strict, anxious, and efficient care which he took for ascertaining the preparation and fitness of candidates for orders were admirable.

At the period of his translation to the see of Dublin, Ireland was even more than usually agitated by religious dissensions, and there was great reason to apprehend that many of the Protestant clergy throughout that country might be prevented, by intimidation, from the firm discharge of their duties. A general feeling of joy, at the appointment of Archbishop Magee, prevailed amongst the friends of the Protestant church. Individuals, high in station, who once, under feelings of rivalry, had been opposed to his advancement, now rejoiced at it. Some of them expressed that joy to the writer of this memoir. They described his appointment as the happiest event for the church establishment, and as a signal blessing from providence.—"From his commanding influence," said they; "from his transcendent talents, and his zeal and fidelity, all exerted in his high office as Archbishop in the metropolitan see, the established church will now derive the most critical and decisive advantages for resisting the increasing attacks of her enemies."

Too true it was, that not a few of the Protestant clergy in the country did feel great reason for intimidation; and just cause there was to believe that timidity, or the love of ease, might to some extent interfere with the faithful performance of their clerical duties. The Archbishop of Dublin felt the awful importance of the call which the circumstances of the established church in Ireland then made upon him. He put himself forward in her defence. He sacrificed every consideration of his own ease and quiet. He naturally loved popularity, but he never would purchase it against his honest conviction of paramount duty;—which now urged him forward, in the exalted and conspicuous station in which he was placed, to support by his high authority and example, the clergy, and all the friends of the established religion in his country, in a firm resistance to Roman Catholic encroachments. If such a man, at such a crisis, raised to such a station, had held back;—if, consulting his own ease, he had declined to come forward in the vindication and defence of the established church, with the influence of his high official authority and commanding character, to oppose her enemies; he would not only have dissatisfied and dispirited the great body of her most attached friends, but have increased and confirmed the reluctance of not a few of her members to expose themselves to disquiet, perhaps danger, in her support.

His resolution was accordingly taken. He put himself forward in the front of the established church's defence; prepared to meet in his own person the assaults of her enemies.

The Archbishop's kind and gracious demeanour and

conduct to his clergy endeared him generally to them all. The same zeal for the strict performance of all the clerical duties, which had before so honourably distinguished him, now showed itself in his more conspicuous station. But such were his candour, considerateness and kindness, that none of his clergy murmured at the great strictness of his exercise of jurisdiction; with the exception of an unfortunate character[a], who afterwards avowed himself to be an infidel, and obtained a bad notoriety in London by the most profane scoffings at the Christian religion.

In his primary charge, at his visitation as Archbishop of Dublin, His Grace expressed his condemnation of parts of the Roman Catholic system of religion against which the Established Church protests, in strong terms; which, coming from such authority, produced amongst Roman Catholic bishops, clergy, and others of their persuasion, much excitement and offence. One of those expressions, which was of a figurative nature, he speedily changed, in the publication of his charge, for another, which was not calculated to wound the feelings of his opponents (which it was always his desire to avoid, so far as he could consistently with his sense of public duty). And with respect to the other expression, offensive as it was considered by Roman Catholic authorities, it was not nearly so much so as other expressions which had been so frequently used by Protestant divines, and still were used by them, against the errors of the Church of Rome; nay, not nearly so strong as some in the homilies of the Established

[a] Mr. Taylor, who came to London and associated himself with the infidel Mr. Carlile. Mr. Taylor had been usher of a school near Dublin. The Archbishop forbade his preaching.

Church,—which homilies are declared in her articles to "contain a godly and wholesome doctrine."*

The Archbishop was now assailed with the utmost zeal of theological hostility, heightened by strong political feelings. In the heat of theological and political party zeal, Roman Catholic opponents made him the great object of their personal animosity. He was assailed with abusive language and with sarcasms. He was charged with now throwing off the mask of private regard for his old companion, Mr. Plunket (then Attorney-General of Ireland), and of treating him with ingratitude. It was represented by the Roman Catholic press, that he owed his professional advancement to Mr. Plunket, and that having now risen, through his means, to his high elevation, he made the most ungrateful return for his services. But what will not the violence of party zeal, especially when mingled with the bitterness of theological animosity, prompt men to imagine against an active and powerful opponent? The zeal of the Archbishop's attachment to the dear and cherished friend of his life, Mr. Plunket, had not at all abated; but he never owed to that friend any part of his professional advancement. The grounds, and the sole grounds, of his promotion have been stated. To his own transcendant merits, and universally known character, all was due, under that Providence which made him an eminent instrument in the defence of pure religion. Within a few months before his decease, a very near and dear relative said to him, "I read and hear a great deal about your change of politics, and your ingratitude to Mr. Plunket, to whom

* Article 35.

Roman Catholics say that you owe your elevation. Will you tell me, do you owe it to his exertions for you?" He replied, "I am sure he cordially rejoiced in my welfare at all times, and would willingly have given me help if I had needed it. But I do not owe any part of my advancement to him. Whatever, at times, I might have lost, I gained nothing by my dear friend."

The Archbishop never considered his own interest, in any opportunity of serving the friend to whom he was so strongly attached. Before his elevation to the see of Raphoe, one or two persons who were extremely intimate with him, in their zeal for his interest, ventured to hint the expediency (with a view to his promotion) of his not continuing his ardent support of that distinguished man. "Ah!" said he, "you do not know my friend. He has the same object at heart that we have. We differ as to the means of accomplishing it; but his fine mind will yield hereafter to the force of truth, and his great talents will aid his honest efforts to uphold the church and constitution."

A number of years before, (about 1805,) the Archbishop would have been highly promoted if he would have consented to cease from supporting Mr. Plunket. The Earl of Hardwicke, then Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, sent for him, and endeavoured to induce him to support the government candidate for the representation of the university; but he answered His Excellency, that it was impossible he should turn against his friend. He was then urged to remain neutral; and to this, he replied, that he could not accede. The Lord Lieutenant expressed his regret, stating that it must pre-

clude the possibility of his ever giving him preferment, though he should always continue to esteem him highly, and Dr. Magee retired with the dignified consciousness of preserving inviolate his fidelity to the cherished friend of his heart, though at the manifest sacrifice of a great worldly interest. Such was the man whom, in the bitterness of their party zeal and anger, his enemies charged with being a *pretended*—a false—friend!

Before the close of his useful and splendid life, he certainly felt much disappointment and regret at a part of the political course which his friend was pursuing; but still his attachment to him continued warm and zealous. It was in the height of this disappointment, that, when an individual in his company had ventured to make some strong remark on the dangerous nature, as he considered it, of Lord Plunket's course at the time, and censuring that distinguished man, one of the Archbishop's daughters immediately said—"How can you speak against my father's friend?"[a] The Archbishop rose from his chair, looked with a smile of the utmost affection and parental love to his daughter, and, overcome by his feelings, left the room. But how could he bear to hear any censure of his dear friend? He, who could never be brought to censure even an enemy! Never, in public or in private, did he make any individual an object of severe remark. His archiepiscopal charge, which excited so much animosity amongst Roman Catholic ecclesiastics against him, was against the errors of their church, not against any individual. But the answers consisted chiefly or almost wholly of personal abuse against *him*. Yet no attack, however bitter in spirit

[a] His eldest daughter, who has supplied many particulars here related.

and unfounded in fact, (and nothing could be more unfounded, and more contrary to the truth, than any imputation of insincerity in his friendship: he was one of the sincerest men living,) could provoke him to speak with severity against any individual; to the latest period of his life he exemplified the lessons which he had earnestly given to his children; and he had often cautioned them, with peculiar anxiety, against censuring their neighbours:—"You may censure principles when they are bad," he used to say, "and I trust you will always feel condemnation for bad principles, but do not judge and condemn other persons; each of us has to answer to our common Master and rightful Judge."

But while the bitterness of animosity excited against him by his public and strong condemnation of the errors of the church of Rome, continued to show itself through the Roman Catholic press in Ireland, and to be directed against him through the private channels of anonymous letters[a], he stedfastly pursued his high course of duty in supporting the established religion, and encouraging her clergy, with undeviating firmness. He had ever a deep conviction of the great errors of the church of Rome. Amongst his papers found after his death, was one containing a petition which he had drawn up, when a fellow of the university, against establishing the Roman Catholic College of Maynooth. But he could not prevail on the board of senior fellows to join in that petition, and it fell to the ground.

[a] The writer of these remarks was with him one morning in London, when ten letters were handed to him, just brought by post. Eight of these were anonymous, and filled with most unfounded charges and scurrilous abuse. And for each a considerable postage was charged. He glanced over each of them, smiled with an expression of pity for the writer, and continued his conversation unmoved.

It may be matter of deep regret that animosity should have prevailed against the Archbishop amongst Roman Catholic authorities on account of his primary charge in his new and exalted situation. But we should remember that the charge did not contain more than may be found in the articles and homilies of our church, (as was observed,) and that in truth it had no expression so severe as some that we may read in the latter. And it should be a subject of great satisfaction to the friends of the Established Church and the sacred cause of Protestantism, that the energetic part which the Archbishop took against the spreading and encroachments of the church of Rome, in His Grace's performance of his high official duties, inspirited and upheld the established clergy of his country in their faithful ministry; and has left on record his most strong and ardent testimony against all the errors of that church, especially against the fundamental one which ascribes infallibility to the decrees of bishops subsequent to the inspired apostles. This is of the greater use, because of the weight of the judgment and authority of such a preeminent Christian divine. And the stand which he made against encroachments of the Roman Catholic church was also of more importance, on account of misconceptions of his sentiments, which his devoted friendship to Mr. Plunket had produced.

The bitterness of the attacks of some of his opponents was extreme. The following is an instance of the manner in which he bore their ribaldry. His daughter had taken up a review in his reception room, in which she found an article filled with low abuse of him. The article was styled "A Dream;" and in it the

Archbishop was introduced as appearing out of a cloud in the figure of a turkey-cock; his personal appearance was derided, (although that appearance was highly pleasing,) and his principles and conduct were vilified. He entered the room soon after his daughter had read this scurrilous article; he was shocked on observing the remarkable change in her countenance, arising from her just indignation. "What is the matter, my dear?" said he. "Oh! sir," she replied, "this odious book has given you such abuse! Should not the author be punished?" The Archbishop, who had not before seen it, said, "Let me see it, my dear." He took the book and read the vilifying article. He then turned on his daughter a look of the most tender benevolence, and said, "Does this vex you, dear?"—"Very much indeed, sir," she answered. "It would vex me," he replied, "if it were true." And throwing by the book, without even the slightest appearance of anger, but with a fond parental look to his daughter, he proceeded to his business and duties.

Amongst those who assailed the excellent Archbishop through the press, was the person named Taylor, whom His Grace silenced from preaching, and who afterwards joined the infidel Carlile in London. An answer to this man's scurrilous pamphlet immediately appeared, in which were the following just passages:—"Every part of the pious and splendid life of Dr. Magee repels your calumny, and confounds the traducer. Ireland hails him as most worthy of his high place; and feels his dignity and presence associated with her honour and her fame.

"While he was in the college, it is scarcely possible

to give an adequate idea of the veneration that surrounded him. Brilliant, generous, and kind, the love and admiration of all ranks were collected on him. As a scholar, an orator, a philosopher, and a divine, he was unrivalled; and humanity sighed, and science wept at his departure from the university." Some just remarks followed respecting his generous munificence to poor students; and the writer concluded thus. Upon Dr. Magee's leaving the university grief was "universal" there: "Sorrow was deep and acute: and the college was considered as a sort of waste after him. No heart ever contained the milk of human kindness in more copious streams; and when he becomes harsh and unfeeling, rivers will run up." The person whom the Archbishop had silenced, and who soon afterwards became the public profane scoffer at Christianity, had represented His Grace as having acted harshly toward him.

It was a favourite pleasure of the Archbishop to be accompanied by his children, as they grew up, in rides through various parts of the country, and to speak to them on the attributes of the Creator, whose works they were beholding. On the appearance of a particularly splendid and beautiful sky, a bold and magnificent mountain, or any grand object of nature, they remarked that his colour suddenly changed, and for a few moments he became affected, and looked up silently and devoutly to heaven, with moistened eyes and an evident expression of deep and pious feeling. Then he continued his edifying and delightful conversation with his children. The following instance may serve to show his attractive domestic amiability. A member of

one of the English universities, having visited Ireland, was invited to the Archbishop's country house, and passed some days there. He described this afterwards as one of the most agreeable events of his life. He had expected to find in one who had passed so much time in deep and severe study, in one of the greatest divines our church ever produced, a man certainly of edifying conversation, but of somewhat distant and reserved manners. Nay, he anticipated something of austerity in one of the most powerful controversial writers that ever defended the divine truth against the assaults of adversaries. But he declared that he had never witnessed such another beautiful example of every engaging domestic amiability as he beheld in that highly gifted and extraordinary man. His affability in his domestic circle was the most unreserved and attractive, his manners lively and innocent, (with his children, even to playfulness.) But his serious thoughts were ever fixed on heaven; and the pious feeling which always prevailed in his breast continually showed itself on the most suitable occasions and in the most engaging manner.

He was particularly remarkable for the most considerate kindness to the servants in his family, who were all, in consequence, exceedingly attached to him. From the earliest period of his being master of a family, it was his invariable custom to assemble every member of it to prayers each morning and evening; and when observing that a servant was absent, he inquired the reason and learned that illness was the cause, he took care that every kind attention should be shown to the invalid; he made inquiries each day concerning the pro-

gress of recovery, visited the sick bed, imparted the best consolation, and when the servant again appeared in the domestic circle assembled for devotion, in the most benevolent manner he expressed his congratulation to the recipient of the divine mercy on being again enabled to join in the family prayers and praises to God.

The Archbishop was always so fond of strict regularity and order, that the papers and documents which at any time he had received or had written, and could afterwards have any possible occasion to consult, were kept so exactly arranged that any one of the vast number could immediately be referred to, though after a considerable lapse of years. In connexion with his fondness for the most strict regularity and order, might perhaps be mentioned what appeared a singularity in this distinguished man. If it happened that his table were laid not precisely in the right line in which it ought regularly to be placed, with the quickest perception of the slightest possible deviation he had it immediately corrected. Even in minute trifles, as well as in matters of more importance, his love of exactness and order ever showed itself.

Many persons, particularly females, applied to him for counsel in religious difficulties, and for support in pecuniary distress; and never failed to receive the appropriate aid, communicated in the most considerate and judicious manner.

His patience and forbearance in dealing with errors in judgment were very remarkable, and the more so on account of the extraordinary quickness and brilliancy of his genius. Some have stated to him their con-

scientious scruples concerning certain ordinances of the church, and in every instance were convinced by him of their errors. He was peculiarly happy in his management of a person affected by such doubts. Kind, considerate, and patient, perfectly informed on the subject, and possessing a most extraordinary power of explanation even to the humblest capacity, he never failed to satisfy the conscientious doubter who communicated to him his religious scruples. Amongst the number of those who did so, were two young men of eminent talents, one of them a clergyman of the established church, the other preparing at the time for ordination. Where he believed scruples to be conscientious, he was peculiarly tender toward them.

The case now referred to, of the young man preparing for ordination, was that of his own son. His eldest son, Mr. John Magee[a], a young gentleman of eminent talents, conceived some scruples previous to his ordination, which he imparted to his father, adding that he could not enter into holy orders. The Archbishop replied that he would not for any consideration that his son were to enter into the sacred profession, without a conviction of the truth of the religion and church of which he was to be a minister, and an honest desire and resolution to discharge all the duties to which he should thus be called, with fidelity. But he then proceeded to discuss with his son the difficulties which had disturbed his mind. The result was that his son saw his errors, and proceeded with satisfaction, from the conversation with his father in the country, to Dublin to be exa-

[a] To whose memory a monument has been erected in St. Peter's Church, at Drogheda, by a grateful and admiring congregation, on account of his faithful services as their minister.

mined for orders. Some doubts, however, afterwards occurred to young Mr. Magee, and he determined instead of remaining in Dublin to be examined, to return home and decline the office of a clergyman, for which he *had been* very earnest. The Archbishop had left his country seat for Dublin in a few hours after his son's departure, and just after entering the town was surprised at meeting him returning. He inquired the reason, and was answered by his son, who appeared to be exceedingly uneasy, that some of his doubts had returned. The Archbishop requested him not to distress himself, and with the tenderest affection accompanied him to the neighbouring house of a friend, where he renewed his patient conversation with him on the subject of his doubts. He listened to and answered all the young man's objections, and by his powers of explanation and reasoning, aided by the calmness and gentleness of his manner, fully succeeded in removing each doubt from the mind of his son, who, under the divine blessing, became a most efficient and faithful minister of the established religion. Often did this excellent young clergyman afterward declare to his most intimate friends, that he always blessed God for that conversation with his beloved father. After the Archbishop's death he frequently remarked, that the extremely indulgent kindness and gentleness of his father's manner to him had served to induce him to listen with candour to every thing that he said to him, and that on calm reflection he fully saw the truth of all his observations.

In 1825, an examination of the Archbishop and of others, on the subject of the tenets of the Roman

Catholic religion, took place before a Parliamentary committee. Particular interest was naturally felt respecting His Grace's answers. Two or three peers, who were strongly opposed to him in politics, cross-examined him sharply; but no man was more perfectly qualified to come off successfully on such an occasion. With one short reply he silenced the most talented of those peers—Lord Holland. His Lordship asked the Archbishop, "Does your Grace really think that there is any person capable of holding such a monstrous opinion, as that the Roman Catholic religion is idolatrous?" The Archbishop calmly fixed his eyes on Lord Holland's countenance, and replied "My Lord, *some have sworn to it.*" The force of the application was so striking that a very strong impression was immediately produced on all present; and Lord Holland resumed his seat, and continued silent during the remainder of the Archbishop's examination.

The angry attacks of his Roman Catholic opponents continued unceasing. It is, however, a gratifying reflection, that he bore them with the utmost patience, and often appeared quite unmoved by them. But he was now about to undergo a very different trial: he was soon to receive the blow from which he never recovered, though he outlived it for some years. Not long after his return to Dublin in 1825, the death of his beloved and admirable wife took place. She had been for thirty-six years his greatest earthly comfort, the partner of his cares and sharer of his joys: she had always aided in dispensing his charities, in enforcing on their children his lessons of piety and virtue, and in promoting in the most munificent and judicious manner the religious

education of the children of the poor. In truth she exemplified every virtue, and was all that his fondest wishes could desire. A husband could not be more blessed in a wife. He would have sunk under his grief, but for the support derived from his fervent piety and the anxious consolations of his children. But, from the period of her loss, his liveliness departed; and even after time had softened the poignancy of his sorrow, his manner and expression were those only of resignation. The following memorandum was found written in the prayer book which he kept for his private use. "This prayer book I used in reading prayers by my beloved wife's bedside in her last illness; and in administering the last sacrament to her, surrounded by our children, on Sunday, the 25th day of September, 1825.—W. Dublin." On the following Tuesday her pious spirit was called away by her divine Master. She died in her husband's arms. The Archbishop fixed to attend her body to the grave; but as the time approached felt unable to do so. He gave it up, saying, "The Lord has supported me wonderfully[a]: but I feel that the trial might be too great for me; I might dishonour Him; I will not go."

Toward all his clergy in general, Archbishop Magee had a parental feeling. Some of them he regarded with peculiarly strong affection; but he disliked all extravagancies and departure from order. He spoke of several of those from whom he differed in sentiment, or in principles not essential, with very great regard. The more he observed of the progress of the agitating

[a] The same expression which he used some time after, in a letter to the writer of this memoir.

question, which was called that of "Roman Catholic Emancipation," the more strongly he felt it to be a question involving great danger to the established church in Ireland; and under this conviction, in the position in which he was placed, he considered himself called upon to oppose it. It may deserve remark, that he repeatedly stated his opinion, that the Emancipation Bill would tend to introduce into the church in England, Roman Catholic principles opposed to Protestantism. If this opinion has been in some degree verified in the cases of some individuals, happily it has not been so to any great extent. And the prelates and great body of our Scriptural Protestant church are awake to the danger; and under Providence will prevent its growth.

During the anxious discussions of the Roman Catholic Emancipation Bill, an address to the King against it from the bench of bishops of the established church in Ireland, was committed to a deputation consisting of the Archbishops of Armagh and Dublin, the Bishop of Clogher (Lord Robert Tottenham), and others. Though scarcely recovered from a severe attack of inflammation in the chest, the Archbishop of Dublin considered the occasion to be of such great and urgent importance to the established church, that at some risk, and contrary to medical advice, he left Dublin for London. The Primate of Ireland was prevented from accompanying the deputation to his Majesty; and the Archbishop of Dublin headed it, followed by Lord Robert Tottenham and others. The King, who was then at Windsor, received them most graciously; and having heard the Address, desired the Archbishop of Dublin to sit down

near him on the sofa upon which his Majesty was then sitting. His Majesty returned an evidently unpremeditated, but excellent answer; and placing his hand on the Archbishop's knee, said, "I feel truly gratified by this attempt of the Irish bishops to preserve the good state of the Protestant constitution." He then spoke of the great strength of the supporters of the Bill, particularly in the House of Commons; and intimated that it was his wish (if he could have done so) to follow the example of his good father: but that he felt the imperious necessity of the case. When he mentioned his father, tears fell from the King's eyes. On the deputation departing from the royal presence, his Majesty took leave of the Archbishop in the most kind and gracious manner.

On account of his charge, and his opposition to the Emancipation Bill, the Archbishop of Dublin had become so obnoxious to the Roman Catholic authorities in Ireland and their party there, that he was continually exposed to insults, which it would be tedious and painful to dwell on. But it is most gratifying to reflect, and it is most honourable to his memory, that he bore all the bitter attacks of his angry opponents, adversaries of his religion and church, with the utmost Christian patience.

He took great pleasure in contributing to the comfort of poor and deserving clergymen. He supplied some who were incapacitated from duty by age or infirmities, but who could not afford to keep curates, money from his own purse to pay that expense. And he formed a plan which he was very anxious to have carried into effect, for establishing a fund out of episcopal incomes,

for paying salaries to a certain number of clergymen not in regular and constant employment, who might be always ready to supply the places of others when sickness or any necessary cause occasioned their absence from their churches. Difficulties prevented the fulfilment of this wish.

Every application for charity was most benevolently attended to by him. His charitable subscriptions and donations were most liberal. Applications from reduced persons, whose deserving cases were well attested, received his peculiarly anxious relief. Often he gave donations to such persons; but usually in the names of his children, or as "A Friend," or "A Clergyman." He particularly avoided any appearance of ostentation in his charity.

At every Christmas he gave an entire new suit of clothes to each of his labourers, and his steward stopped each week from their wages a very small portion, until the sum should be repaid. Thus they were saved from the ill effects of improvidence, they had good suitable clothing, and paid for it so gradually that they did not feel the expense.

Although he was a remarkably fond father, and his children were exceedingly attached to him, even *their* affectionate attention could not supply the mournful void left in his heart by the loss of one of the best of wives that ever lived. Her own daughter has feelingly and justly remarked, "A child could not supply the place of such a companion. Her earthly happiness was wrapped up in his. Her strong mind, sound judgment, and cheerful society, in which he had so much delighted, were departed. While we meekly bowed to the heavenly

Father's will, we saw that our earthly parent could never be himself again. Several weeks passed before he was able to bring himself to see or be seen by any person except the members of his own family. The Lord Lieutenant (Marquis Wellesley) applied to him to perform the ceremony of his marriage with his present Marchioness, some time after the melancholy event by which the Archbishop's remaining years were darkened. But the duty then would have been distressing to his feelings. The Marquis kindly excused him, and the Primate officiated in his stead. He took his family on a tour in England in each of the two succeeding summers, for the restoration of spirits. But his own seemed to have sunk into placid submission.

"On the second of these tours," (continues his daughter, from whose narrative many particulars[a] in this memoir are taken,) "he indulged us with a visit to Burley Wood, the seat of Mrs. Hannah More. There I witnessed a scene which I never can forget. After a short delay, Mrs. Hannah More received us. She had withdrawn from the general reception of visitors; but as soon as she learned who desired to see her, she admitted him and his family immediately. Here a trial awaited him: for her first inquiry was after my mother's health. He was instantly overpowered. He seemed to struggle for a few moments: and then, pointing with his hand to our deep mourning dresses, with quivering lips and trembling voice, he said, 'my family are before you.' After a little time he recovered himself and entered into conversation with Mrs. Hannah More, to which we listened with the utmost interest. When we rose to

[a] Some from her information: others from the writer's knowledge.

depart, she conducted us into an inner room, where her works were arranged on shelves, and desired us to take what we wished for. On my expressing a request that she should select for us, she presented to me 'Hints to a young Princess.' Her companion whispered to her: and she immediately said, O yes, let him come in. Soon, to our surprise, we saw my father's man entering the room, he came in cautiously and timidly: but she spoke kindly to him, and presented to him a small book in which she had written her name. He received it with reverential gratitude; and often read it, with comfort and benefit. She desired my father to take us through her grounds; and when we were returning, her little carriage, made for her by her coachman, was on the lawn near the window of her room. My younger sisters rushed into the carriage alternately, to sit in it. I looked up and saw Mrs. Hannah More standing at her window, smiling at their eager enthusiasm. My father approached the window. She threw it up, and spreading her hands over his head, while he took off his hat, his white hair floating in the breeze, she prayed most fervently for the Redeemer's grace on him, and for the welfare of his family. She then said to him, 'My Lord, you will not depart without giving me your blessing;' which he did with the greatest fervency. We returned from the interesting visit; and as we were coming away, though her companion had, just at our departure, entreated her not to remain at the open window, she continued standing there until we could see her no more. My father wiped the tears from his cheeks. The scene had been exceedingly affecting. We continued our tour, and after some weeks returned

to Dublin. My father exerted himself to the utmost to recover spirits, for our sakes and on account of his many duties: but he was never the same man after my mother's death. All that we could do was done to supply the indescribable loss of such a mother."

With dejected spirits, the Archbishop felt the heavy pressure of his arduous duties more than before. Besides those which were most immediately connected with the superintendence of clerical duties and the care of the churches in the diocese of Dublin, at a period when that important diocese required peculiar exertion on the part of its Archbishop, numerous charitable institutions required his attention. Not one of them was neglected by him. He personally attended to them all. To all these, the duties of a privy counsellor were added; which, on some occasions, occupied much anxious time.

The commissioners who were appointed to compile a book for the use of schools on a new system, submitted different attempts to him for his approbation; but after careful examination he rejected all. He could not bear the mutilation of God's word, which even then was attempted. He would have been still more opposed to the later system.

The Marquis Wellesley was a man of too much refinement, taste, ability, and information, not to derive great pleasure from the society of Archbishop Magee, even though they differed so much on the most important political question relating to Ireland. Notwithstanding the Archbishop's charge, which was so strongly resented by Roman Catholic authorities, still Lord Wellesley cultivated his society; and always showed him the kindest attention. He frequently con-

sulted his opinion, especially in an ecclesiastical appointment.

The Archbishop had been for many years subject to bleedings at the nose, which seemed to relieve the tendency of blood to his head—his complaint from an early age. But latterly these bleedings ceased. He was fond of dwelling on the thought of following his sainted wife to the better world. After some years of declining health, (during which, however, he continued the most faithful attention to all his duties,) he remarked one day to his eldest daughter, in June, 1829, that he had a strange sleepy feeling in his left hand: but at the same time he looked as well as usual. This was the first symptom of a series of attacks of illness increasing in severity. She entreated him to consult a physician. But after this he appeared to be in as good health as for a considerable time before. He left his family at his seat in the county of Wicklow, at the latter end of September, in order to attend the meetings of the board of first fruits at Dublin, in October. He consecrated a new church in a village near Dublin; but, when he was on his way to it in his carriage, he remarked to the Vicar-General, that he felt very ill, and feared that he should not be able to preach and go through his duties for that day. However, he did so, but with much difficulty. In a day or two afterwards, walking with one of his clergy, he felt so ill that he went into an apothecary's house near which, at the moment, he was passing. He was cupped; and he returned home in a sedan chair. His son, who was then in Dublin, wrote to his eldest sister, who had long so anxiously endeavoured to take the utmost care of her

admirable father, informing her of his illness. She hastened to Dublin, and was surprised to meet him riding on horseback; so quickly had the violence of the attack passed off. But she was shocked at the change in his look. It appeared to her as if twenty years had been added to his life during his short absence. Still he continued to attend to duties, and to receive his friends. But not long afterward feeling himself ill, at his country seat, he proceeded again to Dublin for medical assistance. His daughter accompanied him. Snow had recently fallen, and the cabriolet in which they travelled was nearly overset. The cold increased his illness; and his daughter observed that his face had become pale and swelled. He was, however, relieved by medical aid. The attack was attributed to his having resumed his studies. He had begun to prepare a new edition of his work on the Atonement, which had long been earnestly called for by his London publisher. So long before as in 1823 the publisher had sent to inform him that he could then have sold 1500 copies if he had them, but was obliged to decline the demand even to that extent. In a year or two afterwards, the publisher told the writer of these pages that he could then have sold more than two thousand, if he had possessed the supply.

A short time afterwards, he appeared to be much recovered, and had resumed his attention to business. But having gone to the cathedral of St. Patrick's to attend a meeting there, he was exposed to a cold draught of air, and on his return home had a violent and alarming attack of erysipelas. It was so severe, that at its commencement he thought he could not re-

cover, and told his daughter that his summons had arrived. From this illness he recovered with much diminished strength.

Notwithstanding these repeated attacks, his eminent physician, Dr. Cheyne, expressed his opinion that, if the Archbishop would give up attention to business, he might live for a number of years. But His Grace's active mind and habits prevented this. His illnesses having attacked his head, reports utterly false began to be circulated that he showed symptoms of insanity. Some of these reports reached the ears of his family, who were amazed at the falsehoods. Not one of them ever saw the slightest symptom of derangement of their admirable father's great mind. But on learning that there were such rumours, (he had opponents enough to give them existence and circulation,) his daughter earnestly questioned Dr. Cheyne, entreating him to tell her candidly whether there was any foundation for them. But Dr. Cheyne solemnly assured her that they were utterly untrue; that her father's fine intellect was as sound as it ever was; but that he ought not to attend to studies and business. The mind of the excellent Archbishop continued perfectly sound to the last. The slightest apparent ground was seized by some for circulating reports of His Grace's mental derangement. It was particularly necessary that he should avoid exposing his head to the rays of the summer sun. Therefore, walking in his garden or his grounds, he used an umbrella for this purpose. Immediately it was reported that in the midst of a fine dry day he supposed it was raining. Another false rumour was, that he used an umbrella in his parlour and drawing

room. But, not only to the last hour of his life did his fine intellect continue perfectly sound, but his faith and piety seemed to become even more and more fervent. He marked a number of the Psalms of David, which he continually read with devout aspiration to Heaven: they were all penitential psalms. The whole closing part of his life, for months while his disease approached, was a continued time of prayer, with very little intermission. His faith continued to the last, of the most unwavering and undoubting kind. And he exhibited the most beautiful example of Christian meekness, family affection, gratitude for every attention, unmurmuring submission to the will of God, and devotion to his Divine Redeemer, until his pure spirit departed to that Redeemer's keeping, on the 18th of August, 1831. His funeral was, according to his direction, strictly private. Besides his own family the attendants were Lord Plunket's family, and the Honourable and Rev. John Pomeroy.

The Archbishop had a numerous family: besides three children who died at a very early age, three sons and nine daughters. His eldest son (the Rev. John Magee) was an exemplary clergyman in Drogheda, in which town, in St. Peter's church, a monument was erected by the congregation, to his memory. (Note in p. lxv. *supra*). In that church the Archbishop had preached his first sermon; and there his son preached his last. The death of this excellent young clergyman was occasioned, in 1837, by a typhus fever which he caught, in the zealous discharge of his sacred duties, attending the sick. Archdeacon Magee is second son of the Archbishop; and the Rev. William Magee, (Rector of Dun-

ganstown, near Wicklow,) his third and youngest son. The Archbishop's eldest daughter is married to William Hunter, Esq., of "The Lodge," near Colerain; his fifth daughter to the eminent clergyman, the Rev. Hugh M'Neil, of Liverpool; his second daughter to Richard Heywood, Esq., brother of Sir Benjamin Heywood, Bart. His other married daughters also were happily united to gentlemen of great respectability and eminent piety; who were fitted to estimate those graces, which deeply religious parents had so diligently cultivated.

The Archbishop's death was brought on by two complaints, the determination of blood to the head, and an affection of the heart. At one time, while his power of speech was impeded by his illness, expressing himself with difficulty and looking up to heaven with resignation, he remarked, "God is pleased to suit my chastening to my fault: in my younger days, if I felt pride, it was on account of my idea that I possessed a fluency of delivery."

It is not generally known why the Archbishop so very long resisted the solicitations to bring out a new edition of his great work on the Atonement.

The former editions, after the first, of this celebrated work, had appeared each with a dedication to his friend Lord Plunket. But, from his view of the state and progress of things in Ireland, he felt that, dearly as he personally loved his friend, he could not conscientiously renew the dedication. Yet he could not bring himself to retract it, and wound the feelings of a friend so dear to him. A number of years had passed, when his feelings were overcome by his daughter's reading to him a letter from an officer in India, who stated that a short

abridgment of the work on the Atonement having been circulated by an individual among the troops, he, in the spirit of infidelity in which he then was, said, "Let me see this little book, so much is said about it." He added, that he "read it, and closed the book a convinced sinner." When this letter was read to the Archbishop, he was looking at a newspaper, spread out on the table before him his head leaning forward on both his hands, in order to avoid the direct light of the candles. He listened; did not raise his head; but his tears were seen falling on the paper. And it was in consequence of this letter, that after having had many struggles of feeling, he determined to bring out another edition of the work on the Atonement. He had begun to prepare it, but was soon stopped by his increasing and severe illness.

In that admirable work he, as it were, still speaks to us Christian truth enforced by abundant and irrefragable argument, leading us in the way of salvation; vindicating the divinity of the Redeemer, and the glory of God.

DISCOURSES AND DISSERTATIONS

ON THE

SCRIPTURAL DOCTRINES

OF

ATONEMENT AND SACRIFICE.

TO

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE

WILLIAM CONYNGHAM PLUNKET[a].

In placing at the head of these sheets a name, to which the respect and the admiration of the public have attached so much celebrity, and in avowing, at the same time, that I have selected the name of a Friend with whom I have been united, almost from childhood, in the closest habits of intimacy, I am aware that I subject myself to the imputation of acting as much from a motive of pride, as from a sentiment of affection. I admit the imputation to be well founded. To enjoy the happiness of having such a Friend, and not to exult in the possession, would be not to deserve it. It is a pride which, I trust, may be indulged in without blame: and the distinction of having been associated with a character so transcendently eminent for private worth, for public virtue, and for intellectual endowments, I shall always regard as one of the most honourable circumstances of my life.

But, independently of these considerations, the very nature of my subject supplies a reason for the choice which I have made. For I know not, in truth, to whom I could, with greater propriety, inscribe a work

[a] Afterwards Lord Plunket, and Lord High Chancellor of Ireland.

whose chief end is to expose false reasoning and to maintain true religion, than to one in whom the powers of just reasoning are so conspicuously displayed, and by whom the great principles of religion are so sincerely reverenced.

With these views, I trust that I shall stand excused by you, my dear Sir, in having, without your knowledge, thus availed myself of the credit of your name. The following treatise, in which so many additions have been made to a former publication, as in some measure to entitle it to the appellation of a new work, I submit to your judgment: well satisfied, that if it meet your approbation, it will not find an unfavourable reception from the public.

I am, my dear Sir,

With the truest attachment,

Your affectionate Friend and Servant,

THE AUTHOR.

Trinity College, Dublin,
Sept. 21, 1809.

PREFATORY ADDRESS.

TO

THE STUDENTS IN DIVINITY

IN THE

UNIVERSITY OF DUBLIN.

THE following Discourses, originally composed with a view to your instruction, are now with the same design submitted to your more deliberate examination.

In these latter days Christianity seems destined to undergo a fiercer trial, than it has for many centuries experienced. Its defenders are called upon not merely to resist the avowed invader, who assails the citadel from without, but the concealed and treacherous foe, who undermines the works, or tampers with the garrison within. The temporising Christian, who, under the mask of liberality, surrenders the fundamental doctrines of his creed; and the imposing Rationalist, who, by the illusions of a factitious resemblance, endeavours to substitute Philosophy for the Gospel; are enemies even more to be dreaded, than the declared and systematic Deist. The open attacks of the one, directed against the *Evidences* of Christianity, have but served to strengthen the great outworks of our faith, by calling to its aid the united powers of its adherents; whilst the machinations of the others, secretly employed against the *Doctrines* of our religion, threaten, by eluding the vigilance, and lulling the suspicions of its friends, to subvert through fraud, what had been found impregnable by force. To aid these machinations, a modern and depraved Philosophy hath sent abroad its pernicious sophistries, in-

fecting the sources of morality, and enervating the powers of manly thought; and the better to effect these purposes, clad in those engaging colours, which are peculiarly adapted to captivate the imaginations of young and ardent minds. Against arts and enemies such as these, the most strenuous exertions of all who value the religion of Christ are at this moment imperiously demanded.

In what manner to prepare for this conflict we are informed on high authority. We are to *take unto us the whole armour of God—having on the breast-plate of righteousness; and our feet shod with the preparation of the Gospel of peace: above all, taking the shield of* FAITH, *wherewith we shall be able to quench all the fiery darts of the wicked: and taking the helmet of salvation, and the sword of the Spirit, which is* THE WORD OF GOD. These are the arms which are to ensure us victory in the contest: and without these arms we neither can nor ought to stand. A conspiracy the most deep and deadly has been formed against Christianity. The *Powers of Darkness* have combined their mightiest efforts. If, then, the sentinels of the Gospel sleep upon their posts, if they do not instantly rouse to its defence, they are guilty of the blackest treason to their heavenly Master. There is no room for truce or accommodation. The *Captain of our salvation* has declared, that *he that is not with him is against him.* The force of this declaration is at this day peculiarly manifest. It is now become necessary, that a broad and distinct line should be drawn between those who truly acknowledge the authority of Revelation, and those who, whilst they wear the *semblance* of Christians, but lend the more effectual support to the enemies of Christianity.

These reflections, though befitting all who profess the religion of Christ, press peculiarly on those who are destined to teach and to enforce his word. To you, my young friends, who look forward to the clerical office, they are important beyond description; and, if allowed their due weight upon your minds, they cannot fail to stimulate to the most zealous and effectual exertions in your pursuit of sacred knowledge.

Already, indeed, has a more enlivened spirit of religious inquiry been manifested amongst you. To promote that spirit, and to supply some additional security against the prevailing delusions of the day, these Discourses on the doctrines of *Atonement* and *Sacrifice*,—doctrines, against which, above all others, the Deist and the Rationalising Christian direct their attacks,—were originally delivered, and are now published.

The desire expressed for their publication by the existing divinity classes would have been long since complied with, but for the addition of certain arduous Academic duties to the ordinary engagements of the Author's Collegiate situation. To those who are so well acquainted with the laborious employment which those duties and engagements necessarily impose, no apology can be requisite on the ground of delay. More than twelve months have elapsed since the greater part of these sheets was committed to the press: and the prosecution of the subject has been unavoidably suspended during a considerable portion of the intervening period.

The *form* in which the work is now presented seems more to require explanation. The first design extended only to the publication of the two Discourses, with a few occasional and supplementary remarks: and, on this plan, the Sermons were sent to press. But, on farther consideration, it appeared advisable to enter into a more accurate and extensive examination of the subject; even though a short text should thereby be contrasted with a disproportionate body of notes. The great vice of the present day is a presumptuous precipitancy of judgment: and there is nothing from which the cause of Christianity, as well as of general knowledge, has suffered more severely, than from that impatience of investigation, and that confidence of decision upon hasty and partial views, which mark the literary character of an age, undeservedly extolled for its improvements in reasoning and philosophy. A false taste in morals is naturally connected with a false taste in literature: and the period of vicious dissipation is not likely to prove the era of dispassionate and

careful inquiry. There is, however, no short way to truth. The nature of things will not accommodate itself to the laziness, the interests, or the vices of men. The paths, which lead to knowledge, are unalterably fixed; and can be traced only by slow and cautious steps.

From these considerations, it was judged expedient to submit the subject of these discourses, and the crude and superficial reasonings which have of late been exercised upon it, to a stricter and more minute test of inquiry. For this purpose the present plan has been adopted, as best suited to that exactness of critical investigation which is due to the importance of the subject, and as the most fitly calculated to direct the thoughts of the student to the most useful topics of inquiry, and the most profitable sources of information. Such a plan, I have little doubt, will be favourably received by those whose minds, trained in the habits of close deduction, and exercised in the researches of accurate science, cannot but be readily disposed to accept, in the place of general assertion and plausible declamation, a careful review of facts, and a cautious examination of Scripture.

One circumstance, which is of no mean value in the method here pursued, is, that it enables us, without interrupting the thread of inquiry, to canvass and appreciate the pretensions of certain modern writers, whose high tone of self-admiration, and loud vauntings of superior knowledge, have been but too successful in obtaining for them a partial and temporary ascendancy in public opinion; and who have employed the influence derived from that ascendancy, to weaken the truths of Christianity, and to subvert the dearest interests of man. I trust that you, my young readers, will see enough in the *Illustrations* and *Explanatory Dissertations*, accompanying these *Discourses*, to convince you of the emptiness of their claims to that superiority, which, did they possess it, would be applied to purposes so injurious. You will, probably, see sufficient reason to pronounce, that their pretensions to philosophic distinction, and their claims to critical pre-eminence, stand on no better grounds than their assumption of

the exclusive profession of a *pure* Christianity. The confident and overbearing language of such men you will then regard as you ought: and, from the review of their reasonings, and the detail of their religious opinions, you will naturally be led to feel the full value of the duly regulated discipline of the youthful understanding, in those severer exercises of scientific study, which give vigour to the intellect, and steadiness to the judgment; and the still greater value of that early reverence for the mysterious sublimities of religion, which teaches the humility becoming man's highest powers, when directed to the yet higher things of God.—The half learning of modern times has been the fruitful parent of multiplied evils: and it is not without good cause, that the innovating theorist of the present day makes it his first object to abridge the work of education, and, under the pretence of introducing a system of more immediate practical utility, to exclude that wholesome discipline, and regular institution, which are essential to conduct the faculties of the young mind to sound and manly strength.

I cannot conclude this prefatory address, without indulging in the gratifying reflection, that, whilst the deceptions of wit and the fascinations of eloquence, combined with a wily sophistry and an imposing confidence, have but too frequently produced their pernicious effects, to the detriment of a true Christian faith, on the minds of the inexperienced and unreflecting; these audacious attempts have seldom found, in this place, any other reception than that of contempt and aversion. And with true pleasure I feel myself justified in pronouncing with confidence, that, so long as the Students of this Seminary, intended for the office of the ministry, continue to evince the same serious attention to religious subjects, which has of late years so honourably distinguished numbers of your body, and so profitably rewarded the zealous labours of your instructors in sacred literature, Christianity will have little to fear in this land from such attempts.

That you may gloriously persevere in these laudable efforts to attain the most useful of all learning, and in the con-

scientious endeavour to qualify yourselves for the due discharge of the most momentous of all duties; that so the work of God may not suffer in your hands; and that, being judged fit dispensers of that *wisdom which is from above*, you may hereafter be enabled to *turn many to righteousness*, and finally to obtain the recompense of the *good and faithful servants* of Christ, is the ardent wish and prayer of your very sincere friend,

THE AUTHOR.

April 22, 1801.

ADVERTISEMENT

TO THE

SECOND EDITION.

It is now nearly seven years since application was made to the Author, by his Bookseller, for a new Edition of the Discourses on the Scriptural Doctrines of Atonement and Sacrifice. As it was his design to introduce into the work considerable alterations in point of *form* and considerable additions in point of *matter*, he deferred complying with the Bookseller's desire, until he should be able to accomplish this intention. The same impediments, to which, in the Prefatory Address to the Students, he had occasion formerly to advert, again operated to produce delay, and have occasioned this late appearance of the promised publication. The work which now issues from the press was, he is almost ashamed to avow, committed to it in June, 1807. It is only to those, however, who are unacquainted with the nature of the Author's academic occupations, that he feels any explanation to be necessary upon this head.

Sept. 21, 1809.

ADVERTISEMENT

TO THE

THIRD EDITION.

In the Edition now given to the public, additional matter, which, it is hoped, may bestow some additional value, has been introduced; and a few changes (conceived to be improvements) in form and arrangement, have been adopted. The principal additions will be found in Numbers VII., VIII., XII., XIV., XVII., XXVII., XXX., XLI., XLII., LIII., LXV., LXIX., and its Postscript; and in the Appendix. The Index of *Matters*, and List of *Books*, are likewise enlarged: and a new Index of *Texts* is introduced. The alterations of arrangement chiefly affect Numbers XXXV., LIX., LXIX.—The Syriac quotations are printed in their proper character; which could not be done in the former Editions, from the want of a Syriac type. It should be remarked also, for the better understanding of certain parts of the work, that the Edition was sent to press early in the year 1810; although, from unavoidable delays, it only now makes its appearance.

January 1, 1812.

ADVERTISEMENT

TO THE

FOURTH EDITION.

It was not the Author's intention, on putting this Edition to press, to add so much to the dimensions of a work already considerably enlarged. But the extraordinary and increasing exertions of that Body, against whose pernicious errors it is principally directed, have forced upon him what has exceeded his original design: and that which was at first calculated upon as likely to form little more than a pamphlet, has unavoidably grown into a volume.

June 1, 1816.



Crist.º Allori dip. V.º Biondi dis. e inc.

EGO DORMIO, ET COR MEUM VIGILAT.

TWO DISCOURSES

ON THE

SCRIPTURAL DOCTRINES

OF

ATONEMENT AND SACRIFICE;

DELIVERED IN THE

CHAPEL OF TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN,

ON

GOOD FRIDAY,

IN THE YEARS 1798 AND 1799.

DISCOURSE I.

1 Cor. i. 23, 24.

"BUT WE PREACH CHRIST CRUCIFIED, UNTO THE JEWS A STUMBLINGBLOCK, AND UNTO THE GREEKS FOOLISHNESS; BUT UNTO THEM WHICH ARE CALLED—CHRIST THE POWER OF GOD, AND THE WISDOM OF GOD."

That the sublime mystery of the Redemption should have escaped the comprehension both of the Jew, and of the Greek; that a crucified Saviour should have given offence to the worldly expectant of a triumphant Messiah, whilst the proud philosopher of the schools turned with disdain from the humiliating doctrine which proclaimed the insufficiency of human reason, and threatened to bend its aspiring head before the foot of the Cross,—were events which the matured growth of national prejudice, on the one hand, and the habits of contentious discussion, aided by a depraved moral system, on the other, might, in the natural course of things, have been expected to produce. That the Son of God had descended from heaven; that he had disrobed himself[a] of the Glory which he had with the Father, before the world began; that he had assumed the form of the humblest and most degraded of men; that, submitting to a life of reproach, and want, and sorrow, he had closed the scene with a death of ignominy and torture; and, that, through this voluntary degradation and suffering, a way of reconciliation with the Supreme Being had been opened to the whole human race, and

[a] No. I.

an atonement made for those transgressions, from the punishment of which unassisted reason could have devised no means of escape,—these are truths, which prejudice and pride could not fail, at all times, to have rejected; and these are truths, to which the irreligion and self-sufficiency of the present day oppose obstacles not less insurmountable than those which the prejudice of the Jew, and the philosophy of the Greek, presented in the age of the Apostle. For at this day, when we boast a wider diffusion of learning, and more extensive acquirements of moral knowledge, do we not find these fundamental truths of Revelation questioned? Do we not see the haughtiness of lettered scepticism presuming to reject the proffered terms of Salvation, because it cannot trace, with the finger of human science, the connexion between the cross of Christ and the redemption of man? But to these vain and presumptuous aspirings after knowledge placed beyond human reach we are commanded to preach CHRIST CRUCIFIED: which, however it may, to the self-fancied wise ones of this world, appear as foolishness, is yet, to those who will humble their understanding to the dispensations of the Almighty, the grandest display of the divine perfections; *Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God.*

To us also, my brethren, who profess a conviction of this truth, and who are called on by the return of this day more [a] particularly to recollect the great work of Salvation, wrought out for us by the memorable event which it records, it may not be unprofitable to take a short view of the objections that have been urged against this fundamental [b] doctrine of our religion; that so we may the better discern those snares which beset the Christian path, and that, being guarded against the obstructions which are insidiously raised against that true and gospel faith, whereby alone *we* can hope for acceptance and happiness, we may be able to place the great pillar of our hopes upon a basis which no force can shake, and no art can undermine.

In the consideration of this subject, which every Christian

[a] No. II. [b] No. III.

must deem most highly deserving of the closest examination, our attention should be directed to two different classes of objectors:—those who deny the necessity of any mediation whatever; and those who question the particular nature of that mediation which has been appointed. Whilst the Deist, on the one hand, ridicules the very notion of a Mediator; and the philosophising Christian, on the other, fashions it to his own hypothesis; we are called on to vindicate the word of truth from the injurious attacks of both, and carefully to secure it, not only against the open assaults of its avowed enemies, but against the more dangerous misrepresentations of its false, or mistaken friends.

The objections which are peculiar to the former are, upon this subject, of the same description with those which they advance against every other part of Revelation; bearing with equal force against the system of Natural Religion, which they support, as against the doctrines of Revealed Religion, which they oppose. And, indeed, this single circumstance, if weighed with candour and reflection—that is, if the Deist were truly the Philosopher he pretends to be—might suffice to convince him of his error. For the closeness of the analogy between the works of Nature and the word of the Gospel being found to be such, that every blow which is aimed at the one rebounds with undiminished force against the other, the conviction of their common origin must be the inference of unbiassed understanding.

Thus, when, in the outset of his argument, the Deist tells us, that, as obedience must be the object of God's approbation, and disobedience the ground of his displeasure, it must follow, by natural consequence, that, when men have transgressed the divine commands, repentance and amendment of life will place them in the same situation, as if they had never offended;—he does not recollect that actual experience of the course of Nature directly contradicts the assertion, and that, in the common occurrences of life, the man, who, by intemperance, and voluptuousness, has injured his character, his fortune, and his health, does not find himself

instantly restored to the full enjoyment of these blessings on repenting of his past misconduct, and determining on future amendment. Now, if the attributes of the Deity demand that the punishment should not outlive the crime, on what ground shall we justify this temporal dispensation? The difference in *degree* cannot affect the question in the least. It matters not whether the punishment be of long, or of short duration; whether in this world, or in the next. If the justice or the goodness of God require that punishment should not be inflicted, when repentance has taken place; it must be a violation of those attributes, to permit any punishment whatever, the most slight, or the most transient. Nor will it avail to say, that the evils of *this life* attendant upon vice are the effects of an established constitution, and follow in the way of natural consequence. Is not that established constitution, itself, the effect of the divine decree? And are not its several operations as much the appointment of its Almighty Framer, as if they had individually flowed from his immediate direction? But, besides, what reason have we to suppose that God's treatment of us in a future state will not be of the same nature as we find it in this; according to established rules, and in the way of natural consequence? Many circumstances might be urged, on the contrary, to evince the likelihood that it will. But this is not necessary to our present purpose. It is sufficient that the Deist cannot *prove* that it will *not*. Our experience of the present state of things evinces that indemnity is not the consequence of repentance here: can he adduce a counter-experience to show that it will be so hereafter? The justice and goodness of God are not then *necessarily* concerned, in virtue of the sinner's repentance, to remove all evil consequent upon sin in the next life; or else the arrangement of events in this, has not been regulated by the dictate of justice and goodness. If the Deist admits the latter, what becomes of his Natural Religion?

Now let us inquire, whether the conclusions of abstract reasoning will coincide with the deductions of experience. If obedience be at all times our duty, in what way can present

repentance release us from the punishment of former transgressions? [a] Can repentance annihilate what is past? Or, can we do more by present obedience, than acquit ourselves of present obligation? Or, does the contrition we experience, added to the positive duties we discharge, constitute a surplusage of merit, which may be transferred to the reduction of our former demerit? And is the justification of the Philosopher, who is too enlightened to be a Christian, to be built, after all, upon the absurdities of supererogation? "We may as well affirm," says a learned Divine, "that our former obedience atones for our present sins, as that our present obedience makes amends for antecedent transgressions." And it is surely with a peculiar ill grace, that this sufficiency of repentance is urged by those, who deny the *possible* efficacy of Christ's mediation; since the ground, on which they deny the latter, equally serves for the rejection of the former: the *necessary connexion* between the merits of one being and the acquittal of another not being less conceivable than that which is imagined to subsist between obedience at one time, and the forgiveness of disobedience at another.

Since, then, upon the whole, experience (so far as it extends) goes to prove the natural inefficacy of repentance to remove the effects of past transgressions; and the abstract reason of the thing can furnish no link, whereby to connect present obedience with forgiveness of former sins; it follows, that, however the contemplation of God's infinite goodness and love might excite some faint hope that mercy would be extended to the sincerely penitent, the animating *certainty* of this momentous truth, without which the religious sense can have no place, can be derived from the express communication of the Deity alone [b].

But it is yet urged by those who would measure the proceedings of divine wisdom by the standard of their own reason, that, admitting the necessity of a Revelation on this subject, it had been sufficient for the Deity to have made known to man his benevolent intention; and that the circuitous ap-

[a] No. IV. [b] No. V.

paratus of the scheme of redemption must have been superfluous for the purpose of rescuing the world from the terrors and dominion of sin; when this might have been effected, in a way infinitely more simple, and intelligible, and better calculated to excite our gratitude and love, merely by proclaiming to mankind a free pardon, and perfect indemnity, on condition of repentance and amendment.

To the disputer, who would thus prescribe to God the mode by which he can best conduct his creatures to happiness, we might, as before, reply, by the application of his own argument to the course of ordinary events; and we might demand of him to inform us, wherefore the Deity should have left the sustenance of life depending on the tedious process of human labour and contrivance, in rearing from a small seed, and conducting to the perfection fitting it for the use of man, the necessary article of nourishment, when the end might have been at once accomplished by its instantaneous production. And will he contend that bread has not been ordained for the support of man, because, instead of the present circuitous mode of its production, it might have been rained down from heaven, like the manna in the wilderness? On grounds such as these, the Philosopher (as he wishes to be called) may be safely allowed to object to the notion of forgiveness by a Mediator.

With respect to every such objection as this, it may be well, once for all, to make this general observation.—We find, from the whole course of nature, that God governs the world, not by independent acts, but by connected system. The instruments which he employs, in the ordinary works of his providence, are not physically necessary to his operations. He might have acted without them if he pleased. He might, for instance, have created all men, without the intervention of parents: but where then had been the beneficial connexion between parents and children; and the numerous advantages resulting to human society, from such connexion? The difficulty lies here: the *uses*, arising from the *connexions* of God's acts may be various; and such are the *pregnancies*

of his works, that a *single act* may answer a prodigious variety of purposes. Of these several purposes we are, for the most part, ignorant: and from this ignorance are derived most of our weak objections against the ways of his providence; whilst we foolishly presume, that, like human agents, he has but one end in view [a].

This observation we shall find of material use in our examination of the remaining arguments adduced by the Deist, on the present subject. And there is none to which it more forcibly applies than to that, by which he endeavours to prove the notion of a Mediator to be inconsistent with the *divine immutability*. It is either, he affirms [b], agreeable to the will of God, to grant salvation on repentance, and then he *will* grant it without a Mediator: or it is not agreeable to his will, and then a Mediator can be of no avail, unless we admit the mutability of the divine decrees.

But the objector is not, perhaps, aware how far this reasoning will extend. Let us try it in the case of prayer. All such things as are agreeable to the will of God must be accomplished, whether we pray or not; and, therefore, our prayers are useless, unless they be supposed to have the power of altering his will. And, indeed, with equal conclusiveness it might be proved, that Repentance itself must be unnecessary. For, if it be fit that our sins should be forgiven, God will forgive us without repentance; and if it be unfit, repentance can be of no avail [c].

The error in all these conclusions is the same. It consists in mistaking a conditional for an absolute decree, and in supposing God to ordain an end unalterably, without any concern as to the intermediate steps whereby that end is to be accomplished. Whereas the *manner* is sometimes as necessary as the *act* proposed: so that if not done in that particular way, it would not have been done at all. Of this observation abundant illustration may be derived as well from natural, as from revealed religion. "Thus, we know, from natural religion, that it is agreeable to the will of God, that

[a] No. VI. [b] No. VII. [c] No. VIII.

the distresses of mankind should be relieved: and yet we see the destitute, from a wise constitution of Providence, left to the precarious benevolence of their fellow-men; and if not relieved by *them*, they are not relieved *at all*. In like manner, in Revelation, in the case of Naaman the Syrian, we find that God was willing he should be healed of his leprosy; but yet he was not willing that it should be done, except in *one particular manner*. Abana and Pharpar were as famous as any of the rivers of Israel. Could he not wash in them, and be clean? Certainly he might, if the design of God had been no more than to heal him. Or it might have been done without any washing at all. But the healing was not the only design of God, nor the most important. The *manner* of the cure was of more consequence in the moral design of God, than the *cure* itself: the effect being produced, for the sake of manifesting to the whole kingdom of Syria the great power of the God of Israel, by which the cure was performed." And, in like manner, though God willed that the penitent sinner should receive forgiveness, we may see good reason, why, agreeably to his usual proceeding, he might will it to be granted in one particular manner only,—through the intervention of a Mediator[a].

Although, in the present stage of the subject, in which we are concerned with the objections of the DEIST, the argument should be confined to the deductions of natural reason; yet I have added this instance from Revelation, because, strange to say, some who assume the name of Christians, and profess not altogether to discard the written word of Revelation, adopt the very principle which we have just examined. For what are the doctrines of that description of Christians[b], in the sister country, who glory in having brought down the high things of God to the level of man's understanding?—That Christ was a person sent into the world, to promulgate the will of God; to communicate new lights, on the subject of religious duties; by his life, to set an example of perfect obedience; by his death, to manifest his sincerity; and by

[a] No. IX. [b] No. X.

his resurrection, to convince us of the great truth which he had been commissioned to teach,—our rising again to future life. This, say they, is the sum and substance of Christianity. It furnishes a purer morality, and a more operative enforcement: its morality more pure, as built on juster notions of the divine nature; and its enforcement more operative, as founded on a *certainty* of a state of retribution[a].—And is, then, Christianity nothing but a new and more formal promulgation of the religion of nature? Is the death of Christ but an attestation of his truth? And are we, after all, left to our own merit for acceptance; and obliged to trust, for our salvation, to the perfection of our obedience? Then, indeed, has the great Author of our Religion in vain submitted to the agonies of the cross; if, after having given to mankind a law which leaves them less excusable in their transgressions, he has left them to be judged by the rigour of that law, and to stand or fall by their own personal deserts.

It is said, indeed, that, as by this new dispensation the certainty of pardon, on repentance, has been made known, mankind has been informed of all that is essential in the doctrine of mediation. But, granting that no more was intended to be conveyed than the sufficiency of repentance, yet it remains to be considered *in what way* that repentance was likely to be brought about. Was the bare declaration, that God would forgive the repentant sinner, sufficient to ensure his amendment? Or was it not rather calculated to render him easy under guilt, from the facility of reconciliation? What was there to alarm, to rouse, the sinner from the apathy of habitual transgression? What was there to make that impression which the nature of God's moral government demands? Shall we say, that the grateful sense of divine mercy would be sufficient; and that the generous feelings of our nature, awakened by the supreme goodness, would have secured our obedience? that is, shall we say, that the love of virtue, and of right, would have maintained man in his allegiance? And have we not, then, had abundant ex-

[a] No. XI.

perience of what man can do, when left to his own exertions, to be cured of such vain and idle fancies? What is the history of man, from the creation to the time of Christ, but a continued trial of his natural strength? And what has been the *moral* of that history, but that man is strong, only as he feels himself weak?—strong, only as he feels that his nature is corrupt, and, from a consciousness of that corruption, is led to place his whole reliance upon God? What is the description which the Apostle of the Gentiles has left us, of the state of the world at the coming of our Saviour?—*Being filled with all unrighteousness, fornication, wickedness, covetousness, maliciousness; full of envy, murder, debate, deceit, malignity; whisperers, backbiters, haters of God, despiteful, proud, boasters, inventors of evil things, disobedient to parents, without understanding, covenant breakers, without natural affection, implacable, unmerciful—who, knowing the judgment of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death, not only do the same, but have pleasure in them that do them*[a].

Here were the fruits of that natural goodness of the human heart, which is the favourite theme and fundamental principle with that class of Christians with whom we are at present concerned. And have we not, then, had full experiment of our natural powers? And shall we yet have the madness to fly back to our own sufficiency, and our own merits, and to turn away from that gracious support, which is offered to us through the mediation of Christ?[b] No: lost as men were, at the time when Christ appeared, to all sense of true Religion; lost as they must be to it, at all times, when left to a proud confidence in their own sufficiency; nothing short of a strong and salutary terror could awaken them to virtue. Without some striking expression of God's abhorrence of sin, which might work powerfully on the imagination, and on the heart, what could prove a sufficient counteraction to the violent impulse of natural passions? what, to the entailed depravation, which the history of man, no less than the voice

[a] Rom. i. 29, 30, 31, 32. [b] No. XII.

of Revelation, pronounces to have infected the whole human race? Besides, without a full and adequate sense of guilt, the very notion of forgiveness, as it relates to us, is unintelligible. We can have no idea of forgiveness, unless conscious of something to be forgiven. Ignorant of our forgiveness, we remain ignorant of that goodness which confers it. And thus, without some proof of God's hatred for sin, we remain unacquainted with the greatness of his love.

The simple promulgation, then, of forgiveness on repentance, could not answer the purpose. Merely to *know* the condition could avail nothing. An *inducement*, of sufficient force to ensure its *fulfilment*, was essential. The system of *sufficiency* had been fully tried, to satisfy mankind of its folly. It was now time to introduce a new system, the system of *humility*. And for this purpose, what expedient could have been devised more suitable, than that which has been adopted?—the sacrifice of the Son of God, for the sins of men: proclaiming to the world, by the greatness of the ransom, the immensity of the *guilt*[a]; and thence, at the same time, evincing, in the most fearful manner, God's utter abhorrence of sin, in requiring such expiation; and the infinity of his love, in appointing it.

To this expedient for man's salvation, though it be the clear and express language of Scripture, I have as yet sought no support from the authority of Scripture itself. Having hitherto had to contend with the Deist, who denies all Revelation, and the pretending Christian, who, rationalising away its substance, finds it a mere moral system, and can discover in it no trace of a Redeemer, to urge the declarations of Scripture, as to the particular nature of redemption, would be to no purpose. Its authority disclaimed by the one and evaded by the other, each becomes unassailable on any ground, but that which he has chosen for himself,—the ground of general reason.

But we come now to consider the objections of a class of Christians, who, as they profess to derive their arguments

[a] No. XIII.

from the language and meaning of Scripture[a], will enable us to try the subject of our discussion by the only true standard, the word of Revelation. And, indeed, it were most sincerely to be wished, that the doctrines of Scripture were at all times collected purely from the Scripture itself; and that preconceived notions, and arbitrary theories, were not first to be formed, and then the Scripture pressed into the service of each fanciful dogma. If God has vouchsafed a Revelation, has he not thereby imposed a duty of submitting our understandings to its perfect wisdom? Shall weak, short-sighted man presume to say,—"If I find the discoveries of Revelation correspond to my notions of what is right and fit, I will admit them: but if they do not, I am sure they cannot be the genuine sense of Scripture: and I am sure of it on this principle,—that the wisdom of God cannot disagree with itself?" That is, to express it truly, that the wisdom of God cannot but agree with what this judge of the actions of the Almighty deems it wise for him to do. The language of Scripture must, then, by every possible refinement, be made to surrender its fair and natural meaning, to this predetermination of its necessary import. But the word of Revelation being thus pared down to the puny dimensions of human reason, how differs the Christian from the Deist? The only difference is this: that whilst the one denies that God hath given us a Revelation; the other, compelled by evidence to receive it, endeavours to render it of no effect. But in both, there is the same self-sufficiency, the same pride of understanding, that would erect itself on the ground of human reason, and that disdains to accept the divine favour on any conditions but its own. In both, in short, the very characteristic of a Christian spirit is wanting—HUMILITY. For in what consists the entire of Christianity but in this,—that, feeling an utter incapacity to work out our own salvation, we submit our whole selves, our hearts, and our understandings, to the divine disposal; and that, relying on God's gracious assistance, ensured to our honest endeavours to obtain it,

[a] No. XIV.

through the mediation of Christ Jesus, we look up to him, and to him alone, for safety? Nay, what is the very *notion* of religion, but this humble reliance upon God? Take this away, and we become a race of independent beings, claiming, as a debt, the reward of our good works[a]; a sort of contracting party with the Almighty, contributing nought to his glory, but anxious to maintain our own independence, and our own rights. And is it not to subdue this rebellious spirit, which is necessarily at war with Virtue and with God, that Christianity has been introduced? Does not every page of Revelation peremptorily pronounce this? And yet, shall we exercise this spirit, even upon Christianity itself? God forbid! If our pride of understanding, and self-sufficiency of reason, are not made to prostrate themselves before the awfully mysterious truths of Revelation; if we do not bring down the rebellious spirit of our nature, to confess that the *wisdom of man* is but *foolishness with God*, we may bear the name of Christians, but we want the essence of Christianity.

These observations, though they apply, in their full extent, only to those who reduce Christianity to a system purely rational, are yet, in a certain degree, applicable to the description of Christians, whose notion of redemption we now come to consider. For what but a preconceived theory, to which Scripture had been compelled to yield its obvious and genuine signification, could ever have led to the opinion, that, in the death of Christ, there was *no expiation for sin;* that the word *sacrifice* has been used by the writers of the New Testament merely in a figurative sense; and that the whole doctrine of the Redemption amounts but to this,— "that God, willing to pardon repentant sinners, and at the same time willing to do it only in that way which would best promote the cause of virtue, appointed that Jesus Christ should come into the world; and that *he*, having taught the pure doctrines of the Gospel, having passed a life of exemplary virtue, having endured many sufferings, and finally death itself, to prove his truth, and perfect his obedience;

[a] No. XV.

and having risen again, to manifest the certainty of a future state; has, not only, by his example, proposed to mankind a pattern for imitation; but has, by the merits of his obedience, obtained, through his intercession, as a reward, a kingdom or government over the world, whereby he is enabled to bestow pardon, and final happiness, upon all who will accept them, on the terms of sincere repentance?"[a] That is, in other words, we receive salvation through a Mediator: the mediation is conducted through intercession: and that intercession is successful, in recompense of the meritorious obedience of our Redeemer.

Here, indeed, we find the notion of redemption admitted: but in setting up, for this purpose, the doctrine of *pure intercession* in opposition to that of *atonement*, we shall perhaps discover, when properly examined, some small tincture of that mode of reasoning, which, as we have seen, has led the modern Socinian to contend against the idea of Redemption at large; and the Deist, against that of Revelation itself.

For the present, let us confine our attention to the *objections* which the patrons of this new system bring against the principle of atonement, as set forth in the doctrines of that Church to which we more immediately belong. As for those which are founded in views of general reason, a little reflection will convince us, that there is not one, which can be alleged against the latter, that may not be urged, with equal force, against the former: not a single difficulty, with which it is attempted to encumber the one, that does not equally embarrass the other. This having been evinced, we shall then see how little reason there was for relinquishing the plain and natural meaning of Scripture; and for opening the door to a latitude of interpretation, in which it is but too much the fashion to indulge at the present day, and which, if persevered in, must render the word of God a nullity.

The first and most important of the objections we have now to consider, is that which represents the doctrine of atonement as founded on the *divine implacability*—inasmuch

[a] No. XVI.

as it supposes, that, to appease the rigid justice of God, it was requisite that punishment should be inflicted; and that, consequently, the sinner *could* not by any means have been released, had not Christ suffered in his stead[a]. Were this a faithful statement of the doctrine of atonement, there had, indeed, been just ground for the objection. But that this is not the fair representation of candid truth, let the objector feel, by the application of the same mode of reasoning to the system which he upholds. If it was necessary to the forgiveness of man, that Christ should suffer; and through the merits of his obedience, and as the fruit of his intercession, obtain the power of granting that forgiveness; does it not follow, that, had not Christ thus suffered, and interceded, we could not have been forgiven? And has *he* not then, as it were, taken us out of the hands of a severe and strict Judge; and is it not to *him* alone that we owe our pardon? Here the argument is exactly parallel, and the objection of implacability equally applies. Now what is the answer? "That although it is through the merits and intercession of Christ, that we are forgiven; yet these were not the *procuring cause*, but the *means*, by which God, originally disposed to forgive, thought it right to bestow his pardon." Let then the word *intercession* be changed for *sacrifice*, and see whether the answer be not equally conclusive.

The sacrifice of Christ was never deemed by any, who did not wish to calumniate the doctrine of atonement, to have *made* God placable; but merely viewed as the *means*, appointed by divine wisdom, through which to bestow forgiveness. And agreeably to this, do we not find this sacrifice everywhere spoken of, as ordained by God himself?—*God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life*[b]—and, *herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins*[c];—and again we are told, that *we are redeemed with the precious blood of Christ, as of a Lamb without*

[a] No. XVII. [b] John, iii. 16. [c] 1 John, iv. 10.

blemish and without spot—who verily was foreordained before the foundation of the world[a]—and again, that Christ is *the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world*[b]. Since, then, the notion of the efficiency of the sacrifice of Christ, contained in the doctrine of atonement, stands precisely on the same foundation with that of pure intercession, — merely as the *means* whereby God has thought fit to grant his favour and gracious aid to repentant sinners, and to fulfil that merciful intention which he had at all times entertained towards his fallen creatures; and since, by the same sort of representation, the charge of implacability in the Divine Being is as applicable to the one scheme as to the other; that is, since it is a calumny most foully cast upon both; we may estimate with what candour this has been made, by those who hold the one doctrine, the fundamental ground of their objections against the other. For it is on the ground of the expression of God's unbounded love to his creatures everywhere through Scripture, and of his several declarations that he forgave them *freely*, that they principally contend, that the notion of expiation by the sacrifice of Christ cannot be the genuine doctrine of the New Testament[c].

But still it is demanded, "in what way can the death of Christ, considered as a sacrifice of expiation, be conceived to operate to the remission of sins, unless by the appeasing a Being, who otherwise would not have forgiven us?"—To this the answer of the Christian is, "I know not, nor does it concern me to know, *in what manner* the sacrifice of Christ is connected with the forgiveness of sins: it is enough, that this is declared by God to be the medium through which my salvation is effected. I pretend not to dive into the councils of the Almighty. I submit to his wisdom: and I will not reject his grace, because his mode of vouchsafing it is not within my comprehension." But now let us try the doctrine of pure intercession by this same objection. It has been asked, how can the sufferings of one Being be conceived to have any connexion with the forgiveness of another? Let us like-

[a] 1 Pet. i. 18, 19, 20. [b] Revel. xiii. 8. [c] No. XVIII.

wise inquire, how the meritorious obedience of one Being can be conceived to have any connexion with the pardon of the transgressions of another[a]: or whether the prayer of a righteous being in behalf of a wicked person can be imagined to have more weight in obtaining forgiveness for the transgressor, than the same supplication, seconded by the offering up of life itself, to procure that forgiveness? The fact is, the want of discoverable connexion has nothing to do with either. Neither the sacrifice, nor the intercession, has, so far as we can comprehend, any *efficacy* whatever. All that we know, or can know of the one, or of the other, is, that it has been appointed as the means by which God has determined to act with respect to man. So that to object to the one, because the mode of operation is unknown, is not only giving up the other, but the very notion of a Mediator; and, if followed on, cannot fail to lead to pure Deism, and, perhaps, may not stop even there.

Thus we have seen, to what the general objections against the doctrine of atonement amount. The charges of *divine implacability*, and of *inefficacious means*, we have found to bear with as little force against this, as against the doctrine which it is attempted to substitute in its room.

We come now to the objections which are drawn from the immediate language of Scripture, in those passages in which the nature of our redemption is described. And first, it is asserted, that it is nowhere said in Scripture, that God is reconciled *to us* by Christ's Death, but that we are everywhere said to be reconciled *to God*[b]. Now, in this objection, which clearly lays the whole stress upon *our obedience*, we discover the secret spring of this entire system, which is set up in opposition to the scheme of atonement: we see that reluctance to part with the proud feeling of merit, with which the principle of Redemption by the sacrifice of Christ is openly at war; and, consequently, we see the essential difference there is between the two doctrines at present under consideration; and the necessity there exists for separating

[a] No. XIX. [b] No. XX.

them by the clearest marks of distinction. But, to return to the objection that has been made: it very fortunately happens, that we have the meaning of the words in their Scripture use, defined by no less an authority than that of our Saviour himself.—*If thou bring thy gift to the altar, and there rememberest that thy brother hath* AUGHT AGAINST THEE, *leave there thy gift before the altar, and go thy way—first* BE RECONCILED *to thy brother, and then come and offer thy gift*[a]. Now, from this plain instance, in which the person *offending* is expressly described as the party to *be reconciled to* him who had been *offended*, by agreeing to his terms of accommodation, and thereby making his peace with him, it manifestly appears in what sense this expression is to be understood, in the language of the New Testament. The very words, then, produced for the purpose of showing that there was no displeasure on the part of God, which it was necessary by some means to avert, prove the direct contrary: and our *being reconciled to God*, evidently does not mean our giving up our sins, and thereby laying aside *our* enmity[b] to God, (in which sense the objection supposes it to be taken,) but the turning away *his* displeasure, whereby we are enabled to regain his favour. And, indeed, it were strange had it not meant this. What! are we to suppose the God of the Christian, like the Deity of the Epicurean, to look on with indifference upon the actions of this life, and not to be offended at the sinner? The displeasure of God, it is to be remembered, is not, like man's displeasure, a resentment or passion; but a judicial disapprobation: which if we abstract from our notion of God, we must cease to view him as the moral governor of the world. And it is from the want of this distinction which is so highly necessary, and the consequent fear of degrading the Deity, by attributing to him what might appear to be the weakness of passion, that they, who trust to reason more than to Scripture, have been withheld from admitting any principle that implied displeasure on the part of God. Had they attended but a little to the plain lan-

[a] Matt. v. 23, 24.

[b] No. XXI.

guage of Scripture, they might have rectified their mistake. They would there have found the wrath of God against the disobedient spoken of in almost every page [a]. They would have found also a case, which is exactly in point to the main argument before us; in which there is described, not only the wrath of God, but, the turning away of his displeasure by the mode of sacrifice. The case is that of the three friends of Job,—in which God expressly says that his *wrath is kindled against the friends of Job, because they had not spoken of him the thing that was right* [b];—and at the same time directs them to offer up a sacrifice, as the way of averting his anger [c].

But then it is urged, that God is everywhere spoken of as a Being of infinite love. True; and the whole difficulty arises from building on partial texts. When men perpetually talk of God's justice as being necessarily modified by his goodness [d], they seem to forget that it is no less the language of Scripture, and of reason, that his goodness should be modified by his justice. Our error on this subject proceeds from our own narrow views, which compel us to consider the attributes of the Supreme Being as so many distinct qualities; when we should conceive of them as inseparably blended together, and his *whole nature* as *one great impulse* to what is *best*.

As to God's displeasure against sinners, there can be then upon the whole no reasonable ground of doubt. And against the doctrine of atonement no difficulty can arise from the Scripture phrase, of men being *reconciled to God:* since, as we have seen, that directly implies the turning away the displeasure of God, so as to be again restored to his favour and protection.

But, though all this must be admitted by those who will not shut their eyes against reason and Scripture, yet still it is contended that the death of Christ cannot be considered as a *propitiatory sacrifice*. Now, when we find him described

[a] No. XXII.
[b] Job, xlii. 7.
[c] No. XXIII.
[d] No. XXIV.

as *the Lamb*[a] *of God, which taketh away the sins of the world*[b]; when we are told, that *Christ hath given himself for us, an offering and a sacrifice to God*[c]; and that he *needed not, like the High Priests under the law, to offer up sacrifice daily, first for his own sins, and then for the people's; for that this he did once, when he offered up himself*[d]; when he is expressly asserted to be the *propitiation for our sins*[e]; and God is said to have *loved us, and* to have *sent his Son to be the propitiation*[f] *for our sins*[g]; when Isaiah[h] describes *his soul as made an offering for sin*[i]; when it is said that *God spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all*[k]; and that *by him we have received the*[l] *atonement*[m]; when these, and many other such passages, are to be found; when every expression, referring to the death of Christ, evidently indicates the notion of a sacrifice of atonement and propitiation; when this sacrifice is particularly represented, as of the nature of a *sin offering*; which was a species of sacrifice[n] "prescribed to be offered upon the commission of an offence, after which the offending person was considered as if he had never sinned:"—it may well appear surprising on what ground it can be questioned that the death of Christ is pronounced in Scripture to have been a sacrifice of atonement and expiation for the sins of men.

It is asserted that the several passages which seem to speak this language contain nothing more than *figurative allusions*; that all that is intended is, that Christ laid down his life *for*, that is, *on account of*, mankind[o]; and that there being circumstances of resemblance between this event and the sacrifices of the Law, terms were borrowed from the latter, to express the former in a manner more lively and impressive. And as a proof that the application of these terms is but figurative[p], it is contended, 1st[q], That the death of Christ did

[a] No. XXV.
[b] John, i. 29.
[c] Ephes. v. 2.
[d] Hebr. vii. 27.
[e] 1 John, ii. 2.
[f] No. XXVI.
[g] 1 John, iv. 10.
[h] liii. 10.
[i] No. XXVII.
[k] Rom. iivi. 32.
[l] No. XXVIII.
[m] Rom. v. 11.
[n] No. XXIX.
[o] No. XXX.
[p] No. XXXI.
[q] No. XXXII.

not correspond *literally*, and exactly, to the ceremonies of the Mosaic Sacrifice: 2dly, That being, in different places, compared to different kinds of sacrifices, to *all* of which it could not possibly correspond, it cannot be considered as exactly of the nature of *any:* and lastly, That there was no such thing as a sacrifice of *propitiation* or *expiation of sin*, under the Mosaic dispensation at all; this notion having been entirely of Heathen origin [a].

As to the two first arguments, they deserve but little consideration. The want of an exact similitude to the precise form of the Mosaic sacrifice is but a slender objection. It might as well be said, that because Christ was not of the species of animal, which had usually been offered up; or because he was not slain in the same manner; or because he was not offered by the High Priest, there could have been no sacrifice [b]. But this is manifest trifling. If the formal notion of a sacrifice for sin, that is, a life offered up in expiation, be adhered to, nothing more can be required to constitute it a sacrifice, except by those who mean to cavil, not to discover truth.

Again, as to the second argument, which, from the comparison of Christ's death to the *different* kinds of sacrifices, would infer that it was not of the nature of *any*, it may be replied, that it will more reasonably follow that it was of the nature of *all*. Resembling that of the *Passover* [c], inasmuch as by it we were delivered from an evil yet greater than that of Egyptian bondage; partaking the nature of the *Sin offering*, as being accepted in expiation of transgression; and similar to the institution of the *Scape Goat*, as bearing the accumulated sins of all; may we not reasonably suppose that this one great sacrifice contained the full import and completion of the whole sacrificial system; and that so far from being spoken of in figure, as bearing some resemblance to the sacrifices of the Law, *they* were on the contrary, as the apostle expressly tells us [d], but figures, or faint and partial

[a] No. XXXIII.
[b] No. XXXIV.
[c] No. XXXV.
[d] Hebr. x. 1.

representations, of this stupendous sacrifice, which had been ordained from the beginning? And, besides, it is to be remarked in general, with respect to the figurative application of the sacrificial terms to the death of Christ, that the striking resemblance between that and the sacrifices of the Law, which is assigned as the reason of such application, would have produced just the contrary effect upon the sacred writers; since they must have been aware that the constant use of such expressions, aided by the strength of the resemblance, must have laid a foundation for error in that which constitutes the main doctrine of the Christian faith. Being addressed to a people whose religion was entirely sacrificial, in what, but the obvious and literal sense, could the sacrificial representations of the death of Christ have been understood?

We come now to the third and principal objection, which is built upon the assertion, that no sacrifices of *atonement* (in the sense in which we apply this term to the death of Christ) had existence under the Mosaic Law; such as were called by that name having had an entirely different import[a]. Now, that certain offerings under this denomination related to *things*, and were employed for the purpose of purification, so as to render them fit instruments of the ceremonial worship, must undoubtedly be admitted. That others were again appointed to relieve *persons* from *ceremonial* incapacities, so as to restore them to the privilege of joining in the services of the temple, is equally true. But that there were others of a nature strictly *propitiatory*, and ordained to avert the displeasure of God from the transgressor not only of the ceremonial, but, in some cases, even of the *moral* law[b], will appear manifest upon a very slight examination. Thus, we find it decreed, that *if a soul sin, and commit a trespass against the Lord, and lie unto his neighbour in that which was delivered him to keep—or have found that which was lost, and lieth concerning it, and* SWEARETH FALSELY, *then, because he hath sinned in this, he shall not only make restitution to his neighbour—but he shall bring his trespass-*

[a] No. XXXVI. [b] No. XXXVII.

offering unto the Lord, a ram without blemish out of the flock; and the Priest shall make an ATONEMENT *for him before the Lord, and it shall be* FORGIVEN HIM [a]. And again, in a case of criminal connexion with a bond-maid who was betrothed, the offender is ordered to *bring his trespass-offering, and the Priest is to make* ATONEMENT *for him with the tresspass-offering, for the sin which he hath done; and the sin which he hath done shall be* FORGIVEN *him* [b]. And in the case of all offences which fell not under the description of *presumptuous*, it is manifest, from the slightest inspection of the book of Leviticus, that the atonement prescribed was appointed as the means whereby God might be *propitiated*, or *reconciled to the offender*.

Again, as to the *vicarious* import of the Mosaic sacrifice [c], or, in other words, its expressing an acknowledgment of what the sinner had deserved; this not only seems directly set forth in the account of the first offering in Leviticus, where it is said of the person who brought a free-will offering, *he shall put his hand upon the head* [d] *of the burnt offering, and it shall be* ACCEPTED FOR *him, to make atonement for him* [e]; but the ceremony of the Scape-Goat on the day of expiation appears to place this matter beyond doubt. On this head, however, as not being *necessary* [f] to my argument, I shall not at present enlarge.

That expiatory sacrifice (in the strict and proper sense of the word) was a part of the Mosaic institution, there remains then, I trust, no sufficient reason to deny. That it existed in like manner amongst the Arabians [g], in the time of Job, we have already seen. And that its universal prevalence in the Heathen world, though corrupted and disfigured by idolatrous practices, was the result of an original divine appointment, every candid inquirer will find little reason to doubt [h]. But, be this as it may, it must be ad-

[a] Levit. vi. 2—7.
[b] Levit. xix. 20—22.
[c] No. XXXVIII.
[d] No. XXXIX.
[e] Levit. i. 4.
[f] No. XL.
[g] No. LIX.
[h] No. XLI.

mitted, that *propitiatory sacrifices* not only existed throughout the whole Gentile world, but had place under the law of Moses. The argument, then, which, from the non-existence of such sacrifices amongst the Jews, would deny the term when applied to the death of Christ to indicate such sacrifice, necessarily falls to the ground [a].

But, in fact, they, who deny the sacrifice of Christ to be a real and proper sacrifice for sin, must, if they are consistent, deny that *any such* sacrifice ever did exist, by divine appointment. For on what principle do they deny the former, but this?—that the sufferings and death of Christ, for the sins and salvation of men, can make no change in God; cannot render him more ready to forgive, more benevolent, than he is in his own nature; and, consequently, can have no power to avert from the offender the punishment of his transgression. Now, on the same principle, *every* sacrifice for the expiation of sin must be impossible. And this explains the true cause why these persons will not admit the language of the New Testament, clear and express as it is, to signify a real and proper sacrifice for sin; and why they feel it necessary to explain away the equally clear and express description of that species of sacrifice in the Old [b]. Setting out with a preconceived, erroneous notion of its nature, and one which involves a manifest contradiction, they hold themselves justified in rejecting every acceptation of Scripture which supports it. But, had they more accurately examined the true import of the term in Scripture use, they would have perceived no such contradiction, nor would they have found themselves compelled to refine away, by strained and unnatural interpretations, the clear and obvious meaning of the sacred text. They would have seen that a sacrifice for sin, in Scripture language, implies solely this,—"a sacrifice wisely and graciously *appointed* by God, the moral governor of the world, to expiate the *guilt* of sin in such a manner as to avert the *punishment* of it from the offender." [c] To ask *why* God should have appointed this particular mode, or in *what*

[a] No. XLII. [b] No. XLIII. [c] No. XLIV.

way it can avert the punishment of sin; is to take us back to the general point at issue with the Deist, which has been already discussed. With the Christian, who admits redemption under *any* modification, such matters cannot be a subject of inquiry.

But, even to our imperfect apprehension, some circumstances of natural connexion and fitness may be pointed out. The whole may be considered as a sensible and striking representation of a punishment, which the sinner was conscious he deserved from God's justice: and then, on the part of God, it becomes a public declaration of his *holy displeasure* against sin, and of his *merciful compassion* for the sinner; and on the part of the offender, when offered by or for him, it implies a sincere *confession of guilt*, and a hearty desire of obtaining *pardon:* and upon the *due* performance of this service, the sinner is pardoned, and escapes the penalty of his transgression.

This we shall find agreeable to the nature of a *sacrifice for sin*, as laid down in the Old Testament. Now, is there any thing in this degrading to the honour of God, or, in the smallest degree, inconsistent with the dictates of natural reason? And, in this view, what is there in the death of Christ, as a sacrifice for the sins of mankind, that may not, in a certain degree, be embraced by our natural notions? For, according to the explanation just given, is it not a declaration to the whole world, of the greatness of their sins; and of the proportionate mercy and compassion of God, who had ordained this method, whereby, in a manner consistent with his attributes, his fallen creatures might be again taken into his favour, on their making themselves parties in this great sacrifice; that is, on their complying with those conditions, which, on the received notion of sacrifice, would render them parties in this; namely, an adequate conviction of guilt, a proportionate sense of God's love, and a firm determination, with an humble faith in the sufficiency of this sacrifice, to endeavour after a life of amendment and obedience? Thus much falls within the reach of our comprehen-

sion on this mysterious subject. Whether, in the expanded range of God's moral government, some other end may not be held in view, in the death of his only begotten Son, it is not for us to inquire; nor does it in any degree concern us to know. What God *has* been pleased to reveal, it is alone our duty to believe.

One remarkable circumstance, indeed, there is, in which the sacrifice of Christ differs from all those sacrifices which were offered under the law. Our blessed Lord was not only the *Subject* of the offering, but the *Priest* who offered it. Therefore he has become not only a sacrifice, but an intercessor; his intercession being founded upon this voluntary act of benevolence, by which *he offered himself without spot to God*. We are not only, then, in virtue of the *sacrifice*, forgiven; but, in virtue of the *intercession*, admitted to favour and grace. And thus the Scripture notion of the sacrifice of Christ includes every advantage, which the advocates for the pure intercession seek from their scheme of redemption. But it also contains others, which they necessarily lose by the rejection of that notion. It contains the great advantage[a] of impressing mankind with a *due* sense of their guilt, by compelling a comparison with the immensity of the sacrifice made to redeem them from its effects. It contains that, in short, which is the soul and substance of all Christian virtue —HUMILITY. And the fact is plainly this, that, in every attempt to get rid of the Scripture doctrine of atonement, we find feelings of a description opposite to this Evangelic quality, more or less, to prevail: we find a fondness for the opinion of man's own sufficiency, and an unwillingness to submit, with devout and implicit reverence, to the sacred word of Revelation.

If, now, upon the whole, it has appeared, that natural reason is unable to evince the *efficacy of repentance;* if it has appeared, that, for the purpose of forgiveness, the idea of a *Mediatorial scheme* is perfectly consistent with our ordinary notions; if it has appeared, that Revelation has most

[a] No. XLV.

unequivocally pronounced, that, through the mediation of Jesus Christ, the Son of God, *our redemption has been effected;* if it has appeared, that Christ is declared to have effected that redemption, by *the sacrifice of himself for the sins of mankind;* if it has appeared, that in the Scripture meaning of sacrifice for sin, is included *atonement for transgression;* and if it has appeared, that the expression has been applied to Christ, in the plain and literal sense of the word, as *the propitiation of an offended God;* I trust we are sufficiently fortified against the Deist, who denies the DIVINE MISSION; against the Socinian, who denies the REDEEMING MEDIATION; and against the modern rationalising Arian, who denies the EXPIATORY SACRIFICE of Christ: in short, against all, who would deprive us of any part of the precious benefits, which, as on this day, our Saviour died to procure for us; against all, who would rob us of that humble feeling of our own insufficiency, which alone can give us an ardent and animating faith in the death and merits of our blessed Redeemer.

DISCOURSE II.

HEBR. ix. 22.

"AND WITHOUT SHEDDING OF BLOOD IS NO REMISSION."

ON the last commemoration of the awful subject of this day's observance, it was attempted, in this place, to clear the important doctrine of Redemption from those difficulties in which it had been artfully entangled by the subtle speculations of the disputatious Deist, and of the philosophising Christian. The impotence of Reason to erect the degraded sinner to an *assured* hope of the *sufficiency* of repentance, pointed out to us the necessity of an express revelation on this head: that revelation, in announcing the expedient of a Mediator, was seen to fall in with the analogies of the Providential economy: the Mediatorial scheme was shown to have been accomplished, through the sacrifice of the only begotten Son of God; and this sacrifice to have been effective to the expiation of the sins of the whole human race. What the peculiar nature, and true import, of this sacrifice are, and in what sense the expiation effected by it is strictly to be understood, it is my purpose on this day to inquire. And as, on the one hand, there is no article of Christian knowledge of deeper concern, and, on the other, none that has been more studiously involved in obscurity, I trust that you, my young Brethren, will not refuse your patient attention, whilst I endeavour to unfold to your apprehension the genuine, because the Scriptural, interpretation of that great Sacrifice, whereby we are redeemed from the power of sin, and have *received the promise of an eternal inheritance.*

In the mode of inquiry which has been usually adopted on this subject, one prevailing error deserves to be noticed. The nature of sacrifice, as generally practised and understood, antecedent to the time of Christ, has been first examined; and from that, as a ground of explanation, the notion of Christ's sacrifice has been derived: whereas, in fact, by *this*, all former sacrifices are to be interpreted; and in reference to *it* only, can they be understood. From an error so fundamental, it is not wonderful that the greatest perplexities should have arisen concerning the nature of sacrifice in general, and that they should ultimately fall, with cumulative confusion, on the nature of that particular sacrifice, to the investigation of which fanciful and mistaken theories had been assumed as guides. Thus, whilst some have presumptuously attributed the early and universal practice of sacrifice to an irrational and superstitious fear of an imagined sanguinary divinity, and have been led, in defiance of the express language of Revelation, to reject and ridicule the notion of sacrifice, as originating only in the grossness of superstition[a]; others, not equally destitute of reverence for the sacred word, and consequently not treating this solemn rite with equal disrespect, have yet ascribed its origin to human invention[b]; and have thereby been compelled to account for the divine institution of the Jewish sacrifices, as a mere accommodation to prevailing practice; and, consequently, to admit even the sacrifice of Christ itself to have grown out of, and been adapted to, this creature of human excogitation.

Of this latter class, the theories, as might be expected, are various. In one, sacrifices are represented in the light of *gifts*[c], intended to soothe and appease the Supreme Being, in like manner as they are found to conciliate the favour of men: in another, they are considered as *federal rites*[d], a kind of eating and drinking with God, as it were, at his table, and thereby implying the being restored to a state of friendship with him, by repentance and confession of sins: in a third,

[a] No. XLVI. [b] No. XLVII. [c] No. XLVIII. [d] No. XLIX.

they are described as but *symbolical actions*, or a more expressive language, denoting the gratitude of the offerer, in such as are eucharistical; and in those that are expiatory, the acknowledgment of, and contrition for sin, strongly expressed by the death of the animal, representing *that* death, which the offerer confessed to be his own desert[a].

To these different hypotheses, which in the order of their enumeration, claim respectively the names of *Spencer*, *Sykes*, and *Warburton*, it may *generally* be replied, that the *fact* of Abel's sacrifice seems inconsistent with them all: with the first, inasmuch as it must have been antecedent to those distinctions of property, on which alone experience of the effects[b] of gifts upon men could have been founded: with the second, inasmuch as it took place several ages prior to that period, at which, both the words of Scripture, and the opinions of the wisest commentators, have fixed the permission of animal food to man[c]: with the third, inasmuch as the language which Scripture expressly states to have been derived to our first parents from divine instruction[d], cannot be supposed so defective in those terms that related to the worship of God, as to have rendered it necessary for Abel to call in the aid of actions, to express the sentiment of gratitude or sorrow; and still less likely is it, that he would have resorted to that *species* of action, which, in the eye of reason, must have appeared displeasing to God,—the slaughter of an unoffending animal[e].

To urge these topics of objection in their full force against the several theories which have been mentioned, would lead to a discussion far exceeding the due limits of a discourse from this place. I therefore dismiss them for the present. Nor shall I, in refutation of the *general* idea of the human invention of sacrifice, enlarge upon the *universality*[f] of the practice; the *sameness*[g] of the notion of its efficacy, pervading nations and ages the most remote; and the *unreasonableness* of supposing any natural connexion between the slaying

[a] No. L. [b] No. LI. [c] No. LII. [d] No. LIII. [e] No. LIV. [f] No. LV. [g] No. LVI.

of an animal and the receiving pardon for the violation of God's laws;—all of which appear decisive against that idea. But, as both the general idea, and the particular theories which have endeavoured to reconcile to it the nature and origin of sacrifice, have been caused by a departure from the true and only source of knowledge, let us return to that sacred fountain; and, whilst we endeavour to establish the genuine Scripture notion of sacrifice, at the same time provide the best refutation of every other.

It requires but little acquaintance with Scripture to know, that the lesson which it everywhere inculcates, is, that man by disobedience had fallen under the displeasure of his Maker; that to be reconciled to his favour, and restored to the means of acceptable obedience, a Redeemer was appointed; and that this Redeemer laid down his life, to procure for repentant sinners forgiveness and acceptance. This surrender of life has been called by the sacred writers, a sacrifice; and the end attained by it, expiation or atonement. With such as have been desirous to reduce Christianity to a mere moral system it has been a favourite object to represent this sacrifice as entirely figurative[a], founded only in allusion and similitude to the sacrifices of the law; whereas, that this is spoken of by the sacred writers as a real and proper sacrifice, to which those under the law bore respect but as types or shadows, is evident from various passages of Holy Writ, but more particularly from the epistle to the Hebrews; in which it is expressly said, that *the law, having a shadow of good things to come, can never with those sacrifices, which they offered year by year continually, make the comers thereunto perfect:—but this man, after he had offered one sacrifice for sins, for ever sat down on the right hand of God*[b]. And again, when the writer of this epistle speaks of the High Priest entering into the Holy of Holies with the blood of the sacrifice, he asserts, that *this was a figure for the time then present, in which were offered both gifts and sacrifices, that could not make him that did the*

[a] Nos. XXXI. and XLIII. [b] Hebr. x. 1. 12.

service perfect; but Christ being come, an High Priest of good things to come; not by the blood of goats and calves, but by his own blood, he entered once into the holy place, having obtained eternal redemption for us; for, he adds, *if the blood of bulls and of goats sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh, how much more shall the blood of Christ, who, through the eternal Spirit, offered himself without spot to God, purge your conscience from dead works to serve the living God?* [a] It must be unnecessary to detail more of the numerous passages, which go to prove that the sacrifice of Christ was a true and effective sacrifice, whilst those of the Law were but faint representations, and inadequate copies, intended for *its* introduction.

Now, if the sacrifices of the *Law* appear to have been but preparations for this one great Sacrifice, we are naturally led to consider, whether the same may not be asserted of sacrifice from the beginning; and whether we are not warranted by Scripture in pronouncing the entire rite to have been ordained by God, as a type of that ONE SACRIFICE, in which all others were to have their consummation.

That the institution was of divine ordinance [b] may, in the first instance, be reasonably inferred from the strong and sensible attestation of the divine acceptance of sacrifice in the case of Abel [c]; again, in that of Noah; afterwards, in that of Abraham; and also from the systematic establishment of it, by the same divine authority, in the dispensation of Moses. And, whether we consider the Book of Job [d] as the production of Moses; or of that pious worshipper of the true God, among the descendants of Abraham, whose name it bears; or of some other person who lived a short time after, and composed it from the materials left by Job himself; the representation there made of God as *prescribing* sacrifice to the friends of Job, in every supposition, exhibits a strong authority, and of high antiquity, upon this question.

These few facts, which I have stated, unaided by any comment, and abstracting altogether from the arguments which

[a] Hebr. ix. 9—14. [b] No. LVII. [c] No. LVIII. [d] No. LIX.

embarrass the contrary hypothesis to which I have already alluded, might, perhaps, be sufficient to satisfy an inquiring and candid mind, that sacrifice must have had its origin in DIVINE INSTITUTION. But if, in addition, this rite, as practised in the earliest ages, shall be found connected with the sacrifice of Christ, confessedly of divine appointment, little doubt can reasonably remain on this head. Let us, then, examine, more particularly, the circumstances of the first sacrifice offered up by Abel.

It is clear from the words of Scripture, that both Cain and Abel made oblations to the Lord. It is clear, also, notwithstanding the well known fanciful interpretation of an eminent commentator[a], that Abel's was an animal sacrifice. It is no less clear that Abel's was accepted, whilst that of Cain was rejected. Now, what could have occasioned the distinction? —The acknowledgment of the Supreme Being, and of his universal dominion, was no less strong in the offering of the fruits of the earth by Cain, than in that of the firstlings of the flock by Abel; the intrinsic efficacy of the gift must have been the same in each, each giving of the best that he possessed: the expression of gratitude was equally significant and forcible in both. How then is the difference[b] to be explained? If we look to the writer to the Hebrews, he informs us that the ground, on which Abel's oblation was preferred to that of Cain, was, that Abel offered his in *faith*; and the criterion of this faith also appears to have been, in the opinion of this writer, the *animal* sacrifice. The words are remarkable—*By faith Abel offered unto God a more excellent sacrifice than Cain, by which he obtained witness that he was righteous, God testifying of his gifts*[c]. The words here translated, *a more excellent sacrifice*, are in an early version rendered *a much more sacrifice*[d], which phrase, though uncouth in form, adequately conveys the original. The meaning then is, that by faith Abel offered that, which was much more of the true nature of sacrifice than what had been offered by Cain. Abel, consequently, was directed by faith; and this faith was mani-

[a] No. LX. [b] No. LXI. [c] Hebr. xi. 4. [d] No. LXII.

fested in the nature of his offering. What, then, are we to infer?—Without some revelation[a] granted, some assurance held out as the object of faith, Abel could not have exercised this virtue: and without some peculiar mode of sacrifice enjoined, he could not have exemplified his faith by an appropriate offering. The offering made, we have already seen, was that of an animal. Let us consider, whether this could have a connexion with any divine assurance, communicated at that early day.

It is obvious that the promise made to our first parents conveyed an intimation of some future deliverer, who should overcome the tempter that had drawn man from his innocence, and remove those evils which had been occasioned by the fall. This assurance, without which, or some other ground of hope, it seems difficult to conceive how the principle of religion could have had place among men, became to our first parents the grand object of faith. To perpetuate this fundamental article of religious belief among the descendants of Adam, some striking memorial of the fall of man, and of the promised deliverance, would naturally be appointed[b]. And, if we admit, that the scheme of Redemption by the death of the only begotten Son of God was determined from the beginning; that is, if we admit, that, when God had ordained the deliverance of man, he had ordained the means; if we admit, that Christ was *the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world;* what more apposite memorial could be devised than that of animal sacrifice?—exemplifying, by the slaying of the victim, the death which had been denounced against man's disobedience:—thus exhibiting the awful lesson of that death which was the wages of Sin, and at the same time representing that death which was actually to be undergone by the Redeemer of mankind:—and hereby connecting in one view the two great, cardinal events in the history of man,—the FALL, and the RECOVERY; the death denounced against sin; and the death appointed for that Holy One, who was to lay down his life to deliver man from the consequences

[a] No. LXIII. [b] No. LXIV.

of sin. The institution of animal sacrifice seems, then, to have been peculiarly significant, as containing all the elements of religious knowledge: and the adoption of this rite, with sincere and pious feelings, would at the same time imply an humble sense of the unworthiness of the offerer; a confession that death, which was inflicted on the victim, was the desert of those sins which had arisen from man's transgression; and a full reliance upon the promises of deliverance, joined to an acquiescence in the means appointed for its accomplishment.

If this view of the matter be just, there is nothing improbable even in the supposition, that that part of the signification of the rite, which related to the sacrifice of Christ, might have been in some degree made known from the beginning. But, not to contend for this, (Scripture having furnished no express foundation for the assumption,) room for the exercise of faith is equally preserved, on the idea, that animal sacrifice was enjoined in the general as the religious sign of faith in the promise of Redemption, without any intimation of the way in which it became a sign. Agreeably to these principles, we shall find but little difficulty in determining on what ground it was that Abel's offering was accepted, whilst that of Cain was rejected. Abel, in firm reliance on the promise of God, and in obedience to his command, offered that sacrifice, which had been enjoined as the religious expression of his faith; whilst Cain, disregarding the gracious assurances that had been vouchsafed, or, at least, disdaining to adopt the prescribed mode of manifesting his belief, possibly as not appearing to *his reason* to possess any efficacy or natural fitness, thought he had sufficiently acquitted himself of his duty, in acknowledging the general superintendence of God, and expressing his gratitude to the Supreme Benefactor, by presenting some of those good things, which he thereby confessed to have been derived from his bounty. In short, Cain, the first-born of the fall, exhibits the first-fruits of his Parent's disobedience, in the arrogance and self-sufficiency of reason rejecting the aids of Revelation,

because they fell not within *its* apprehension of right. He takes the first place in the annals of Deism, and displays, in his proud rejection of the ordinance of sacrifice, the same spirit which, in later days, has actuated his *enlightened* followers, in rejecting the sacrifice of Christ.

This view of the subject receives strength from the terms of expostulation in which God addresses Cain, on his expressing resentment at the rejection of *his* offering, and the acceptance of Abel's. The words in the present version are, *If thou doest well, shalt thou not be accepted?—and if thou doest not well, sin lieth at the door*[a]—which words, as they stand connected in the context, supply no very satisfactory meaning, and have long served to exercise the ingenuity of Commentators to but little purpose. But, if the word, which is here translated SIN, be rendered, as we find it in a great variety of passages in the Old Testament, a SIN OFFERING, the reading of the passage then becomes, *if thou doest well, shalt thou not be accepted? and if thou doest not well, a sin offering lieth even at the door*[b]. The connexion is thus rendered evident. God rebukes Cain for not conforming to that species of sacrifice, which had been offered by Abel. He refers to it, as a matter of known injunction; and hereby points out the ground of distinction, in his treatment of him and his brother: and thus, in direct terms, enforces the observance of animal sacrifice.

As that part of my general position, which pronounces sacrifice to have been of *divine institution*, receives support from the passage just recited; so, to that part of it, which maintains, that this rite bore an aspect to the *sacrifice of Christ*, additional evidence may be derived from the language of the writer to the Hebrews, inasmuch as he places the blood of Abel's sacrifice in direct comparison with the blood of Christ, which he styles pre-eminently *the blood of sprinkling*[c]; and represents both, as *speaking good things*, in different degrees[d]. What then is the result of the foregoing reflections?

[a] Gen. iv. 7.
[b] No. LXV.
[c] Hebr. xii. 24.
[d] No. LXVI.

—The sacrifice of Abel was an animal sacrifice. This sacrifice was accepted. The ground of this acceptance was the *faith* in which it was offered. Scripture assigns no other object of this faith, but the promise of a Redeemer: and of this faith, the offering of an animal in sacrifice appears to have been the legitimate, and, consequently, the instituted, expression. The institution of animal sacrifice, then, was coeval with the fall, and had a reference to the sacrifice of our redemption. But, as it had also an immediate, and most apposite, application to that important event in the condition of man, which, as being the occasion of, was essentially connected with, the work of redemption; *that* likewise, we have reason to think, was included in its signification. And thus, upon the whole, SACRIFICE appears to have been ordained, *as a standing memorial of the death introduced by sin, and of that death which was to be suffered by the Redeemer.*

We, accordingly, find this institution of animal sacrifice continue until the giving of the law: no other offering than that of an animal being recorded in Scripture down to this period [a], except in the case of Cain; and that, we have seen, was rejected. The sacrifices of Noah and of Abraham are stated to have been burnt-offerings. Of the same kind also were the sin-offerings presented by Job; he being said to have offered burnt-offerings according to the number of his sons, lest some of them *might have sinned in their hearts* [b]. But, when we come to the promulgation of the law, we find the connexion between animal sacrifice and atonement, or reconciliation with God, clearly and distinctly announced. It is here declared, that sacrifices for sin should, on conforming to certain prescribed modes of oblation, be accepted as the means of deliverance from the penal consequences of transgression. And, with respect to the *peculiar* efficacy of animal sacrifice, we find this remarkable declaration,—*the life of the flesh is in the blood, and I have given it to you upon the altar, to make atonement for the Soul* [c]: in reference to which words, the sacred writer, from whom I have

[a] No. LXVII. [b] Job, i. 5. [c] Lev. xvii. 11.

taken the subject of this day's discourse, formally pronounces, that *without shedding of blood there is no remission.* Now, in what conceivable light can we view this institution, but in relation to that great Sacrifice, which *was* to make atonement for sins; to that *blood of sprinkling*, which was to *speak better things than that of Abel*[a], or that of the law? The *law* itself is said to have had respect solely unto him. To what else can the principal institution of the law refer?—an institution, too, which, unless *so* referred, appears utterly unmeaning. The offering up an animal cannot be imagined to have had any intrinsic efficacy in procuring pardon for the transgression of the offerer. The blood of bulls and of goats could have possessed no virtue whereby to cleanse him from his offences. Still less intelligible is the application of the blood of the victim to the purifying of the parts of the tabernacle, and the apparatus of the ceremonial worship. All this can clearly have had no other than an *instituted* meaning; and can be understood, only as in reference to *some* blood-shedding, which, in an eminent degree, possessed the power of purifying from pollution. In short, admit the sacrifice of Christ to be held in view in the institutions of the law; and every part is plain and intelligible: reject that notion; and every theory devised by the ingenuity of man, to explain the nature of the ceremonial worship, becomes trifling and inconsistent.

Granting, then, the case of the Mosaic sacrifice and that of Abel to be the same; neither of them in itself efficacious; both instituted by God; and both instituted in reference to that true and efficient Sacrifice, which was one day to be offered; the rite, as practised before the time of Christ, may justly be considered as a SACRAMENTAL MEMORIAL, *shewing forth the Lord's death until he came*[b]; and, when accompanied with a due faith in the promises made to the early believers, may reasonably be judged to have been equally acceptable with that sacramental memorial, which has been enjoined by our Lord himself to his followers, for the *shewing*

[a] Hebr. xii. 24. [b] 1 Cor. xi. 26.

forth his death until his coming again. And it deserves to be noticed, that this very analogy seems to be intimated by our Lord, in the language used by him at the institution of that solemn Christian rite. For, in speaking of his own blood, he calls it, in direct reference to the blood wherewith Moses established and sanctified the first covenant, *the blood of the* NEW *covenant, which was shed for the remission of sins*[a]; thus plainly marking out the similitude in the nature and objects of the two covenants, at the moment that he was prescribing the great sacramental commemoration of his own sacrifice.

From this view of the subject, the history of Scripture sacrifice becomes consistent throughout. The sacrifice of Abel, and the Patriarchal sacrifices down to the giving of the law, record and exemplify those momentous events in the history of man,—the death incurred by sin, and that inflicted on the Redeemer. When length of time, and mistaken notions of religion leading to idolatry and every perversion of the religious principle, had so far clouded and obscured this expressive act of primeval worship, that it had ceased to be considered by the nations of the world in that *reference*, in which its true value consisted; when the mere rite remained, without any remembrance of the promises, and consequently unaccompanied by that faith in their fulfilment which was to render it an acceptable service; when the nations, deifying every passion of the human heart, and erecting altars to every vice, poured forth the blood of the victim, but to deprecate the wrath, or satiate the vengeance of each offended deity; when, with the recollection of the true God, all knowledge of the true worship was effaced from the minds of men; and when, joined to the *absurdity* of the sacrificial rites, their *cruelty*, devoting to the malignity of innumerable sanguinary gods endless multitudes of human victims, demanded the divine interference; then, we see a people peculiarly selected, to whom, by express revelation, the knowledge of the one God is restored, and the species of worship, ordained by him

[a] Matt. xxvi. 28.

from the beginning, particularly enjoined. The principal part of the Jewish service we accordingly find to consist of sacrifice; to which the virtue of expiation and atonement is expressly annexed: and, in the manner of it, the particulars appear so minutely set forth, that, when the *object* of the whole law should be brought to light, no doubt could remain as to its intended application. The Jewish sacrifices, therefore, seem to have been designed, as those from the beginning had been, to prefigure that *one*, which was to make atonement for all mankind. And as, *in* this, all were to receive their consummation, so, *with* this, they all conclude; and the institution closes with the completion of its object. But, as the gross perversions, which had pervaded the Gentile world, had reached likewise to the chosen people; and as the temptations to idolatry, which surrounded them on all sides, were so powerful as perpetually to endanger their adherence to the God of their fathers, we find the ceremonial service adapted to their carnal habits. And, since the law itself, with its accompanying sanctions, seems to have been principally temporal; so, the worship it enjoins is found to have been, for the most part, rather a public and solemn declaration of allegiance to the true God in opposition to the Gentile idolatries, than a pure and spiritual obedience in moral and religious matters, which was reserved for that more perfect system, appointed to succeed in due time, when the state of mankind would permit.

That the sacrifices of the law should, therefore, have chiefly operated to the cleansing from external impurities, and to the rendering persons or things fit to approach God in the exercises of the ceremonial worship; whilst, at the same time, they were designed to prefigure the sacrifice of Christ, which was purely spiritual, and possessed the transcendent virtue of atoning for all moral pollution,—involves no inconsistency whatever, since in this the true proportion of the entire dispensations is preserved. And to this point it is particularly necessary that our attention should be directed in the examination of the present subject; as upon the *apparent dis-*

proportion in the objects and effects of sacrifice in the Mosaic and Christian schemes, the principal objections against their intended correspondence have been founded [a].

The sacrifices of the law, then, being preparatory to that of Christ; *the law itself being but a schoolmaster to bring us to Christ;* the sacred writers in the *New Testament* naturally adopt the sacrificial terms of the ceremonial service; and, by their reference to the use of them as employed under the law, clearly point out the sense in which they are to be understood, in their application under the Gospel. In examining, therefore, the meaning of such terms, when they occur in the *New* Testament, we are clearly directed to the explanation that is circumstantially given of them in the *Old.* Thus, when we find the virtue of atonement attributed to the sacrifice of Christ, in like manner as it had been to those under the law; by attending to the representation so minutely given of it in the latter, we are enabled to comprehend its true import in the former [b].

Of the several sacrifices under the law, that one, which seems most exactly to illustrate the sacrifice of Christ, and which is expressly compared with it by the writer to the Hebrews, is that which was offered for the whole assembly on the solemn anniversary of expiation [c]. The circumstances of this ceremony, whereby atonement was to be made for the sins of the whole Jewish people, seem so strikingly significant, that they deserve a particular detail. On the day appointed for this general expiation, the Priest is commanded to offer a bullock and a goat, as sin-offerings, the one for himself, and the other for the people: and, having sprinkled the blood of these in due form before the mercy-seat, to lead forth a second goat, denominated the scape-goat; and, after laying both his hands upon the head of the scape-goat, and confessing over him all the iniquities of the people, to *put them upon the head* of the goat, and to send the animal, thus bearing the sins of the people, away into the wilderness: in this manner expressing, by an action which cannot be mis-

[a] No. LXVIII. [b] No. LXIX. [c] No. LXX.

understood, that the atonement, which it is directly affirmed was to be effected by the sacrifice of the sin-offering, consisted in removing from the people their iniquities by a symbolical translation to the animal. For it is to be remarked, that the ceremony of the scape-goat is not a *distinct* one; it is a continuation of the process, and is evidently the concluding part, and symbolical consummation, of the sin-offering[a]. So that the transfer of the iniquities of the people upon the head of the scape-goat, and the bearing them away to the wilderness, manifestly imply, that the atonement effected by the sacrifice of the sin-offering consisted in the transfer and consequent removal of those iniquities. What, then, are we taught to infer from this ceremony?—That, as the atonement under the law, or expiation of the legal transgressions, was represented as a translation of those transgressions, in the act of sacrifice in which the animal was slain, and the people thereby cleansed from their legal impurities, and released from the penalties which had been incurred; so, the great atonement for the sins of mankind was to be effected by the sacrifice of Christ, undergoing, for the restoration of men to the favour of God, that death, which had been denounced against sin; and which he suffered in like manner as if the sins of men had been *actually* transferred to him, as those of the congregation had been *symbolically* transferred to the sin-offering of the people.

That this is the true meaning of the atonement effected by Christ's sacrifice is fully confirmed in every part of both the Old and the New Testament; and that, thus far, the death of Christ is vicarious, cannot be denied without a total disregard of the sacred writings.

It has indeed, been asserted, by those who oppose the doctrine of atonement as thus explained, that nothing *vicarious* appears in the Mosaic sacrifices[b]. With what justice this assertion has been made, may be judged from the instance of the sin-offering that has been adduced. The transfer to the animal of the iniquities of the people, (which must necessarily

[a] No. LXXI. [b] No. LXXII.

mean the transfer of their penal effects, or the subjecting the animal to suffer on account of those iniquities,)—this accompanied with the death of the victim; and the consequence of the whole being the removal of the punishment of those iniquities from the offerers, and the ablution of all legal offensiveness in the sight of God;—thus much of the nature of vicarious, the language of the Old Testament justifies us in attaching to the notion of atonement. Less than this we are clearly not at liberty to attach to it. And what the law thus sets forth as its express meaning directly determines that which we must attribute to the great Atonement, of which the Mosaic ceremony was but a type: always remembering carefully to distinguish between the figure and the substance; duly adjusting their relative value and extent; estimating the efficacy of the one, as real, intrinsic, and universal; whilst that of the other is to be viewed as limited, derived, and emblematic [a].

It must be confessed, that, to the principles on which the doctrine of the Christian atonement has been explained in this, and a former discourse, several objections, in addition to those already noticed, have been advanced [b]. These, however, cannot now be examined in this place. The most important have been discussed; and as for such as remain, I trust, that, to a candid mind, the general view of the subject which has been given will prove sufficient for their refutation.

One word more, my young Brethren, and I have done.—On this day we have assembled to commemorate the stupendous sacrifice of himself, offered up by our blessed Lord for *our* redemption from the bondage and wages of sin: and we are invited to participate on next Sunday, of that solemn rite, which he hath ordained for the purpose of making us partakers in the benefit of that sacrifice. Allow me to remind you, that this is an awful call, and upon an awful occasion. Let him who either refuses to obey this call, or presumes to attend upon it irreverently, beware what his condition is. The man who can be guilty of either deliberately is not safe.

[a] No. LXXIII. [b] No. LXXIV.

Consider seriously what has been said, and *may the God of peace, that brought again from the dead our Lord Jesus, that great Shepherd of the sheep, through the blood of the everlasting covenant, make you perfect in every good work to do his will, working in you that which is well-pleasing in his sight, through Jesus Christ; to whom be glory for ever and ever. Amen.*

Carlo Dolci dipt. *Raffs. Morghen inc.*

SALVATORE

Il quadro Originale trovasi nella Reale Galleria di Monaco.

Mannheim presso D. Artaria 1815.

ILLUSTRATIONS

AND

EXPLANATORY DISSERTATIONS.

ILLUSTRATIONS

AND

EXPLANATORY DISSERTATIONS.

NO. I.—ON THE PRE-EXISTENCE OF CHRIST, AND THE SPECIES OF ARGUMENTS BY WHICH THIS ARTICLE OF THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE HAS BEEN OPPOSED.

PAGE 1. (a) Ἐκένωσεν ἑαυτόν—strictly, *emptied himself*—viz. of that *form of God—that Glory which he had with God before the world was*—see Phil. ii. 6, 7. compared with John xvii. 5. — see also *Krebs. Observ. Flav.* p. 329. *Fortuita Sacra*, p. 217—219. *Elsner. Obs. Sac.* ii. p. 240—245. See also *Schleusner*, on the word ἐκένωσεν. On the whole of the passage from Philippians, I would particularly recommend the observations of Bishop Tomline, *Elements*, &c. vol. ii. p. 111—115. Middleton likewise (*Doctrine of the Greek Article*, p. 537—539) deserves to be consulted.

It has, indeed, been pronounced, in a late extraordinary publication, distinguished, at least, as much by strength of assertion as by force of argument, that "a person who has not paid particular attention to the subject would be surprised to find how very few texts there are, which even *seem* directly to assert the PRE-EXISTENCE OF CHRIST."—How this matter may appear to those who have "*not* paid particular attention to the subject," I leave to the author of this work to determine. With those who *have*, it is unnecessary to say what must be the reception of an observation so directly opposed, not more to the plain and uniform language of Scripture, than

to every conclusion of a just and rational criticism applied to the sacred text. Bold, however, as this writer appears in assertion, he seems by no means deficient in prudence; for, whilst he affirms that even those *few* texts (as he chooses to represent them) furnish no real support to the doctrine they are adduced to confirm, he has on this position, as on almost every other throughout his book, affecting the interpretation of Scripture, declined exposing his *proof* to hazard. We are referred, indeed, to "the Commentary of Grotius, Dr. Lardner's Letter on the Logos, Mr. Lindsey's Apology for resigning the Vicarage of Catterick, and the Sequel to that apology, Hopton Haynes on the Attributes of God, and Dr. Priestley's History of early Opinions." These, we are told, will completely overturn the *unscriptural notion* of the *pre-existence of Christ*. And this they are to accomplish, by showing, that all such passages as contribute to its support, "are either *interpolated, corrupted*, or *misunderstood*."—(See Mr. *Thomas Belsham's Review of Mr. Wilberforce's Treatise*, pp. 272, 273.) Entrenched behind this oddly marshalled phalanx, this gentleman feels perfectly secure. It seems, indeed, somewhat strange, that, encouraged by such powerful aid, he has not thought fit to offer a single text in support of his own opinion, nor a confutation of any one of those which have been urged by his adversaries in defence of theirs.

In the face, however, of this polemic array, and in defiance of those extraordinary powers of modifying Scripture which we find here ascribed to it, I have not hesitated to cite the passages referred to in the beginning of this Number. And when we find the great Person who is there spoken of, described, *repeatedly*, as having *come down from heaven*, as from a place of *settled abode*, previous to his appearance among men, (see John iii. 13. 31; vi. 38. 62; xiii. 3; xvi. 28, &c.); when we find him declared by St. Paul (1 Cor. xv. 47) to be *the Lord from Heaven;* and, again, (Phil. ii. 6, 7, 8,) to have been *in the form of God*, yet to have taken *upon him the form of a servant*, and to have been *made in the likeness of man;* when, again, we find him represented (Hebr. i. 2, 3)

as that Being, *by whom God made the worlds:* and as *the brightness of his glory;* which GLORY, as has been already noticed, he had with God *before the world was;* and when, again, we are told (Colos. i. 15, 16) that he *is the image of the invisible God;* and that *by him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth;*—when these passages, and many others of the same import, are to be met in the Evangelic and Apostolic writings, and the whole tenor of Scripture is found perfectly corresponding, I own I cannot feel this essential article of the Christian faith much endangered, either from the confidence of this writer's assertions, or from the force of those arguments, under whose mighty shade he is content triumphantly to repose.

Lest, however, curiosity may have been excited with respect to those ἀναπόδεικτοι συλλογισμοὶ, which Mr. B. and his friends profess to have at their command, I subjoin the following specimen.—The passage in Heb. i. 2. which directly assigns the work of CREATION to Christ, will be admitted to be one of those that "*seem* to assert his *pre-existence.*" In what manner is this fallacious semblance to be removed?—Δι' οὗ καὶ τοὺς αἰῶνας ἐποίησεν, Grotius translates, FOR *whom he made the worlds;* and thus gives to the word διὰ a signification which not only has no parallel in the entire of the New Testament, but is in direct opposition to the established rule of all Grammarians; διὰ, with a *genitive* case, commonly signifying *the means by which;* but never implying *the final cause,* unless when joined with the *accusative.* See *Phavorinus*[a], *Scapula, Stephanus, Hoogeveen in Viger. Glassius,* &c. See also, on the application of the word in the New Testament, *Sykes on Redemption,* pp. 196. 221. 241.—but particularly *Schleusner's* enumeration of its various senses[b],

[a] Διὰ, πρόθεσις. ὅτε μὲν συντάσσεται γενικῇ, δηλοῖ μεσιτείαν. οἷον, διὰ σοῦ ἐποίησα τόδε, μεσιτεύοντός σου δηλονότι. ὅτε δὲ αἰτιατικῇ, αἰτίαν. οἷον, διὰ σὲ ἐποίησα τόδε. *Phavor.* p. 480.

[b] Amongst the multiplied texts which *Schleusner* has collected, the only one which seems to him not to coincide in the general result, is from 2 Pet. i. 3. But this is manifestly a mistake, as may be clearly seen on consulting *Rosenmüller, Newcome,* and, indeed, almost every commentator, upon the passage. It is to be noted, also, that, under the

which seems to be quite decisive on the point. The solitary instance which *Grotius* has been able to discover in defence of his translation of the word διὰ, is to be found in Rom. vi. 4; in which it is manifest that his criticism cannot be maintained. Schleusner so pronounces upon it in the most peremptory terms.

Whilst Grotius thus violates the rules and analogy of the language, in one part of the sentence, later Socinians [a], finding this mode of distorting the sense indefensible, have betaken themselves to another, where they have exercised an equal violence on the original.—Τοὺς αἰῶνας (which elsewhere in this very epistle (xi. 3) is *allowed* to mean the material world, and which is always used *plurally* by the Jews, as implying the inferior and superior worlds, and, in its connexion here, exactly corresponds with the *things in Heaven*, and the *things in Earth* (Col. i. 16); and, upon the whole, clearly means the *physical* world, or *the Heavens and the Earth* [b],) is yet strained by the Socinians to imply *the Evangelical dispensation:* so that the entire passage is made to signify, merely, that, by Christ's *ministry*, there should be, as it were, a *new creation;* that is, *a new church begun upon earth.* Now, it deserves to be considered, on what principle of just interpretation such a translation can be adopted. It is true,

head of διὰ coupled with the *genitive*, the 20th sense ascribed by Schleusner bears no reference to the *final cause*, though the Latin term, which he makes use of, may at first sight seem to imply it.

[a] I do not mean by this expression to intimate, that Grotius is, strictly speaking, to be ranked among the followers of Socinus. I am aware, that this charge advanced against him by the author of *L'Esprit de M. Arnauld* has been refuted; (see Bayle's Dict. vol. v. pp. 581, 582;) and his single treatise, *De Satisfactione Christi contra Faustum Socinum*, might be judged sufficient to redeem him from the appellation. But his exposition of most of the passages of Scripture relating to the divinity of Christ is so clearly favourable to the main principle of the Socinian scheme, that, with some latitude, the term *Socinian* is not unfairly applicable.—*Dr. Lardner*, in his *Letter on the Logos*, (vol. xi. p. 112, Kippis's Edition of his Works,) written expressly for the purpose of establishing the *proper humanity* of Christ, affirms, that "Grotius explains texts *better* than the *professed* Socinians." — Whether *Lardner*, then, viewed him as far removed from the pale of the *Fratres Poloni*, is surely not difficult to decide.

[b] See *Whitby* and *Rosenmüller*, in loc. and Col. i. 16; likewise *Peirce* and *Hallet*:—also, *Krebs. Observ.* on Col. i. 17.

that Christ, in some of the Greek versions of Isai. ix. 6, has been styled, πατὴρ τοῦ μέλλοντος αἰῶνος. But, admitting the word here to imply a *dispensation* that was to come, does it follow that this *one* dispensation is to be expressed by the plural word αἰῶνας? To force upon it this meaning, is again to do violence to grammar and usage. And yet this *is* done, because the plural interpretation, *by whom he constituted the* AGES OR DISPENSATIONS, lets in the obnoxious idea of pre-existence, as completely as the sense of a *material creation* can do.

It may be worth while to inquire, in what way Mr. Lindsey has treated this subject, in an Essay written by him, in the 2d vol. of the Theological Repository, entitled "Brief Remarks concerning the two Creations;" the express object of which is to show, that none but a moral or spiritual creation was to be ascribed to Christ. He never once notices this passage of Hebrews; but directs his attention, almost entirely, to the text in Colossians, and to that in Ephes. iii. 9. And this is the more remarkable, because he refers to a passage to the same purport, in the very same chapter of Hebrews. The reason of this, however, it may not be difficult to discover, when it is considered, that, in the passages which he *has* examined, though manifestly repugnant to his conclusion, there was not to be found so brief and stubborn an expression, as τοὺς αἰῶνας ἐποίησεν. As to the arguments derived by him from the passages which he has thought proper to notice, they do not seem entitled to very minute attention. They amount merely to a note of Mr. Locke on the one, and an *assertion*, on the other, that the natural creation *cannot* have been intended, "because this is uniformly spoken of, throughout the Bible, as effected by the immediate power of God, without the interposition of any other being whatever."

Thus, Mr. Belsham's *assertion*, that Mr. Lindsey *would* overturn the notion of the pre-existence of Christ, is maintained by Mr. Lindsey's own *assertion* that he *has* done so. He admits, indeed, that his argument is not likely to "have any effect upon those who are Tritheists, or Orthodox in the

vulgar and strict sense; who can, with the same breath, and in the same sentence, without being astonished at themselves, assert, that there are three Creators and yet but one Creator. There is no arguing," he adds, "with men that can swallow, without feeling, downright contradictions." Mr. Belsham, in his engagement that the champions of his tenets would be able fully to establish them, by proving that all such passages of Scripture as contradicted them were "either interpolated, corrupted, or misunderstood," forgot to make the exception, which is here very properly introduced by Mr. Lindsey:—for *sound argument* must surely be lost upon such men as the above.

But let us examine, farther, in what way the parallel passages in Colos. i. 16 and Ephes. iii. 9, which, by attributing the work of creation to Christ, *seem* to intimate his pre-existence, are explained by other writers, who are fellow-labourers with Mr. Belsham, in the laudable work of reducing the exalted dignity of our blessed Saviour to the common standard of human nature. "It is true," says Mr. Tyrwhitt, (*Commentaries and Essays*, vol. ii.,) "that it is said" (Eph. iii. 9) "that God *created all things by Jesus Christ*. But these words are thus to be interpreted:—*things* must be taken for *persons;* because there are passages where the word is so understood:—by *things that are*, must be intended persons peculiarly chosen by God, as the Jews were, in opposition to the Gentiles, who are described as *things that are not*. But, as we now speak of the Christian dispensation, by *all things* must be understood, *all persons, whether Jews or Gentiles, who believe in the Gospel;* and by the word *created*, is meant to be conveyed, "*not* the giving being, or bringing into existence; but the conferring benefits and privileges, or the placing in a new and more advantageous state of being." —And thus, these few *slight* and *obvious* transitions being admitted, Mr. Tyrwhitt easily explains the *creation* of *all things* by Jesus Christ, to be, *the bestowing upon all persons who would accept them, the privileges of the Gospel, by the ministry of Christ.*

Again, on Col. i. 16, we are informed by the German divines, Ernesti and Teller, in a similar felicity of interpretation, that, when it is said, by Christ *were all things created, that are in Heaven, and that are in earth; visible and invisible, &c.*, it is meant to express by an EASY FIGURE, *a new moral creation wrought in the world by the Gospel of Christ: the things that are in Heaven, and that are in earth*, meaning the *Jews* and *Pagans*:—and the things *visible and invisible*, the *present and future generations of men!* See *Rosenmüller's Scholia*—on Col. i. 16[a].

To remind these writers that St. John has placed this matter beyond dispute, in his first chapter, by declaring that the world which was made by Christ, was a world which *yet knew him not*, and *therefore* could not have been the work of a *spiritual* creation, the very nature of which was to bestow the true knowledge of Christ and his Gospel; to remind them, I say, of this, and of the other express declarations in that chapter, on the subject of Christ's pre-existence, in general, as well as on that of the creation by him, in particular, is but to little purpose. It is replied, that, in that chapter, the *Logos*, to whose operations the effects there spoken of are ascribed, does not imply a *person*, but an *attribute*: and, that the work of creation is consequently not attributed to Christ, but to the WISDOM of God the Father. This is not the place to discuss this point. Whoever wishes to see it fully examined, may consult Whitby, Doddridge, and Rosenmüller. To the inquiring reader I would more particularly recommend, upon this head, *Pearson on the Creed*, pp. 116—120: *Le Clerc, Nov. Test.* tom. i. pp. 392—400: *Wits. Misc. Sacr.* tom. ii. pp. 88—118: *Whitaker's Origin of Arianism*, pp. 39—114: *Howes's Critical Observ-*

[a] What says the learned dissenter, Mr. *Peirce*, upon such treatment of this passage of Colossians?—"The interpretation which refers what is here said of our Saviour to the new creation, or the renovation of all things, is so *forced and violent*, that it can hardly be thought that men would ever have espoused it, but for the sake of an hypothesis. The reader may meet with a confutation of it in most commentators."—*Paraphrase*, &c., p. 12, note w.

ations, vol. iv. pp. 38—198: *Bishop Tomline's Elements*, Art. ii., and *Dr. Laurence's Dissertation upon the Logos.*

But I am content to rest the whole issue of the question upon the state of the case furnished by the Socinian or Unitarian writers themselves. Let the reader but look into the translation of this chapter by Mr. Wakefield, and let him form his judgment of the merits of the Socinian hypothesis, from the mode of expounding Scripture, which he will there find employed for its support. Let him try if he can even comprehend the distinct propositions contained in the first fourteen verses. Let him try if he can annex any definite notions to the assertion, that wisdom (meaning thereby an *attribute* of God) *was* God; or to the assurance, so strongly enforced by repetition, that the wisdom of God was *with* God; in other words, that the Deity had not existed before his own essential attributes:—or, again, if he can conceive how the Evangelist (supposing him in his senses) could have thought it necessary, after pronouncing the true light to be God, formally to declare that John *was not* that light: or, how he could affirm, that the wisdom, of which he had spoken but as an *attribute*, was made flesh, and became a *person*, visible, and tangible:—in short, let him try if he does not find, both in the translation and the explanatory notes, as much unintelligible jargon as was ever crowded into the same compass; nay, as is even, according to Mr. Wakefield's notion, to be found in the Athanasian creed itself. This, however, is called a *candid* and *critical* investigation of Scripture; and this, it is to be remembered, is the latest[a], and,

[a] *Notes on all the Books of Scripture*, by Dr. Priestley, have issued from the press since the first edition of this work: and to the exposition there attempted of the introduction of St. John's Gospel, the remarks, which I have made on Mr. Wakefield's translation, apply as aptly, as if for that they had been originally designed. Whoever has a curiosity to discover whether Mr. Wakefield or Dr. Priestley be the more unintelligible, may consult *Notes*, &c. vol. iii. pp. 18, 19, compared with Mr. Wakefield's comment already referred to. In addition to this work, there has yet more lately been given to the public from the Socinian press, what the authors are pleased to call, *An improved Version of the New Testament.* What new lights this improved Version

therefore we may suppose, the best digested, production of the Socinian school: it comes also from the hands of a writer certainly possessed of classical erudition,—a quality of which few of his Unitarian fellow labourers in the sister country are entitled to boast.

But, to add one instance more of the ingenious mode of reasoning employed by these writers on the subject of Christ's pre-existence:—in the 8th chap. of John we find our Saviour arguing with the Jews; who, on his asserting that Abraham had seen *his* day, immediately reply, *Thou art not yet fifty years old, and hast thou seen Abraham? Jesus said unto them, Verily, verily, I say unto you, before Abraham was,* I AM. The inference upon this, that our Saviour here declared himself to have existed before the time of Abraham, appears not to be a very violent one; his answer being immediately and necessarily applied to the remark made by the Jews upon *his age*, which rendered it impossible that he could have seen Abraham: so that this passage will be admitted to be one of those, that "seem directly to assert the pre-existence of Christ." Now, in what way have Socinus and his followers got rid of this *seeming* contradiction to their opinions? "Πρὶν Ἀβραὰμ γενέσθαι, ἐγώ εἰμι, must be thus translated: *Before Abram can be* ABRAHAM, that is, THE FATHER OF MANY NATIONS, *I must be*—THE MESSIAH, or Saviour of the world." This famous discovery, which belongs to Socinus, was indeed esteemed of a nature so far above mere human apprehension, that his nephew, Faustus Socinus, informs us, he had received it from divine inspiration.—*Non sine multis precibus ipsius, Jesu nomine invocato, impetravit ipse.* (*Socinus contr. Eutrop.* tom. ii. p. 678.) This *sublime* interpretation has, it must be confessed, been relinquished by later Socinians, who, in imitation of Grotius, consider Christ as asserting, only, that he was before Abraham *in the decree of God.* But how this could serve as a reply to the objection of the Jews, respecting priority of actual existence; or how, in this, Christ

has thrown upon this part of Scripture, will be seen when we come more particularly to notice this performance in another part of these volumes.

said any thing of himself, that was not true of every human being, and therefore nugatory; or why the Jews, upon a declaration so innocent and so unmeaning, should have been fired with rage against him as a blasphemer; or (if the sense be, that Christ existed in the divine mind antecedently, not to Abraham's *birth*, but to *his existence in the divine mind* likewise) what the meaning can be of a priority in the divine foreknowledge, I leave to Mr. Belsham and his assistant commentators to unfold. Indeed, this last interpretation seems not to have given entire satisfaction to Socinians themselves, as we find from a paper signed *Discipulus*, in the 4th vol. of the Theol. Repos., in which it is asserted, "that the modern Unitarians have needlessly departed from the interpretation given by Slichtingius, Enjidinus, and other old Socinians, and have adopted another in its stead, *which is not to be supported by any just grammatical construction*." This gentleman then goes on to furbish up the old Socinian armour, and exults in having rendered it completely proof against all the weapons of Orthodoxy.

Mr. Wakefield, however, seems to think it safer to revert to the principles of Grotius's interpretation; and, accordingly, having fortified it against the charge of *grammatical* inaccuracy, he presents it in somewhat of a new shape, by translating the passage, *Before Abraham was born, I am* HE—viz. *the Messiah*. By which, he says, Christ means to imply, that "his mission was settled and certain before the birth of Abraham." That Mr. Wakefield has, by this construction, not only avoided the mystical conceits of Socinus's interpretation, but also some of the errors chargeable on that of Grotius, cannot be denied: but, besides that he has built his entire translation of the passage upon the arbitrary assumption of an ellipsis, to which the texts quoted as parallel furnish no support whatever, it remains, as before, to be shown, what intelligible connexion subsists between our Lord's answer and the question put to him by the Jews. If he meant merely to say, that his mission, as the Messiah, had been ordained before the birth of Abraham, (which is in

itself a tolerable strain upon the words even of this new translation,) it will require all Mr. Wakefield's ingenuity to explain in what way this could have satisfied the Jews as to the possibility of Christ's having actually *seen* Abraham, which is the precise difficulty our Lord proposes to solve by his reply. Doctor Priestley, in his later view of this subject, has not added much in point of clearness or consistency to the Socinian exposition. He confesses, however, that the "*literal meaning* of our Lord's expressions" in the 56th verse, was, that "he had lived before Abraham," and that it was so considered by the Jews: but at the same time he contends that our Lord did not intend his words to be so understood; and that, when he afterwards speaks of his priority to Abraham, his meaning is to be thus explained: "that, in a *very proper sense* of the words, he may be said to have been even before Abraham; the Messiah having been held forth as the great object of hope and joy for the human race, not only to Abraham, but even to his ancestors." (*Notes*, &c., vol. iii. pp. 329, 330. 333, 334.) Such is what Dr. Priestley calls the *proper sense* of the words, BEFORE ABRAHAM WAS, I AM.

I have here given a very few instances, but such as furnish a fair specimen of the mode of reasoning by which those enlightened commentators, to whom Mr. Belsham refers, have been enabled to explain away the direct and evident meaning of Scripture. I have adduced these instances from the arguments which they have used relating to the pre-existence of Christ, as going to the very essence of *their* scheme of *Christianity*, (if such it can be called,) and as being some of those on which they principally rely. I have not scrupled to dwell thus long upon a matter not *necessarily* connected with the subject of these discourses, as some benefit may be derived to the young student in divinity, (for whom this publication has been principally intended,) from exposing the hollowness of the ground on which these high-sounding gentlemen take their stand, whilst they trumpet forth their own extensive knowledge, and the ignorance of those who

differ from them. These few instances may serve to give him some idea of the fairness of their pretensions, and the soundness of their criticism. He may be still better able to form a judgment of their powers in scriptural exposition, when he finds, upon trial, that the *formulæ* of interpretation, which have been applied to explain away the notion of Christ's pre-existence from the passages that have been cited, may be employed, with the best success, in arguing away such a meaning from *any* form of expression that can be devised.

Thus, for example, had it been directly asserted that our Lord had existed for ages before his appearance in this world; it is replied, all this is true, *in the decree of God*, but it by no means relates to an actual existence. Had Christ, as a proof of his having existed prior to his incarnation, expressly declared, that all things had been created by him; the answer is obvious—he must have been ordained by the divine mind, long before he came into being, as by him it had been decreed, that the great moral creation, whereby a new people should be raised up to God, was to be wrought. Should he go yet farther, and affirm that he had resigned the God-like station which he filled, and degraded himself to the mean condition of man; a ready solution is had for this also—he made no ostentatious display of his miraculous powers, but offered himself to the world like an ordinary man. If any stronger forms of expression should be used, (and stronger can scarcely be had, without recurring to the language of Scripture,) they may all be disposed of in like manner.

But should even all the varieties of critical, logical, and metaphysical refinement be found in any case insufficient, yet still we are not to suppose the point completely given up. The modern Unitarian Commentator is not discomfited. He retires with unshaken fortitude within the citadel of his philosophic conviction, and under its impenetrable cover bids defiance to the utmost force of his adversary's argument. Of this let Dr. Priestley furnish an instance in his own words.

Endeavouring to prove, in opposition to Dr. Price, that the expressions in John, vi. 62, *What and if ye shall see the Son of Man ascend up where he was before?* supply no argument in favour of Christ's pre-existence, he uses the following remarkable language:—"*though not satisfied with any interpretation* of this extraordinary passage, yet, *rather than believe* our Saviour to have existed in any other state before the creation of the world, or to have left some state of great dignity and happiness when he came hither, he *would have recourse* to the old and exploded Socinian idea of Christ's actual ascent into heaven, or of his *imagining* that he had been carried up thither in a vision; which, like that of St. Paul, *he had not been able to distinguish from a reality:* nay, he would not build an article of faith of such magnitude, on *the correctness of John's recollection and representation of our Lord's language;* and so strange and incredible does the hypothesis of a pre-existent state appear, that, *sooner than admit it, he would suppose the whole verse to be an interpolation,* or that THE OLD APOSTLE DICTATED ONE THING, AND HIS AMANUENSIS WROTE ANOTHER." (*Letters to Dr. Price,* pp. 57, 58, &c.)—Thus is completed the triumph of Unitarian philosophy over revelation: and thus is the charge of incredulity against the pretended philosopher of the present day refuted! For what is there too monstrous for his belief, if you except only the truths of the Gospel?

NO. II.—UNITARIAN OBJECTIONS TO THE RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCE OF STATED DAYS.

PAGE 2. (a). That the day on which the Saviour of men laid down his life for their transgressions should have attached to it any feelings of reverence, or should be in any respect distinguished from the number of ordinary days, has long been denied by different classes of dissenters from the established form; forgetting that its celebration was designed to awaken livelier feelings of devotion, by associating cir-

cumstances; and not reflecting, that the argument, which went to prove that no one day could possess a sanctity above another, should have carried them much farther, and have ended in the abolition of the Sabbath itself. The writer, however, already alluded to in the last number, has, in his answer to Mr. Wilberforce's most excellent and truly pious work on the present state of Religion, completely removed the charge of inconsistency, by directly asserting, that "Christianity expressly abolishes all distinction of days." —"To a true Christian," he observes, "every day is a sabbath, every place is a temple, and every action of life an act of devotion"—"whatever is lawful or expedient upon any one day of the week, is, under the Christian dispensation, equally lawful and expedient on any other." (*Belsham's Review*, &c., p. 20.)

Lest we should, however, imagine that this writer means to impose upon Christians so severe a duty, as to require them to substitute, for *occasional* acts of devotion, that *unceasing* homage, which the unbroken continuity of the Christian's Sabbath, and the ubiquity of his Temple, might seem to demand, he informs us, (p. 133,) that "a virtuous man is performing his duty to the Supreme Being, as really, and as acceptably, when he is pursuing the proper business of life, or even when enjoying its innocent and decent amusements, as when he is offering direct addresses to him, in the closet, or in the Temple." And thus we see the matter is rendered perfectly easy. A Christian may be employed, through the entire of his life, in worshipping his God, by never once thinking of him, but merely pursuing his proper business, or his innocent amusements. This, it is true, is a natural consequence from his first position; and gives to the original argument a consistency, which before it wanted. But is consistency of argument a substitute for Christianity? Or could the teacher of divinity at Hackney have expected, that, from such instructions, his pupils should not so far profit, as to reject not only Christianity, but, many of them, the public worship, and, with it, the recollection, of a God?—It may be

worth while to inquire, what has been the *fact*, respecting the Students of the late Academy at Hackney; and, indeed, what is the state of all the Dissenting Academies throughout Great Britain, into which the subverting principles of Unitarianism have made their way. Do any of this description now exist?—And wherefore do they not?—But, on this subject, more in the Appendix.

NO. III.—ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DOCTRINE OF REDEMPTION.

PAGE 2. (b). There is no one article of the Christian faith which, considered in itself, is more deserving of our closest attention, than that of our redemption by Jesus Christ. This is, in truth, the very corner-stone of the fabric. Against this, accordingly, every framer of a new hypothesis directs his entire force. This once shaken, the whole structure falls in ruins. We, therefore, find the collective powers of heterodox ingenuity summoned to combat this momentous doctrine, in a work published some years back, entitled the *Theological Repository*. Of what consequence, in the frame and essence of Christianity, it was deemed by the principal marshaller of this controversial host, may be inferred, not only from the great labour he has bestowed on this one subject, (having written five different essays in that work, in opposition to the received doctrine of atonement,) but also from his express declarations. In *Theol. Rep.* vol. i. p. 429, he pronounces this doctrine to be "one of the *radical*, as well as the most generally prevailing, corruptions of the Christian scheme;" and in p. 124, he calls it "a disgrace to Christianity, and a load upon it, which it must either throw off, or sink under." And lest the combined exertions of the authors of this work should not prove sufficient to overturn this unchristian tenet, he renews his attack upon it with undiminished zeal in his *History of the Corruptions of Christianity;* among which he ranks this as one of the most important, stating (vol. i. p. 152) that, "as the doctrine of the Divine Unity was infringed

by the introduction of that of the Divinity of Christ, and of the Holy Ghost (as a person distinct from the Father); so the doctrine of the natural placability of the Divine Being, and our ideas of the equity of his government, have been greatly debased by the gradual introduction of the *modern* doctrine of atonement." And, on this account, he declares his intention of showing, in a *fuller manner*, than with respect to any other of the corruptions of Christianity, that it is totally unfounded both in reason and Scripture, and an entire departure from the genuine doctrine of the Gospel. Indeed, the avowed defender of the *Socinian* heresy *must* have felt it indispensable to the support of his scheme, to set aside this doctrine. Thus, (*Hist. of Cor.* vol. i. p. 272,) he says, "it immediately follows from his" (*Socinus's*) "principles, that, Christ being only a man, though ever so innocent, his death *could not*, in any proper sense of the word, atone for the sins of other men." Accordingly, both in his *History of the Corruptions*, and in the *Theological Repository*, he bends his principal force against *this* doctrine of our church. Shall not then so determined a vehemence of attack upon this doctrine, in particular, convince us still more of its importance in the Christian scheme; and point out to the friends of Gospel truth, on what ground they are chiefly to stand in its defence?

NO. IV.—PARDON NOT *NECESSARILY* CONSEQUENT UPON REPENTANCE.

PAGE 5. (a). Balguy, in his *Essay on Redemption*, (and after him Dr. Holmes [a],) has argued this point with uncommon

[a] The late Dr. Holmes, for some years Canon of Christ Church in Oxford, and afterwards Dean of Winchester. I cannot mention this gentleman's name, without paying to it that tribute of respect which it so justly claims. To his indefatigable and learned research the public is indebted for one of the most valuable additions to biblical literature, which, at this day, it is capable of receiving. Treading in the steps of that great benefactor to the biblical student, Dr. Kennicott, he devoted a life to the collection of materials for the emendation of the text of the Septuagint Scriptures, as his distinguished predecessor had done for that of the Hebrew. After the most assiduous, and, to a per-

strength and clearness. The case of *penitence*, he remarks, is clearly different from that of *innocence:* it implies a mixture of guilt pre-contracted, and punishment proportionally deserved. It is consequently inconsistent with *rectitude*, that both should be treated alike by God. The present conduct of the penitent will receive God's approbation: but the reformation of the sinner cannot have a retrospective effect. The agent may be changed, but his former sins cannot be thereby cancelled: the convert and the sinner are the same individual person: and the agent must be answerable for his whole conduct. The conscience of the penitent furnishes a fair view of the case. His sentiments of himself can be only a mixture of approbation and disapprobation, satisfaction and displeasure. His past sins must still, however sincerely he may have reformed, occasion self-dissatisfaction: and this will even be the stronger, the more he improves in virtue. Now, as this is agreeable to truth, there is reason to conclude that God beholds him in the same light. See *Balguy's Essay*,

son not acquainted with the vigour of Dr. Holmes's mind, almost incredible labour, in the collation of MSS. and versions, he was enabled to give to the public the valuable result of his inquiries, in one complete volume of the Pentateuch, and the Book of Daniel. That it was not allotted to him to finish the great work in which he had engaged, is most deeply to be regretted. It is, however, to be hoped, that the learned University, on whose reputation his labours have reflected additional lustre, will not permit an undertaking of such incalculable utility to the Christian world to remain unaccomplished, especially as the materials for its prosecution, which the industry of Dr. Holmes has so amply supplied, and which remain deposited in the Bodleian library, must leave comparatively but little to be done for its final execution. The preface to the volume which has been published concludes with these words:—"Hoc unum superest monendum, quod Collationes istæ ex omni genere, quæ ad hoc opus per hos quindecim annos jam fuerunt elaboratæ, in Bibliothecâ Bodleianâ reponantur, atque vel a me, si vivam et valeam, vel, si aliter acciderit, ab alio quodam Editore, sub auspicio Colendissimorum Typographei Clarendoniani Oxoniensis Curatorum, in publicum emittentur."—The language also of the valuable and much to be lamented author, (with whom I was personally acquainted, and had for some years the satisfaction of corresponding,) was always such as to encourage the expectation here held out. That this expectation should be gratified, and with all practicable despatch, cannot but be the anxious wish of every person interested in the pure and unadulterated exposition of Scriptural truth. [The expectation here expressed by the learned author, was subsequently realized by the completion of Dr. Holmes's edition of the Septuagint version by the Rev. J. Parsons, B.D. It now forms five volumes in large folio.—*Editor.*]

1785, pp. 31—55; and *Mr. Holmes's Four Tracts*, pp. 138, 139. —The author of the *Scripture Account of Sacrifices*, part i. sect. 6, and part iv. sect. 4, has likewise examined this subject in a judicious manner.—It may be worth remarking also, as Dr. Shuckford has done, that Cicero goes no farther on this head than to assert, Quem pœnitet peccâsse, *penè* est innocens.

Lamentable it is to confess, that the name of *Warburton* is to be coupled with the defence of the deistical objection, against which the above reasoning is directed. But no less true is it than strange, that, in the account of natural religion, which that eminent writer has given, in the ninth book of the *Divine Legation*, he has expressed himself in terms the most unqualified upon the intrinsic and necessary efficacy of repentance; asserting that it is plainly obvious to human reason, from a view of the connexion that must subsist between the creature and his Maker, that, whenever man forfeits the favour of God by a violation of the moral law, his sincere repentance *entitles* him to the pardon of his transgressions.—I have been led, with the less reluctance, to notice this pernicious paradox of the learned Bishop, because it affords me the opportunity of directing the reader's attention to the judicious and satisfactory refutation which it has lately received, in a Prize Essay in one of the Sister Universities. See *Mr.* [*now the Rev. Dr.*] *Pearson's Critical Essay on the Ninth Book of the Divine Legation*, pp. 25—34. The reasons that induced Warburton to adopt so heterodox a position are assigned by himself in one of his private letters to his friend Dr. Hurd, and are, to the full, as insufficient as the position is untenable. These, together with the alarm given to Dr. Hurd by the new doctrine taken up by his friend, will be found noticed in the *Letters from a late eminent Prelate*, pp. 421—423. *Locke* and *Nye* (as well as *Warburton*) have given but too much countenance to the erroneous opinion combated in this Number.

NO. V.—THE SENSE ENTERTAINED BY MANKIND OF THE *NATURAL* INEFFICACY OF REPENTANCE, PROVED FROM THE HISTORY OF HUMAN SACRIFICES.

PAGE 5. (b).—If we look to the practices of the Heathen world, we shall find the result of the reasoning which is advanced in the page referred to, confirmed from experience by abundant proof. We shall find that almost the entire of the religion of the Pagan nations consisted in rites of *deprecation*. Fear of the Divine displeasure seems to have been the leading feature in their religious impressions; and in the diversity, the costliness, and the cruelty, of their sacrifices they sought to appease Gods, to whose wrath they felt themselves exposed, from a consciousness of sin, unrelieved by any information as to the means of escaping its effects. So strikingly predominant was this feature of terror in the Gentile superstitions, that we find it expressly laid down by the Father of Grecian history, τὸ Θεῖον πᾶν φθονερόν τε καὶ ταραχῶδες (*Herod.* lib. i. cap. 32): and Porphyry directly asserts, "that there was wanting some universal method of delivering men's souls, which no sect of philosophy had ever yet found out:" (*August. de Civit. Dei*, lib. x. cap. 32:)—that is, that something besides their own repentance was wanting to appease the anger of their gods.

The universal prevalence of HUMAN SACRIFICES, throughout the Gentile world, is a decisive proof of the light in which the human mind, unaided by Revelation, is disposed to view the Divinity, and clearly evinces how little likelihood there is in the supposition, that unassisted reason could discover the sufficiency of repentance to regain the favour of an offended God. Of this savage custom, M. de Pauw (*Rech. Phil. sur les Américs.* vol. i. p. 211) asserts, that there is *no* nation mentioned in history, whom we cannot reproach with having, more than once, made the blood of its citizens stream forth, in holy and pious ceremonies, to appease the Divinity when he appeared angry, or to move him when he appeared indolent.

Of this position both ancient and modern historians supply the fullest confirmation. Heliodorus (*Æthiopic.* lib. x. p. 465. ed. 1630) informs us, that the Ethiopians were required by their laws to sacrifice boys to the Sun, and girls to the Moon. Sanchoniathon, as quoted by Philo, (*Euseb. Præp. Evang.* lib. i. cap. 10,) asserts, that among the Phœnicians it was customary, in great and public calamities, for princes and magistrates to offer up, in sacrifice to the avenging demons, the dearest of their offspring, εἰς λύτρον τοῖς τιμωροῖς δαίμοσι. This practice is also attributed to them by Porphyry. (*Euseb. P. Ev.* lib. iv.) Herodotus (lib. iv. cap. 62) describes it as a custom with the Scythians to sacrifice every hundredth man of their prisoners to their god Mars. And Keysler, who has carefully investigated the antiquities of that race, represents the spreading oaks, under which they were used to perform their sanguinary rites, as being always profusely sprinkled with the blood of the expiring victims. (*Antiq. Septentr.* Dissert. iii.) Of the Egyptians, Diodorus relates it (lib. i. p. 99. ed. *Wessel.*) to have been an established practice, to sacrifice red-haired men at the tomb of Osiris; from which, he says, misunderstood by the Greeks, arose the fable of the bloody rites of Busiris. This charge brought by Diodorus against the Egyptians is supported by Plutarch, on the authority of Manetho. (*Isid. et Osir.* p. 380.) At Heliopolis, also, three men were daily offered up to Lucina; which practice, Porphyry informs us, was put a stop to by Amasis. (See *Wessel. Diod.* p. 99. n. 86.) And we are told by an Arabian writer, Murtadi, that it had been customary with the Egyptians to sacrifice, to the river Nile, a young and beautiful virgin, by flinging her, decked in the richest attire, into the stream: and, as Mr. Maurice remarks, a vestige of this barbarous custom remains to this day; for we learn from *Mr. Savary's Letters on Egypt*, (vol. i. p. 118,) that the Egyptians annually make a clay statue in the form of a woman, and throw it into the river, previous to the opening of the dam—see *Maurice's Indian Antiquities*, p. 433.

That this cruel practice existed also among the Chinese,

appears from their histories, which record the oblation of their monarch Chingtang, in pacification of their offended deity, and to avert from the nation the dreadful calamities with which it was at that time visited. This sacrifice, it is added, was pronounced by the Priests to be demanded by the will of Heaven: and the aged monarch is represented as supplicating at the altar, that his life may be accepted, as an atonement for the sins of the people. (*Martin. Hist. Sin.* lib. iii. p. 75. ed. 1659.)—Even the Persians, whose mild and beneficent religion appears at this day so repugnant to this horrid usage, were not exempt from its contagion. Not only were there sacred rites, like those of other nations, stained with the blood of immolated victims, as may be seen in Herodotus (lib. i. cap. 132, and lib. vii. cap. 113), Xenophon (*Cyrop.* lib. viii.), Arrian (*De Exped. Alex.* lib. vi. ad finem), Ovid (*Fast.* lib. i.), Strabo (lib. xv. p. 1065. ed. 1707), Suidas (in Μιθρα); and, as is fully proved by Brissonius (*De Reg. Pers. Princ.* lib. ii. a cap. v. ad cap. xliii.): but Herodotus (lib. vii. cap. 114) expressly pronounces it to have been the Persian *custom* to offer *human* victims by inhumation; Περσικὸν δὲ τὸ ζώοντας κατορύσσειν: and, in support of his position, he adduces two striking instances of the fact; in one of which his testimony is corroborated by that of Plutarch. The mysteries also of the Persian god Mithra, and the discovery of the Mithraic sepulchral cavern, as described by Mr. Maurice, have led that writer, in the most decisive manner, to affix to the Persian votary the charge of human sacrifice. (*Indian Antiquities*, pp. 965. 984, &c.)—The ancient Indians, likewise, however their descendants at this day may be described by Mr. Orme (*Hist. of Indost.* vol. i. p. 5) as of a nature utterly repugnant to this sanguinary rite, are represented both by Sir W. Jones (*Asiat. Res.* vol. i. p. 265) and Mr. Wilkins (in his explanatory notes on the Heetopades, note 292) as having been polluted by the blood of human victims. This savage practice appears also to have been enjoined by the very code of Brahma; as may be seen in the Asiatic Researches, as already referred to. The self-

devotions, so common among this people, tend likewise to confirm the accusation. On these, and the several species of *meritorious suicide* extracted from the Ayeen Akbery, by Mr. Maurice, see *Ind. Antiq.* pp. 164. 166. The same writer asserts, (p. 434,) that the Mahometans have exerted themselves for the abolition of this unnatural usage, both in India and Egypt. This author, indeed, abounds with proofs, establishing the fact of human sacrifice in Ancient India.

Of the same horrid nature were the rites of the early Druids, as may be seen in *Diod. Sic.* (vol. i. pp. 354, 355. ed. Wess.) The Massilian Grove of the Gallic Druids is described by Lucan, in his *Pharsalia*, (lib. iii. 400, &c.,) in terms that make the reader shudder:—" that every branch was reeking with human gore," is almost the least chilling of the poetic horrors with which he has surrounded this dreadful sanctuary of Druidical superstition. We are informed, that it was the custom of the Gallic Druids to set up an immense, gigantic figure of a wicker man, in the texture of which they entwined above an hundred human victims, and then consumed the whole as an offering to their gods. For a delineation of this monstrous spectacle, see *Clarke's Cæsar*, p. 131. fol. ed. 1712. Nor were the Druids of Mona less cruel in their religious ceremonies than their brethren of Gaul: *Tacitus* (vol. ii. p. 172. ed. Brot.) represents it as their constant usage, to sacrifice to their gods the prisoners taken in war: cruore captivo adolere aras, fas habebant. In the Northern nations these tremendous mysteries were usually buried in the gloom of the thickest woods. In the extended wilds of Arduenna, and the great Hercynian forest particularly, places set apart for this dreadful purpose abounded.

Phylarchus, as quoted by Porphyry, affirms, that, of old, it was a rule with every Grecian state, before they marched against an enemy, to supplicate their gods by human victims; and, accordingly, we find human sacrifices attributed to the Thebans, Corinthians, Messenians, and Temessenses, by Pausanias: to the Lacedæmonians by Fulgentius, Theodoret, and Apollodorus; and to the Athenians by Plutarch (*Themist.*

p. 262. et *Arist.* p. 300. ed. Bryan); and it is notorious, that the Athenians, as well as the Massilians, had a custom of sacrificing a man every year, after loading him with dreadful curses, that the wrath of the gods might fall upon his head, and be turned away from the rest of the citizens.—See Suidas on the words περίψημα, κάθαρμα, and φαρμακός.

The practice prevailed also among the Romans; as appears not only from the devotions so frequent in the early periods of their history, but also from the express testimonies of Livy, Plutarch, and Pliny. In the year of Rome 657, we find a law enacted in the Consulship of Lentulus and Crassus, by which it was prohibited: but it appears, notwithstanding, to have been in existence so late even as in the reign of Trajan; for, at this time, three Vestal virgins having been punished for incontinence, the Pontiffs, on consulting the books of the Sibyls to know whether a sufficient atonement had been made, and finding that the offended deity continued incensed, ordered two men and two women, Greeks and Gauls, to be buried alive. (*Univ. Hist.* vol. xiv. p. 588. ed Dub.) Porphyry also assures us, that, even in his time, a man was every year sacrificed at the shrine of Jupiter Latialis.

The same cruel mode of appeasing their offended gods we find ascribed to all the other Heathen nations: to the Getæ, by Herodotus (lib. iv. c. 94); to the Leucadians, by Strabo lib. x. p. 694); to the Goths, by Jornandes (*De Reb. Getic.* cap. xix.); to the Gauls, by Cicero (*pro Fonteio*, p. 487. ed. 1684), and by Cæsar (*Bell. Gall.* lib. vi. § 15); to the Heruli, by Procop. (*Bell. Goth.* lib. ii. c. 15); to the Britons, by Tacitus (*Annal.* xiv. 30), and by Pliny (lib. xxx. cap. 1.); to the Germans, by Tacitus (*De Mor. Germ.* cap. ix.); to the Carthaginians, by Sanchoniathon (*Euseb. P. Ev.* lib. i. cap. 10), by Plato (*in Minoe*, Opera, p. 565. ed. 1602), by Pliny (lib. xxxvi. cap. 12), by Silius Italicus (lib. iv. lin. 767, &c.), and by Justin (lib. xviii. cap. 6. and lib. xix. cap. 1). Ennius says of them, (ed. *Hess.* 1707, p. 28,) Poenei sont soliti sos sacrificare puellos. They are reported, by Diodorus, to have

offered two hundred human victims at once: and to so unnatural an extreme was this horrid superstition carried by this people, that it was usual for the parent himself to slaughter the dearest and most beautiful of his offspring at the altars of their bloody deities. Scripture proves the practice to have existed in Canaan before the Israelites came thither. (*Levit.* xx. 23.) Of the Arabians, the Cretans, the Cyprians, the Rhodians, the Phocæans, those of Chios, Lesbos, and Tenedos, the same may be established; see *Porphyr. apud Euseb. P. Ev.* lib. iv. cap. 16. Monimus, as quoted by Clem. Alexand., (*Euseb.* ibid.,) affirms the same of the inhabitants of Pella. And Euripides has given to the bloody altars of the Tauric Diana a celebrity that rejects additional confirmation.—So that the *universality* of the practice in the ancient Heathen world cannot reasonably be questioned.

In what light, then, the Heathens of antiquity considered their deities, and how far they were under the impression of the existence of a Supreme Benevolence requiring nothing but repentance and reformation of life, may be readily inferred from this review of facts. Agreeably to the inference which these furnish, we find the reflecting Tacitus pronounce, (*Hist.* lib. i. cap. 3,) "that the gods interfere in human concerns, but to punish"—Non esse curæ deis securitatem nostram, esse ultionem. And in this he seems but to repeat the sentiments of Lucan, who, in his Pharsalia (iv. 107, &c.), thus expresses himself:—

> "Felix Roma, quidem, civesque habitura beatos,
> Si libertatis Superis tam cura placeret,
> Quam *vindicta* placet"——

On this subject the Romans appear to have inherited the opinions of the Greeks. Meiners (*Historia Doctrinæ de vero Deo*, p. 208) asserts, that the more ancient Greeks imagined their gods to be envious of human felicity; so that, whenever any great success attended them, they were filled with terror, lest the gods should be offended at it, and bring on them some dreadful calamity. In this the learned professor but

affirms what, as we have seen in p. 66, is the formal declaration attributed to Solon by Herodotus: a declaration repeated and confirmed by the Historian, in the instances of Polycrates and Xerxes: in the former of which, the prudent Amasis grounds his alarm for the safety of the too prosperous prince of Samos on the notoriety of the *envious* nature of the divine being, τὸ θεῖον ἐπισταμένῳ ὡς ἔστι φθονερόν (lib. iii. cap. 40)—and in the latter, the sage Artabanus warns Xerxes, that even the blessings which the gods bestow in this life are derived from an *envious* motive, ὁ δὲ θεὸς, γλυκὺν γεύσας τὸν αἰῶνα, φθονερὸς ἐν αὐτῷ εὑρίσκεται ἐών (lib. vii. cap. 46). That fear of the gods, was not an unusual attendant on the belief of their existence, may be inferred likewise from the saying of Plutarch (*De Superst.*), τέλος τοῦ μὴ νομίζειν θεοὺς μὴ φοβεῖσθαι: and Pliny, (lib. ii. cap. 7,) speaking of the deification of death, diseases, and plagues, says, that "these are ranked among the gods, whilst with a trembling fear we desire to have them pacified,"—dum esse *placatas, trepido metu* cupimus. Cudworth also (*Intell. Syst.* p. 664) shews, in the instances of Democritus and Epicurus, that terror was attached to the notion of a divine existence: and that it was with a view to get free from this terror, that Epicurus laboured to remove the idea of a providential administration of human affairs. The testimony of Plato is likewise strong to the same purpose: speaking of the punishment of wicked men, he says, all these things "hath *Nemesis* decreed to be executed in the second period, by the ministry of *vindictive* terrestrial demons, who are overseers of human affairs; *to which demons the supreme God hath committed the government of this world.*"—*De Anima Mundi.* Opera, p. 1096. ed. Franc. 1602.

Thus the Gentile Religion, in early ages, evidently appears to have been a religion of *fear.* Such has it been found likewise in later times; and so it continues to this day. Of the length of time during which this practice of human sacrifice continued among the Northern nations, Mr. Thorkelin, who was perfectly conversant with Northern literature, furnishes several instances, in his *Essay on the Slave Trade.*

Ditmarus charges the Danes with having put to death, in their great sacrifices, no fewer than ninety-nine slaves at once. (*Loccen. Antiq. Sue. Goth.* lib. i. cap. 3.) In Sweden, on urgent occasions, and particularly in times of scarcity and famine, they sacrificed kings and princes. Loccenius (*Histor. Rer. Suecic.* lib. i. p. 5) gives the following account: Tantâ fame Suecia afflicta est, ut ei vix gravior unquam incubuerit; cives inter se dissidentes, cum pœnam delictorum divinam agnoscerent, primo anno boves, altero homines, tertio regem ipsum, velut *iræ cœlestis piaculum*, ut sibi persuasum habebant, Odino immolabant: and we are told that the Swedes, at one time, boasted of having sacrificed five kings in a single day. Adam of Bremen, (*Hist. Eccles.* cap. 234,) speaking of the awful grove of Upsal, a place distinguished for the celebration of those horrid rites, says, "There was not a single tree in it that was not reverenced, as gifted with a portion of the divinity, because stained with gore, and foul with human putrefaction." In all the other Northern nations, without exception, the practice is found to have prevailed: and to so late a period did it continue, that we learn from St. Boniface, that Gregory II. was obliged to make the sale of slaves for sacrifice by the German converts, a capital offence; and Carloman, in the year 743, found it necessary to pass a law for its prevention. Mallet, whose account of this horrid custom among the Northern nations deserves particularly to be attended to, affirms that it was not abolished in those regions until the ninth century. (*Northern Antiquities*, vol. i. pp. 132—142.) And Jortin (*Remarks on Eccles. Hist.* vol. v. p. 233) reports, from Fleury, an adherence to this custom, in the island of Rugia, even so late as at the close of the twelfth century.

The same dreadful usage is found to exist, to this day, in Africa; where, in the inland parts, they sacrifice the captives, taken in war, to their fetiches: as appears from Snelgrave, who, in the king of Dahoome's camp, was witness to his sacrificing multitudes to the deity of his nation. Among the islanders of the South Seas we likewise learn from Captain

Cook that human sacrifices were very frequent: he speaks of them as customary in Otaheitè, and the Sandwich Islands; and in the island of Tongataboo he mentions ten men offered at one festival. All these, however, are far exceeded by the pious massacre of human beings in the nations of America. The accounts given by Acosta, Gomara, and other Spanish writers, of the monstrous carnage of this kind, in these parts of the world, are almost incredible. The annual sacrifices of the Mexicans required many thousands of victims; and in Peru two hundred children were devoted for the health of the Ynca. (*Acost. Hist. of Ind.* pp. 379—388. ed. 1604.—*Anton. de Solis.* and *Clavig. Hist. of Mex.* lib. vi. sect. 18, 19, 20.)—Mr. Maurice also informs us, that, at this day, among certain tribes of the Mahrattas, human victims, distinguished by their beauty and youthful bloom, are fattened like oxen for the altar (*Ind. Antiq.* p. 843): and the same writer (pp. 1077, 1078) instances other facts from Mr. Crauford's *Sketches of Indian Mythology*, from which he concludes, that the notion of the efficacy of human sacrifice is by no means extinct in India at the present time. This position is certainly contradictory to the testimonies of Dow, Holwel, and Grose. But, as the laborious research of Mr. Maurice has drawn together numerous and authentic documents in corroboration of his opinion, it may fairly be questioned whether the authority of these writers is to be considered as of much weight in the opposite scale. The learned professor Meiners (*Historia Doct. de vero Deo.* sect. iv.) does not hesitate to pronounce the two former unentitled to credit: the first, as being of a disposition too credulous; and the second, as deserving to be reckoned, for fiction and folly, another Megasthenes[a]. Mr. Dow's incompetency, on the

[a] In addition to the authorities already referred to upon this head, I would suggest to the reader a perusal of *Mr. Mickle's Enquiry into the Brahmin Philosophy*, suffixed to the seventh Book of his Translation of *Camoens' Lusiad.* He will find in that interesting summary abundant proofs not only of the existence of the practice of human sacrifice in modern India, but also of the total incredibility of the romances of Dow and Holwel; and he will at the same time discover the reason why these authors are viewed with so much partiality by a certain description of writers. The *philosophic* tincture of their ob-

subject of the Indian theology, has also been proved by Mr. Halhed, who has shewn, in the preface to his translation of the Gentoo Code, (p. 32. ed. 1776,) that writer's total deficiency in the knowledge of the sacred writings of the Hindoos: and as to Mr. Grose, I refer the reader to the *Indian Antiquities* (pp. 249. 255) for instances of his superficial acquaintance with the affairs of Hindostan. It is of the greater importance to appreciate truly the value of the testimony given by these writers; as on their reports has been founded a conclusion directly subversive of the fact here attempted to be established [a].

servations upon religion, and the liberties taken, by Mr. Holwel especially, with both the Mosaic and Christian revelations, were too nearly allied to the spirit of Unitarianism not to have had charms for the advocates of that system. —The superiority of the revelation of *Brahma* over that of *Moses*, Mr. Holwel instances in the creation of man. In the former, he says, "the creation of the human form is *clogged with no difficulties, no ludicrous unintelligible circumstances, or inconsistencies.* God previously constructs mortal bodies of *both sexes* for the reception of the angelic spirits." (*Mickle's Lusiad*, vol. ii. p. 253.) Mr. Holwel, also, in his endeavours to prove the revelation of *Birmah* and of *Christ* to be the same, gravely proceeds to solve the difficulty which arises from their present want of resemblance, by asserting, that "the doctrine of Christ, as it is delivered to us, is totally corrupted; that age after age has discoloured it; that even the most ancient record of its history, the New Testament, is grossly corrupted; that *St. Paul by his reveries*, and *St. Peter by his sanction to kill and eat*, began this woful declension and perversion of the doctrines of Christ." (*Mickle's Lusiad*, vol. ii. p. 254.) After this, can we wonder, that Dr. Priestley considered this writer sufficiently *enlightened*, to be admitted as undoubted evidence in the establishment of whatever facts he might be pleased to vouch? Yet it is whimsical enough, that this writer, who is so eminently *philosophical*, and, as such, is so favourite a witness with Dr. Priestley, should have disclosed an opinion with respect to *philosophers*, so disreputable as the following:—"The devil and his chiefs have often, as well as the good angels, taken the human form, and appeared in the character of tyrants, and corrupters of morals, or of *philosophers*, who are the *devil's faithful deputies.*" (*Mickle's Lusiad*, vol. ii. p. 250.)

[a] To the curious reader, who may wish to see the latest and most interesting account of the sanguinary superstitions of the Hindoos, and of the general state of that people in point of civilization at the present day, I would strongly recommend Dr. BUCHANAN'S *Memoir on the Expediency of an Ecclesiastical Establishment for British India*; in which he will not only find ample confirmation of Mr. Maurice's statements, as to the dreadful extent of human sacrifice among the natives of Hindostan, (see pp. 33, 34. 47—50. 91—104,) but also the most affecting exposition of the decaying state of religion amongst their conquerors.

In this latter point of view, it is a work that cannot be too generally known, nor too attentively perused. The contrast which it exhibits between the indifference of Protestantism and the zeal

The subject of this Number may derive additional light from the nature of the *representations* of the Divinity, through-

of Popery, in those distant regions, is strikingly illustrative of the prevailing character of each. An establishment of eighteen military chaplains, of whom not more than twelve are at any one time in actual appointment,—with three churches, one at Calcutta, one at Madras, and one at Bombay,—constitutes the entire means of religious instruction for the vast extent of the British empire in the East; whilst, at the various settlements and factories, at Bencoolen, Canton, and the numerous islands in that quarter in the possession of Britain, not a single clergyman of the English Church is to be found, to perform the rite of baptism, or any other Christian rite whatever. British armies, also, have been known to be not unfrequently in the field without a chaplain: and it is said, that Marquis Cornwallis was indebted to the services of a British officer, for the last solemn offices of interment. The consequence (as Dr. Buchanan states) has been, that "all respect for Christian institutions has worn away; and that the Christian sabbath is now no otherwise distinguished, than by the display of the British flag!" So that, "we seem at present," he says, "to be trying the question, WHETHER RELIGION BE NECESSARY FOR A STATE: whether a remote, commercial empire, having no sign of the Deity, no type of any thing heavenly, may not yet maintain its Christian purity and its political strength, amidst Pagan superstitions, and a voluptuous and unprincipled people." The effect also of this want of religious instruction Dr. Buchanan describes to be such as might naturally be expected,—a general spread of profligacy amongst our own people, and a firm belief amongst the natives, that "THE ENGLISH HAVE NO RELIGION."

Now, in what way does Dr. Buchanan describe the exertions of the ROMISH CHURCH to propagate its peculiar tenets? An establishment of three archbishops and seventeen bishops, with a proportional number of churches and inferior clergy, is indefatigably employed in sending through the East, and particularly through the dominions of Protestant Britain, that form of religious faith, which Protestants condemn as perniciously erroneous. In Bengal alone, he states, there are eight Romish churches, besides four Armenian, and two Greek: and it affords matter of melancholy reflection, that we are compelled to derive a consolation under the consequences of our own religious apathy, from the contemplation of those beneficial effects, which Dr. Buchanan ascribes to the influence of this Romish establishment, in its civilizing operation on the minds of the Asiatics.

The sentiments, which an acquaintance with these facts must naturally excite, in the minds of such as retain any sense of the value of true religion, make it particularly desirable that this work should be known to all; especially to those who have the power to promote the means of rectifying the dreadful evils which it authenticates. To a religious mind, the perusal of the work must undoubtedly be distressing. But, from the gloom, which the darkness of Pagan superstition, joined to the profligacy of European irreligion, spreads over the recitals it contains, the pious heart will find a relief in that truly evangelical production of pastoral love, presented in Archbishop Wake's primary charge to the Protestant missionaries in India; and yet more in that delightful picture which is given of the church at Malabar:—a church, which, as it is reported to have been of Apostolic origin, carries with it to this day the marks of Apostolic simplicity: and which presents the astonishing phenomenon of a numerous body of Hindoo Christians, equalling, both in their practice and their doctrines, the purity of any Christian church since the age of the Apostles.

out the Heathen nations. Thus, in the images of the Deity among the Indians, we find an awful and terrific power the ruling feature. Thousands of outstretched arms and hands, generally filled with swords and daggers, bows and arrows, and every instrument of destruction, express to the terrified worshipper the cruel nature of the god. The collars of human skulls, the forked tongues shooting from serpents' jaws, the appendages of mutilated corpses, and all the other

" Such are the heresies of this church," said their Portuguese accusers, " that their clergy married wives; that they owned but two sacraments, baptism and the Lord's supper; that they denied transubstantiation; that they neither invoked saints nor believed in purgatory; and that they had no other orders or names of dignity in the church than bishop or deacon." Such was found to be the state of the church of Malabar in the year 1599; and such, there is good reason to believe, had been its state, from its foundation in the earliest times of Christianity. (See *Dr. Buchanan's Memoir*, pp. 1—8. 12. 18. 55—62. 75—79.) To the question which popery triumphantly proposes to the Protestant, " WHERE WAS YOUR RELIGION BEFORE LUTHER?" the answer, " IN THE BIBLE," derives now an auxiliary from this most important and interesting fact.

I should deem it necessary to apologize to the reader for this digression respecting the contents of Dr. Buchanan's publication, were I not convinced, that, in drawing attention to its subject, I am doing a real service to Christianity.

As a most valuable Appendix to this publication, I must beg leave also to recommend to the reader the xviith article of the 1st volume of the *Quarterly Review*. The impious policy, that would impede the introduction of the Christian religion into India, is there treated as it deserves. The fashionable sophistry, which had for a time prevailed upon this subject, is most happily exposed by the Reviewer. And, with no common talent and address, it is unanswerably proved to be no less the interest, than the duty, of the conqueror, to spread the light of the Gospel far and wide through the regions of Hindostan. Melancholy it truly is that such arguments should be wanted to convince a Christian people. Great is the power of the British empire, most undoubtedly. Yet, surely, if its interests are found to be incompatible with the interests of Christ's kingdom, it cannot be difficult to pronounce which of the two must fall.

That the reader may feel the full force of the observations contained in this note, he is requested to peruse the extraordinary details, authenticated by *Dr. Buchanan*, in his recent publication, entitled *Christian Researches in Asia*; particularly those relating to the *worship of Juggernaut*, and the *present condition of Ceylon*, which are to be found at pp. 129—147, and pp. 182—190 of that work *.

* It is due to the memory of the learned and pious author of this work to acknowledge, that the great improvements which have taken place in the provision for the religious instruction of the population of our Eastern dependencies, since the above note was written, are, in a great measure, to be attributed to the earnest remonstrance which it contains.—ED.

circumstances of terrific cruelty which distinguish the Black Goddess Seeva, Haree, and other of the idols of Hindostan, (*Maurice's Ind. Antiq.* pp. 182. 253. 327. 381, 382. 856, 857. 882,) sufficiently manifest the genius of that religion which presented these as objects of adoration. To the hideous idols of Mexico, one of which was of most gigantic size, seated upon huge snakes, and expressly denominated TERROR, (*Clavig.* lib. vi. sect. 6,) it was usual to present the heart, torn from the breast of the human victim, and to insert it, whilst yet warm and reeking, in the jaws of the blood-thirsty divinity. (Ibid. lib. vi. sect. 18.) The supreme god of the ancient Scythians was worshipped by them under the similitude of a naked SWORD (*Herod.* lib. iv. cap. 62): and in Valhalla, or the *Hall of Slaughter*, the Paradise of the terrible god of the Northern European regions, the cruel revelries of Woden were celebrated by deep potations from the skulls of enemies slain in battle.

Conformably with this character of their gods, we find the worship of many of the heathen nations to consist in suffering and mortification, in cutting their flesh with knives, and scorching their limbs with fire. Of these unnatural and inhuman exercises of devotion ancient history supplies numberless instances. In the worship of Baal, as related in the book of Kings, and in the consecration to Moloch, as practised by the Ammonites, and not infrequently by the Hebrews themselves, the Sacred Volume affords an incontestable record of this diabolical superstition. Similar practices are attested by almost every page of the profane historian. The cruel austerities of the Gymnosophist, both of Africa and India, the dreadful sufferings of the initiated votaries of Mithra and Eleusis, (see *Maurice's Ind. Antiq.* pp. 990—1000,) the Spartan διαμαστίγωσις in honour of Diana, the frantic and savage rites of Bellona, and the horrid self-mutilations of the worshippers of Cybele, but too clearly evince the dreadful views entertained by the ancient heathens of the nature of their gods. Of the last named class of pagan devotees, (to instance one, as a specimen of all,) we have the fol-

lowing account from Augustine—"Deæ magnæ sacerdotes, qui Galli vocabantur, virilia sibi amputabant, et furore perciti caput rotabant, cultrisque faciem musculosque totius corporis dissecabant; morsibus quoque se ipsos impetebant." (*August. de Civ. Dei.* pp. 140. 156. ed. 1661.) And Seneca, as quoted by the same writer, (lib. vi. cap. 10,) confirms this report in the following passage, taken from his work on Superstition, now no longer extant: "Ille viriles sibi partes amputat, ille lacertos secat. Ubi iratos deos timent, qui sic propitios merentur? — Tantus est perturbatæ mentis et sedibus suis pulsæ furor, ut sic dii placentur quemadmodum ne homines quidem teterrimi.—Se ipsi in templis contrucidant, vulneribus suis ac sanguine supplicant." And it deserves to be remarked, that these unnatural rites, together with that most unnatural of all—human sacrifice—are pronounced by Plutarch (*Opera*, tom. ii. p. 417. ed. Franc. 1620) to have been instituted for the purpose of averting the wrath of malignant demons.

Nor have these cruel modes of worship been confined to the heathens of antiquity. By the same unworthy conceptions of the Deity, the pagans of later times have been led to the same unworthy expressions of their religious feelings. Thus, in the narrative of Cook's voyages, we are informed, that it was usual with the inhabitants of the Friendly Islands, when afflicted with any dangerous disorder, to cut off their little finger as an offering to the Deity, which they deemed efficacious to procure their recovery: and in the Sandwich Islands, it was the custom to strike out the fore-teeth, as a propitiatory sacrifice, to avert the anger of the Eatooa, or Divinity. If we look again to the religion of the Mexicans, we meet the same sort of savage superstition, but carried to a more unnatural excess. Clavigero (lib. vi. sect. 22) says, "It makes one shudder, to read the austerities, which they exercised upon themselves, either in atonement of their transgressions, or in preparation for their festivals:" and then proceeds, in this section and in those that follow, to give a dreadful description, indeed, of the barbarous self-lacerations,

practised both by the Mexicans and Tlascalans, in the discharge of their religious duties: and yet, he afterwards asserts, (vol. ii. p. 446, 4to, ed. Lond.,) that all these, horrid as they are, must be deemed inconsiderable, when compared with the inhumanities of the ancient priests of Bellona and Cybele, of whom we have already spoken; and still more so, when contrasted with those of the penitents of the East Indies and Japan.

With good reason, indeed, has the author made this concluding remark: for, of the various austerities, which have been at different times practised as means of propitiating superior powers, there are none that can be ranked with those of the devotees of Hindostan at the present day. Dreadful as Mr. Maurice represents the rites of Mithra and Eleusis to have been, dreadful as we find the other rites that have been noticed, yet their accumulated horrors fall infinitely short of the penitentiary tortures endured by the Indian Yogee, the Gymnosophist of modern times—"to suspend themselves on high in cages, upon trees considered sacred, refusing all sustenance, but such as may keep the pulse of life just beating; to hang aloft upon tenterhooks, and voluntarily bear inexpressible agonies; to thrust themselves by hundreds, under the wheels of immense machines, that carry about their unconscious gods, where they are instantly crushed to atoms; at other times, to hurl themselves from precipices of stupendous height; now to stand up to their necks in rivers, till rapacious alligators come to devour them; now to bury themselves in snow till frozen to death; to measure with their naked bodies, trained over burning sands, the ground lying between one pagoda and another, distant perhaps many leagues; or to brave, with fixed eyes, the ardor of a meridian sun between the tropics:" these, with other penances not less tremendous, which Mr. Maurice has fully detailed in the last volume of his *Indian Antiquities*, are the means, whereby the infatuated worshippers of Brahma hope to conciliate the Deity, and to obtain the blessings of immortality: and by these, *all* hope to attain those blessings, except only the

wretched race of the Chandalahs, whom, by the unalterable laws of Brahma, no repentance, no mortification, can rescue from the doom of eternal misery; and against whom the gates of happiness are for ever closed.—See *Maur. Ind. Antiq.* pp. 960, 961.

Now, from this enumeration of facts, it seems not difficult to decide, whether the dictate of untutored reason be, the conviction of the DIVINE BENEVOLENCE, and the persuasion that the Supreme Being is to be conciliated by good and virtuous conduct *alone:* and from this also we shall be enabled to judge what degree of credit is due to the assertions of those who pronounce, that "*all* men *naturally* apprehend the Deity to be propitious:" that "*no nation whatever*, either Jew or Heathen, ancient or modern, appears to have had the least knowledge, or to betray the least sense of their want of *any* expedient of satisfaction for sin, besides repentance and a good life:" and, that "from a full review of the religions of all ancient and modern nations, they appear to be *utterly destitute of any thing like a doctrine of proper atonement.*"

These assertions Doctor Priestley has not scrupled to make (*Theol. Rep.* vol. i. pp. 401. 411. 416. and 421); and boldly offers "the range of the whole Jewish and Heathen world" to supply a single fact in contradiction. He professes also to survey this wide-extended range himself; and, for this purpose, begins with adducing a single passage from Virgil, whence, he says, it appears that "even the *implacable hatred* of Juno could be appeased;" and an instance from the *Phædon* of Plato, from which he concludes that Socrates, although "the farthest possible from the notion of appeasing the anger of the gods by any external services, yet died *without the least doubt of an happy immortality;*" notwithstanding that in p. 31, when treating of another subject, he had found it convenient to represent this philosopher as utterly *disbelieving* a future state; and even here, he adds, what renders his whole argument a nullity, *provided there were any such state for man.* Having by the former of these esta-

blished his position, as to the religion of the vulgar, among the Greeks and Romans; and by the latter, as to the religion of the *philosophers;* he yet farther endeavours to fortify his conclusion by the assertion, that no facts have been furnished either by Gale or Clarke, to justify the opinion, that the ancients were at a loss as to the terms of divine acceptance; notwithstanding that not only Clarke, (*Evidences*, vol. ii. pp. 662—670. fol. 1738,) but Leland, (*Christ. Rev.* vol. i. pp. 259. 270. 473. 4to, 1764,) and various other writers have collected numerous authorities on this head, and that the whole mass of heathen superstitions speaks no other language: insomuch that Bolingbroke himself (vol. v. pp. 214, 215. 4to) admits the point in its fullest extent. He next proceeds to examine the religion of the Ancient Persians and modern Parsis. To prove this people to have been free from any idea of atonement or sacrifice, he quotes a prayer from Dr. Hyde, and a description of their notion of future punishments from Mr. Grose: and, though these can, at the utmost, apply only to the *present* state of the people, (and whoever will consult Dr. Hyde's history, pp. 570. 574, on the account given by Tavernier, of their notion of *absolution*, and on that given by himself, of their ceremony of the *Scape-Dog*, will see good reason to deny the justness even of *this* application,) yet Dr. Priestley has not scrupled to extend the conclusion derived from them to the *ancient* Persians, in defiance of the numerous authorities referred to in this Number, and notwithstanding that, as Mr. Richardson asserts, (*Dissert.* pp. 25, 26. 8vo, 1788,) the Parsis acknowledge the original works of their ancient lawgiver to have been long lost; and that, consequently, the ceremonials of the modern Guebres preserve little or no resemblance to the ancient worship of Persia. See also *Hyde, Rel. Vet. Pers.* p. 574. ed. Oxon. 1760. Our author, last of all, cites the testimonies of Mr. Dow and Mr. Grose, to establish the same point concerning the religion of the Hindoos; and particularly to shew, that it was "*a maxim* with the Brahmans, *never* to defile their sacrifices with blood." The value to be attached to these testimonies

may be estimated from what has been already advanced concerning these writers; from the terrific representations of the gods of Hindostan; the cruel austerities with which they were worshipped; and the positive declarations of the most authentic and recent writers on the history of the Hindoos.

Thus, not a single authority of those adduced by Dr. Priestley is found to justify his position. But, admitting their fullest application, to what do they amount?—to an instance of relenting hatred in Juno, as described by Virgil; an example of perfect freedom from all apprehension of divine displeasure, in the case of Socrates; and a quotation or two from Mr. Dow and Mr. Grose, with a prayer from Dr. Hyde, to ascertain the religious notions of the Parsis and the Hindoos. These, with a few vague observations on the tenets of certain Atheists of ancient and modern times, (the tendency of which is to shew, that men who did not *believe in* a moral Governor of the Universe, did not *fear* one,) complete his survey of the religious history of the *Heathen* world:—and in the conclusion derived from this *very copious* induction he satisfactorily acquiesces, and boldly defies his opponents to produce a single contradictory instance.—(N. B. His abstract of the *Jewish* testimonies I reserve for a distinct discussion in another place: see No. XXXIII.)

When Dr. Priestley thus gravely asserts, that, by this *extensive* review of facts, he has completely established the position, that natural religion impresses no fears of divine displeasure, and prescribes no satisfaction for offended justice beyond repentance, it seems not difficult to determine how far he relies upon the ignorance of his readers, and upon the force of a bold assertion. As to the position itself, it is clear, that never was an αὐτὸς ἔφα more directly opposed to the voice of history, and to notoriety of fact. Parkhurst, in his Hebrew Lexicon, on the word אשם, says, "It is known to *every one*, who is acquainted with the mythology of the Heathens, how strongly and generally they retained the tradition of an *atonement* or *expiation for sin*." What has been already offered in this Number, may, perhaps, appear

sufficient to justify this affirmation. But, indeed, independent of all historical research, a very slight glance at the Greek and Roman Classics, especially the Poets, the popular divines of the ancients, can leave little doubt upon this head. So clearly does their language announce the notion of a *propitiatory atonement*, that, if we would avoid an imputation on Dr. Priestley's fairness, we are driven of necessity to question the extent of his acquaintance with those writers. Thus, in Homer, (*Il.* i. 386,) we find the expression Θεὸν ἱλάσκεσθαι so used, as necessarily to imply the *appeasing the anger* of the God: and again (*Il.* ii. 550) the same expression is employed, to denote the *propitiation* of Minerva by *sacrifice*, Ἐνθάδε μιν ταύροισι καὶ ἀρνειοῖς ἱλάονται. Hesiod, in like manner, (Ἔργ. καὶ Ἡμ. 338,) applies the term in such a sense as cannot be misunderstood. Having declared the certainty, that the wicked would be visited by the divine vengeance, he proceeds to recommend sacrifice, as amongst the means of rendering the deity *propitious*—Ἄλλοτε δὴ σπονδῇσι θυέεσσί τε ἱλάσκεσθαι. Plutarch makes use of the word, expressly in reference to the *anger of the Gods*, ἐξιλάσασθαι τὸ μήνιμα τῆς θεοῦ. That the words ἱλάσκεσθαι, ἱλασμὸς, &c., carry with them the force of *rendering propitious an offended deity*, might be proved by various other instances from the writers of antiquity; and that, in the use of the terms ἀποτροπίασμα or ἀποτροπιασμὸς, κάθαρμα, περίψημα, and φαρμακὸς, the ancients meant to convey the idea of *a piacular sacrifice averting the anger of the gods*, he who is at all conversant with their writings needs not to be informed. The word περίψημα, particularly, Hesychius explains by the synonymous terms, ἀντίλυτρον, ἀντίψυχον: and Suidas describes its meaning in this remarkable manner: "Οὕτως ἐπέλεγον, (Ἀθηναῖοι) τῷ κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν συνέχοντι πάντων κακά." (This Schleusner affirms to be the true reading)—περίψημα ἡμῶν γενοῦ, ἤτοι σωτηρία καὶ ἀπολύτρωσις. Καὶ οὕτως ἐνέβαλλον τῇ θαλάσσῃ, ὡσανεὶ τῷ Ποσειδῶνι θυσίαν ἀποτινύντες.

Nor is the idea of propitiatory atonement more clearly expressed by the Greek, than it is by the Latin writers of an-

tiquity. The words placare, propitiare, expiare, litare, placamen, piaculum, and such like, occur so frequently, and with such clearness of application, that their force cannot be easily misapprehended, or evaded. Thus Horace, (lib. ii. sat. 3,) "Prudens *placavi sanguine* Divos:" and (lib. i. Ode 28) "Teque *piacula* nulla *resolvent:*" and in his second Ode, he proposes the question, "cui dabit partes *scelus expiandi* Jupiter?" ("to which," says Parkhurst, whimsically enough, "the answer in the Poet is, Apollo—the second person in the Heathen Trinity.") Cæsar, likewise, speaking of the Gauls, says, as has been already noticed, "*Pro vitâ hominis nisi vita hominis reddatur*, non posse deorum immortalium numen *placari* arbitrantur." Cicero, (*pro Fonteio.* x.,) speaking of the same people, says, "Si quando aliquo *metu* adducti, deos *placandos* esse arbitrantur, humanis hostiis eorum aras ac templa funestant." The same writer (*De Nat. Deor.* lib. iii. cap. 6) says, "Tu autem etiam Deciorum *devotionibus placatos* Deos esse censes." From Silius Italicus and Justin, we have the most explicit declarations, that the object of the unnatural sacrifices of the Carthaginians was to obtain pardon from the gods. Thus, the former (lib. iv. lin. 767, &c.)—

> "Mos fuit in populis, quos condidit advena Dido
> *Poscere cæde deos veniam*, ac flagrantibus aris
> (Infandum dictu) parvos imponere natos"—

And in like manner the latter (lib. xviii. cap. 6,) expresses himself; "Homines ut victimas immolabant: et impuberes aris admovebant; *pacem sanguine eorum exposcentes*, pro quorum vitâ dii rogari maxime solent." Lucan also, referring to the same bloody rites, usual in the worship of the cruel gods of the Saxons, thus speaks of them (*Pharsal.* lib. i. lin. 443, &c.):—

> "Et quibus immitis *placatur sanguine diro*
> Teutates, horrensque feris altaribus Hesus,
> Et Tharamis Scythiæ non mitior ara Dianæ."

Virgil likewise, (*Æn.* ii. lin. 116,)—

" *Sanguine placastis* ventos, et virgine cæsâ,
Sanguine quærendi reditus, *animâque litandum*
Argolicâ."—

Suetonius relates of *Otho*, (cap. 7,) Per omnia *piaculorum* genera, manes Galbæ *propitiare* tentasse. And Livy (lib. vii. cap. 2) says, Cum vis morbi nec humanis consiliis, nec ope divinâ levaretur, ludi quoque scenici, inter alia *cœlestis iræ placamina* institui dicuntur: and the same writer, in another place, directly explains the object of animal sacrifice; Per dies aliquot, hostiæ majores sine *litatione* cæsæ, diuque non *impetrata pax Deûm*. The word litare is applied in the same manner by Pliny, (*De Viris Illust. Tull. Host.*) Dum Numam sacrificiis imitatur, Jovi Elicio *litare* non potuit; fulmine ictus cum regiâ conflagravit. This sense of the word might be confirmed by numerous instances. Servius (*Æn.* iv. lin. 50) and Macrobius (lib. iii. cap. 5) inform us, that it implies "facto sacrificio placare numen:" and Stephanus says from Nonius, that it differs from sacrificare in this, that the signification of the latter is, veniam *petere*, but that of the former, veniam *impetrare*.

But to produce all the authorities on this head were endless labour: and, indeed, to have produced so many, might seem to be an useless one, were it not of importance to enable us to appreciate, with exactness, the claims to literary pre-eminence, set up by a writer, who, on all occasions, pronounces ex cathedrâ; and on whose dicta, advanced with an authoritative and imposing confidence, and received by his followers with implicit reliance, has been erected a system embracing the most daring impieties that have ever disgraced the name of Christianity. If the observations in this number have the effect of proving to any of his admirers the incompetency of the guide whom they have hitherto followed with unsuspecting acquiescence, I shall so far have served the cause of truth and of Christianity, and shall have less reason to regret the trouble occasioned both to the reader and to myself, by this prolix detail.

NO. VI.—ON THE MULTIPLIED OPERATION OF THE DIVINE ACTS.

PAGE 7. (a).—This thought we find happily conveyed by Mr. Pope, in his *Essay on Man*:—

> "In human works, though laboured on with pain,
> A thousand movements scarce one purpose gain;
> In God's, one single does its end produce;
> Yet serves to second, too, some other use."—

In the illustration of this part of my subject, I have been much indebted to the excellent Sermons of the Bishop of London, *On the Christian Doctrine of Redemption*;—and also to the sixth Letter of H. Taylor's *Ben Mordecai's Apology*—a work which, though it contains much of what must be pronounced to be erroneous doctrine, is, nevertheless, in such parts as do not take their complexion from the tinge of the author's peculiar opinions, executed with acuteness, learning, and research.

NO. VII.—DEISTICAL REASONING INSTANCED IN CHUBB.

PAGE 7. (b).—The objection stated in the page here referred to, is urged by Chubb, in his reasoning on *Redemption*.

The species of argument which he has employed is a favourite one with this deistical writer. He applies it, on another occasion, to establish a conclusion no less extraordinary, than that the conversion of the Jews or Heathens to Christianity was a matter of little consequence, either as to the favour of God, or their own future safety; *for*, adds he, IF *they were virtuous and good men, they were secure without such conversion; and* IF *they were bad vicious men, they were not secured by it!* (*Posthumous Works*, vol. ii. p. 33.) Thus, with the simple apparatus of an IF and a DILEMMA, was this acute reasoner able, on all occasions, to subvert any part of the system of revelation against which he chose to direct his attacks. The ΔΟΣ ΠΟΥ ΣΤΩ was never wanting to this moral Archimedes; and the fulcrum and two-

forked lever were always ready at hand to aid the designs of the logical mechanician.

Yet this man was one of the *enlightened* in his day. And even at the present time, there is good reason to think that he is held in no small estimation by those who claim to be distinguished by that appellation, amongst the professors of Christianity: for, in the treatises of Unitarian and other *philosophic* Christians of these later times, we find the arguments and opinions of this writer plentifully scattered; and at the same time all ostentatious display of the source, from which they are derived, most carefully avoided:—circumstances, from which their serious reverence of the author, and the solid value they attach to his works, may reasonably be inferred.

Now, as this is one of the oracles from which these illuminating teachers derive their lights, it may afford some satisfaction to the reader, who may not have misemployed time in attempting to wade through the swamp of muddy metaphysics which he has left behind him, to have a short summary of this writer's notions concerning Christianity laid before him.

Having altogether rejected the Jewish revelation, and pronounced the New Testament to be a "fountain of confusion and contradiction," and having, consequently, affirmed every appeal to Scripture to be "a certain way to perplexity and dissatisfaction, but not to find out the truth;" he recommends our return from all these absurdities to "that prior rule of action, that eternal and invariable rule of right and wrong, as to an infallible guide, and as the solid ground of our peace and safety." Accordingly, having himself returned to this infallible guide, he is enabled to make these wonderful discoveries.—1. That there is no particular Providence: and that, consequently, any dependence on Providence, any trust in God, or resignation to his will, can be no part of religion; and, that the idea of application to God for his assistance, or prayer in any view, has no foundation in reason. 2. That we have no reason to pronounce the soul of man to

be immaterial, or that it will not perish with the body. 3. That if ever we should suppose a future state in which man shall be accountable, yet the judgment, which shall take place in that state, will extend but to a small part of the human race, and but to a very few of the actions which he may perform,—to such alone, for example, as affect the public weal.

Such are the results of reasoning triumphing over Scripture; and such is the wisdom of man when it opposes itself to the wisdom of God!—Yet this strange and unnatural blasphemer of divine truth declares, that the work, which conveys to the world the monstrous productions of insanity and impiety above cited, (and these are but a small portion of the entire of that description,) he had completed in the decline of life, with the design to leave to mankind "a valuable legacy," conducing to their general happiness. The reader will hardly be surprised, after what has been said, to learn, that the same infallible guide, which led this maniac to revile the Jewish and Christian Scriptures, and to condemn the Apostles and first publishers of Christianity as *blunderers* and *impostors*, prompted him at the same time to speak with commendation of the religion of MAHOMET [a]. "Whether

[a] It deserves to be noticed, that a complacency for the religion of Mahomet is a character by which the liberality of the Socinian or Unitarian is not less distinguished, than that of the Deist. The reason assigned for this by Dr. Van Mildert is a just one. Mahometanism is admired by both, because it sets aside those distinguishing doctrines of the Gospel, the *divinity of Christ*, and the *sacrifice upon the Cross*; and prepares the way for what the latter are pleased to dignify with the title of Natural Religion, and the former with that of Rational Christianity. — *Van Mildert's Boyle Lect.* vol. i. p. 208. The same writer also truly remarks, (p. 202,) that, besides exhibiting a strange compound of Heathen and Jewish errors, the code of Mahomet comprises almost every heterodox opinion that has ever been entertained respecting the Christian faith.

Indeed, the decided part which the Unitarians have heretofore taken with the prophet of Mecca seems not to be sufficiently adverted to at the present day. The curious reader, if he will turn to *Mr. Leslie's Theolog. Works*, vol. i. p. 207, will not be a little entertained to see conveyed, in a solemn address from the English Unitarians to the Mahometan embassador of Morocco, in the Reign of Charles the Second, a cordial approbation of Mahomet and of the Koran. The one is said to have been raised up by God, to scourge the idolizing Christians, whilst the other is spoken of as a precious record of the true faith. Mahomet they represent to be "a preacher of the Gospel of Christ;" and they describe themselves to be "his

the Mahometan revelation be of a divine original or not, there seems," says he, "to be a plausible pretence, arising from the circumstances of things, for *stamping a divine character upon it!*"—However, at other times he seems disposed not to elevate the religion of Mahomet decidedly above that of Christ; for he observes, that "the turning from Mahometanism to Christianity, or from Christianity to Mahometanism, is only laying aside one external form of religion and making use of another; which is of no more real benefit than a man's changing the colour of his clothes." His decision upon this point, also, he thinks he can even defend by the authority of St. Peter, who, he says, has clearly given it as his opinion in Acts, x. 34, 35, that all forms of religion are indifferent.

I should not have so long detained my reader with such contemptible, or rather pitiable, extravagances, if I had not

fellow champions for the truth." The mode of warfare they admit, indeed, to be different; but the object contended for they assert to be the same. "We, with our Unitarian brethren, have been in all ages exercised, to defend with our pens the faith of one supreme God; as *he hath raised your Mahomet to do the same with the sword*, as a scourge on those idolizing Christians." (p. 209.) Leslie, upon a full and deliberate view of the case, concedes the justice of the claim set up by the Unitarians to be admitted to rank with the followers of Mahomet; pronouncing the one to have as good a title to the appellation of Christians as the other. (p. 337.) On a disclosure, by Mr. Leslie, of the attempt which had thus been made by the Socinians, to form a confederacy with the Mahometans, the authenticity of the address, and the plan of the projected condition, at the time, were strenuously denied. The truth of Mr. Leslie's statement, however, (of which from the character of the man no doubt could well have been at any time entertained,) has been since most fully and incontrovertibly confirmed. — See *Whitaker's Origin of Arianism*, p. 399. Mr. Leslie also shows, that this Unitarian scheme, of extolling Mahometanism as the only true Christianity, continued, for a length of time, to be acted on with activity and perseverance. He establishes this at large, by extracts from certain of their publications, in which it is endeavoured to prove, "that Mahomet had no other design but to restore the belief of the Unity of God, which at that time was extirpated among the Eastern Christians by the doctrines of the *Trinity* and *Incarnation*; that Mahomet meant not, that his religion should be esteemed a new religion, but only the restitution of the true intent of the Christian religion: that the Mahometan learned men call themselves the true disciples of the Messias:"—and, to crown all, "that Mahometanism has prevailed so greatly, *not by force and the sword,—but by that one truth in the Koran, the Unity of God.*" And, as a just consequence from all this, it is strongly contended, that, "the Tartars had acted more rationally in embracing the sect of Mahomet, than the Christian faith of the Trinity, Incarnation," &c. *Leslie*, vol. i. pp. 216, 217.

thought that the specimen they afford of the wild wanderings of reason, when *emancipated* from Revelation, may prepare his mind for a juster view of what is called RATIONAL CHRISTIANITY.

NO. VIII.—ON THE CONSISTENCY OF PRAYER WITH THE DIVINE IMMUTABILITY.

PAGE 7. (c).—See *Price's Dissertations*—2d edit. pp. 209, 210. There are some observations of this excellent and serious writer upon the nature of prayer, which are not only valuable in themselves, but, with some extension, admit so direct a bearing upon the subject before us, that I cannot resist the desire I feel of laying them before the reader. In answer to the objection derived from the unchangeableness of God, and the conclusion thence deduced that prayer cannot make any alteration in the Deity, or cause him to bestow any blessing which he would not have bestowed without it; this reply is made:—If it be in itself proper, that we should humbly apply to God for the mercies we need from him, it must also be proper, that a regard should be paid to such applications; and that there should be a different treatment of those who make them, and those who do not. To argue this as implying changeableness in the Deity, would be extremely absurd: for the unchangeableness of God, when considered in relation to the exertion of his attributes in the government of the world, consists, not in always acting in the same manner, however cases and circumstances may alter; but in always doing what is right, and in adapting his treatment of his intelligent creatures to the variation of their actions, characters, and dispositions. If prayer, then, makes an alteration in the case of the supplicant, as being the discharge of an indispensable duty; what would in truth infer changeableness in God, would be, not his *regarding and answering* it, but his *not* doing this. Hence it is manifest, that the notice which he may be pleased to take of our prayers by granting us blessings in answer to them, is not to be con-

sidered as a yielding to importunity, but as an instance of rectitude in suiting his dealings with us to our conduct. Nor does it imply that he is backward to do us good, and, therefore, wants to be *solicited* to it; but merely that there are certain conditions, on the performance of which the effects of his goodness to us are suspended; that there is something to be done by us before we can be proper objects of his favour; or before it can be fit and consistent with the measures of the divine government to grant us particular benefits. Accordingly, to the species of objection alluded to in page 7, (namely, that our own worthiness or unworthiness, and the determined will of God, must determine how we are to be treated, *absolutely*, and so as to render prayer altogether unnecessary,) the answer is obvious, that *before* prayer we may be unworthy; and that prayer may be the very thing that *makes* us worthy: the act of prayer being itself the very *condition*, the very *circumstance* in our characters, that contributes to render us the proper objects of divine regard, and the neglect of it being that which disqualifies us for receiving blessings.

Mr. Wollaston, in his *Religion of Nature*, (pp. 115, 116,) expresses the same ideas with his usual exact, and (I may here particularly say) mathematical, precision. "The respect, or relation, which lies between God, considered as an *unchangeable* being, and *one* that is humble, and supplicates, and endeavours to qualify himself for mercy, cannot be the *same* with that, which lies between the same *unchangeable* God, and *one* that is obstinate, and will not supplicate [a], or endeavour to qualify himself: that is, the same thing, or being, cannot respect *opposite* and *contradictory* characters in the same manner [b]. It is not, in short, that by our sup-

[a] Πῶς ἂν δοίη τῷ πρὸς τὰς ὁρμὰς αὐτιξουσίῳ μὴ αἰτοῦντι ὁ διδόναι πεφυκὼς Θεός;—Hierocl.

[b] This position he exhibits thus, in language which will be intelligible to mathematicians only. "The ratio of G to M + q, is different from that of G to M − q: and yet G remains unaltered."—To the opponents of the argument this formula of its exposition will no doubt afford ground rather of jocularity than of conviction. For, of men capable of maintaining a contrary opinion, there can be no great hazard in pronouncing, that they are *not* mathematicians.

plication we can pretend to produce any alteration in the Deity, but by an alteration in ourselves we may alter the relation or respect lying between him and us."

The beautiful language of Mrs. Barbauld, upon this subject, I cannot prevail upon myself to leave unnoticed. Having observed upon that high toned philosophy, which would pronounce prayer to be the weak effort of an infirm mind to alter the order of nature and the decrees of Providence, in which it rather becomes the wise man to acquiesce with a manly resignation; this elegant writer proceeds to state, that they who cannot boast of such philosophy may plead the example of Him, who prayed, though with meek submission, that the cup of bitterness might pass from him; and who, as the moment of separation approached, interceded for his friends and followers with all the anxiety of affectionate tenderness. But (she adds) we will venture to say, that practically there is no such philosophy.—If prayer were not enjoined for the perfection, it would be permitted to the weakness of our nature. We should be betrayed into it, if we thought it sin: and pious ejaculations would escape our lips, though we were obliged to preface them, with God forgive me for praying!—To those (she proceeds) who press the objection, that we cannot see in what manner our prayers can be answered, consistently with the government of the world according to general laws; it may be sufficient to say, that prayer, being made almost an instinct of our nature, it cannot be supposed but that, like all other instincts, it has its use: but that no idea can be *less* philosophical, than one which implies, that the existence of a God who governs the world, should make no difference in our conduct; and few things less probable, than that the child-like submission which bows to the will of a father, should be exactly similar in feature to the stubborn patience which bends under the yoke of necessity. *Remarks on Wakefield's Enquiry*, pp. 11—14. See also the excellent remarks of Dr. Percival to the same purport, cited in the Appendix to these volumes.

NO. IX.—ON THE GRANTING OF THE DIVINE FORGIVENESS THROUGH A MEDIATOR OR INTERCESSOR.

PAGE 8. (a).—See *H. Taylor's Ben. Mord.* 5th Letter; in which a number of instances are adduced from the Old Testament, to show that God's dealing with his creatures is of the nature here described. Thus we find, that, when God had declared that he would destroy the entire nation of Israel, for their idolatry at Horeb, (*Numb.* ch. xiv.,) and again, for their intended violence against Caleb and Joshua, (*Deut.* ch. ix.,) yet, upon the intercession of Moses, he is said to have forgiven them. In like manner, for the sake of ten righteous persons, he would have spared Sodom. (*Gen.* xviii. 32.) In remembrance of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and for *their sakes*, he is represented as being merciful to their posterity. (*Gen.* xxvi. 24.)—He forgave Abimelech also upon the prayer of Abraham, (*Gen.* xx. 7,) and the friends of Job, upon the solicitation of that patriarch (*Job*, xlii. 10); — and what renders these two last instances particularly strong, is, that whilst he declares the purpose of forgiveness, he at the same time expressly *prescribes* the mediation by which it was to be obtained. To quote more of the numerous instances which the Old Testament supplies on this head, must be unnecessary. What has been urged will enable us to form a true judgment of that extraordinary position, on which Dr. Priestley relies not a little, (*Hist. of Cor.* vol. i. p. 156,) viz. that "the declarations of Divine Mercy are made without reserve or limitation to the truly penitent, *through all the books of Scripture, without the most distant hint of any regard being had to the sufferings or merit of any being whatever.*"

Very different, indeed, were the sentiments of the pious writer referred to in the last Number. He not merely admits the contrary of this position to be founded in the facts of Revelation; but he maintains the abstract reasonableness of the principle, with a force and feeling, that must render his remarks upon this head particularly acceptable to the reader. "If it be asked," he says, "what influence our prayers can

have upon the state of others; what benefit they can derive from our intercessions; or, whether we can conceive, that God, like weak men, can be persuaded by the importunity of one person to bestow upon another, blessings, which he would not else have bestowed: the proper answer is to be derived from the consideration, that it is by no means necessary to suppose, that the treatment which beings shall receive depends, in all cases, solely on what they are in themselves. This, without doubt, is what the universal Governor *chiefly* regards; but it is not *all*. And though there are some benefits of such a nature, that no means can obtain them for beings who have not certain qualifications, there are other benefits which one being may obtain for another, or for which he may be indebted entirely to the kind offices of his fellow-creatures. An advantage may become proper to be granted to another, in consequence of some circumstances he may be in, or some relations in which he may stand to others, which, abstracted from such circumstances and relations, would not have been proper. Nothing more frequently happens in the common course of events.

"The whole seheme of nature seems, indeed, to be contrived on purpose in such a manner, as that beings might have it in their power, in numberless ways, to bless one another. And one great end of the precarious and mutually dependent condition of men appears plainly to be, that they might have room and scope for the exercise of the beneficent affections. From this constitution of things it is, that almost all our happiness is conveyed to us, not immediately from the hands of God, but by the instrumentality of our fellow-beings, or through them as the channels of his beneficence; in such a sense, that, had it not been for their benevolence and voluntary agency, we should have for ever wanted the blessings we enjoy.

"Now with respect to prayer, why may not this be one thing that may alter a case, and be a reason with the divine Being for showing favour? Why, by praying for one another, may we not, as in many other ways, be useful to one another?

Why may not the universal Father, in consideration of the humble and benevolent intercessions of some of his children for others, be pleased often, in the course of his providence, to direct events for the advantage of the persons interceded for, in a manner that otherwise would not have been done? —No truly benevolent and pious man can help lifting up his heart to the Deity in behalf of his fellow-creatures. No one whose breast is properly warmed with kind wishes to his brethren about him, and who feels within himself earnest desires to do them all possible good, can avoid offering up his kind wishes and desires to the common Benefactor and Ruler, who knows what is best for every being, and who can make those we love infinitely happy. In reality, supplications to the Deity for our friends and kindred and all in whose welfare we are concerned, are no less *natural* than supplications for ourselves. And are they not also *reasonable?* What is there in them, that is not worthy the most exalted benevolence? May it not be fit, that a wise and good Being should pay a regard to them? And may not the regarding and answering them, and, in general, granting blessings to some on account of the virtue of others, be a proper method of encouraging and honouring virtue, and of rewarding the benevolence of beings to one another? Perhaps, there may not be a better way of encouraging righteousness in the creation, than by making it as much as possible the cause of happiness, not only to the agent himself, but to all connected with him: since there is no virtuous being who would not, in many circumstances, choose to be rewarded with a grant of blessings to his fellow-beings, rather than to himself.

" That our prayers for others may be attended with beneficial effects upon *their* condition, he considers also to be a prevailing sentiment: otherwise wherefore should we feel ourselves impelled to offer them? Our immediate view in praying must be to obtain what we pray for. This, which is true as applied to prayers on our own behalf, must be also true of our supplications for others. We cannot mean, in

addressing to the Deity our desires for *others*, merely to obtain some benefit to *ourselves*. And this in itself proves, that the effect of prayer is not merely to be estimated by its tendency to promote our moral and religious improvement."

At the same time, I cannot but lay before the reader the edifying and delightful representation, given by the author, in another place, of the beneficial influence of *intercessionary* prayer on the mind of him who offers it. "No one can avoid feeling how happy an effect this must have in sweetening our tempers, in reconciling us to all about us, and causing every unfriendly passion to die away within us. We cannot offer up prayers to God for our fellow-men, without setting them before our minds in some of the most engaging lights possible; as partaking of the same nature with ourselves, liable to the same wants and sufferings, and in the same helpless circumstances; as children of the same Father, subjects of the same all-wise government, and heirs of the same hopes. He who prays for others with understanding and sincerity, must see himself on the same level with them; he must be ready to do them all the good in his power; he must be pleased with whatever happiness they enjoy: he can do nothing to lessen their credit or comfort; and fervent desires will naturally rise within him, while thus engaged, that his own breast may be the seat of all those good dispositions and virtues, which he prays that they may be blessed with. Resentment and envy can never be indulged by one, who, whenever he finds himself tempted to them, has recourse to this duty, and sets himself to recommend to the divine favour the persons who excite within him these passions. No desire of retaliation or revenge, nothing of unpeaceableness, ill nature, or haughtiness, can easily show itself in a heart kept under this guard and discipline. How is it possible to use *him* ill, for whom we are constant advocates with God? How excellent a parent or friend is *he* likely to make, who always remembers before God the concerns and interests of his children and friends, in the

same manner that he remembers his own? Is there a more rational way of expressing benevolence than this? or a more effectual way of promoting and enlarging it? Nothing is more desirable or more delightful than to feel ourselves continually under the power of kind affections to all about us. Would we be thus happy? Would we have our hearts in a constant state of love and good-will? Would we have every tender sentiment strong and active in our breasts?—Let us be constant and diligent in this part of devotion, and pray continually for others, as we do for ourselves." (*Price's Four Dissertations*, pp. 207. 221—227. 237—239.)

Such was the language of a man, who, whilst (unlike Dr. Priestley and his Unitarian associates) he really possessed, and by the habits of his studies daily strengthened, the powers of *accurate* thinking, had not *rationalized* away those just and natural sentiments which belong to the truly religious character, and which, whilst the highest exercises of mere intellect cannot reach, its soundest decisions cannot but approve. At the same time, how deeply is it to be deplored, that, in certain of his theological opinions, such a man should have departed widely from the truth of Scripture!

I have willingly permitted myself in this extract to wander beyond what the immediate subject demanded; because, amidst the thorny mazes of polemics, the repose and refreshment which these flowers of genuine piety present would, I apprehended, afford to the reader a satisfaction not less than they had yielded to myself.

NO. X.—ON UNITARIANS; OR *RATIONAL* DISSENTERS.

PAGE 8. (b).—It is obvious, that the sect, to which I here allude, is that known by the title of UNITARIANS: a title by which it is meant modestly to insinuate that they are the only worshippers of *One God*. From a feeling similar to that which has given birth to this denomination, they demand,

also, to be distinguished from the other Non-conformists, by the appellation of *Rational* Dissenters.

Mr. Howes has observed, (*Critical Observ.* vol. iv. p. 17,) that the term, *Unitarian*, has been used with great vagueness by the very writers who arrogate the name: being applied by some to a great variety of sects, Arians, Ebionites, Theodotians, Sabellians, and Socinians; to any sect, in short, which has pretended to preserve the *unity* of the Deity, better than the *Trinitarians* according to the council of Nice: whilst by others, and particularly by Dr. Priestley, it is attributed exclusively to those who maintain the *mere humanity* of Christ. On this account Mr. Howes proposed to substitute the word *Humanist*, as more precisely expressing the chief principle of the sect intended: and this word he afterwards exchanged for *Humanitarian*, Mr. Hobhouse and other Unitarians having adopted that appellation. (*Crit. Obs.* vol. iv. p. 91.)—However, as I find the latest writers of this description prefer the denomination of *Unitarian*, I have complied with their wishes, in adopting this term throughout the present work; perfectly aware, at the same time, of the impropriety of its appropriation, but being unwilling to differ with them merely about names, where so much attention is demanded by things.

For a full account of the doctrines of this new sect, (for *new* it must be called, notwithstanding Dr. Priestley's laboured, but unsubstantial, examination of "Early Opinions,") the reader may consult the *Theological Repository*, the various Theological productions of Dr. Priestley, and particularly, Mr. Belsham's *Review of Mr. Wilberforce's Treatise.* Indeed this last publication presents, on the whole, so extraordinary a system, and conveys so comprehensive a view of *all* the principles and consequences of the Unitarian scheme, not to be found in any other work of so small a compass, that I think it may not be unacceptable to subjoin to these pages a brief abstract of it, as described by the author. A summary of the tenets of this *enlightened* sect may furnish

matter of speculation, not merely curious but instructive, to those who are not yet tinctured with its principles; and to those who are, it may, perhaps, suggest a salutary warning, by showing it in all its frightful consequences.—Unitarianism, it is true, has not yet made its way into *this* country in any digested shape; but wherever there are found to prevail a vain confidence in the sufficiency of human reason, and a consequent impatience of authority and control, with a desire to reject received opinions, and to fritter away, by subtle distinctions, plain and established precepts, there the soil is prepared for its reception, and the seed is already sown.

NO. XI.—ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN UNITARIANS AND SOCINIANS.

PAGE 9. (a).—The doctrine stated in the page here referred to, is that maintained by all the Socinian writers. It may be found so laid down (*Theol. Rep.* vol. i.) in the first article written by Dr. Priestley, under the title of *Clemens*. It is, however, to be noted, that Doctor Priestley, his follower, Mr. Belsham, and others of the same Theological opinions, disclaim the title of *Socinian;* and desire to be distinguished by that of *Unitarian*, for the reason assigned in the preceding Number. Mr. Belsham goes so far as to say (*Review*, &c., p. 227) that his "Creed is as far removed from that of Socinus, as it is from the *peculiar doctrines* of Mr. Wilberforce." Indeed, to do Socinus justice, it must be admitted that the Creed of the Unitarian differs materially from his. *He* had not reached the acmé of modern illumination. *He* had not sufficient penetration to discern the various mistakes in the application of Scripture, and the numerous errors in reasoning, committed by the Evangelists and Apostles, which have been detected and dragged to light by the sagacious Unitarian. *He* had not discovered that Christ was the human offspring of *Joseph* and Mary. *He* had not divested our Lord of his regal, as well as his sacerdotal character, and reduced him to the condition of a mere prophet. *He* had

weakly imagined, that, by virtue of his *regal* office, Christ possessed the power of delivering his people from the punishment of their sins. But Doctor Priestley has rectified this error. In his *Hist. of Cor.* (vol. i. p. 272) he expressly points out the difference between himself and Socinus, on this head. "It immediately follows," he says, "from his (Socinus's) principles, that Christ being only a man, though ever so innocent, his death *could* not, in any proper sense of the word, atone for the sins of *other men.* He was, however, far from abandoning the doctrine of *Redemption*, in the Scripture sense of the word, that is, of our deliverance from the *guilt* of sin, by his Gospel, as promoting repentance and reformation; and from the *punishment* due to sin, by his power of giving eternal life to all that obey him.—*But, indeed, if God himself freely forgives the sins of men, upon repentance, there could be no occasion, properly speaking, for any thing farther being done to avert the punishment with which they had been threatened.*"

This passage, whilst it marks the distinction between the Socinian and the Unitarian, fully opens up the scheme of the latter. But, on this system, it may be curious to inquire in what light the *death* of our blessed Lord is represented. Dr. Priestley (*Theol. Rep.* vol. i. p. 39) gives us this information: —"Christ being a man, who suffered and died in the best of causes, there is nothing so very different in the occasion and manner of his death from that of others who suffered and died after him in the same cause of Christianity, but that *their sufferings and death may be considered in the same light with his.*" This extraordinary assertion exactly agrees with what is recorded of Solomon Eccles, a great preacher and prophet of the Quakers; who expressly declares, "that the blood of Christ was no more than the blood of any other Saint." (*Leslie's Works*, fol. vol. ii. p. 195.)—Thus strangely do the philosophy of Doctor Priestley, and the fanaticism of the Quaker, concur with that, which both would pronounce to be the gross absurdity of Popery. For, if the death of Christ be viewed in the same light with the death of any other mar-

tyr, the invocation of the Popish Saints may appear a consequence not so revolting to Christian piety. That the lines of error, in their manifold directions, should sometimes intersect, if not for a certain length of way coincide, is not, however, matter of surprise.

But, the *death* of Christ being treated in this manner by Doctor Priestley and his Unitarian followers, one is naturally led to inquire what their notions are of his state, subsequent to his resurrection. Mr. Belsham (*Review*, &c., p. 74) gives us satisfaction on this head. The Unitarians, he says, here entirely differ from the Socinians: for that the latter hold the "*unscriptural and most incredible notion*, that, since his resurrection, he has been advanced to the government of the Universe: but a *consistent Unitarian*, acknowledging Jesus as *a man in all respects like to his brethren*, regards his kingdom as entirely of a spiritual nature." We are not, however, to suppose our blessed Lord altogether banished from existence; for this gentleman admits again, (p. 85,) that he is "now alive" somewhere, "and without doubt employed in offices the most honourable and benevolent;"—in such, of course, as any of his *brother-men*, to whom he has been described as in all respects similar, might be engaged. On this, and other such wild blasphemies of this sect, *as represented by Mr. Belsham*, see the Appendix.

NO. XII.—ON THE CORRUPTION OF MAN'S NATURAL STATE.

PAGE 10. (b).—They, who may wish to see this subject extensively treated, will find it amply discussed in Leland's work on the *Advantage and Necessity of the Christian Revelation*. In Mr. Wilberforce's PRACTICAL VIEW, also, we meet with a description of the state of unassisted nature, distinguished not less, unhappily, by its truth, than by its eloquence.

After a forcible enumeration of the gross vices into which the heathen world, both ancient and modern, had been sunk; and this not only amongst the illiterate and the vulgar, but

also amongst the learned and the refined, even to the decent Virgil and the philosophic Cicero; he proceeds, in the following animated tone, to examine the state of morals among those who have been visited by the light of the Gospel:—

"But you give up the heathen nations as indefensible; and wish rather to form your estimate of man, from a view of countries which have been blessed with the light of Revelation. True it is, and with joy let us record the concession, Christianity has set the general tone of morals much higher than it was ever found in the pagan world. She has everywhere improved the character, and multiplied the comforts of society; particularly to the poor and the weak, whom, from the beginning, she professed to take under her special patronage. Like her divine Author, 'who sends his rain on the evil and on the good,' she showers down unnumbered blessings on thousands who profit from her bounty, while they forget or deny her power, and set at nought her authority. Yet, even in this more favoured situation, we shall discover too many lamentable proofs of the depravity of man. Nay, this depravity will now become even more apparent and less deniable. For what bars does it not now overleap? Over what motives is it not now victorious? Consider well the superior light and advantages which we enjoy, and then appreciate the superior obligations which are imposed on us. Consider well," &c.

"Yet in spite of all our knowledge, thus powerfully enforced and pressed home upon us, how little has been our progress in virtue! It has been by no means such as to prevent the adoption, in our days, of various maxims of antiquity, which, when well considered, too clearly establish the depravity of man." Having adduced several instances in proof of this assertion, he thus proceeds:—"But surely to any who call themselves Christians, it may be justly urged as an astonishing instance of human depravity, that we ourselves, who enjoy the full light of Revelation; to whom God has vouchsafed such clear discoveries of what it concerns us to know of his being and attributes; who profess to believe

that *in him we live, and move, and have our being;* that to him we owe all the comforts we here enjoy, and the offer of eternal glory purchased for us by the atoning blood of his own Son; that we, thus loaded with mercies, should every one of us be continually chargeable with forgetting his authority, and being ungrateful for his benefits; with slighting his gracious proposals, or receiving them, at best, but heartlessly and coldly."

"But to put the question concerning the natural depravity of man to the severest test: take the *best of the human species*, the *watchful, diligent, self-denying Christian*, and let *him* decide the controversy; and that, not by inferences drawn from the practices of a thoughtless and dissolute world, but by an appeal to his *personal experience*. Go with him into his closet, ask him *his* opinion of the corruption of the heart; and he will tell you, that he is deeply sensible of its power, for that he has learned it from much self-observation, and long acquaintance with the workings of his own mind. He will tell you, that *every day* strengthens this conviction; yea, that *hourly* he sees fresh reason to deplore his want of simplicity in intention, his infirmity of purpose, his low views, his selfish, unworthy desires, his backwardness to set about his duty, his languor and coldness in performing it: that he finds himself obliged *continually* to confess, that he feels within him two opposite principles, and that *he cannot do the things that he would*. He cries out in the language of the excellent Hooker, 'The little fruit which we have in holiness, it is, God knoweth, *corrupt* and *unsound:* we put no confidence at all in it, we challenge nothing in the world for it, we dare not call God to reckoning, as if we had him in our debt books; *our continual suit to him is, and must be, to bear with our infirmities, and pardon our offences!*'" (*Wilberforce's Practical View*, pp. 28—37.)

Such is the view, which a pious and impressive writer has given of what all, who reflect, must acknowledge to be the true condition of man. Another writer, not less pious and impressive, (Mrs. Hannah More,) has, with her usual powers

of eloquence, presented the same picture of the moral and religious history of the world, in her admirable *Strictures on the modern System of Female Education.* To observations similar to those of Mr. Wilberforce, on the doctrine of human depravity, she adds this remark:—"Perhaps one reason why the faults of the most eminent saints are recorded in Scripture, is, to add fresh confirmation to this doctrine. If *Abraham*, *Moses*, *Noah*, *Elijah*, *David*, and *Peter*, sinned, who, shall we presume to say, has escaped the universal taint?" (*H. More's Works*, vol. iv. pp. 330, 331.)

How easily is this question answered by the follower of Priestley:—or I may add, (strange as the combination may appear,) of Wesley! The former produces his philosopher, the latter his saint, in refutation of such unworthy and disparaging notions of human nature. They differ, indeed, in one material point. The one contends, that by his *own* virtuous resolutions he can extricate *himself* from vicious propensities and habits: whilst the other is *proud* to admit, that the divine favour has been *peculiarly* exerted in *his* behalf, to rescue him from his sins. The one denies that he was ever subject to an innate depravity: the other confesses that he was, boasts even of its inveteracy, but glories that he has been *perfectly purified* from its stains. But both are found to agree, most exactly, in that vain self-complacency, which exults in the reflection that they "are not as other men[a]

[a] The contemptuous language, which the overweening Methodist is too apt to employ, with respect to all who are not within his sanctified pale, but more especially with respect to the clergy of the Establishment, affords but too strong a justification of this charge as it applies to him. The clergy are uniformly with religionists of this description, "dumb dogs," "watchmen who sleep upon their posts," "priests of Baal," "wolves in sheep's clothing," &c. &c. Indeed, Mr. *Whitefield* informs us in his works, (vol. iv. p. 67,) that "Mr. *Wesley* thought *meanly of Abraham*, and, he believes, of *David* also:" whilst, of Mr. *Wesley* himself we are told, that "wherever he went, he was received as an Apostle;" and that "in the honour due to Moses he also had a share, being placed at the head of a great people by Him who called them," &c. (*Hampson's Life of Wesley*, vol. iii. p. 35. *Coke's Life of Wesley*, p. 520.)—Mr. *Wesley* has taken care to let mankind know, that Methodism "is the only religion worthy of God" (*Hamps.* vol. iii. p. 30); and the miracles which repeatedly attested his divine mission for the propagation of this religion he has most copiously recorded throughout his *Journals*.—Whoever wishes to form a just idea of

are ;" and in the arrogant presumption, that they are lifted above that corruption of nature from which the more humble and more deserving Christian feels himself not to be exempt. In the *philosophising* Unitarian all this is natural and consistent. But in the Methodist, (I speak of the Arminian Methodist, or follower of Wesley,) it is altogether at variance with the doctrines which he *professes* to maintain. Accuracy of reasoning, however, is not among the distinctive marks of this latter description of religionists. But what is wanting in reason is made up in fancy. And as the great mass of mankind is moved more by the passions than by the understanding, it is not surprising, that a scheme of religion, which addresses itself almost exclusively to the former, should have been extensively embraced; and that fanaticism and ignorance have, in consequence, combined, with alarming effect, in spreading far and wide through these countries the mischievous extravagances of this sect.

It is much to be lamented, that any of the friends of true religion have given countenance to such a perversion of its soundest principles: and it is matter equally of wonder and concern, that a system, which no longer covertly, but openly and avowedly, works in continued hostility to the established religion, has not met with more effectual resistance from those who may be supposed to take an interest in the well-being of the Establishment. On the contrary, examples are not wanting of cases, in which the clergy have been set aside in the work of religious instruction; whilst men, who uphold the Wesleyan chimera of perfection, who openly reject the Liturgy [a] and Articles, and oppose the doctrines of the Esta-

the pernicious extravagances of this enthusiastic teacher, and of his followers, will find ample satisfaction in *Bishop Lavington's Enthusiasm of Methodists and Papists compared,* (a book, which B. Warburton, in one of his private letters to his friend Hurd, very unfairly describes, as "a bad copy of Stillingfleet's famous book of the *Fanaticism of the Church of Rome,*") and in the later publication of *Nott's Religious Enthusiasm considered.*

[a] The treatment which the Liturgy and the Articles have experienced from Mr. Wesley, is, I apprehend, very little understood by the generality of those who are disposed to look with complacency upon the sect of which he has been the founder. Professing to adopt the Liturgy of the Church of England,

blished Church, have been deemed fit objects of preference to the recognised religious teachers of the land.

Against abuses such as these, and particularly against the open outrages upon decency and upon the rights of the Establishment, of which many of this visionary sect have

he has framed one for his followers, differing from it in many and essential particulars. He confesses, indeed, that he has made *some slight alterations;* which he enumerates in such a way as would naturally induce the supposition, that the difference is altogether unimportant: whilst, in truth, he has not only newly modified the Common Prayer, and nearly abolished the whole of the baptismal office; but, besides mutilating above sixty of the Psalms, has discarded thirty-four others, and newly rendered many of the remainder. Of the Psalms which he has discarded, six, at least, are admitted to be eminently prophetic of our Saviour, of his incarnation, his sufferings, and his ascension: whilst the reason assigned for the expurgation is, their being "improper for the mouth of a Christian congregation!" But this is not all: the Rubrick and the appointed lessons are in most places altered; and the *Catechism*, and the two *Creeds* (the Nicene and Athanasian) totally discarded. Of these last-mentioned alterations, it is also particularly to be observed, that Mr. Wesley gave to his followers no notice whatever; whilst the former were represented by him as of a nature altogether unimportant: so that the ignorant amongst his adherents were led to imagine that they were not materially departing from the forms of the Establishment; when, in truth, they were altogether drawn away from the offices of the Church.—To complete the whole, Mr. Wesley provided his Communion also with a new set of *Articles;* reducing the number from thirty-nine to twenty-five, and making such changes in those which he retained as he found most convenient. —It may be satisfactory to the reader to know, exactly, what are the Articles and Psalms that have been rejected by Mr. Wesley.—The *Articles* rejected are, the third, eighth, the greater part of the *ninth*, thirteenth, *fifteenth*, seventeenth, *eighteenth*, twentieth, twenty-first, *twenty-third*, twenty-sixth, much of the twenty-seventh, *twenty-ninth*, thirty-third, and three others of the less important ones at the end. Those marked in italics are more particularly to be noticed. The *Psalms* rejected are, the 14th, 21st, 52d, 53d, 54th, 58th, 60th, 64th, 72d, 74th, 78th—83d, 87th, 88th, 94th, 101st, 105th, 106th, 108th —110th, 120th, 122d, 129th, 132d, 134th, 136th, 137th, 140th, 149th. The general character of the rejected Articles and Psalms will pretty clearly establish what has been alleged as to the nature of the opinions which Mr. Wesley and his followers maintain, or, at least, of the doctrines which they reject. But, not to enter further into particulars, it may be sufficient in this place to notice two instances of omitted Articles; from which the spirit that governed the whole may easily be divined. The eighteenth Article, which pronounces, that "Eternal salvation is to be obtained only by the name of Christ;" and the fifteenth, which asserts, "that Christ alone was without sin," are two of those, which the founder of Methodism has declared to be unfit objects of a Christian's belief. Thus it appears that the Socinian is not the only sectary that would degrade the dignity of Christ. —Such are the people from whom certain weak members of the Establishment apprehend no mischief.—On the points which have been here noticed, see particularly *Nott's Relig. Enth.* pp. 150—167.

been guilty, I am happy to say that some respectable members of the National Church have lifted their voices in both countries. Amongst these I allude with particular pleasure to my respected friend and brother academic, Dr. Hales: and I allude to him the more willingly, not only because he has with much ability and good temper combated and confuted the extravagant dogmas of *sinless perfection*, and *miraculous impulses*, which are the distinguishing tenets of this sect; but because he has, in opposition to their wild rhapsodies, exhibited such a portrait of the true Christian, and of the nature of that perfection which it is permitted him in this life to attain, as is strictly warranted by Scripture, and highly edifying to contemplate. I, therefore, here subjoin it, both as being naturally connected with the present subject, and as being calculated to afford satisfaction and improvement to the Christian reader.

"The *perfect Christian*, according to the representation of Holy Writ, is he, who, as far as the infirmity of his nature will allow, *aspires* to *universal holiness of life;* uniformly and habitually *endeavouring* to 'stand perfect and complete in all the will of God,' and to 'fulfil all righteousness,' in humble imitation of his Redeemer: who daily and fervently prays for 'increase of faith,' like the Apostles themselves; and strenuously labours to 'add to his faith, virtue; and to virtue, knowledge; and to knowledge, temperance; and to temperance, patience; and to patience, godliness; and to godliness, brotherly kindness; and to brotherly kindness, charity.' Such is the assemblage of virtues necessary to constitute the character of the perfect Christian; ever aiming at, though never attaining to, *absolute* or *sinless* perfection, in this present state of trial, probation, and preparation for a better; and meekly resting all his hopes of favour and acceptance with God, not on his own defective and imperfect righteousness, but on 'the free grace of God, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus:' 'for by grace we are saved through faith, and this not of ourselves, it is the gift of God; not of works, that no one should boast.'"—*Methodism In-*

spected, pp. 30, 31.—This is the language of reason and of Scripture [a], by which the Christian, though ever aspiring to a higher and a better nature, is still reminded of that nature which belongs to him, and against the infirmities of which he can never either relax in vigilance, or remit in exertion.

How strongly contrasted with such language are the dogmas alluded to in page 106, and the authorities adduced in their support! That the nature of those dogmas, and the extent to which they are maintained, may be the better understood, I must here detain the reader with a few passages from the writings of Mr. Wesley. As possessing the advantages of education, talents, and knowledge of mankind, in a degree which places him much above the level of those who have succeeded him in the Methodist Ministry, he may well be supposed not to have propounded the opinions of the sect in a shape more extravagant than that in which they are embraced by his followers. And first, on the subject of miraculous manifestations and impulses in the forgiveness of sins and assurance of salvation, he tells us: "God does now, as aforetime, give remissions of sin, and the gift of the Holy Ghost to us; and that *always suddenly*, as far as I have known, and often in dreams, and in the visions of God." (*Hampson's Life of Wesley*, ii. 81.) — Again: "I am one of many witnesses of this matter of fact, that God does now make good this his promise daily, very frequently during a representation (how made I know not, but not to the outward eye) of Christ, either hanging on the cross, or standing on the right hand of God." (*Hamps.* ii. 55.)— Again: "I *saw* the fountain opened in his side—we have *often seen* Jesus Christ crucified, and evidently set forth before us." (*B. Lavingt.* vol. i. part i. p. 51.)—And *Coke*, in

[a] *Doctor Stack* also uses a language of like sobriety and scriptural correctness, in those passages of his very useful *Lectures on the Acts*, and *on the Romans*, in which he has occasion to speak of the influence of the Holy Spirit. See particularly pp. 35, 36 of the former work, and pp. 148—150 of the latter. Attend also to the excellent observations of Dr. Tomline, on the degree of purity attainable by the Christian, and the nature of the endeavours which he is to make after perfection.—*Elem. of Christ. Theol.* vol. ii. p. 285.

his *Life of Wesley*, says, that "being in the utmost agony of mind, there was clearly represented to him Jesus Christ pleading for him with God the Father, and gaining a free pardon for him."—Secondly, as to the tenet of *perfection*, Mr. Wesley affords us the following ample explanation:—"They" (the purified in heart) "are freed from self-will: as desiring nothing, no not for a moment, but the holy and perfect will of God: neither supplies in want, nor ease in pain, nor life, nor death, but continually cry in their inmost soul, *Father, thy will be done*."—"They are freed from evil thoughts [a], so that they *cannot enter into them*, no not for an instant. Aforetime, (*i. e.* when only justified,) when an evil thought came in, they looked up, and it vanished away: but now it does not

[a] That he, who could use such language as this, would feel it necessary to reject the fifteenth Article of the Church, as the reader is already apprised Mr. Wesley did, will not appear surprising on a perusal of that article.—"Christ, in the truth of our nature, was made like unto us in all things, sin only except, from which he was clearly void, both in his flesh and in his spirit. He came to be a lamb without spot, who, by sacrifice of himself once made, should take away the sins of the world: and sin, as St. John saith, was not in him. *But all we the rest, although baptized and born again in Christ, yet offend in many things: and if we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us.*" Such is the doctrine of the Established Church; and such is the direct contrary of the doctrine, which Mr. Wesley and his followers hold upon the subject of this Article: for which reason they have, with perfect consistency, rejected it from their code of Christian belief. And, for the same reason, the cry of the party is everywhere loudly raised against every work that intimates the corruption of man's nature, in the language of the Article.

As to the rejection of the Eighteenth Article, Mr. Wesley's language has not been so explicit as to enable us to pronounce, with perfect certainty, upon the precise ground of that rejection. But when we consider, that in that Article there is contained a condemnation of the assertion "that every man shall be saved by the law or sect which he professeth;" and that it is at the same time affirmed, that "Holy Scripture doth set out unto us *only the name of Jesus Christ*, whereby men must be saved;" and when at the same time we recollect, that "the name of Jesus Christ" implies certain belief and doctrines respecting the nature of the Saviour and the religion which he has taught; whilst Mr. Wesley considers doctrines, or *right opinions*, to be of little value, and holds the religious *feelings* which distinguish the true Methodist to be the only sure pledge and passport of salvation: when we compare these things together, we seem to run no great risk in concluding, that this Article was condemned by the founder of Methodism, as clearly marking, that religious opinions were by no means a matter of indifference; that, on the contrary, just notions concerning Christ were requisite for salvation; and that for the want of these no association with any particular sect or religious description whatever could make compensation.

come in; there being no room for this in a soul, which is full of God. They are freed from wanderings in prayer: they have an unction from the Holy One, which abideth in them, and teacheth them every hour what they shall do, and what they shall speak."—(*Pref. to 2d vol. of Wesley's Hymns, Hamps.* iii. 52; and *Coke's Life of Wes.* pp. 278. 344).

These extracts from the writings of the father of Methodism fairly open up to us the two great fundamental doctrines of the sect: viz. 1. That the assurances of forgiveness and of salvation arise from a sudden infusion of divine feeling, conveyed by some sensible and miraculous manifestation of the Spirit: and 2d. That the true believer attains in this life such perfection, as to be altogether free from sin, and even from the possibility of sin. Holding such doctrines, it is not at all wonderful that the Wesleyan Methodist is indifferent about every other. Mr. Wesley fairly says upon the subject of doctrines, "I will not quarrel with you about *any opinions: believe them true or false!*" (*Third Appeal*, p. 185.) In another place he confesses, "the points we chiefly insisted upon were, that Orthodoxy, or *Right Opinions*, is, at best a very slender part of Religion[a], *if it can be allowed to*

[a] On this favourite position of Mr. Wesley, Bishop Warburton justly remarks, that here is a complete separation between reason and religion. For when reason is no longer employed to distinguish *right* from *wrong opinions*, religion has no further connexion with it. But reason once separated from religion, must not piety degenerate either into nonsense or madness? And for the fruits of grace what can remain but the froth and dregs of enthusiasm and superstition? In the first ages of Christianity, the glory of the Gospel consisted in its being a *reasonable service*. By this it was distinguished from the several modes of Gentile religion, the essence of which consisted in fanatic raptures and superstitious ceremonies; without any articles of belief or formula of faith: *right opinion being*, on the principles of the Pagan priesthood, *at best, but a very slender part of religion, if any part of it at all.* But Christianity arose on different principles. St. Paul considers *right opinion* as one full third part of religion, where, speaking of the three great fundamental principles on which the Christian Church is erected, he makes *truth* to be one of them:—*The fruit of the Spirit is in all* GOODNESS, RIGHTEOUSNESS, *and* TRUTH.—So different was St. Paul's idea, from that entertained of Christianity by Mr. Wesley, who comprises all in the *new birth*, and makes *believing* to consist entirely in *feeling*. On the whole, therefore, we may fairly conclude, (with Warburton,) that that wisdom which divests Christianity of truth and reason, and resolves its essence rather into mental and spiritual sensations, than tries it by moral demonstration, can never be the *wisdom which is from above*, whose

be any part of it at all!" This, it must be admitted, is an excellent expedient for adding to the numbers of the sect. A perfect indifference about doctrines, and a strong persuasion that the divine favour is secured, whilst the fancy of each individual is counted to him for faith,—are such recommendations of any form of religion, as can scarcely be resisted. But what can be more mischievous than all this? What more destructive of true religion? The sound principles of Christian Doctrine disparaged, as of no value to the believer; and the serious feelings of Christian Piety caricatured, and thereby brought into general disrepute; whilst the sober and regulated teaching of the national Clergy is treated with contumely and contempt; and separation from the national Church deemed a decisive criterion of godly sincerity!—In the contemplation of such a state of things, it seems as if one were surveying the completion of the following prospective description given to us by Sir Walter Raleigh:—"When all order, discipline, and Church government shall be left to newness of opinion, and men's fancies; soon after, as many kinds of Religion will spring up as there are parish churches within England: every contentious and ignorant person clothing his fancy with *the Spirit of God*, and his imagination with *the gift of Revelation:* insomuch as when the Truth, which is but *one*, shall appear to the simple multitude, no less variable than contrary to itself, the faith of men will soon after die away by degrees, and all Religion be held in scorn and contempt."—*Hist. of the World*, b. ii. ch. v. sect. 1.

first characteristic attribute is *purity*. The same writer truly adds, that if Mr. Wesley's position be well founded, the first Reformers of Religion from the errors of Popery have much to answer for: who, for the sake of *right opinion, at best a slender part of religion, if any part of it at all*, occasioned so much turmoil, and so many revolutions in civil as well as in religious systems.—See *Warburton's Principles of Nat. and Rev. Religion*, vol. i. pp. 263—267.

NO. XIII.—ON THE MISREPRESENTATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT BY UNITARIANS.

PAGE 11. (a).—On this subject Dr. Priestley (*Hist. of Cor.* vol. i. p. 153) thus represents the arguments of the Orthodox. "Sin, being an offence against an infinite Being, requires an infinite satisfaction, which can only be made by an infinite person; that is, one who is no less than God himself. Christ, therefore, in order to make this infinite satisfaction for the sins of men, must himself be God, equal to God the Father." —With what candour this has been selected, as a specimen of the mode of reasoning by which the doctrine of Atonement, as connected with that of the divinity of Christ, is maintained by the Established Church, it is needless to remark. That some few, indeed, have thus argued, is certainly to be admitted and lamented. But how poorly such men have reasoned, it needed not the acuteness of Dr. Priestley to discover. On their own principle, the reply is obvious,—that sin being *committed by* a finite creature, requires only a finite satisfaction, for which purpose a finite person might be an adequate victim. But the insinuation, that our belief in the divinity of Christ has been the offspring of this strange conceit, is much more becoming the determined advocate of a favourite cause, than the sober inquirer after truth. Our mode of reasoning is directly the reverse. The Scriptures proclaim the divinity of Christ; and so far are we from inferring this attribute of our Lord from the necessity of an infinite satisfaction, that we infer, *from it*, both the great love of our Almighty Father, who has "spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all;" and the great heinousness of human guilt, for the expiation of which it was deemed fit that so great a Being should suffer. The *decent* manner in which Mr. *Belsham* has thought proper to represent the orthodox notion of the Atonement, is, that man could "not have been saved, unless one God had died, to satisfy the justice, and appease the wrath of another." (*Review, &c.*, p. 221.) This is language with which I should not have disgraced my page,

but that it may serve to show how dangerous a thing it is to open a door to opinions, that can *admit of treating* subjects the most sacred with a levity which seems so nearly allied to impiety.

NO. XIV.—ON THE DISRESPECT OF SCRIPTURE MANIFESTED BY UNITARIAN WRITERS.

PAGE 12. (a).—Perhaps I may be charged with having made a distinction in this place, which gives an unfair representation of Unitarians, inasmuch as they also *profess* to derive their arguments from Scripture. But whether that profession be not intended in mockery one might be almost tempted to question, when it is found, that, in *every* instance, the doctrine of Scripture is tried by their abstract notion of right, and rejected if not accordant;—when, by means of figure and allusion, it is everywhere made to speak a language the most repugnant to all fair, critical interpretation; until, emptied of its true meaning, it is converted into a vehicle for every fantastic theory, which, under the name of *rational*, they may think proper to adopt;—when, in such parts as propound Gospel truths of a contexture too solid to admit of an escape in figure and allusion, the sacred writers are charged as bunglers, producing "lame accounts, improper quotations, and inconclusive reasonings," (*Dr. Priestley's 12th Letter to Mr. Burn,*) and philosophy is consequently called in to rectify their errors;—when one writer of this class (Steinbart) tells us, that "the narrations" (in the New Testament) "true or false, are only suited for ignorant, uncultivated minds, who cannot enter into the evidence of natural religion;" and again, that "Moses according to the childish conceptions of the Jews in his days, paints God as agitated by violent affections, partial to one people, and hating all other nations;"—when another, (Semler,) remarking on St. Peter's declaration that *prophecy came not in old time by the will of man, but holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Spirit,*

says, that "Peter speaks here according to the conception of the Jews," and that "the prophets may have delivered the offspring of their own brains as divine revelations" (*Dr. Erskine's Sketches and Hints of Ch. Hist.* No. 3. pp. 66. 71); —when a third (Engedin) speaks of St. John's portion of the New Testament, as written with "concise and abrupt obscurity, inconsistent with itself, and made up of allegories;" and Gagneius glories in having given "a little light to St. Paul's darkness, a darkness, as some think, industriously affected;"—when we find Mr. Evanson, one of those able Commentators referred to by Mr. Belsham in his *Review*, &c., p. 206, assert, (*Dissonance*, &c., p. i.,) that "the Evangelical histories contain gross and irreconcileable contradictions," and consequently discard three out of the four, retaining the Gospel of St. Luke only; at the same time drawing his pen over as much of this, as, either from its *infelicity of style*, or other *such* causes, happens not to meet his approbation;— when we find Dr. Priestley, besides his charge against the writers of the New Testament before recited, represent, in his letter to Dr. Price, the narration of Moses concerning the creation and the fall of man, as a lame account; and thereby meriting the praise of *magnanimity* bestowed on him by theologians, equally enlightened;—when finally, not to accumulate instances where so many challenge attention, we find the Gospel openly described by Mr. Belsham, (*Review*, &c., p. 217,) as containing nothing more than the Deism of the French Theo-Philanthrope, save only the *fact* of the resurrection of a human being (see Appendix); and when, for the purpose of establishing this, he engages, that the Unitarian writers shall prune down the Scriptures to this *moral system* and this *single fact*, by showing that *whatever* supports any thing else is either "interpolation, omission, false reading, mistranslation, or erroneous interpretation" (*Review*, pp. 206. 217. 272);—when, I say, all these things are considered, and when we find the Bible thus contemned and rejected by the gentlemen of this new light, and a new and more convenient

Gospel carved out for themselves, can the occasional profession of reverence[a] for Scripture, as the word of God, be treated in any other light, than as a convenient mask, or an insulting sneer?

It might be a matter of *more than curious* speculation, to frame a Bible according to the modifications of the Unitarian Commentators. The world would then see, after all the due amputations and amendments, to what their respect for the sacred text amounts. Indeed it is somewhat strange, that men so zealous to enlighten and improve the world have not, long before this, blessed it with so vast a treasure. Can it be, that they think the execution of such a work would impair their claim to the name of *Christians?* Or is it rather, that even the Bible, so formed, must soon yield to another more perfect, as the still increasing flood of light pours in new knowledge? That the latter is the true cause, may, perhaps, be inferred, as well from the known *magnanimity* of

[a] The fathers of the Socinian School are as widely distinguished from their followers of the present day, by their modesty and moderation, as by their learning and their talents. Yet, that it may be the more plainly discerned how remote the spirit of Socinianism has been, at all times, from the reverence due to the authority of Scripture, I here subjoin, in the words of two of their early writers, specimens of the treatment which the sacred volume commonly receives at their hand.—*Faustus Socinus,* after pronouncing with sufficient decision against the received doctrine of the Atonement, proceeds to say, "Ego quidem, *etiamsi non semel, sed sæpe id in sacris monimentis scriptum extaret;* non idcirco tamen ita rem prorsus se habere crederem." *Socin. Opera,* tom. ii. p. 204.—And with like determination: Smalcius affirms of the Incarnation; "Credimus, *etiamsi non semel atque iterum, sed satis crebro et dissertissime scriptum extaret* Deum esse hominem factum, multo satius esse, quia hæc res sit absurda, et sanæ rationi plane contraria, et in Deum blasphema, *modum aliquem dicendi comminisci,* quo ista de Deo dici possint, *quam ista simpliciter ita ut verba sonant intelligere.*" (Homil. viii. ad cap. 1 Joh.)—Thus it appears from these instances, joined to those which have been adduced above, to those which have been noticed at the end of No. I. and to others of the like nature, which might be multiplied from writers of the Socinian School without end; that the most explicit, and precise, and emphatical language, announcing the doctrines which the philosophy of that school condemns, would, to its disciples, be words of no meaning; and the Scripture, which adopted such language, but an idle fable. *Non persuadebis etiamsi persuaseris,* is the true motto of the Unitarian. And the reader, I trust, will not think that I have drawn too strong conclusions upon this subject in the three concluding pages of the first Number, when he finds the proof of what is there advanced growing stronger as we proceed.

those writers, which cannot be supposed to have stooped to the former consideration, as from Dr. Priestley's own declarations. In his *Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever*, (part ii. pp. 33—35,) he informs us, that he was once "a Calvinist, and that of the straitest sect." Afterwards, he adds, he "became a high Arian; next a low Arian; and then a Socinian; and in a little time a Socinian of the lowest kind, in which Christ is considered as a mere man, the son of *Joseph* and Mary, and *naturally as fallible and peccable as Moses, or any other prophet.*" And, after all, he tells us, (*Def. of Unit. for* 1787, p. 111,) that he "does not know, when his creed will be fixed." Mr. Belsham having set out and ended at the same point with Dr. Priestley, it is not improbable that he has gone through the same revolution: and that he, and others who have enjoyed the same progressive illumination, would, equally with Dr. Priestley, still contend for the freedom of an unsettled creed, is not, perhaps, too violent a presumption. Now, as every step, in such an indefinite progress, must induce a corresponding change of canon, it is not wonderful that they whose creed is in a perpetual state of variation, and whose Bible must be, like their almanack, suited only to a particular season, should not have attempted any fixed standard [a] of the Sacred Word.

NO. XV.—ON THE HEATHEN NOTIONS OF MERIT ENTERTAINED BY UNITARIAN WRITERS.

PAGE 13. ([a]).—A writer, whom I cannot name but with respect, —to the beauties of whose composition no one, that possesses taste or feeling, can be insensible,—speaking of Dr. Price, in her captivating defence of public worship against Mr. Wakefield, (to which publication I have already referred the reader in a preceding Number,) uses this extraordinary language:—

[a] Since the date of the above observation, first introduced in the second edition of this work, a Testament has been published by the Unitarians, under the title of *An Improved Version of the New Testament.* Of this *Improved Version* some notice has been already taken in the preceding pages, and more will be said hereafter.

"When a man like Dr. Price is about to resign his soul into the hands of his Maker, he ought to do it not only with a reliance on his mercy, but his *justice*." (*Mrs. Barbauld's Remarks on Mr. Wakefield's Enquiry*, p. 72.) In the same style do Unitarian writers, in general, express themselves on this subject, representing good works as giving a *claim of right* to the divine acceptance.

Indeed, the manner in which some Socinians, of the new school, speak of their virtues, their merits, and their title to the rewards of a happy immortality, is such as might lead us to suppose ourselves carried back to the days of the old heathen schools of the Stoics, and receiving lessons, not from the followers of the humble Jesus, but from the disciples of the arrogant, and magniloquent, Chrysippus, Seneca, or Epictetus. When Chrysippus tells us, that, "as it is proper for Jupiter to glory in himself, and in his own life, and to think and speak magnificently of himself, as living in a manner that deserves to be highly spoken of; so these things are becoming all good men, as being in nothing exceeded by Jupiter" (*Plut. De Stoic. Repugn. Oper.* tom. ii. p. 1038. ed. Xyl.); when Seneca pronounces, that "a good man differs only in *time* from God" (*De Provid.* cap. 1); that "there is one thing, in which the wise man excels God, that God is wise by the benefit of nature, not by his own choice" (*Epist.* 53); and that "it is shameful to importune the Gods in prayer, since a man's happiness is entirely in his own power" (*Epist.* 31): and when Epictetus (*Disc.* lib. iv. cap. 10) represents the dying man making his address to God, in a strain of self-confidence, without the least acknowledgment of any one failure or neglect of duty; so that, as Miss Carter with a becoming piety remarks, it is such an address, "as cannot, without shocking arrogance, be uttered by any one born to die;"—when, I say, we hear such language from the ancient Stoic, what *do* we hear, but the sentiments of the philosophising Christian of the present day? and, on casting an eye into the works of Priestley, Lindsey, Evanson, Wakefield, Belsham, and the other Unitarian writers, do we not

instantly recognise that proud, and independent, and, I had almost said, heaven-defying self-reliance, which had once distinguished the haughty disciple of the Stoa?

NO. XVI.—ON DR. JOHN TAYLOR'S SCHEME OF ATONEMENT.

PAGE 14. [a].—The scheme of *Atonement*, as it is here laid down, is that which has been maintained in the letters of *Ben Mordecai*, by the learned and ingenious, but prejudiced and erroneous, H. Taylor. It is substantially the same that has been adopted by other theologians, who, admitting a mediatorial scheme in the proper sense of the word, have thought right to found it upon the notion of a *pure benevolence*, in opposition to that of a *retributive justice*, in the Deity. But I have selected the statement of it given by this writer, as being the best digested, and most artfully fortified. It seems to avoid that part of the scheme of Dr. Taylor of Norwich, which favours the Socinian principles: but, as will appear on examination, it cannot be entirely extricated from them, being originally built on an unsound foundation.

With respect to the system of Dr. Taylor of Norwich, as laid down in his *Key to the Apostolic Writings*, and his *Scripture Doctrine of Atonement*, it is obvious to remark, that it is nothing more than an artificial accommodation of Scripture phrases to notions utterly repugnant to Scripture doctrine. A short view of his scheme will satisfy us on this head. "By a *Sacrifice*," he says, (*Script. Doctr.* ch. ii. Nos. 24, 25,) "is meant a symbolical address to God, intended to express before him the devotions, affections, &c., by significant, emblematical actions:" and, consequently, he adds, "*whatever* is expressive of a pious and virtuous disposition, may be *rightly* included in the notion of a Sacrifice; as *prayers*, *thanksgivings*, *labours*," &c. &c.

Having thus widened up the notion of *Sacrifice*, it becomes necessary that *sacrificial atonement* should be made of equally extensive signification; and, accordingly, because

the word כפר, which we commonly translate as *making atonement*, is, as he says, found to be applied in the Old Testament, in its *general* sense, to *all* means used for procuring any benefit, spiritual or temporal, at God's hands, whether for ourselves or others, such as obedience, a just life, sacrifices, prayers, intercessions, self-denials, &c. &c., he therefore thinks himself justified in extending to *all* these that *particular species* of atonement, which is effected by sacrifice; and thereby he is enabled to pronounce the *Sacrifice of Christ* to be a ground of atonement, without taking in a single idea that truly and properly belongs to sacrifice, or sacrificial atonement. And so, he triumphantly concludes, (*Script. Doctr.* &c., No. 152,) that he has made out the Sacrifice of Christ to be "truly and properly, in the highest manner, and far beyond any other, piacular and expiatory, to make an atonement for sins, or take them away; not only to give us an example, not only to assure us of remission, or to procure our Lord a commission to publish the forgiveness of sin, but, moreover, to obtain that forgiveness, by doing what God in his wisdom and goodness judged fit and expedient to be done, in order to the forgiveness of sin."

But in what, according to this explication, consists the *efficacy* of Christ's Sacrifice, and *how* has it made atonement for Sin?—He informs us himself (*Key*, &c., No. 148): "*Obedience*, or doing the will of God, was the sacrifice of sweet smelling savour, which made atonement for the sins of the world; *in this sense*, that God, on account of his (Christ's) goodness and perfect obedience, thought fit to grant unto mankind the forgiveness of those sins that were *past;* and, *farther*, erected a glorious and perfect dispensation of grace, exceeding any which had gone before, in means, promises, and prospects, at the head of which he set his Son our Lord Jesus Christ," &c. &c.—Thus, then, the *obedience* of Christ was the *sacrifice:* and the *benefits* procured to us by that obedience, constitute the *atonement* effected by it. And the nature of these benefits, and the way in which they are wrought out for us by Christ's obedience, as we find them

explained by this writer, will help us to a just view of the true nature of that which he calls our atonement.

"Truth required," says he, (*Key*, &c., No. 149,) "that grace be dispensed, in a manner the most proper and probable to produce reformation and holiness. Now this is what our Lord has done. He has *bought us by his blood*, and procured the remission of sins, *as* what he did and suffered was a proper reason for granting it, and a fit way of conveying and rendering effectual the grace of God," &c.—"Now this could be done no otherwise, than by means of a *moral kind*, such as are apt to influence our minds, and engage us to forsake what is evil, and to work that which is good," &c.—"And what means of this sort could be more effectual, than the heavenly and most illustrious *example* of the Son of God, showing us the most perfect obedience to God, and the most generous goodness and love to men, recommended to *our imitation*, by all possible endearments and engaging considerations?"—And again he says, (*Script. Doctr.* No. 170,) "By the *blood* of Christ God discharges us from the *guilt*, *because* the blood of Christ is the most powerful mean of freeing us from the *pollution and power of Sin*."—And he adds, "it is the ground of redemption, as it is a *mean of sanctification*."—What then means the *blood of Christ?*—"Not a mere corporeal substance; in which case," as he says, "it would be of no more value in the sight of God, than any other thing of the same kind: nor is it to be considered merely in relation to our Lord's death and sufferings, as if mere death or suffering could be of itself pleasing and acceptable to God:" no, the writer informs us, (*Key*, &c., No. 146,) that the "*blood of Christ* is *his perfect obedience and goodness;* and that it implies a *character*," which we are to transcribe into our lives and conduct. And, accordingly, he maintains (*Script. Doctr.* No. 185) that "our Lord's sacrifice and death is so plainly represented, as a *powerful mean of improving our virtue*, that we have no sufficient ground to consider its virtue and efficacy in *any other light*."

To what, then, according to this writer, does the entire scheme of the Atonement amount?—God, being desirous to rescue man from the consequences and dominion of his Sins, and yet desirous to effect this in such a way, as might best conduce to the advancement of virtue, thought fit to make forgiveness of all sins that were past, a reward of the meritorious obedience of Christ; and, by exhibiting that obedience as a model for universal imitation, to engage mankind to follow his example, that, being thereby improved in their virtue, they might be rescued from the dominion of sin: and thus making the example of Christ a "mean of sanctification," redemption from Sin might thereby be effected.—This, so far as I have been able to collect it, is a faithful transcript of the author's doctrine. And what there is in all this, of the nature of *Sacrifice* or *Atonement*, (at least so far as it affects those who have lived *since* the time of Christ,) or in what material respect it differs from the Socinian notion, which represents Christ *merely* as our *instructer* and *example*, I profess myself unable to discover.

I have been thus full in my account of this writer's scheme, because, by some strange oversight, and possibly from his artful accommodation of Scriptural phrases to his own notions, whereby he is enabled to express himself in the language of Scripture, his works have received considerable circulation, even among those whose opinions on this subject are of an opposite description. Nay, the erroneous tenets of this author have been conveyed in a collection of *Theological Tracts*, some time since published by an able and learned Prelate, in the sister country: and the candidates for orders in this, are by authority enjoined to receive part of their theological instruction from his writings. Those, who wish to see the errors of this scheme more amply reviewed and refuted, I refer to the examination of the doctrine, in the *Scripture Account of Sacrifices*, by Mr. Portal, and in the *Criticisms on Modern Notions of Atonement*, by Dr. Ritchie: in the latter of which, particularly, the fallacy of the author's

principles, and the gross ambiguity of his terms, are exposed with no less truth than ingenuity.

With respect to *H.* Taylor, who, in his *B. Mord. partly* coincides with this writer in his explication of atonement, it is but justice to say, that he gives a view of the subject, in the main, materially different; inasmuch as he represents Christ's concern for mankind, and his earnest intercession recommended by his meritorious obedience, to be the appointed means of his obtaining from God that kingdom, which empowers him to dispense forgiveness, &c.—Whereas Dr. *J.* Taylor makes the *obedience* of Christ (with regard to such as have lived since his time) the means of redemption, *as being the means of man's improvement in virtue;* and, so far from attributing any efficacy to Christ's obedience, *as* operating through *intercession*, (to which, we find from Scripture, God has frequently bestowed his blessings, see Number IX. pp. 93, 94,) he considers the intercessions and prayers of good men for others, in no other light, than *as acts of obedience, goodness, and virtue.* So that, in fact, the whole of his scheme, when rightly considered, (excepting only with respect to those who lived *before* Christ, in which part he seems inconsistent with himself, and on his own principles not easy to be understood,) falls in with the notion of good works and moral obedience, as laid down by the Socinian. And here lies the secret of Mr. Belsham's remark, (*Review*, &c., p. 18,) that "Dr. Taylor has, in general, well explained *these Jewish phrases*" (viz. *propitiation, sacrifice, redemption through Christ's blood*, &c.) "in his admirable Key."—As Mr. Belsham rejects the notion of redemption by Christ, and of faith in Christ, *in toto*, (see *Review*, &c., pp. 18. 104. 145,) it is not difficult to assign the cause of this commendation.

NO. XVII.—THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT FALSELY CHARGED WITH THE PRESUMPTION OF PRONOUNCING ON THE *NECESSITY* OF CHRIST'S DEATH.

PAGE 15. [a].—That men *could* not have been forgiven, unless Christ had suffered to purchase their forgiveness, is no part of the doctrine of Atonement, as held by the Church of England. What God *could* or *could not* have done, it presumes not to pronounce. What God declares he *has* done, that merely it asserts: and on his express word alone is it founded. But it is to be remembered, that on this occasion, as on many others, that *à priori* reasoning, which so frequently misleads those who object to the doctrines of our Church, is imputed by them to us. Not being themselves in the habit of bowing with humble reverence to the Sacred Word, they consider not that we speak merely its suggestions [a]; and that, if we do at any time philosophize, it is but

[a] The language of Witsius upon this subject is worth attending to. "Supposito extare Revelationem de mysteriis, at inquiri in sensum verborum quibus ista Revelatio mihi exponitur: non est in ista inquisitione ita procedendum, ut primo rationem meam consulam, quid ea, in idearum ac notionum suarum scriniis, rei de qua agitur simile aut adversum habeat, ut secundum eas quas ibi invenio notiones verba revelationis exponam, id unice operam dans, ut sensum tandem aliquem quantâ maximâ possum commoditate iisdem; qui istis meis prænotionibus optime conveniat. Sed attendendum est ad ipsa verba, quid in omnibus suis circumstantiis significare apta nata sint, quidque secundum Scripturæ stilum significare soleant: atque hâc viâ reperto sensu quem verba *sine torsione* per se fundunt, secure in eo acquiescendum est, omniaque rationis cita subjicienda sunt isti sensui quem iis me verbis docet Deus." To these observations he subjoins an example of the opposite modes of investigating the sense of Scripture by the philosophizing and the humble inquirer, applying the former epithet to Socinus, and taking for the particular subject of investigation the passage in Joh. i. 14, ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο.—"Socinus ita procedit: nihil invenit in toto rationis suæ penu, quod ipsi repræsentet, Deum ita humanæ unitum naturæ, ut ea unam cum ipso constituat personam; ideoque talem conceptum absurdum Deoque injuriosum esse sciscit. *Id supponit ad horum verborum explicationem se accingens:* idcirco omnes ingenii sui nervos intendit, ut sensum aliquem iis applicet, qui ab isthâc assertione remotissimus sit. *Sollicitat verba singula, sollicitat nexum eorum, flectit, torquet, omnia agit, ne id dicere videantur quod dicunt.* Nos longe aliter procedendum existimamus. Accedimus ad hanc pericopam simplici atque humili mente *audituri atque accepturi quidquid Deo nos placeat docere.* Consideramus verba in nativo suo significatu, et prout passim in sacris literis usurpantur; expendimus quid λόγος notet secundum phrasin Johannis, quid γίνεσθαι, quid σάρξ: consideramus quomodo alibi de hâc re sacræ literæ loquantur. Ex his omnibus for-

to *follow*, not to *lead*, the meaning of Scripture. To enter into the councils of the Almighty, and to decide what Infinite Wisdom *must* have determined, under a constitution of things different from the present, were a speculation not less absurd, than it is impious. Of this even the few writers, whose language has, by a rigorous interpretation, been forced into a ground for the above charge against the doctrine of atonement, are perfectly innocent: for it never occurred to them to suppose a constitution of things different from that which Divine Wisdom *has* appointed.

When, therefore, Grotius, Stillingfleet, and Clarke, are charged (as they are in *H. Taylor's B. Mord.* Let. 5) with contending for "the *necessity* of a vindication of God's honour, either by the suffering of the offenders, or by that of Christ in their room," they are by no means to be considered as contending, that it was *impossible* for God to have established such a dispensation as might enable him to forgive the Sinner without some satisfaction to his justice (which is the sense forcibly put upon their words): but that, according to the method and dispensation which God's wisdom *has* chosen, there results a *moral necessity* of such vindication, founded in the *wisdom* and *prudence* of a Being, who has announced himself to mankind, as an upright Governor, resolved to maintain the observance of his laws.

That by the *necessity* spoken of, is meant but a *moral necessity*, or, in other words, a *fitness* and propriety, Dr. Clarke himself informs us: for he tells us, (Sermon 137, vol. ii. p. 142, fol. ed.,) that, "when the honour of God's laws had

mamus sensum, quem recipimus humili fidei obsequio firmiterque apud animum nostrum statuimus, Filium Dei humanam naturam tam arcte sibi junxisse, ut idem et Deus et homo sit: et quamvis nostra ratio nihil unquam huic rei simile invenerit, tamen eam verissimam esse, quia verba Dei hoc docent. Qui ita, ut Socinus, instituunt, eos ex suo penu multa in verbum Dei inferre necesse est: quâ re ei insignis fit injuria. Qui uti nos, illi cogitationes suas ex verbo Dei hauriunt, quibus rationis suæ penum locupletent, quod Deo gloriosum est."—*Misc. Sacr.* tom. ii. pp. 591, 592.—If the spirit which governed Socinus in his critical investigation of the sacred text has been fairly described by Witsius in the passage which has just been cited, it must be unnecessary to add, that his followers of the present day have in no respect departed from the example of their Master.

been diminished by sin, it was *reasonable* and *necessary*, in respect of *God's wisdom in governing* the world, that there should be a vindication," &c. And again, (Sermon 138, vol. ii. p. 150,) in answer to the question, "Could not God, if he had pleased, absolutely, and of his supreme authority, without any sufferings at all, have pardoned the sins of those, whose repentance he thought fit to accept?" he says, "It becomes not us to presume to say he had not *power* so to do:" but that there seems to be a *fitness*, in his testifying his indignation against sin; and that "the death of Christ was *necessary*, to make the pardon of sin reconcileable, not perhaps, absolutely, with *strict justice*, (for we cannot presume to say that God might not, consistently with mere *justice*, have remitted as much of his own right as he pleased,)—but it was *necessary*, at least in *this* respect, to make the pardon of sin consistent with the *wisdom* of God, in his good government of the world; and to be a *proper attestation* of his irreconcileable hatred against all unrighteousness."

That the word *necessary* is imprudently used by Dr. Clarke and others, I readily admit; as it is liable to be misunderstood, and furnishes matter of cavil to those who would misrepresent the whole of the doctrine. But it is evident from the passages I have cited, that, so far from considering the sacrifice of Christ as a *debt* paid to, because rigorously exacted by, the divine *justice*, it is represented by Dr. Clarke, and generally understood, merely as a *fit* expedient, demanded by the *wisdom* of God, whereby mercy might be safely administered to sinful man. Now, it is curious to remark, that H. Taylor, who so warmly objects to this notion of a necessity of vindicating God's honour, as maintained by Clarke, &c., when he comes to reply to the Deist, in defence of the scheme of Christ's mediation, uses a mode of reasoning that seems exactly similar:—"God (*B. Mordec.* Let. 5) was not *made* placable by intercession; but was ready and willing to forgive, before, as well as after: and only waited to do it *in such a manner as might best show his regard to righteousness*."—Is not this in other words saying, There was a *fitness*,

and consequently a *moral necessity*, that God should forgive sins through the intercession and meritorious obedience of Christ, for the purpose of *vindicating his glory as a righteous Governor?*

The profound Bishop Butler makes the following observations upon the subject of this Number:—"Certain questions have been brought into the subject of redemption, and determined with rashness, and, perhaps, with equal rashness contrary ways. For instance, whether God *could* have saved the world by other means than the death of Christ, consistently with the general laws of his government? And, had not Christ come into the world, what would have been the future condition of the better sort of men; those just persons over the face of the earth, for whom, Manasses in his prayer asserts, repentance was not appointed?—The meaning of the first of these questions is greatly ambiguous: and neither of them can properly be answered, without going upon that infinitely absurd supposition, that we know the whole of the case. And, perhaps, the very inquiry, *what would have followed if God had not done as he has?* may have in it some very great impropriety, and ought not to be carried on any farther than is necessary to help our partial and inadequate conceptions of things." (*Butler's Analogy*, p. 240.)—Such were the reflections of that great divine and genuine philosopher, who at the same time maintained the doctrine of *Atonement* in its legitimate strictness. Will it then still be said, that divines of the Church of England uphold, as a part of that doctrine, the position, that men *could* not have been saved, had not Christ died to purchase their forgiveness?

NO. XVIII.—ON THE MODE OF REASONING WHEREBY THE SUFFICIENCY OF GOOD WORKS WITHOUT MEDIATION IS ATTEMPTED TO BE DEFENDED FROM SCRIPTURE.

PAGE 16. (c).—Dr. Priestley enumerates a great variety of texts to this purpose, in his 3d paper of the signature of

Clemens. (*Theol. Repos.* vol. i.) Dr. Sykes, in the 2d ch. of his *Scripture Doctrine of Redemption*, and H. Taylor, in his 5th and 6th Letters (*B. Mord.*), have done the same. Dr. Priestley adds to these texts, the instances of Job, David, Hezekiah, Nehemiah, and Daniel, to show that on good works *alone* dependence was to be placed for acceptance: and that the pardon of sin is everywhere in Scripture represented as dispensed *solely* on account of man's personal virtue, without the least regard to the sufferings or merit of any being whatever.

A great display is constantly made of texts of this nature, by all who oppose the received doctrine of atonement. But it is to be remarked, that, as they all amount *merely* to this, that repentance and a good life are acceptable to God, the inference derived from them can only have weight against that doctrine, when *its* supporters shall disclaim repentance and a good life, as *necessary* concomitants of that faith in Christ's merits, whereby they hope to be saved; or, when it shall be made to appear from Scripture, that these are of *themselves* sufficient. But do those writers who dwell so much on good works in *opposition* to the doctrine of Atonement, seriously mean to insinuate, that the advocates of this doctrine endeavour to stretch the beneficial influence of Christ's death to the *impenitent* and *disobedient?*—Or can it be necessary to remind them, that obedience and submission to the divine will are the main ingredients of that very spirit, which we hold to be indispensable to the producing and perfecting of a Christian faith? And again; do they wish to infer, that, because these qualities are acceptable to God, they are so in *themselves*, and independent of all other considerations? Is it forgotten, that, whilst some parts of Scripture speak of these, as well pleasing to God, others, not less numerous, might be adduced to show, that besides these something more is required? Dr. Priestley, indeed, fairly asserts, that *nothing more is* required; and that the language of Scripture everywhere represents repentance, and good works, as sufficient, *of themselves*, to recom-

mend us to the divine favour. (*Hist. of Cor.* vol. i. p. 155.) How then does he get over those declarations of Scripture? —He shall speak for himself.

"It certainly must be admitted," (*Theol. Rep.* vol. i. p. 252,) "that some texts do *seem* to represent the pardon of sin, as dispensed in consideration of something else than our repentance, or personal virtue;—and according to their *literal* sense, the pardon of sin is in some way or other procured by Christ. But since the pardon of sin is sometimes represented, as dispensed in consideration of the sufferings, sometimes of the merit, sometimes of the resurrection, and even of the life and obedience of Christ; when it is sometimes Christ, and sometimes the Spirit, that intercedes for us; when the dispensing of pardon is sometimes said, to be the proper act of God the Father; and again, when it is Christ that forgives us; we can hardly hesitate in concluding, that these must be, severally, *partial representations*, in the nature of figures and allusions, *which at proper distances are allowed to be inconsistent*:—and from so vague a representation of a matter of fact, founded on texts which carry with them so much the air of figure, allusion, and accommodation, reason and common sense compel us to appeal to the plain general tenor of Scripture," which he pronounces to be in favour of the sufficiency of good works.—And thus a great part of Scripture is swept away at one stroke, under the name of figure, allusion, &c. &c. And because Christ is pointed out to us, as the means of our salvation, in *every* light in which he is viewed, (for as to the Father and the Holy Spirit being spoken of, as also concerned in the work of our Redemption, this creates no difficulty,) reason and common sense compel us to pronounce him as not connected with our salvation in *any*.

This furnishes an additional specimen of the way in which Scripture is treated, by our modern *rational* Commentators. A number of texts, enforcing a spirit of humble submission to God's will, which is by no means inconsistent with, but, on the contrary, includes in its nature, a spirit of Christian

faith, are taken *literally*, as not implying this faith, because it is not expressly named. And then another set of passages, in which this faith is *expressly* named, and *literally* required, are set aside as *figurative*. And it is pronounced, upon the whole, that common sense is to decide the matter.—And thus, by rejecting one set of passages entirely as figurative; and then by explaining another set literally and independently, with which the former were connected and would have perfectly coalesced, so as to afford a satisfactory and consistent meaning; the point is clearly made out. Relying upon this method, which Dr. Priestley has discovered, of retaining whatever establishes his opinion, and rejecting whatever makes against it, Mr. Belsham may, indeed, safely challenge the whole body of the orthodox to produce a single text, that shall stand in opposition to his and Dr. Priestley's dogmas.

But, moreover, it has been well remarked, that all such declarations in Scripture, as promise pardon to repentance, and are thence inferred to pronounce repentance of itself sufficient, as they were subsequent to the promise of a Redeemer, must be altogether inconclusive, even viewed in a distinct and independent light, inasmuch as it may have been in virtue of the *pre-ordained* atonement, that this repentance was accepted. And as to the force of the word *freely*, on which not only Dr. Priestley relies very much, but also Dr. Sykes in his *Scrip. Doctr. of Redempt.* and H. Taylor, in the beginning of his Sixth Letter, (*B. Mord. Apol.*,) it is obvious, that nothing more is meant by passages that employ this expression in describing God's forgiveness of Sinners, than that this forgiveness was *free* with respect to any *merits on the part of man*, or any *claim* which, from repentance, or any other cause, he might be supposed to possess: since, admitting such claim, it would not be free, but earned. And in this very sense it is, that Dr. J. Taylor himself, in his *Key*, *&c.*, (No. 67,) contends that the word FREE is to be understood: "the blessing of redemption being, as he says, *with regard to us*, of free grace—that is, *not owing to any obedience*

of ours."—Any other application of the term must make the word *free* synonymous with *unconditional;* in which case, forgiveness could not be a free gift, if repentance were required to obtain it; that is, unless it were extended indiscriminately to the impenitent as well as the penitent. So that, in fact, the very use of the word *free*, as applied to God's forgiveness of men, is so far from supporting the opinion of the sufficiency of repentance in itself, that it goes to establish the direct contrary: clearly evincing, that repentance can give no *claim* to forgiveness.—See some excellent reasoning on this subject, in the judicious discourses, delivered at the Bampton Lecture, by Mr. Veysie, Serm. 6 and 7.

NO. XIX.—THE WANT OF A DISCOVERABLE CONNEXION BETWEEN THE MEANS AND THE END, EQUALLY APPLIES TO EVERY SCHEME OF ATONEMENT.

PAGE 17. (a).—Dr. J. Taylor illustrates this matter by a familiar parallel. (*Key, &c.* No. 151.)—To the question "wherein is Christ's love and obedience a just foundation of the divine grace?" he answers, that he knows not how to explain himself better than by the following instance:—There have been masters willing, now and then, to grant a relaxation of study, or even to remit deserved punishment, in case any one boy, in behalf of the whole school, or of the offender, would compose a copy of Latin verses. This at once shewed the master's love and lenity, was a *proper expedient* for promoting learning and benevolence to the society of little men, training up for future usefulness, &c.—and one may say, that the kind verse-maker purchased the favour in both cases, or that his learning, industry, goodness, and compliance with the governor's will and pleasure, was a just ground and foundation of the pardon and refreshment, or a *proper reason* of granting them.

This Dr. T. declares to be the best explanation he can give, of *his* scheme of man's redemption by Christ. And that in this there is any natural connexion between the ex-

ertions of the individual, and the indulgence granted to the rest of this little society, it is not even pretended. The whole contrivance is admitted as a good expedient, or means, whereby the intended kindness of the master was to be shewn. If, in order to supply a link, whereby they may be drawn into connexion, the indulgence granted be supposed as a *reward* to the exertions and obedience of the individual, as is done by H. Taylor, in his *Ben. Mord. Apology:* then, unless this reward, in the case of Christ, be but *ostensibly* such, and intended solely as a *public exhibition* to mankind of the favour with which obedience and good conduct will be viewed by the Deity, (in which case it is not a real reward, but merely a prudent expedient, as before,) it must, of necessity, be admitted, that the trial of Christ's obedience was a principal object in the scheme of his incarnation; for without some *trial* of his obedience how could it merit a reward? Now in what just sense of the word, there could have been any *trial* of Christ's obedience, it is for those to consider, who do not mean to degrade the Son of God to the Socinian standard.

The author of the *Scripture Account of Sacrifices* has devised a scheme, the chief object of which is to remedy the want of connexion. In this, the sacrifice of Christ is not considered as a wise expedient of an *instituted* nature merely, but as a *natural inducement*, whereby God's displeasure against mankind was literally averted by Christ's intercession and mediation recommended by his great zeal, and interest, in the salvation of men, manifested in the offering up his life in the cause. The author of this scheme has, with great ingenuity, accommodated to his notion the nature of the Patriarchal, and Jewish Sacrifices; making their efficacy to consist entirely in the force of supplication or intercession, and their nature to be that of a gift, strongly expressive of homage and devotion. This author, however, although his work contains most excellent and instructive matter, is not perfectly consistent: since, to have *appointed* a scheme of intercession, whereby, agreeably to rectitude, God might be *induced* to grant forgiveness, (and that God *did* appoint this

scheme the author is obliged to confess,) is, in other words, to have planned the redemption of man *through the medium of* intercession, but not *in consequence* of it:—in which case, this theory falls in with the notion of *instituted means* adopted by the rest.

But surely, upon the whole, it is not wonderful, that the grand and mysterious scheme of our Redemption should present to the ambitious curiosity of human intellect the same impediment, which restrains its inquisitive researches in every part of nature:—the *modus operandi*, the connecting link of cause and effect, being itself a mystery impenetrable to human sagacity, equally in things the most familiar and the most obscure. On this subject it were well that the old distinction, laid down by Mr. Locke, were remembered by those, who would deem it an insult to have it supposed that they were not perfectly acquainted with the writings of that eminent philosopher.

NO. XX.—ON THE SCRIPTURE PHRASE OF *OUR BEING RECONCILED TO GOD.*

PAGE 17. (b).—See *Theol. Repos.* vol. i. pp. 177, 178, in which several texts are adduced, to establish the proposition laid down in the text here referred to. It is likewise attempted to maintain it on the general ground of the divine immutability: in virtue of which, it is asserted, the sufferings of Christ can produce no change in *God:* and that in *man*, consequently, the change is to be brought about. God is, therefore, not to be reconciled *to men*, but men *to God.* H. Taylor also (*Ben. Mord. Apol.* pp. 692—694) contends, that "God is never said to be reconciled to the world, because he never was at enmity with it. It was the world that was at enmity with God, and was to be reconciled by coming to the knowledge of his goodness to them." He adduces texts, similar to those above referred to, in confirmation of his opinion; and upon the whole peremptorily asserts, that "the New Testament knows no such language, as that God was

reconciled to the world." The same ground had been before taken by Sykes, in his *Scrip. Doctr. of Redemp.* (pp. 56. 426) and in his *Com. on Hebr.*—" There could be no need," he says, (on Hebr. vii. 27,) " of reconciling *God to man*, when he had already shewn his love to man so far, as to send his Son to reconcile *man to God*."

The argument adopted by these writers had been long before urged by Crellius, in support of the system of Socinus. And it deserves to be remarked, that all these writers have built their arguments upon an erroneous acceptation of the original word, which implies *reconciliation*. Hammond, and, after him, Le Clerc, (on Matt. v. 24,) remark, that the words καταλλάττεσθαι and διαλλάττεσθαι have a peculiar sense in the New Testament: that, whereas in ordinary Greek Authors they signify to *be pacified*, and so *reconciled*, here, on the other hand, in the force of the reciprocal Hithpahel among the Hebrews, is implied to *reconcile one's self* to another, that is to *appease*, or *obtain the favour of*, that other: and in support of this interpretation they adduce instances from Rom. v. 10, 1 Cor. vii. 11, 2 Cor. v. 20, and especially Matt. v. 24, in which last διαλλάγηθι τῷ ἀδελφῷ σου, must necessarily signify, *Take care that thy Brother be reconciled to thee*, since that which goes before, is not, that he had done *thee injury*, but *thou him:* and this they derive from the force of the Hebrew word רצה transferred to the Greek verb, in the use of it by Jewish writers. In this sense of the words καταλλάττεσθαι and διαλλάττεσθαι, as applied in the New Testament[a], all the Commentators concur. See Rosenmüller and Wall on 2 Cor. v. 20, and Whitby on the words, wherever they occur. *Schleusner*, in his excellent Lexicon, confirms, by several

[a] The application of the word διαλλάττεσθαι is precisely the same as is made by the *Seventy*, in their translation of 1 Sam. xxix. 4, where they speak of David's *appeasing the anger* of *Saul*. Ἐν τίνι ΔΙΑΛΛΑΓΗΣΕΤΑΙ τῷ κυρίῳ αὐτοῦ; *Wherewith shall he* RECONCILE HIMSELF *to his master?* according to our common version. Not, surely, how shall he *remove his own anger against his master;* but, how shall he *remove his master's anger against him;* how shall he *restore himself to his master's favour?* If any additional instance had been wanted to establish the use of the word in this sense among the Jewish writers, this one must prove decisive.

instances, the explication of the terms here contended for: and *Palairet*, in his *Observ. Philolog. in Nov. Test.* Matt. v. 24, maintains, that this use of the terms is not confined to the Jewish writers, transferring the force of the verb רצה to the Greek expression, but is frequent among writers purely Greek: he instances *Theano in Opusc. Mythолog.* and *Appian. Alexandr. de Bell. Civil.*, and explains it as an elliptical form, the words εἰς χάριν being understood.

It is evident, then, that the writers who have founded their objection against the propitiation of the Divinity, on the use of the word *reconciled* in the New Testament, have attended rather to the force of the term, as applied in the language of the translation, than in that of the original. But, even without looking beyond the translation, it seems surprising, that the context did not correct their error; since that clearly determines the sense, not only in Matt. v. 24, where it is perfectly obvious and unequivocal, as is shown in page 18; but also in 2 Cor. v. 19, in which the manner of reconciling the world *to God* is expressly described, viz. his *not imputing their trespasses unto them*, that is, his granting them forgiveness. There are, upon the whole, but five places in the New Testament, in which the term is used *with respect to God;* Rom. v. 10, and xi. 15; 2 Cor. v. 18, 19, 20; Ephes. ii. 16; and Col. i. 20, 21. Whoever will take the trouble of consulting Hammond and Whitby on these passages, will be satisfied, that the application is diametrically opposite to that, for which the Socinian writers contend. There are but two places besides, in which the term occurs, Matt. v. 24, and 1 Cor. vii. 11, in both of which the application is clear. And it deserves to be particularly noticed, that Dr. Sykes (*Scrip. Doctr. of Redemp.* p. 57) sinks the former passage altogether, and notices the latter alone, asserting that this is the *only one*, in which the word is used, not in relation to the reconciliation of the world to God: and this, after having inadvertently stated in the preceding page that there were *two* such passages. This will appear the less unaccountable, when it is considered, that the expression, as applied in Matthew, could

be got rid of by no refinement whatever: but that the application in 1 Corinthians (not, indeed, in our translation, which is not sufficiently explicit, but examined in the original) will appear as little friendly to his exposition, Hammond and Le Clerc have abundantly evinced by their interpretation of the passage.

NO. XXI.—ON THE TRUE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE LAYING ASIDE OUR ENMITY TO GOD, AND BEING RECONCILED TO GOD.

PAGE 18. (b).—It is well remarked in the Theological Repository, by a writer under the signature *Verus* [a], that the laying aside *our* enmity to God must be a necessary qualification *for*, though without constituting the formal nature *of*, our reconciliation to God. This judicious distinction places the matter in a fair light. That God will not receive us into favour so long as we are at enmity with him, is most certain: but that thence it should be inferred, that, on laying aside *our* enmity, we are *necessarily* restored to his favour, is surely an odd instance of *logical* deduction.

NO. XXII.—ON THE PROOFS FROM SCRIPTURE, THAT THE SINNER IS THE OBJECT OF THE DIVINE *DISPLEASURE*.

PAGE 19. (a).—Heb. x. 26, 27. *For if we sin wilfully, after that we have received the knowledge of the truth, there remaineth no more SACRIFICE FOR SINS, but a certain FEARFUL LOOKING FOR OF JUDGMENT AND FIERY INDIGNATION, which shall devour the adversaries:* and again, *For we know him that hath said, Vengeance belongeth unto me, I will recompense, saith the Lord:* and again, *It is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the Living God:* and again, (Rom. v.

[a] This writer I find to have been the Rev. Mr. Brekell: a writer certainly deserving of praise, both for the ability with which he combated the sophistry of the heterodox, and for the boldness with which he carried the war into the very camp of the enemy.

9, 10,) *Much more then, being now justified by his blood, we shall be saved from wrath through him—for if, when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God through his Son,* &c. In this last passage, it is not only clearly expressed, that we are from disobedience exposed to the divine displeasure, but also that the way whereby we are rescued from the effects of that displeasure, or, as is here held an equivalent form of expression, *reconciled to* God, is by the death of Christ.

To quote all the passages that speak a similar language, were a tedious task. Nor indeed was the voice of Revelation wanted to inform men, that the Sinner is the object of God's displeasure. Reason has at all times loudly proclaimed this truth: and in that predominating terror, that Δεισιδαιμονία, which, as shown in Number V., has, in every age and clime, disfigured, or rather absorbed, the religion of the Gentiles, the natural sentiment of the human mind may be easily discerned.

What is the language of the celebrated *Adam Smith* on this subject?—"But if it be meant, that vice does not appear to the Deity to be, for its own sake, the object of abhorrence and aversion, and what, for its own sake, it is fit and right should be punished, the truth of this maxim can, by no means, be so easily admitted. If we consult our natural sentiments, we are apt to fear, lest, before the holiness of God, vice should appear to be more worthy of punishment, than the weakness and imperfection of human nature can ever seem to be of reward. Man, when about to appear before a Being of infinite perfection, can feel but little confidence in his own merit, or in the imperfect propriety of his own conduct. In the presence of his fellow-creatures, he may often justly elevate himself, and may often have reason to think highly of his own character and conduct, compared to the still greater imperfection of theirs. But the case is quite different when about to appear before his *infinite Creator.* To such a Being, he can scarce imagine, that his littleness and weakness should ever seem to be the

proper object, either of esteem or of reward. But he can easily conceive, how the numberless violations of duty, of which he has been guilty, should render him the object of *aversion* and *punishment;* neither can he see any reason why the divine *indignation* should not be let loose, without any restraint, upon so vile an insect, as he is sensible that he himself must appear to be. If he would still hope for happiness, he is conscious that he cannot demand it from the *justice*, but that he must intreat it from the *mercy* of God. Repentance, sorrow, humiliation, contrition at the thought of his past conduct, are, upon this account, the sentiments which become him, and seem to be the only means which he has left for appeasing that wrath which, he knows, he has justly provoked. He even distrusts the efficacy of all these, and naturally fears, lest the wisdom of God should not, like the weakness of man, be prevailed upon to spare the crime, by the most importunate lamentations of the criminal. *Some other intercession, some other sacrifice, some other atonement*, he imagines, must be made for him, beyond what he himself is capable of making, before the purity of the divine justice can *be reconciled* to his manifest offences.

"The doctrines of Revelation coincide, in every respect, with those *original anticipations of nature;* and, as they teach us how little we can depend upon the imperfection of our own virtue, so they shew us, at the same time, that the most powerful *intercession* has been made, and the most *dreadful atonement has been paid for our manifold transgressions and iniquities.*" (THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS, pp. 204—206.)

Such were the reflections of a man, whose powers of thinking and reasoning will surely not be pronounced inferior to those of any even of the most distinguished champions of the Unitarian school, and whose theological opinions cannot be charged with any supposed tincture from professional habits or interests. A layman, (and he too the familiar friend of David Hume,) whose life was employed in scientific, political, and philosophical research, has given to the world these

sentiments as the natural suggestions of reason[a]. Yet these are the sentiments which are the scoff of sciolists and witlings. —Compare these observations of Adam Smith with what has been said on the same subject in Numbers IV. IX. and XV.

NO. XXIII.—INSTANCE, FROM THE BOOK OF JOB, OF SACRIFICE BEING *PRESCRIBED* TO AVERT GOD'S *ANGER*.

PAGE 19. (c).—It was not without much surprise, that, after having written the sentence here referred to, I found on reading a paper of Dr. Priestley's in the *Theol. Rep.* (vol. i. p. 404,) that the Book of Job was appealed to by him, as furnishing a *decisive proof*, not only, "that mankind in his time had not the least apprehension that repentance and reformation *alone*, without the *sufferings* or *merit* of any Being whatever, would not sufficiently atone for past offences:" but that "the Almighty himself gives a sanction to these sentiments." Let the Book of Job speak for itself:—*The Lord said to Eliphaz the Temanite, My wrath is kindled against thee and thy two friends: for ye have not spoken of me the thing that is right, as my servant Job hath.—Therefore take unto you now seven bullocks and seven rams, and go to my servant Job, and offer up for yourselves a burnt-offering; and my servant Job shall pray for you: for him will I accept: lest I deal with you after your folly.* (Job xlii. 7, 8.) If this be not a sufficient

[a] When these observations were before committed to the press, I was not aware that the pious reflections, to which they particularly advert, are no longer to be found as constituting a part of that work from which they have been quoted. The fact is, that in the later editions of the *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, no one sentence appears of the extract which has been cited above, and which I had derived from the first edition, the only one that I possessed. This circumstance, however, does not in any degree affect the truth of what had been said by the author, nor the justness of the sentiments which he had uttered in a pure and unsophisticated state of mind. It evinces, indeed, that he did not altogether escape the infection of David Hume's society; and it adds one proof more to the many that already existed, of the danger, even to the most enlightened, from a familiar contact with infidelity. How far Adam Smith's partiality to Hume did ultimately carry him, may easily be collected from his emphatical observations on the character of his deceased friend, to which I shall have occasion to direct the reader's attention in another part of these volumes.

specimen, we are supplied with another in ch. i. 4, 5, in which it is said, that, after the sons of Job had been employed in feasting, *Job sent and sanctified them, and rose up early in the morning, and offered burnt-offerings according to the number of them all: for Job said* IT MAY BE THAT MY SONS HAVE SINNED, AND CURSED GOD IN THEIR HEARTS. *Thus did Job continually.*—I leave these without comment, to confront the assertions of Dr. Priestley, and to demonstrate the value of his representations of Scripture. I shall only add, that, in the very page in which he makes the above assertions, he has quoted from Job a passage that *immediately* follows the former of those here cited.

NO. XXIV.—ON THE ATTRIBUTE OF THE DIVINE JUSTICE.

PAGE 19. (d).—Dr. Priestley (*Theol. Rep.* vol. i. p. 417) asserts, that "Justice, in the Deity, can be no more than a modification of that goodness or benevolence, which is his *SOLE governing principle*:" from which he of course infers, that "under the administration of God, there can be no occasion to exercise any severity on penitent offenders;" or, in other words, that repentance must of itself, from the nature of the Deity, cancel all former offences; and that the man who has spent a life of gross vice and audacious impiety, if he at any time reform, shall stand as clear of the divine displeasure as he who has uniformly, to the utmost of his power, walked before his God in a spirit of meek and pious obedience. This is certainly the necessary result of *pure* benevolence: nay, the same principle followed up must exclude punishment in all cases whatsoever; the very notion of punishment being incompatible with pure benevolence. But surely it would be a strange property of JUSTICE, (*call* it, with Dr. Priestley, a *modification of benevolence*, or whatever else he pleases,) to release *all* from punishment; the hardened and unrelenting offender, no less than the sincerely contrite, and truly humbled penitent.

But in his use of the term *justice*, as applied to the Deity,

is not Dr. Priestley guilty of most unworthy trifling? Why speak of it, as "a modification of the divine benevolence," if it be nothing *different* from that attribute; and if it *be* different from it, how can benevolence be the "SOLE governing principle" of the divine administration?—The word *justice*, then, is plainly but a sound made use of to save appearances, as an attribute called by that name has usually been ascribed to the Deity; but in reality nothing is meant by it, in Dr. Priestley's application of the term, different from pure and absolute benevolence. This is likewise evident, as we have seen, from the whole course of his argument. Now, could it be conceded to Dr. Priestley, that the whole character of God is to be resolved into simple benevolence, then the scheme, which, by rejecting the notion of divine displeasure against the sinner, involves impunity of guilt, might fairly be admitted. But, as it has been well remarked, "If rectitude be the measure and rule of that benevolence, it might rather be presumed, that the scheme of Redemption would carry a relation to Sinners, in one way as objects of mercy, in another as objects of punishment; that God *might be just, and* YET *the justifier of him that believeth* in the Redeemer." See the 2d of *Holmes's Four Tracts*, in which he confirms, by parallel instances, the use of the word καὶ, as applied in the above passage by Whitby in his Paraphrase.—On the subject of this Number at large, see also Numbers IV. XXII., and Balguy's *Essay on Redemption*.

NO. XXV.—ON THE TEXT IN JOHN, DESCRIBING OUR LORD AS *THE LAMB OF GOD*, WHICH TAKETH AWAY THE SINS OF THE WORLD.

PAGE 20. (a).—What efforts are made to get rid of those parts of Scripture, that lend support to the received doctrine of the Sacrifice of Christ, is evident from the remark made on this passage by the ingenious author of *Ben. Mordecai's Apology*. "The allusion here," he says, "seems to be made to the 53d

chapter of Isaiah; but the Lamb is not there considered as a Lamb to be *sacrificed*, but as a Lamb to be *sheared*." (Let. vii. p. 794, 2d ed. 8vo.)—Now upon what principle this author is enabled to pronounce that the allusion in this place is made to the Lamb spoken of in *Isaiah*, rather than to the Paschal Lamb, or to the Lamb which, under the Jewish Law, was offered daily for the sins of the people, it is difficult to discover. His only reason seems to be, that, in admitting the reference to either of the two last, the notion of *sacrifice* is necessarily involved; and the grand object in maintaining the resemblance to a Lamb that was to be sheared, not slain, was to keep the *death* of Christ out of view as much as possible.

But of the manner in which Scripture is here used to support a particular hypothesis we shall be better able to form a right judgment, when it shall have appeared, that the reference in John is *not* made to Isaiah; and also, that the Lamb in Isaiah *is* considered as a Lamb to be *slain*.

The latter is evident, not only from the entire context, but from the very words of the prophet, which describe the person spoken of (liii. 7) to be "brought as a Lamb to the *slaughter*;" so that one cannot but wonder at the pains taken to force the application to this passage of Isaiah, and still more at the peremptory assertion, that the Lamb here spoken of was a Lamb to be sheared only. It is true, indeed, there is subjoined, *and as a sheep before her* SHEARERS *is dumb*: but if Mr. Wakefield's remark on Acts viii. 32, in which he contends that the word translated *shearer*, should have been rendered *slayer*, be a just one, the objection vanishes at once. Retaining, however, the clause as it stands in the present version, that which follows,—*so he openeth not his mouth*,—clearly explains, that the character intended to be conveyed by the Prophet, in the whole of this figurative representation, was that of a meek and uncomplaining resignation to suffering and death.

And this also shows us that the passage in Isaiah could not have been the *one immediately* referred to by John; be-

cause in it the Lamb is introduced but *incidentally*, and as furnishing the only adequate resemblance to that character, which was the primary object of the Prophet's contemplation: whereas, in the Baptist's declaration, that Jesus was *THE Lamb of God that taketh away the sins of the world*, the reference must naturally be to a Lamb before described, and understood, as possessed of some similar or corresponding virtue, such as St. Peter alludes to when he says (1 Peter, i. 18, 19,) *Ye were REDEEMED—with the precious blood of Christ, as of a Lamb without blemish.* In this an allusion is evidently made to a Lamb, whose *blood*, under the Jewish Law, bore analogy to that of Christ: that is, either to the Paschal Lamb, by the sprinkling of whose blood the Israelites had been delivered from destruction; or to the Lamb that was daily sacrificed for the sins of the people, and which was bought with that half shekel, which all the Jews yearly paid, *εἰς λύτρον τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῶν, ἐξιλάσασθαι περὶ τῶν ψυχῶν αὐτῶν, as the price of redemption of their Lives, to make an atonement for them.* (Exod. xxx. 12. 14. 16.) With a view to this last, it is, that St. Peter most probably uses the expressions, *Ye were not redeemed with silver and gold—but with the precious blood of Christ, as of a Lamb*, &c., *i. e.* it is not by a Lamb purchased with silver and gold that you have been redeemed, but by Christ, that truly spotless Lamb, which the former was intended to prefigure; who, by shedding his blood, has effectually redeemed you from the consequences of your sins; or, as the Baptist had before described him, *the Lamb of God that taketh away the sins of the world;* and, as St. John, who records these expressions of the Baptist, again speaks of him in the Apocalypse, (v. 9,) the *Lamb* which had been *SLAIN, and by its Blood REDEEMED men out of every kindred and tongue and people and nation*, or, in other words, *that had taken away the sins of the world.*

The author indeed admits (what it was impossible for him to deny) that, in the Apocalypse, Christ "*is* spoken of as a Lamb that was *slain*:" but then he says, that "he is not

spoken of as a *vicarious* sacrifice; for the Jews had *no* sacrifices of that nature." (Vol. ii. p. 789.) Be it so for the present: it is clear, however, that the Lamb, to which the allusion is made in the figurative representations of Christ in the New Testament, is a Lamb that was *slain* and *sacrificed;* and that nothing but the prejudices arising from a favourite hypothesis could have led this writer to contend against a truth so notorious, and upon grounds so frivolous.

NO. XXVI.—ON THE MEANING OF THE WORD *PROPITIATION* IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.

PAGE 20. (f).—The word ἱλασμὸς, translated *propitiation*, occurs in the New Testament only in the two passages noticed in the page here referred to, viz. 1 John ii. 2, and iv. 10. Its true force, however, is obvious; since, as appears from the application of the words ἱλασμὸς, ἱλάσκομαι, ἐξιλάσκομαι, by the Seventy in the Old Testament, it corresponds to the Hebrew word כִּפֶּר, and therefore implies, *the making atonement, and thereby effecting a reconciliation with*, or *propitiating the Deity*.—The Greek translation of Ezekiel (xliv. 29) has made it synonymous with חַטָּאת, *a sin-offering:* and thus, H. Taylor (*B. Mord.* p. 808) asserts, that the word should be here translated.

But it is curious to remark, that this writer has been so far led away by a desire to maintain the system which he has adopted, that, in two pages after, he goes on to show that *no one* circumstance belonging to the sin-offering is to be found in the sacrifice of Christ. As producing indeed "the *effect* of the sin-offerings, remission of sins," he concludes it may be *so called*, though possessing no one ingredient that enters into the composition of a sin-offering. His radical error on the Scripture use of the word *reconciliation* (which has been already examined) prevented him from admitting the term *propitiation*, or *propitiatory* sacrifice: *sin-offering* he therefore substitutes, and then endeavours to fritter this away.—It deserves to be noticed, that even Sykes, whose attachment to

the orthodox opinions will not be suspected to have much biassed his judgment on this subject, considers ἐξιλάσκεσθαι to be correspondent to כִּפֶּר, and explains both by the words *expiate*, *atone*, *propitiate*, "whatever the means were," he adds, "by which this was to be done." *Essay on Sacrifices*, pp. 132. 135.

In Rom. iii. 25, ἱλαστήριον [a] is translated in the same sense with ἱλασμὸς, *a propitiation*, or *propitiatory offering*, θῦμα, or ἱερεῖον, being understood as its substantive: and although it be true, as Krebsius observes, that the Seventy always apply this term to the *Mercy-Seat*, or covering of the ark, yet strong arguments appear in favour of the present translation. See *Schleusner* on the word: also *Josephus*, as referred to by *Krebsius* and *Michaelis* [b]. *Veysie* (*Bampt. Lect.* pp. 219, 220, 221) has well enumerated its various significations.

NO. XXVII.—ON THE TEXTS DESCRIBING CHRIST'S DEATH AS A SACRIFICE FOR SIN.

PAGE 20. (i).—Isai. liii. 5—8. Matt. xx. 28; xxvi. 28. Mark, x. 45. Acts, viii. 32, 33. Rom. iii. 24, 25; iv. 25; v. 6—10.

[a] Ἱλαστήριον—subaudiendum videtur ἱερεῖον aut θῦμα, *expiatorium sacrificium*, quemadmodum eadem ellipsis frequentissima est apud τοὺς ὁ in voce σωτήριον, et in χαριστήριον, apud Auctores. Hesychius exponit Καθέδρισιν eadem ellipsi; nisi substantive sumptum idem significare malis quod ἱλασμὸν *propitiationem*, ut Vulgatus vertit, consentiente Beza. Ejus generis substantiva sunt δικαστήριον, θυσιαστήριον, φυλακτήριον, et similia; adeoque Christus eodem modo vocabitur ἱλαστήριον, quo ἱλασμὸς, 1 Joh. ii. 2, et iv. 10. *Elsner. Obs. Sacr.* tom. ii. pp. 20, 21.

[b] Michaelis says, (*Translation by Marsh*, vol. i. p. 187,) "Josephus, having previously observed that the blood of the martyrs had made atonement for their countrymen, and that they were ὥσπερ ἀντίψυχον (victima substituta) τῆς τοῦ ἔθνους ἁμαρτίας, continues as follows, καὶ διὰ τοῦ αἵματος τῶν εὐσεβῶν ἱκείνων, καὶ τοῦ ΙΛΑΣΤΗΡΙΟΥ τοῦ θανάτου αὐτῶν ἡ θεία πρόνοια τὸν Ἰσραὴλ διέσωσε!" On the use of the word ἱλαστήριον amongst Jewish writers, and the strict *propitiatory* sense in which it was used by the Hellenistic Jews, I deem this passage from Josephus decisive; and I have but little hesitation in defying the utmost ingenuity of Socinian exposition to do away the force of its application to the subject before us.—Michaelis, in p. 179, remarks, that "in Rom. iii. 25, ἱλαστήριον has been taken by some in the sense of *mercy-seat*, but that Kypke has properly preferred the translation PROPITIATORY SACRIFICE."—Michaelis was surely no superficial nor bigoted expositor of holy writ.

1 Cor. v. 7; xv. 3. 2 Cor. v. 21. Eph. i. 7. Col. i. 14. 1 Tim. ii. 6. Heb. i. 3; ii. 17; ix. 12—28; x. 10. 14. 18. 1 Pet. i. 18, 19. 1 John iv. 10. Rev. v. 9—12; xiii. 8.—All which, and several other passages, speak of the death of Christ in the same sacrificial terms that had been applied to the sin-offerings of old. So that they who would reject the notion of Christ's death, as a true and real sacrifice for sin, must refine away the natural and direct meaning of all these passages: or, in other words, they must new model the entire tenor of Scripture language, before they can accomplish their point.

Dr. Priestley, indeed, although he professes (*Theol. Rep.* vol. i. p. 125) to collect "ALL the texts in which Christ is represented as a sacrifice, either expressly, or by plain reference," has not been able to find *so many* to this purpose as have been here referred to. After the most careful research, he could discover but a *very few;* and of these he remarks, that "the greater part are from one Epistle, which is allowed in other respects to abound with the strongest figures, metaphors, and allegories:" and these being rejected, "the rest," he says, "are too few to bear the very great stress that has been laid upon them:"—and thus they are all discarded with one sweeping remark, that they carry with them the air of figure, and that had Christ's death been considered as the intended antitype of the sacrifices under the law, this would have been asserted in the fullest manner, and would have been more frequently referred to. We are here furnished with an instance of the most expeditious and effectual method of evading the authority of Scripture. First, overlook a considerable majority, and particularly of the strongest texts, that go to support the doctrine you oppose; in the next place assert, that, of the remainder, a large proportion belongs to a particular writer, whom you think proper to charge with metaphor, allegory, &c. &c.: then object to the residue, as too few on which to rest any doctrine of importance: but, lest even these might give some trouble in the examination, explode them at once with the cry of figure,

&c. &c.—This is the treatment that Scripture too frequently receives from those who choose to call themselves rational and enlightened Commentators.

There are two texts, however, on which Dr. Priestley *has* thought fit to bestow some critical attention, for the purpose of showing that they are not entitled to rank even with those few that he has enumerated, as bearing a plausible resemblance to the doctrine in question. From his reasoning on these, we shall be able to judge what the candour and justice of his criticisms on the others would have been, had he taken the trouble to produce them. The two texts are, Isai. liii. 10, *When thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin: and* 2 Cor. v. 21, *He made him* SIN *for us, who knew no sin, that we might be made the righteousness of God in him.*

Against the first he argues from the disagreement in the versions, which, he observes, may lead us to suspect some corruption in our present copies of the Hebrew text. Our translation, he says, makes a change of person in the sentence—HE *hath put him to grief—when* THOU *shalt make his soul an offering for sin,* HE *shall see his seed*, &c., in which, he adds, it agrees with no ancient version whatever. In the next place, he asserts, that the Syriac *alone* retains the *sense* of our translation, and at the same time remarks that *this* version of the Old Testament is but of little authority. He then gives the reading of the clause by the Seventy and the Arabic, *If ye offer a sacrifice for sin, your Soul shall see a long-lived offspring.* He concludes with the Chaldee paraphrase of Jonathan, which is different from all. And from the whole he draws this result, that the uncertainty as to the true reading of the original must render the passage of no authority. (*Theol. Rep.* vol. i. p. 127.)

But the real state of the case is widely different from this representation: for, 1. our translation does *not* absolutely pronounce upon the change of person, so as to preclude an agreement with the ancient versions. 2. The Syriac is *not* the only version that retains the *sense* of ours, the Vulgate, which Dr. P. has thought proper to omit, exactly correspond-

ing in sense. 3. The Syriac version of the Old Testament, so far from being of *little authority*, is of the *very* highest. 4. The concurrence of the LXX and the Arabic is not a *joint*, but a *single* testimony, inasmuch as the Arabic is known to be little more than a version of the LXX[a], and, consequently, can lend no farther support, than as verifying the reading of the LXX, *at the time when this version was made:* and that it does not even authenticate the reading of the LXX at an *early* day, may be collected from the *Prolegom. of Walton*, and *Kennicott's State of the Hebr. Text*, as referred to in the note below. 5. The Chaldee paraphrase of Jonathan is remarkable (as Bishop Lowth states in his *Prelim. Dissert.*) "for a wordy, allegorical explanation," so that an *exactness* of translation is not here to be expected. And, lastly, the apparent differences of the versions may be explained by, and fairly reconciled to, the present reading of the Hebrew text.

These several points will be best explained, by beginning with the last. The state of the Hebrew text, as it stands in all our present Bibles, (at least in such of them as I have consulted, viz. Walton's Polyglot, Michaelis, Houbigant, Kennicott, Doederlein, &c., and scarcely undergoing any variation, however minute, from the prodigious variety of copies examined by Kennicott and de Rossi,) is as follows, אם תשים אשם נפשו יראה זרע יאריך ימים. Now these words, as they stand, manifestly admit of a two-fold translation, according as the word תשים is considered to be of the *second person masculine*, or the *third person feminine*,—viz. *when* THOU *shalt make his soul an offering for sin*, or, *when* HIS SOUL *shall make an offering for sin:* and though, with Ludovicus de Dieu, our present translation of the Bible has followed the former in the *text*, yet has it, with Cocceius, Montanus, Junius and Tremellius, Castellio, and almost every other learned expositor of the Bible, retained the latter, inserting

[a] See *Bishop Lowth's Preliminary Dissert. to his Translation of Isaiah—and Walton's Polyglot Prolegom.* 15—also *Kennicott's State of the Hebr. Text*, vol. ii. pp. 453, 454.

it in the *margin*, as may be seen in any of our common Bibles. It deserves also to be remarked, that, in the old editions of our English Bible, (see *Matthewe's*, *Cranmer's* or *the Great Bible*, and *Taverner's*,—see also the Bibles in the time of Elizabeth, viz. the *Geneva* and *Bishops'* Bibles, and the *Douay*,—see all, in short, that preceded *James's* translation,) this latter reading is the only one that is given: and it should be observed, (see *Newcome's Historic. View*, p. 105,) that one of the rules prescribed to the translators employed in the last named version, which is the one now in use, was, —"that where a Hebrew or Greek word admitted of *two proper senses*, one should be expressed in the context, and the other in the margin." Thus it appears, that Dr. Priestley must have glanced his eye most cursorily indeed upon our English translation, when he charges it so peremptorily with the abrupt change of person.

Again, this very translation, which, beside the older expositors above referred to, has the support of Vitringa and Bishop Lowth, and is perfectly consistent with the most accurate and grammatical rendering of the passage in question, agrees sufficiently with the *ancient* versions. In *sense* there is no difference, and whatever variation there is in the *expression* may be satisfactorily accounted for from a farther examination of the original. Thus, in the Vulgate it is rendered, *When he shall make his soul an offering for sin, he shall see*, &c.—and in the Syriac, the penalty of *sin is laid upon his soul*, (i. e. in other words, his soul is made an offering for sin,) *that he might see*, &c. Now the first is a literal translation of the Hebrew, if, only, instead of תשים be read ישים [a], which we may readily suppose some copies of the Hebrew to have done, without introducing the smallest uncertainty into the text. The second will also be found a literal version, if for תשים be read תשם, which may be taken passively, *shall be made*. Now it appears from Kennicott's

[a] Doederlein translates as if the word were ישים, *ubi vitam suam, ut piaculum, interposuerit;* and adds, that the book *Sohar* (Parascha וישב) particularly warns us that it is so to be read, not תשים.

various readings, that one MS. supports this reading. But there is a remark on this head made by Houbigant (which has been overlooked both by Bishop Lowth, and the commentator on Isaiah who has succeeded him [a]) that seems to deserve considerable notice. "The word," he says, "should be תשם, in the passive voice: for that, as Morinus observes, the Jews, before the vowel points were introduced, were used to mark the passive by the letter י interposed; and that here, this Chaldaism had been allowed to remain by the transcriber." —See Houbigant in loc.

Again, with respect to the LXX version of this passage, (for as to the *Arabic*, it need not be taken into account, for the reasons before stated,) the difference between it and the last mentioned translation is not so great, as on the first view might appear. It is true, the reading of the LXX, as given in our Polyglot, is ἐὰν δῶτε, *if ye offer:* but it is remarked by Bishop Lowth, that some copies of the LXX read δῶται, *shall be offered:* which agrees exactly with the Syriac. Indeed, as Mr. Dodson very properly observes, δῶται may be considered the true reading of the LXX, not only on the authority of *Clemens R.* and *Justin*, who read it so; but also from the custom, which prevails in Greek MSS. of writing ε instead of αι. This practice is noticed by Wotton, in his edition of *Clem. R.* (p. 142) on the words προτρέπετε ἡμᾶς ἐπ' αὐτῷ, and is well known to all who are conversant in Greek MSS., as obtaining not only at the termination of words, as in the instance taken from *Clemens*, but in all parts of the word indifferently. This reading is likewise approved by

[a] Mr. Dodson was here intended, as being the only person, who (at the date of the first publication of this work) had given to the public a version of Isaiah later than that of Bishop Lowth. But the observation equally applies to Bishop Stock, who has given the latest translation of the Prophet, and who has in like manner overlooked this remark: for whilst he renders the word in a *passive* sense, *If his life shall* BE MADE *a trespass-offering*, he assigns for it a wrong reason; deriving the passive signification from a supposed reflective import of the verb—*should be made, or* (he says) *should render* ITSELF; forgetting, that, if this latter sense belonged to the verb, it would have been given in the form *Hithpahel*, which clearly is not that of the verb תשים.—Dathe's translation of the passage is decisive for the passive signification of the verb: *Quodsi vita ejus ut sacrificium pro peccatis oblata fuerit.*

Capellus[a]. Thus far, then, (and this, it is to be noted, is the most important clause in the passage,) the disagreement between the LXX and the other ancient versions is done away. That it differs both from them and the Hebrew text, in some other parts of the sentence, must be allowed; but that from an extensive collation of the several MSS., (which has now happily been at length undertaken,) even these differences may yet be removed, there is much reason to expect. The confirmation of the present reading of the Septuagint by the Arabic version is by no means an argument against this; as that version is not above 900 years old, and may, therefore, have been derived from copies of the Septuagint, not the most perfect. Besides, it deserves to be remarked, that Bishop Lowth (*Prelim. Diss.*) pronounces the Septuagint version of *Isaiah* to be inferior to that of any other book in the Old Testament; and, in addition to this, to have come down to us in a condition exceedingly incorrect.

Upon the whole, then, since the present state of the Hebrew text has been shown to agree with the Syriac, the Vulgate, (both of which, it should be noted, were taken from the Hebrew,—one in the first, the other in the fourth century,) with our English translation, and, in a material part, even with the LXX, we may judge with what fairness Dr. Priestley's rejection of the present text, on the ground of the disagreement of the translations with it and with each other, has been conducted. His omission of the Vulgate; his overlooking the marginal translation of our present, and the text of our older English Bibles, and pronouncing peremptorily on their contents in opposition to both; his stating the Arabic as a *distinct* testimony, concurring with the LXX; and his assertion, that the Syriac version of the Old Testament is *confessed to be* of little authority, when the direct

[a] "Aliquando diversitas citationis a LXX posita est in diversa lectione variantium Codd. Græcorum τῶν LXX: ut Esa. liii. 10, editio Sixtina τῶν LXX habet, ἐὰν δῶτε περὶ ἁμαρτίας, *si dederitis pro peccato*, quæ corrupta est lectio. At Justinus cum quibusdam codicibus habet, ἐὰν δῶται, *si datus fuerit*, quæ genuina est lectio respondens Hebræo." *Critica Sacra, Ludov. Capel.* pp. 529, 530.

contrary is the fact, it being esteemed by all biblical scholars as of the very highest;—and all this done to darken and discard a part of holy writ,—cannot but excite some doubt as to the knowledge, or the candour, of the critic.

With respect to the *Syriac* version, Bishop Lowth, in his *Prelim. Dissert.*, thus expresses himself. After describing the Chaldee paraphrase of Jonathan, which he states to have been made about or before the time of our Saviour, he says, "The Syriac stands next in order of time, but is superior to the Chaldee in usefulness and authority, as well in ascertaining, as in explaining, the Hebrew text: it is a *close* translation of the Hebrew, into a language of *near affinity* to it: it is supposed to have been made as early as the *first century*."—Doctor Kennicott also (*State of the Hebr. Text*, vol. ii. p. 355) speaks in the strongest terms of this version, "which," he says, "being *very literal* and *very ancient*, is of *inestimable value:*"—he concludes it to have been "made about the end of the first century, and that it might consequently have been made from Hebrew MSS. almost as old as those which were before translated into Greek:" and he, of course, relies on it for many of the most ancient and valuable readings. The language of De Rossi is, if possible, still stronger. "Versio hæc *antiquissima* ordinem ipsum verborum sacri textus et literam presse sectatur; et *ex versionibus* OMNIBUS *antiquis purior ac tenacior habetur*." (*Var. Lect. Vet. Test.* Proleg. p. xxxii.) Dathe, also, both in his preface to the Syriac Psalter, and in his *Opuscula*, pronounces in the most peremptory terms in favour of the fidelity and the high antiquity of the Syriac Version. In the latter work, particularly, he refers to it as a decisive standard by which to judge of the state of the Hebrew text in the second century. *Dath. Opusc. Coll. a Rosenm.* p. 171. In this high estimate of the Syriac [a] Version these great critics but coin-

[a] Although I am only here concerned with the Syriac Version of the *Old Testament*, yet I cannot omit the opportunity of noticing a judicious and satisfactory defence of the high antiquity of what is called the *Old* Syriac Version of the *New* Testament, lately given to the public by Dr. Laurence. That this

cide with the suffrages of Pocock, Walton, and all the most learned and profound Hebrew scholars, who in general ascribe it to the *Apostolic* age.—(See *Pocock. pref.* to *Micah*, and *Walton's Prolegom.* 13.)—Dr. PRIESTLEY, however, *has said*, that "*it is confessed to be of little authority!*"—I have dwelt much too long upon this point: but it is of importance that the reader should know what reliance is to be placed on the *knowledge*, and what credit is to be given to the *assertions*, of a writer, whose theological opinions have obtained no small degree of circulation in the sister island, and whose confident assumption of critical superiority, and loud complaints against the alleged backwardness of divines of the Established Church in biblical investigation, might draw the unwary reader into an implicit admission of his gratuitous positions.

I come now to examine his objections against the second text—*He made him* SIN *for us, who knew no sin, that we might be made the righteousness of God in him.*—In this passage, the word ἁμαρτία, which is translated SIN, is considered by Hammond, Le Clerc, Whitby, and every respectable Commentator, to mean a *sin offering* or *sacrifice for sin:* it is so translated expressly by Primate Newcome in his new Version. That this is the true meaning of the word, will readily be admitted, when it is considered that this is the application of it in the Hebrew idiom; and that Jews, translating their own language into Greek, would give to the latter the force of the corresponding words in the former. And that they *have* done so, is evident from the use of the word through the entire of the Greek version of the *Old* Testa-

version (or the *Peshito*, as it is usually named for distinction) was the production of the Apostolic age, or at least of that which immediately succeeded, had been the opinion of the most eminent critics both in early and modern times. The very learned J. D. Michaelis has maintained the same opinion, in his *Introduction to the New Testament*, vol. ii. pp. 29—38. But in this he has not received the support of his English annotator, Dr. Marsh, who contends that we have no sufficient proof of the existence of this Version at a period earlier than the fourth century: ibid. pp. 551—554. Dr. Laurence has, however, clearly shown, that Dr. Marsh's objections are not formidable, and has treated the subject in such a manner as to evince that the alleged antiquity of the Version stands upon the strongest grounds of probability. See *Laurence's Dissert. upon the Logos*, pp. 67—74.

ment, to which the Apostles, when speaking in Greek, would naturally have adhered. Dr. Middleton, in his answer to Dr. Bentley, remarks, that "the whole New Testament is written in a language peculiar to the Jews; and that the idiom is Hebrew or Syriac, though the words be Greek." Michaelis also says, "The language of the New Testament is so intermixed with Hebraisms, that many native Greeks might have found it difficult to understand it." (*Introd. to N. T.* vol. i. p. 100.) Ludovicus Capellus (in speaking of the Greek translators of the Old Testament, whose style he says is followed by the writers of the New) asks the question, "Quis nescit, verba quidem esse Græca, at phrases et sermonis structuram esse Hebræam?" (*Crit. Sacr.* p. 522.) And Dr. Campbell, in his *Preliminary Dissertations*, pronounces, almost in the words of Capellus, "The phraseology is Hebrew, and the words are Greek."[a] The justice of these

[a] Ernesti affirms, "Stilus Novi Testamenti recte dicatur *Hebræo-græcus*." See p. 82, *Inst. Interp. Nov. Test.* Indeed the observations of this writer (pp. 73—88) are particularly worthy of attention. If the reader should be desirous to see this curious and interesting subject of the style of the New Testament fully and satisfactorily handled, I refer him to the last named work; also to Michaelis's fourth chapter on *the Language of the New Testament*, (*Introduction*, &c. vol. i. pp. 97—200,) and particularly to Dr. Campbell's first and second *Preliminary Dissertations* to the *Four Gospels*, &c. At the same time, I must differ widely from Dr. Campbell, when he refers (as he does in p. 20, vol. i.) to the Bishop of Gloucester's *Doctrine of Grace*, for the *best* refutation of the objections against the inspiration of Scripture derived from the want of classic purity in its language. I would, on the contrary, direct the reader's attention to the *Dissertation on the Principles of Human Eloquence*, in which the bold paradoxes of the Bishop are set aside, and the argument placed upon a sound and legitimate basis, by the learned Dr. Thomas Leland, formerly a Fellow of this University.

The Bishop, it is well known, had held, that the *want of purity* in the writings of the New Testament supplies in itself a *proof of their divine original;* and had defended this position upon reasons nearly subversive of every just notion of the nature of human eloquence. Dr. Leland, on the contrary, with a due regard to the principles of eloquence, of taste, and of common sense, and in the direct maintenance of them all against the attacks of this formidable assailant, more discreetly and successfully contended for the truth of this proposition, that "whatever rudeness of style may be discoverable in the writings of the New Testament, it can afford neither proof nor presumption that the authors were *not* divinely inspired." See p. 97, or rather, indeed, the whole of the judicious discussion from p. 88 to p. 118 of the *Dissertation*. This drew forth a reply in defence of the Bishop, which was distinguished more for point and sarcasm than for ingenuity and strength. Suspicion early fixed upon Dr. Hurd as the

observations, as applying particularly to the expression in the present text, is evinced in numerous instances adduced

author. The letters of Warburton and Hurd lately published, prove the suspicion to have been just. It appears, also, that Warburton himself took considerable pains to have the pamphlet printed and circulated in Ireland, (*Letters*, &c., pp. 352. 354,) in the confident expectation, that the *Irish Professor* would be completely put to silence. The effect, however, was otherwise. The Professor returned to the charge with renovated vigour; and by a reply, distinguished by such ability as proved to the opposite party the inexpediency of continuing the contest, closed the controversy. How complete, in the public opinion, was Dr. Leland's triumph over both his mitred opponents, may easily be collected from the fact, that, however anxious to give extended circulation to the castigatory *Letter* before it received an answer, they both observed a profound silence upon the subject ever after; and that the *Letter to Dr. Leland*, remaining unacknowledged by the author, was indebted for its farther publicity to the very person against whom it was directed, who deemed it not inexpedient, in a new edition of his tracts, to give it a place between the *Dissertation* which caused it and the defence which it occasioned. The critical decisions of the day were decidedly in favour of Dr. Leland. A late Review pronounces, that Leland, "in the opinion of all the world, completely demolished his antagonist." (*Edinb. Rev.* vol. xiii. p. 358.) The Critical Reviews for July and November, 1764, and April, 1765, contain some masterly pieces of criticism upon the *Dissertation* and the *Letter*. But in no work is there a more striking or more honourable testimony borne to Dr. Leland's superiority in this controversy, than in that which is entitled *Tracts by Warburton and a Warburtonian*; particularly in the *Dedication and Preface* prefixed to *the Two Tracts*, which the eloquent editor describes as "Children, whom their parents were afraid or ashamed to acknowledge," and which he therefore (compassionately, it certainly cannot be said) determines to present to the public notice. Of these *Two Tracts*, Dr. Hurd's well known Letter to Dr. Jortin, *On the Delicacy of Friendship*, is one, and his *Letter to Dr. Leland*, is the other: and on the subject of these tracts, by which, it is added, Warburton was most extravagantly flattered, Leland most petulantly insulted, and Jortin most inhumanly vilified, *severe* justice is inflicted upon the author, by the indignant vindicator of the two respectable characters that had been so unworthily attacked. General opinion has long appropriated this publication to a name of no mean note in the republic of Letters. Undoubtedly the vigour of conception, the richness of imagery, and the splendour of diction, displayed in those parts of the work which the Editor claims as his own, are such as must reflect honour upon any name. At the same time, it is much to be lamented, that talents and attainments of so high an order, as manifestly belong to the writer, should have been devoted to purposes so little congenial with the feelings of benevolence: and that the same spirit, which pressed forward with such generous ardour to cast the shield over one reputation, should direct the sword with such fierce hostility against another, and exult in inflicting the very species of wound which it was its highest glory to repel.

The eulogium pronounced upon *Dr. Leland* I here seize the opportunity of extracting from this performance. It is sketched by the hand of a master, and is too creditable to the memory of the individual, to be passed over by any one who takes an interest in what relates either to the man, or to the University of which he was an ornament. "Of Leland, my opinion is not, like the

by Hammond and Whitby in loc. And to this very text the passage from Isaiah, which has just been discussed, bears an

Letter-writer's, founded upon hearsay evidence; nor is it determined solely by the great authority of Dr. Johnson, who always mentioned Dr. Leland with cordial regard and with marked respect. It might, perhaps, be invidious for me to hazard a favourable decision upon his *History of Ireland;* because the merits of that work have been disputed by critics; some of whom are, I think, warped in their judgments by literary, others by national, and more, I have reason to believe, by personal prejudices. But I may with confidence appeal to Writings which have long contributed to public amusement, and have often been honoured by public approbation: to the *Life of Philip*, and to the *Translation of Demosthenes*, which the *Letter-writer* professes to have *not* read, —to the judicious *Dissertation upon Eloquence*, which the *Letter-writer did* vouchsafe to read, before he answered it,—to the spirited *Defence* of that Dissertation, which the *Letter-writer, probably*, has read, but never *attempted* to answer. The *Life of Philip* contains many curious researches into the principles of government established among the leading states of Greece: many sagacious remarks on their intestine discords: many exact descriptions of their most celebrated characters, together with an extensive and correct view of those subtle intrigues, and those ambitious projects, by which Philip, at a favourable crisis, gradually obtained an unexampled and fatal mastery over the Grecian Republics. In the *Translation of Demosthenes* Leland unites the man of taste with the man of learning, and shows himself to have possessed, not only a competent knowledge of the Greek language, but that clearness in his own conceptions, and that animation in his feelings, which enabled him to catch the real meaning, and to preserve the genuine spirit, of the most perfect orator that Athens ever produced. Through the *Dissertation upon Eloquence*, and the *Defence* of it, we see great accuracy of erudition, great perspicuity and strength of style, and, above all, a stoutness of judgment, which, in traversing the open and spacious walks of literature, disdained to be led captive either by the sorceries of a self-deluded visionary, or the decrees of a self-created despot." *Tracts by Warburton and a Warburtonian*, pp. 193, 194.—In the very year, in which these observations on Dr. Leland's literary character were given to the public, three volumes of his Sermons issued from the Dublin press; and, though posthumous, and consequently not touched by the finishing hand of the author, they exhibit a specimen of pulpit eloquence, not unworthy of the Translator of Demosthenes and the Historian of Ireland. To these Sermons there is prefixed a brief, but interesting and well-written life of the author, from which it appears, that the amount of his literary productions exceeded what have been here enumerated.—The extract which I have made from the *Tracts*, (although I do not accede to its justice in every particular, being disposed to attribute *somewhat* less to the *Translation of Demosthenes*, and a *vast deal* more to the *History of Ireland*,) I could not deny myself the gratification of noticing, in connexion with the name of Leland; not only as being highly creditable to the memory of a distinguished member of the University with which I am myself so closely connected; but, as supplying one of the few instances, in which a provincial writer of this part of the empire has obtained due honour in the sister country.—In concluding this long note, which has been almost exclusively dedicated to Dr. Leland, I cannot forbear asking the question, to what it is to be ascribed, that, in a recent London edition of his *Translation of the Orations of Demosthenes*, (viz. 1806,) his

exact correspondence: for, as in that *his soul*, or life, was to *be made* אשם, ἁμαρτία, or as the LXX render it, περὶ ἁμαρτίας, *a sin offering*[a], so here Christ is said to have been made ἁμαρτία, a *sin offering;* and *for us*, as it *must* have been from what is immediately after added, that HE *knew no sin*. For the exact coincidence between these passages, Vitringa (Isai. liii. 10) deserves particularly to be consulted. Among other valuable observations, he shows, that περὶ ἁμαρτίας, ὑπὲρ ἁμαρτίας, and ἁμαρτία, are all used by the Greek writers among the Jews in the same sense. Several decisive instances of this, in the New Testament, are pointed out by Schleusner, on the word ἁμαρτία.

Now from this plain and direct sense of the passage in 2 Cor., supported by the known use of the word ἁμαρτία in Scripture language, and maintained by the ablest Commentators on Scripture, Dr. Priestley thinks proper to turn away, and to seek in a passage of Romans, (viii. 3,) to which this by no means necessarily refers, a new explanation, which better suits his theory, and which, as usual with him, substitutes a figurative, in place of the obvious and literal sense. Thus, because in Romans, God is said to have *sent his Son in the likeness of sinful flesh*, ἐν ὁμοιώματι σαρκὸς ἁμαρτίας, he would infer, that, when in 2 Cor. God is said to have *made him sin*, it is merely meant that God had *made him in the likeness of sinful flesh*. Nor is he content with this unwarrantable departure from the language of the text, but he would also insinuate (*Th. Rep.* vol. i. p. 128) that the words περὶ ἁμαρτίας, which occur in the text in Romans, and which, we have already remarked, are commonly used in Scripture language for a *sin offering*, and are so rendered in this place by Primate Newcome, merely imply *for us*, availing himself of our

designation in the title is that of *Fellow of Trinity College, Oxford?* Was the translation of the *Greek* orator supposed too good to have come from *Ireland?* or was it imagined, that the knowledge of its true origin would diminish the profits of its circulation?

[a] In reference probably to the very words in this passage it is, that our Saviour declares, (Matt. xx. 28,) that he gave τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ λύτρον ἀντὶ πολλῶν, or, as St. Paul afterwards expresses it, (1 Tim. ii. 6,) ἀντίλυτρον ὑπὲρ πάντων.

present version, which translates the words, *for sin*. Such vague and uncritical expositions of Scripture may serve any purpose, but the cause of truth. I have already dwelt longer upon them than they deserve, and shall now dismiss them without farther remark.

NO. XXVIII.—ON THE WORD ΚΑΤΑΛΛΑΓΗ, TRANSLATED *ATONEMENT*, IN ROM. V. 11.

PAGE 20. (l).—The word καταλλαγὴν, which is here translated *atonement*, it is remarked by Sykes, (*On Redemp.* pp. 56. 201,) and H. Taylor, (*B. Mord.* p. 807,) and others who oppose the received doctrine of the atonement, should not have been so rendered, but should have been translated *reconciliation*. The justice of this remark I do not scruple to admit. The use of the verb and participle in the former verse seems to require this translation. And this being the single passage in the New Testament, in which it is so rendered, (being elsewhere uniformly translated *reconciling*, or *reconciliation*, Rom. xi. 15; 2 Cor. v. 18, 19,) and being nowhere used by the LXX in speaking of the legal atonements, and, moreover, there being an actual impropriety in the expression, WE *have* RECEIVED[a] *the atonement*, I feel no difficulty in adopting this correction.

But whilst I agree with these writers, in the use of the word *reconciliation* in this passage, I differ from them entirely in the inference they would derive from it. Their notion of reconciliation altogether excludes the idea of propitiation and atonement, as may be seen in Number XX. pp. 134, 135, whereas *by these*, it is manifest, both from the reason of the thing and the express language of Scripture, that *reconciliation* is alone to be effected; as is proved in the same Number. It deserves also to be remarked, that though

[a] It will be worth the while of those commentators, who contend (as we have noticed in Number XX.) that the *reconciliation* spoken of in the New Testament means only *our being reconciled to God*, or *laying aside our enmity* against him,—to consider, in what sense we are said, in this passage, to have RECEIVED the *reconciliation*. What rules of language can they adopt, who talk of a man's *receiving* the *laying aside of his own enmities?*

the word *atonement* is not used in our version of the New Testament, except in the single instance already referred to, yet in the original, the same, or words derived from the same root, with that which the LXX commonly use when speaking of the legal atonement, are not unfrequently employed in treating of the death of Christ. Thus ἱλάσκομαι and ἐξιλάσκομαι, which signify *to appease*, or *make propitious*, are almost always used by the LXX for כפר, which by translators is sometimes rendered *to make atonement for*, and sometimes *to reconcile:* and in Hebrews ii. 17, we find it said of our Lord, that he was *a merciful and faithful high priest, to make reconciliation for* (εἰς τὸ ἱλάσκεσθαι) *the sins of the people;* and, again, he is twice, in 1 John, entitled ἱλασμὸς, a *propitiation*, &c., see Number XXVI. p. 143. Now in all these, the word *atonement* might with propriety have been used; and, as the *reconciliation* which we have received through Christ was the effect of the *atonement* made for us by his death, words which denote the former simply (as καταλλαγὴ, and words derived from the same root) may, when applied to the sacrifice of Christ, be not unfitly expressed by the latter, as containing in them its full import.

NO. XXIX.—ON THE DENIAL THAT CHRIST'S DEATH IS DESCRIBED IN SCRIPTURE AS A *SIN OFFERING*.

PAGE 20. (n).—I have, in the page here referred to, adopted the very words of Dr. Priestley himself. (*Theol. Rep.* vol. i. p. 123.) Dr. Priestley, however, is far from admitting the death of Christ to be of the nature of a *sin offering*. That it is but *compared* in *figure* to that species of sacrifice, is all that he thinks proper to concede.—H. Taylor (*Ben. Mord.* pp. 811—821) contends strenuously, and certainly with as much ingenuity as the case will admit, in support of the same point.—What has been urged, in Number XXVII. upon this head, will, however, I trust, be found sufficient. At all events, it furnishes a direct reply to an argument used by the former of these writers, (*Theol. Rep.* vol. i. pp. 128, 129,)

in which, for the purpose of proving that the "death of Christ was no proper sacrifice for sin, or the antitype of the Jewish sacrifices," he maintains, that, "though the death of Christ is frequently mentioned or alluded to by the Prophets, it is *never* spoken of as a *sin-offering*:" and, to establish this position, he relies principally on his interpretation of Isai. liii. 10, which has been fully examined and refuted in the aforementioned Number.

In addition to what has been advanced, in that Number, upon the other text discussed in it, namely, 2 Cor. v. 21, I wish here to notice the observations of Dr. Macknight and Rosenmüller. The note of the former upon it is this: "Ἁμαρτίαν, *a sin-offering*. There are many passages in the Old Testament, where ἁμαρτία, *sin*, signifies *a sin-offering*, Hosea iv. 8. *They* (the priests) *eat up the sins* (that is, the sin-offerings) *of my people*.—In the New Testament, likewise, the word *sin* hath the same signification, Heb. ix. 26. 28; xiii. 11."—To the same purport, but more at large, Pilkington, in his *Remarks*, &c. pp. 163, 164.—Rosenmüller observes as follows, "Ἁμαρτία, victima pro peccato, ut Hebr. אשם Levit. vii. 2, חטאה et חטאת, quod sæpe elliptice ponitur pro זבח חטאת, ut Ps. xl. 7. Exod. xxix. 14, pro quo LXX usurpant περὶ ἁμαρτίας, sc. θυσία, Levit. v. 8, 9. 11. aliisque locis. Aliis abstractum est pro concreto, et subaudiendum est ὥστε, pro: ὡς ἁμαρτάνοντα ἐποίησε, tractavit eum ut peccatorem; se gessit erga eum, uti erga peccatorem. Sensus est idem."

NO. XXX.—ON THE SENSE IN WHICH CHRIST IS SAID IN SCRIPTURE TO HAVE DIED *FOR US*.

PAGE 20. (°).—Dr. Priestley's remarks on this subject deserve to be attended to, as they furnish a striking specimen of the metaphysical ingenuity, with which the *rational* expositors of the present day are able to extricate themselves from the shackles of Scripture language. Christ being frequently said in

Scripture to have *died* FOR *us*, he tells us that this is to be interpreted,—dying *on our account*, or *for our benefit*. "Or if," he adds, "when rigorously interpreted, it should be found, that, if Christ had not died, *we* must have died, it is still however only *consequentially* so, and by no means *properly* and *directly* so, as a *substitute* for us: for if, in consequence of Christ's not having been sent to instruct and reform the world, mankind had continued unreformed; and the necessary consequence of Christ's coming was his death, by whatever means, and in whatever manner it was brought about; it is plain that there was, in fact, no other alternative but his death or ours: how natural, then, was it, especially to writers accustomed to the strong figurative expression of the East, to say that he died IN OUR STEAD, without meaning it in a strict and proper sense!" *Hist. of Cor.* vol. i. p. 199.

Here then we see, that, had the sacred writers everywhere represented Christ as dying *in our stead*, yet it would have amounted to no more than dying *on our account*, or *for our benefit*, just as under the present form of expression. And thus Dr. Priestley has proved to us that *no* form of expression whatever would be proof against the species of criticism which he has thought proper to employ: for it must be remembered, that the *want* of this very phrase,—*dying in our stead*,—has been urged as a main argument against the notion of a strict propitiatory sacrifice in the death of Christ. To attempt to prove, then, in opposition to those who use this argument, that, when Christ is said in Scripture to have died *for* us, it is meant that he died *instead of* us, must be, in this writer's opinion, a waste of time; since, when this is accomplished, we are, in his judgment, only where we set out. As, however, there have been some who, not possessing Dr. Priestley's metaphysical powers, have thought this acceptation of the word *for*, conclusive in favour of the received doctrine of atonement, and have therefore taken much pains to oppose it, I may hope to be excused, if I deem it necessary to reply to these writers.

Dr. Sykes, in his *Essay on Redemption*, and H. Taylor, in

his *Ben. Mord.* pp. 786, 787, have most minutely examined all the passages, in the New Testament, in which the preposition *for* is introduced. And the result of their examination is, that, in all those passages which speak of Christ as having given himself *for* us, *for* our sins, having died *for* us, &c., the word *for* must be considered as *on account of*, *for the benefit of*, and not *instead of*. The ground upon which this conclusion is founded, as stated by the latter, is this; that "if the true doctrine be, that these things were done *upon our account*, or *for our advantage*, the word *for* will have the same sense in all the texts: but if the true doctrine be, that they were done *instead of*, the sense of the word will not be the same in the different texts."—But surely this furnishes no good reason, for deciding in favour of the former doctrine. The word *for*, or the Greek words ἀντὶ, ὑπὲρ, διὰ, περὶ, of which it is the translation, admitting of different senses, may of course be differently applied, according to the nature of the subject; and yet the *doctrine* may remain unchanged. Thus it might be perfectly proper to say, that Christ suffered *instead of us*, although it would be absurd to say, that he suffered *instead of our offences*. It is sufficient if the different applications of the word carry a *consistent* meaning. To die *instead of us*, and to die *on account of our offences*, perfectly agree. But this change of the expression necessarily arises from the change of the subject. And, accordingly, the same difficulty will be found to attach to the exposition proposed by these writers: since the word *for*, interpreted *on account of*, i. e. *for the benefit of*, cannot be applied in the same sense in all the texts. For, although dying *for our benefit* is perfectly intelligible, dying *for the benefit of our offences* is no less absurd than dying *instead of our offences*.

The only inference that could with justice have been drawn by these writers is, that the word *for*, does not *necessarily* imply substitution in *all* these passages, and that, therefore, it is not *sufficient* to lay a ground for the doctrine, which implies that substitution. But that, on the other hand,

it is evident that it does *not* imply it in *any*, can by no means be contended: the word *ὑπὲρ*, being admitted to have that force frequently in its common application; as may be seen in *Plato Conviv.* p. 1197, and again, 1178, where *ἀποθνήσκειν ὑπὲρ* is manifestly used for dying in *stead*, or *place* of another. —That the Greeks were accustomed by this expression to imply a *vicarious death*, Raphelius, on Rom. v. 8, directly asserts; and he produces several indisputable instances from Xenophon, in which *ὑπὲρ* and *ἀντὶ* have the force of substitution[a]. In like manner, (2 Sam. xviii. 33,) when David saith concerning Absalom, *τίς δῴη τὸν θάνατόν μου ἀντὶ σοῦ*; there is clearly expressed David's wish, that *his* death had gone *instead* of Absalom's.

But, indeed, this force of the word neither can be, nor is, denied by the writers alluded to. The actual application of

[a] Raphelius's observations upon this subject are so valuable, that I apprehend his entire note will be acceptable to the critical reader. — "Rom. v. 8. Τοῦ ἡμῶν ἀπέθανε — id est, *ἀντὶ, loco, vice nostrâ mortuus est*, ut nos mortis pœna liberaremur. *Vicariam* enim mortem hoc loquendi genere Græci declarant. Neque Socinianis, qui secus interpretantur, quenquam ex Græcis credo assensorem esse. Nostræ sententiæ Xenophon adstipulatur. Nam cum Seuthes puerum formosum bello captum occidere vellet, Episthenes autem, puerorum amator, se pro illius morte deprecatorem præberet, rogat Seuthes Episthenem: Ἦ καὶ ἰδίλοις ἄν, ὦ Ἐπίσθενες, ΤΗΣΕΡ ΤΟΤΤΟΥ ΑΠΟΘΑΝΕΙΝ; *Vellesne, mi Episthenes, PRO HOC MORI?* Cumque is nihil dubitaret pro pueri vita cervicem præbere, Seuthes vicissim puerum interrogat, *εἰ παίσειεν αὐτὸν* ΑΝΤΙ *ἐκείνου*; *num hunc feriri PRO SE vellet?* De Exped. Cyri, &c.—Et Hist. Græc. &c. Πρωτεὺς δὲ ὁ Ἀγησίλαος, ὅστις παρέσχετο ἵππον καὶ ὅπλα καὶ ἄνδρα δόκιμον, ὅτι ἐξέστι αὐτῷ μὴ στρατεύεσθαι, ἐποίησεν οὕτω ταῦτα συντόμως πράττεσθαι, ὥσπερ ἄν τις τὸν ΥΠΕΡ ΑΥΤΟΥ ΑΠΟΘΑΝΟΥΜΕΝΟΝ προθύμως ζητοίη. *Quumque Agesilaus denunciasset fore, ut, quicunque daret equum et arma et peritum hominem, immunis esset a militiâ: effecit, ut hæc non aliter magna celeritate facerent, atque si quis alacriter aliquem SUO LOCO moriturum quæreret.* De Venat. p. 768. Ἀντίλοχος τοῦ πατρὸς ΤΥΠΕΡΑΠΟΘΑΝΩΝ, τοσαύτης ἴτυχεν ἰυκλείας, ὥστε μόνος φιλοπάτωρ παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἀναγορευθῆναι. *Antilochus PRO PATRE morti sese objiciens, tantum gloriæ consecutus est, ut solus apud Græcos amans patris appelletur.* —Et quid opus est aliis exemplis? cum luculentissimum sit, Joh. xi. 50, ubi mortuus dicitur Salvator *ὑπὲρ τοῦ λαοῦ*. Quod quale sit, mox exponitur, *ἵνα μὴ ὅλον τὸ ἔθνος ἀπόληται.*" *Raphelii Annot.* tom. ii. pp. 253, 254.

How forcibly the word *ὑπὲρ* is felt to imply *substitution*, is indirectly admitted in the strongest manner even by Unitarians themselves: the satisfaction manifested by Commentators of that description, whenever they can escape from the emphatical bearing of this preposition, is strikingly evinced in their late *Version of the New Testament*. See their observations on Gal. i. 4.

the term, then, in the several passages in which Christ is said to have died for us, to have suffered for us, &c., is to be decided by the general language of Scripture upon that subject. And if it appears, from its uniform tenor, that Christ submitted himself to suffering and death, that thereby *we* might be saved from undergoing the punishment of our transgressions, will it not follow, that Christ's suffering stood in the place of ours, even though it might not be of the *same nature*, in any respect, with that which we were to have undergone?

NO. XXXI.—ON THE PRETENCE OF FIGURATIVE ALLUSION IN THE SACRIFICIAL TERMS OF THE NEW TESTAMENT.

PAGE 20. (P).—On the whole of this pretence of *figurative* applications, whereby H. Taylor, (*B. Mord.*,) Dr. Priestley, and others, endeavour to escape from the plain language of Scripture, it may be worth while to notice a distinction which has been judiciously suggested upon this subject, by Mr. Veysie. (*Bampt. Lecture*, Sermon 5.)—Figurative language, he says, does not arise from the real nature of the thing to which it is transferred, but only from the imagination of him who transfers it. Thus, a man, who possesses the quality of courage in an eminent degree, is figuratively called a *lion;* not because the real nature of a lion belongs to him, but because the quality which characterizes this animal is possessed by him in an eminent degree: therefore the imagination conceives them as partakers of one common nature, and applies to them one common name. Now, to suppose that language, if it cannot be literally interpreted, must necessarily be of the figurative kind *here described*, that is, applied *only* by way of *allusion*, is erroneous; since there is also a species of language, usually called analogical, which, though not strictly *proper*, is far from being *merely figurative:* the terms being transferred from one thing to another, not because the things are *similar*, but because they are in *similar relations*. And the term thus transferred, he contends, is as truly significant of the *real* nature of the thing in the relation in which it

stands, as it could be were it the primitive and proper word. With this species of language, he observes, Scripture abounds.

And, indeed, so it must; for if the one dispensation was really intended to be preparatory to the other, the parallelism of their parts, or their several analogies, must have been such, as necessarily to introduce the terms of the one into the explanation of the other.—Of this Mr. V. gives numerous instances. I shall only adduce that which immediately applies to the case before us; viz. that of "the death of Christ being called, in the New Testament, a *sacrifice* and *sin-offering*." "This," says he, "is not as the Socinian hypothesis asserts, *figuratively*, or merely in allusion to the Jewish sacrifices, but *analogically*, because the death of Christ is to the Christian Church, what the sacrifices for sin were to the worshippers of the Tabernacle:" (or, perhaps, it might be more correctly expressed, because the sacrifices for sin were *so appointed*, that they should be to the worshippers of the Tabernacle, what it had been ordained the death of Christ was to be to the Christian Church:) "And, accordingly, the language of the New Testament does not contain mere *figurative* allusions to the Jewish sacrifices, but ascribes a *real* and *immediate* efficacy to Christ's death, an efficacy *corresponding* to that, which was anciently produced by the legal sin-offerings." This view of the matter will, I apprehend, be found to convey a complete answer to all that has been said upon the subject, concerning *figure*, *allusion*, &c.

Indeed some distinction of this nature is absolutely necessary. For under the pretence of *figure*, we find those writers, who would reject the doctrine of atonement, endeavour to evade the force of texts of Scripture, the plainest and most positive.—Thus Dr. Priestley (*Hist. of Cor.* vol. i. p. 214) asserts, that the death of Christ may be *called a sacrifice for sin*, and a *ransom;* and also that Christ may in general *be said* to have *died in our stead*, and to have *borne our sins:* and that figurative language *even stronger than this* may be used by persons who do not consider the death of Christ *as having any immediate relation to the forgiveness of sins*, but

believe, only, that it was a necessary circumstance in the scheme of the Gospel, and that this scheme was necessary to reform the world.—That, however, there are parts of Scripture which have proved too powerful *even* for the figurative solutions of the Historian of the Corruptions of Christianity, may be inferred from this remarkable concession. " In this then let us acquiesce, not doubting but that, *though not perhaps at present*, we shall in time be able, without any *effort or straining*, to explain all particular expressions in the apostolical epistles," &c. (*Hist. of Cor.* vol. i. p. 279.)—Here is a plain confession on the part of Dr. Priestley, that those enlightened theories, in which he and his followers exult so highly, are wrought out of Scripture only by *effort* and *straining;* and that all the powers of this polemic Procrustes have been exerted to adjust the apostolic stature to certain preordained dimensions, and in some cases exerted in vain.

The reader is requested to compare what has been here said, with what has been already noticed in Numbers I. and XIV., on the treatment given to the authority of Scripture by Dr. Priestley and his Unitarian fellow-labourers.

NO. XXXII.—ARGUMENTS TO PROVE THE SACRIFICIAL LANGUAGE OF THE NEW TESTAMENT FIGURATIVE, URGED BY H. TAYLOR AND DR. PRIESTLEY.

PAGE 20. (q).—The several arguments enumerated in the page referred to are urged at large, and with the utmost force of which they are capable, in the 7th Letter of *Ben. Mordecai's Apology*, by H. Taylor.—Dr. Priestley has also endeavoured to establish the same point, and by arguments not much dissimilar. *Theol. Rep.* vol. i. pp. 121—136.

NO. XXXIII.—ON THE SENSE ENTERTAINED GENERALLY BY ALL, AND MORE ESPECIALLY INSTANCED AMONGST THE JEWS, OF THE NECESSITY OF *PROPITIATORY EXPIATION.*

PAGE 21. (s).—The last of the three arguments here referred to is urged by H. Taylor, (*Ben. Mord.* pp. 784, 785. 797,) as

applied particularly to the notion of *vicarious* sacrifice: but it is clear from the whole course of his reasoning, that he means it to apply to all sacrifice, of a nature properly *expiatory;* that is, to all sacrifice in which, by the suffering and death of the victim, the displeasure of God was averted from the person for whom it was offered, and the punishment due to his offence remitted, whether the suffering of the victim was supposed to be strictly of a *vicarious* nature or not.

The application of such a notion of sacrifice to the death of Christ, this writer ascribes to the engrafting of heathenish notions on Jewish customs; whereby the language of the Jews came to be interpreted by the customs and ceremonies of the heathen philosophers who had been converted to Christianity. Whether this notion be well founded, may appear from the examination of the origin of sacrifice, in the second of these Discourses, and from some of the Explanatory Dissertations connected with it. But it is curious to remark how Dr. Priestley and this author, whilst they agree in the result, differ in their means of arriving at it. This author traces the notion of sacrifice, strictly *expiatory,* to heathen interpretation. Dr. Priestley, on the contrary, asserts, that the Heathens had *no* idea whatever of such sacrifice. He employs almost one entire essay in the *Theological Repository* (vol. i. p. 400, &c.) in attempts to prove, that, in no nation, ancient or modern, has such an idea ever existed; and, as we have already seen in Number V., he pronounces it to be the unquestionable result of an historical examination of this subject, that *all,* whether Jews or Heathens, ancient or modern, learned or unlearned, have been "equally strangers to the notion of expiatory sacrifice; equally destitute of *any thing like a doctrine of proper atonement.*" To pass over, at present, this gross contradiction to all the records of antiquity, how shall we reconcile this gentleman to the other? or, which is of greater importance, how shall we reconcile him to himself? For, whilst in this place he maintains, that neither ancient nor modern Jews ever conceived an idea of expiatory sacrifice, he contends in another, (ibid. p. 426,)

that this notion has arisen from the circumstance, of the simple religion of Christ having been "entrusted to *such vessels*, as were the Apostles:" "for," adds he, "the Apostles were Jews, and had to do with Jews, and consequently represented Christianity in a Jewish dress,"—and this more particularly, "in the business of sacrifices."—Now, if the Jews had *no* notion whatever of expiatory sacrifice, it remains to be accounted for, how the clothing the Christian doctrine of redemption in a *Jewish* dress, could have led to this notion. It is true, he adds, that over the *Jewish disguise*, which had been thrown on this doctrine *by the Apostles*, another was drawn by Christians. But if the Jewish dress bore *no* relation to a doctrine of atonement, then the Christian disguise is the only one. And thus the Christians have deliberately, without any foundation laid for them, *either by Heathens or Jews*, superinduced the notion of an expiatory sacrifice upon the simple doctrines of the Gospel: converting *figurative language*, into a *literal* exposition of *what was known never to have had a real existence!*

To leave, however, this region of contradictions, it may not be unimportant to inquire into the *facts* which have been here alleged by Dr. Priestley. And it must be allowed, that he has crowded into this one Essay as many assertions at variance with received opinion, as can easily be found, comprised in the same compass, on any subject whatever. He has asserted that no trace of *any scheme of atonement*, or of *any requisite for forgiveness save repentance and reformation*, is to be discovered either in the book of Job, or in the Scriptures of the ancient, or any writings of the modern Jews; or amongst the heathen world, either ancient or modern.—These assertions, as they relate to Job, and the religion of the Heathens, have been already examined; the former in Number XXIII., the latter in Number V. An inquiry into his position, as it affects the Jews, with some farther particulars concerning the practices of the Heathen, will fully satisfy us, as to the degree of reliance to be placed on this writer's historical exactness.

With respect to the sentiments of the ancient Jews, or, in other words, the sense of the Old Testament upon the subject, that being the main question discussed in these Discourses, especially the second, no inquiry is in this place necessary: it will suffice at present to examine the writings of the Jews of later times; and we shall find that these give the most direct contradiction to his assertions. He has quoted Maimonides, Nachmanides, Abarbanel, Buxtorf, and Isaac Netto, and concludes, with confidence, that among the modern Jews no notion has ever existed "of any kind of mediation being necessary to reconcile the claims of justice with those of mercy;" or, as he elsewhere expresses it, of "any satisfaction beside repentance being necessary to the forgiveness of sin." (*Theol. Rep.* vol. i. pp. 409—411.)—Now, in direct opposition to this, it is notorious, that the stated confession made by the Jews, in offering up the victim in sacrifice, concludes with these words, *Let this* (the victim) *be my expiation*[a]. And this the Jewish writers directly interpret as meaning, "Let the evils, which in justice should have fallen on my head, light upon the head of the victim which I now offer." Thus Baal Aruch says, "That wherever the expression *Let me be another's expiation*, is used, it is the same as if it had been said, *Let me be put in his room, that I may bear his guilt:* and this again is equivalent to saying, *Let this act, whereby I take on me his transgression, obtain for him his pardon.*" In like manner, Solomon Jarchi (*Sanhedr.* ch. 2) says, "*Let us be your expiation*, signifies, *Let us be put in your place, that the evil, which should have fallen upon you, may all light on us:*" and in the same way Obadias de Bartenora, and other learned Jews, explain this formula.

Again, respecting the burnt offerings, and sacrifices for sin, Nachmanides, on *Levit.* i., says, that "it was right, that the offerer's own blood should be shed, and his body burnt: but that the Creator, in his mercy, hath accepted this victim from

[a] See the form of confession in *Maim. de Cult. Divin. de Veil.* pp. 152, 153.

him, as a vicarious substitute (תמורה), and an atonement (כפר), that its blood should be poured out *instead* of his blood, and its life stand *in place* of his life." R. Bechai also, on *Lev.* i., uses the very same language. Isaac Ben Arama, on *Leviticus*, likewise says, that "the offender, when he beholds the victim, on account of *his* sin, slain, skinned, cut in pieces, and burnt with fire upon the altar, should reflect, that thus *he* must have been treated, had not God in his clemency accepted *this expiation for his life*." David de Pomis, in like manner, pronounces the victim, the *vicarious substitute* (תמורה) for the offerer. And Isaac Abarbanel affirms, in his preface to Levit., that "the offerer deserved that his blood should be poured out, and his body burnt for his sins; but that God, in his clemency, accepted from him the victim as his *vicarious substitute* (תמורה), and *expiation* (כפר), whose blood was poured out *in place of his blood*, and its life given in *lieu of his life*."

I should weary the reader and myself, were I to adduce all the authorities on this point. Many more may be found in *Outram de Sacrificiis*, pp. 251—259. These, however, will probably satisfy most readers, as to the fairness of the representation which Dr. Priestley has given of the notion entertained by modern Jews concerning the doctrine of atonement, and of their total ignorance of any satisfaction for sin, save only repentance and amendment.—One thing there is in this review, that cannot but strike the reader, as it did me, with surprise: which is this,—that of the three writers of eminence among the Jewish Rabbis, whom Dr. Priestley has named, Maimonides, Abarbanel, and Nachmanides, the two last, as is manifest from the passages already cited, maintain in direct terms the strict notion of atonement: and though Maimonides has not made use of language equally explicit, yet on due examination it will appear, that he supplies a testimony by no means inconsistent with that notion. —Dr. Priestley's method of managing the testimonies furnished by these writers will throw considerable light upon his mode of reasoning from ancient authors in support of his

favourite theories. It will not then be time misemployed, to follow him somewhat more minutely through his examination of them.

He begins with stating, that Maimonides considered sacrifice to be merely a Heathen ceremony, adopted by the Divine Being into his own worship, for the gradual abolition of idolatry. This opinion, he says, was opposed by R. Nachmanides, and defended by Abarbanel, who explains the nature of sacrifice, as offered by Adam and his children, in this manner:—viz. "They burned the fat and the kidneys of the victims upon the altar, for their own inwards, being the seat" (not as it is erroneously given in Theol. Rep. *as the seal*) "of their intentions and purposes; and the legs of the victims for their own hands and feet; and they sprinkled their blood, instead of their own blood and life; confessing that in the sight of God, the just Judge of things, the blood of the offerers should be shed, and their bodies burnt for their sins—but that, through the mercy of God, expiation was made for them by the victim being put in their place, by whose blood and life, the blood and life of the offerers were redeemed." (*Exordium Comment. in Levit. de Veil.* pp. 291, 292.) Now it deserves to be noted, that Sykes, whose assistance Dr. Priestley has found of no small use in his attempts upon the received doctrine of atonement, deemed the testimony of this Jewish writer, conveyed in the above form of expression, so decisive, that without hesitation he pronounces him to have held the notion of a *vicarious substitute*, in the strictest acceptation; (*Essay on Sacrifices*, pp. 121, 122;) and, that the sense of the Jewish Rabbis at large is uniformly in favour of atonement by strict vicarious substitution, he feels himself compelled to admit, by the overbearing force of their own declarations, although his argument would have derived much strength from an opposite conclusion. (Ibid. pp. 149, 150. 157, 158.) The same admission is made by the author of the *Scripture Account of Sacrifices*, (Append. pp. 17, 18,) notwithstanding that it is equally repugnant to the principles of *his* theory. But, after

stating the passage last quoted, at full length, what is *Dr. Priestley's* remark?—That "*all this* is evidently *figurative*, the act of sacrificing being represented as emblematical of the sentiments and language of the offerer." And the argument by which he establishes this, is, that "this writer *could never think* that an animal could make proper satisfaction for sin," &c. What then is Dr. Priestley's argument?—The modern Jews have never entertained an idea of any expiation for sin save repentance only; *for* we are told by Abarbanel, that *expiation was made for the offerer by the victim being put in his place;* and by this he *did not* mean, that the animal made expiation for the sin of the sacrificer, because he *could never think* that an animal could make satisfaction for sin! Now might not this demonstration have been abridged to much advantage, and without endangering in any degree the force of the proof, by putting it in this manner?—Abarbanel *did* hold, that by the sacrifice of an animal no expiation could be made for sin, *for* it is impossible that he *could* have thought otherwise.

Complete as this proof is in itself, Dr. Priestley however does not refuse us still farther confirmation of his interpretation of this writer's testimony. He tells us, that "he repeats the observation already quoted from him, in a more particular account of sacrifices for sins committed through ignorance, such as casual uncleanness, &c., in which no proper guilt could be contracted:" and that he also "considers sin-offerings as fines, or mulcts, by way of admonitions not to offend again." (*Theol. Rep.* vol. i. p. 410.)—Now, as to the former of these assertions, it is to be noted, that Abarbanel, in the passage referred to, is speaking of an error of the *High Priest*, which might be attended with the most fatal consequences by misleading the people, perhaps in some of the most essential points of their religion. And as the want of sufficient knowledge, or of due consideration, in him who was to expound the law, and to direct the people to what was right, must be considered as a degree of audacity highly criminal, for which, he says, the offender deserved to be pu-

nished with death, ignorance not being admissible in such a case as an excuse, *therefore* it was, that the sin-offering was required of him, "the mercy of God accepting the sacrifice of the animal in his stead, and appointing that in offering he should place his hands on the animal, to remind him that the victim was received as his (תמורה) vicarious substitute." (*De Veil. Exord.* pp. 313—317.) "For the same reasons," he says, (p. 317,) "the same method was to be observed in the sin-offering of the *Sanhedrim;*" and he adds also, (p. 325,) that, "in the case of an error committed by a *private person*, whereby he had fallen into any *idolatrous* practice, the sin-offering appointed for him was to be of the same nature exactly, and the animal offered the same, as in the case of a similar error in the *High Priest* or the *Prince:* and for this reason, that although in all other offences the criminality of the High Priest or Prince exceeded that of a private individual, yet in this all were equal; for the unity of the true God having been proclaimed to *all* the people, at Sinai, no one was excusable in his *ignorance* of this fundamental truth."[a]

Thus the crimes of ignorance, of which this writer speaks in the passages referred to, are evidently not of the nature represented by Dr. Priestley, namely casual and accidental lapses, in which no proper guilt could be contracted: and consequently his argument, which, from the application of the same form of sacrifice to these cases as to those in which guilt *did* exist, would infer, that in *none* was it the intention by the sacrifice to make expiation for transgression, must necessarily fall to the ground. Had Dr. Priestley, however, taken the pains to make himself better acquainted with the works of the writer, whose authority he has cited in support of his opinion, he would never have risked the observations just now alluded to. He would have found, that, in the opinion of this, as well as of every other, Jewish writer of eminence, even those cases of defilement, which were *in-*

[a] Maimonides gives the same account of this matter.—See *Maim. de Sacrif. De Veil.* p. 116; also, *Moreh Nevochim*, pp. 464, 465.

voluntary, such as leprosy, child-bearing, &c., uniformly implied an idea of *guilt*. Thus Abarbanel, speaking of the case of puerpery in the 12th chapter of Leviticus, says, that "without committing sin no one is ever exposed to suffering; that it is a principle with the Jewish Doctors, *that there is no pain without crime*, and that, *therefore*, the woman who had endured the pains of child-birth was required to offer a piacular sacrifice." And again, on the case of the Leper in the 14th chapter of Leviticus, the same writer remarks, that the sin-offering was enjoined, "because that the whole of the Mosaic religion being founded on this principle, that whatever befalls any human creature is the result of providential appointment, the leper must consider his malady as a judicial infliction for some transgression." And this principle is so far extended by Maimonides, (*Moreh Nevochim*, p. 380,) as to pronounce, that "even a pain so slight as that of a thorn wounding the hand and instantly extracted, must be ranked as a *penal* infliction by the Deity for some offence:" see also *Clavering Annot. in Maim. De Pœnitentia*, pp. 141, 142. Other Jewish writers carry this matter farther. Thus R. Bechai, on Levit. xii. 7, says, that "the woman after child-birth is bound to bring a sin-offering, in expiation of that original taint, derived from the common mother of mankind, by whose transgression it was caused that the procreation of the species was not like the production of the fruits of the earth, spontaneous and unmixed with sensual feelings."

Whether these opinions of the Jewish Rabbis be absurd or otherwise, is a point with which I have no concern. The *fact*, that such were their opinions, is all I contend for. And this I think will satisfy us respecting the *competency* of Dr. Priestley, as an interpreter of their writings; when we find him thus arguing from the actual impossibility that they *could* hold an opinion, which they themselves expressly assert they *did* hold; and when we find him maintaining the rectitude of his theory by their testimony, whilst he explains their testimony by the unquestionable rectitude of his theory. This is a species of Logic, and a mode of supplying author-

rities from ancient writers, in which Dr. Priestley has been long exercised; as may abundantly appear, not only from several parts of these illustrations, but from the collection of very able and useful Tracts published by the late Bishop Horsley.

A few words more concerning the Rabbis.—Dr. Priestley endeavours to insinuate, as we have seen, p. 171, that "Abarbanel considers sin-offerings as fines or mulcts, by way of admonition not to offend again." Now, whoever will take the trouble of consulting that writer himself, will find, that this *subordinate* end of sacrifice is mentioned by him, only in connexion with offences of the slightest kind, and amounting, at the most, to the want of a sufficient caution in guarding against the possibility of accidental defilement. When this want of caution has been on occasions, and in stations so important, as to render it a high crime and capital offence, as in the case of the High Priest, the expression used is, that the offender deserves to be *mulcted with death*, but that the victim is accepted in his stead, &c. (*De Veil. Abarb. Exord.* pp. 313. 315.) Whether, then, the sin-offering was intended to be considered by this writer *merely* as a fine, the reader will judge. Indeed Dr. Priestley himself has already proved that it was not; inasmuch as he has asserted that he has represented sacrifices for sin as *emblematical* actions. Now if they were *solely* emblematical actions, they could not have been fines: and if they were *solely* fines, they could not have been emblematical actions. But if the author, whilst he represented them as fines, considered them *likewise* as emblematical actions, then the circumstance of his having viewed them in the light of fines, is no proof that he might not *likewise* have considered them as strictly propitiatory. The introduction, therefore, of this remark by Dr. Priestley, is either superfluous or sophistical.

The observations applied to Abarbanel extend with equal force to the opinions of Maimonides: for the former expressly asserts more than once, (*Exord. Comment. in Levit.* pp. 231. 235,) that he but repeats the sentiments of the latter,

on the import of the sacrificial rites. Nor will the assertion of Maimonides, (which has been much relied on by Sykes,) viz. that "repentance expiates all transgressions," invalidate in any degree what has been here urged; for it is evident, that, in the treatise on Repentance, in which this position is found, he is speaking in reference to the Jewish institutions, and endeavouring to prove, from the peculiar condition of the Jews since the destruction of their temple, that repentance is the *only remaining* expedient for restoration to the divine favour: "*since* we have no longer a temple or altar, there remains no expiation for sins, but repentance only—and this will expiate all transgressions." (*Maim. De Pœnit. Clavering*, p. 45.) And it seems to be with a view to prove *its* sufficiency, (now that sacrifice was no longer possible, and to prevent the Jews, who had been used to attribute to the sacrifice the principal efficacy in their reconciliation with God, from thinking lightly of that only species of homage and obedience which now remained,) that both here, and in his *Moreh Nevochim*, (p. 435,) he endeavours to represent prayer and confession of sins, as at all times constituting a main part of the sacrificial service. But this by no means proves, that the sacrifice was not in his opinion expiatory; on the contrary it clearly manifests his belief that it *was;* since it is only, *because* it was no longer possible for the Jews according to the Mosaic ordinances, that he considers it as laid aside: for if repentance and prayer were in themselves perfectly sufficient, then the reason assigned for the cessation of sacrifice, and the efficacy of repentance *per se* under the existing circumstances, would have been unmeaning.

But this writer's notion of the efficacy of repentance, and of the ceremonial rites, may be still better understood from the following remarks. Speaking of the Scape Goat, he says, (*Moreh Nevochim*, p. 494,) that "it was believed to pollute those that touched it, on account of the multitude of sins which it carried:" and of this goat he says again, (*De Pœnit.* pp. 44, 45,) that "it expiated all the sins recounted in the Law; of whatever kind, with regard to him who had repented

of those sins; but that with respect to him who had *not* repented, it expiated only those of a lighter sort:" and those sins of a lighter sort, he defines to be all those transgressions of the Law, against which *excision* is not denounced. So that, according to this writer, there were cases, and those not a few, in which repentance was not *necessary* to expiation. And again, that it was not in itself *sufficient* for expiation, he clearly admits, not only from his general notion of sacrifices throughout his works, but from his express declarations on this subject. He says, that with respect to certain offences, "neither repentance, nor the day of expiation," (which he places on the same ground with repentance as to its expiatory virtue,) "have their expiatory effect, unless chastisement be inflicted to *perfect the expiation*." And in one case, he adds, that "neither repentance followed by uniform obedience, nor the day of expiation, nor the chastisement inflicted, can effect the expiation, nor can the expiation be completed but by the death of the offender." (*De Pœnit.* pp. 46, 47.)

The reader may now be able to form a judgment, whether the doctrines of the Jewish Rabbis really support Dr. Priestley's position,—that amongst the modern Jews no notion of any scheme of sacrificial atonement, or of any requisite for forgiveness save repentance and reformation, has been found to have had existence. And I must again remind him of the way in which the authorities of the Jewish writers have been managed by Dr. Priestley, so as to draw from them a testimony apparently in his favour. The whole tribe of Rabbinical authors, who have, as we have seen, in the most explicit terms avowed the doctrine of atonement, in the strictest sense of the word, are passed over without mention, save only Nachmanides, who is but transiently *named*, whilst his declarations on this subject, being directly adverse, are totally suppressed. Maimonides, and Abarbanel, indeed, are adduced in evidence: but how little to Dr. Priestley's purpose, and in how mutilated and partial a shape, I have endeavoured to evince. These writers, standing in the foremost rank of

the Rabbinical teachers, as learned and liberal expositors of the Jewish law, could not but feel the futility of the sacrificial system, unexplained by that great Sacrifice, which, as Jews, they must necessarily have rejected. Hence arises their theory of the *human* origin of sacrifice; and hence their occasional *seeming* departure from the principles of the sacrificial worship, maintained by other Rabbis, and adopted also by themselves, in the general course of their writings. From these parts of their works, which seem to be no more than philosophical struggles to colour to the eye of reason the inconsistencies of an existing doctrine, has Dr. Priestley sought support for an assertion, which is in open contradiction, not only to the testimony of every other Rabbinical writer, but to the express language of these very writers themselves.

But Dr. Priestley is not contented with forcing upon these more remote authors a language which they never used; he endeavours also to extract from those of later date a testimony to the same purpose, in direct opposition to their own explicit assertions. Thus, in Buxtorf's account of the ceremony observed by the modern Jews, of killing a cock, on the preparation for the day of expiation, he thinks he finds additional support for his position, that, amongst the *modern* Jews, no idea of a strict propitiatory atonement has been known to exist. Now, as to Dr. Priestley's representation of Buxtorf I cannot oppose a more satisfactory authority than that of Buxtorf himself, I shall quote the passage as given in that writer; and that no pretence of misrepresentation may remain, I give it untinged by the medium of a translation.

" Quilibet postea paterfamilias, cum gallo præ manibus, in medium primus prodit, et ex Psalmis Davidis ait; *Sedentes in tenebris*, &c.—item, *Si ei adsit Angelus interpres, unus de mille, qui illi resipiscentiam exponat, tunc miserebitur ejus, et dicet*, REDIME EUM, NE DESCENDAT IN FOSSAM: INVENI ENIM EXPIATIONEM (gallum nempe gallinaceum, qui peccata mea expiabit). Deinde expiationem aggreditur, et capiti suo

gallum ter allidit, singulosque ictus his vocibus prosequitur, זה חליפתי זה תחתי זה כפרתי זה התרנגול ילך למיתה ואני אלך לחיים טובים עם כל ישראל אמן.—*Hic Gallus sit* PERMUTATIO PRO ME, *hic* IN LOCUM MEUM SUCCEDAT, *hic sit* EXPIATIO PRO ME, *huic gallo mors afferetur, mihi vero et toti Israeli vita fortunata. Amen.* Hoc ille ter ex ordine facit, pro se, sc. pro filiis suis, et pro peregrinis qui apud illum sunt, uti Summus Sacerdos in vet. test. expiationem quoque fecit. Gallo deinde imponens manus, ut in sacrificiis olim, eum statim mactat, cutemque ad collum ei primum contrahit et constringit, et secum reputat, se, qui *præfocetur aut stranguletur*, dignum esse: hunc autem gallum IN SUUM LOCUM SUBSTITUERE et offerre; cultello postea jugulum resolvit, iterum animo secum perpendens, semet-ipsum, qui *gladio plectatur*, dignum esse; et confestim illum vi e manibus in terram projicit, ut denotet, se dignum esse, qui *lapidibus obruatur:* postremo illum assat, ut hoc facto designet, se dignum esse, qui *igne* vitam finiat: et ita quatuor hæc mortis genera, *pro* Judæis gallus sustinere debet. Intestina vulgo supra domus tectum jaciunt. Alii dicunt id fieri, quia quum peccata internum quid potius quam externum sint, ideo galli intestinis *peccata hærere:* corvos itaque advenire, et cum Judæorum peccatis in desertum avolare debere, ut hircus in vet. test. cum populi peccatis in desertum aufugiebat. Alii aliam reddunt causam. Causa autem, cur *gallo* potius quam alio animante utantur, hæc est, quia vir ebraice גבר *Gebher* appellatur. Jam si *Gebher* peccaverit, *Gebher* etiam peccati PŒNAM SUSTINERE debet. —Quia vero gravior esset pœna, quàm ut illam subire possent Judæi, gallum gallinaceum qui Talmudicâ seu Babyloniâ dialecto גבר *Gebher* appellatur, in locum suum substituunt, et ita justitiæ Dei *satisfit;* quia quum גבר *Gebher* peccaverit, גבר *Gebher* etiam, *i. e.* Gallus gallinaceus plectitur." —*Synagoga Judaica*, ed. 4, pp. 509—512.

I leave this extract, without comment, to confront Dr. Priestley's representation of it; viz. that it indicates nothing of the strict notion of atonement. (*Theol. Rep.* vol. i. pp. 410, 411.) He adds, indeed, for the purpose of confirming

his account of this passage, that this cock is afterwards eaten; as if thence to infer, that the offerers could not consider the animal as a real substitute for them, in respect to their sins and their punishment: and yet Buxtorf expressly asserts, that, when it had been the custom to distribute amongst the poor the animals slain in the manner above described, it created much murmuring: the poor recoiling with horror from the gift, saying that they were required to eat *the sins* of the rich: and that the rich offerers were therefore obliged to bestow their charitable donations on the poor in money, to the amount of the value of their offering; and "thus having *redeemed* the offering from God, by its equivalent in money, they then feasted upon it." (*Syn. Jud.* pp. 515, 516.) Again, Dr. Priestley insinuates, that the Jews *could not* consider this offering as a strict expiation, because that "when they themselves die, they pray that their own deaths may be considered as an expiation or satisfaction for their sins."—Dr. Priestley does not recollect, that the atonement made at the day of expiation extended only to the sins of the past year; and that those which were committed after that day, must remain unexpiated until the day of expiation in the succeeding year. The dying person had consequently to account for all the sins committed since the last preceding day of expiation. And, as every natural ill was deemed by the Jews a penal infliction for sin, death was consequently viewed by them in the same light, and in the highest degree; and therefore it was reasonable that they should hope from it a full atonement, and satisfaction, for their transgressions.

Thus we see, that even the authorities, quoted by Dr. Priestley as supporting his theories, are found to be in direct contradiction to them. And from this, and the numerous other instances, of his misrepresentation of ancient writers, which may be found in the course of these remarks, we may learn a useful lesson respecting his reports of authors in those voluminous writings in which he has laboured to convert the religion of Christ into a system of Heathen morality. I

have, for this purpose, been thus copious on his representations of the opinions of the modern Jews; and, without dwelling longer on this point, or adverting to Isaac Netto, who happened in a "*very good Sermon*" to speak with confidence of the mercy of God, without hinting any thing of mediation as necessary to satisfy his justice, (*Theol. Rep.* vol. i. p. 411,) I turn back to what we are told three pages before concerning Philo and Josephus.

These writers, who were nearly contemporary with our Saviour, Dr. Priestley informs us, furnish no intimation whatever, in any part of their works, of "any ideas that have the least connexion with those that are suggested by the modern doctrine of atonement" (pp. 408, 409): and, according to his usual practice, he produces *one or two* insulated passages from the voluminous works of these authors, to prove that their sentiments on the subjects of sacrifice, and of the divine placability, correspond with his own. Now, were it true, with respect to Josephus, as Dr. Priestley asserts, that he suggests no idea in any degree similar to the received notion of atonement, yet could this furnish no proof that he entertained no such idea; because he himself expressly informs us, (*Ant. Jud.* lib. iii. cap. 9, sect. 3, p. 121, and cap. 11, sect. 2, p. 125.—vol. i. ed. Huds.,) that he reserves the more minute examination of the nature of the animal offerings for a distinct treatise on the subject of sacrifice, which has either not been written, or has not come down to us. But although the historian, in consequence of this intention, has made but slight and incidental mention of the nature of sacrifice, yet has he said enough to disprove Dr. Priestley's assertion, having, in all places in which he has occasion to speak of the sin-offering, described the victim as sacrificed in *deprecation* of God's wrath, and in *supplication of pardon* for transgression, Παραίτησις ἁμαρτημάτων is the expression he constantly employs on this subject[a]: and, in treating of the

[a] Χίμαιρόν τι ὑπὲ παραιτήσει ἁμαρτημάτων—Again, ἴριφον ὑπὲρ ἁμαρτάδων—and, κατὰ παραίτησιν ἁμαρτιῶν ἰρίφου.—See *Josephi Opera. Ant. Jud.* lib. iii. pp. 90. 92, edit. Genev. 1633.

scape goat, he calls it ἀποτροπιασμὸς καὶ παραίτησις ὑπὲρ ἁμαρτημάτων. (See p. 92, as referred to in the preceding note.) And, as to the distinction made by this writer between the sacrifices of Cain and Abel, on the strength of which Dr. Priestley ranks him as an auxiliary on the subject of this sacrificial import, it deserves to be remarked, that this, so far as it can be understood, seems not to be in any degree inconsistent with the commonly received notions of sacrifice, inasmuch as it relates rather to the sentiments of the offerers, than to the intrinsic nature of the things offered[a].

But, besides, we find, in the very section in which this distinction is pointed out, an observation respecting a sacrifice offered by Cain, which, had Dr. Priestley permitted his eyes to wander but a few lines from the passage he has quoted, might have convinced him that Josephus admitted, equally with the supporters of the present doctrine of atonement, the *propitiatory virtue* of sacrifice: for, having related the murder of Abel by his brother, and God's consequent resentment against Cain, he adds, that, upon Cain's "offering up a sacrifice, and by virtue thereof (δι' αὐτῆς) supplicating him not to be extreme in his wrath, God was led to remit the punishment of the murder." Thus the *wrath* of God was *averted* by sacrifice; and that *life*, which, according to strict justice, was to be paid for the life which had been taken away, was preserved through virtue of the offering made. With what reason, then, upon the whole, Dr. Priestley has claimed the support of Josephus's testimony, it is not difficult to judge. Whether he has had better grounds for appealing to that of Philo, remains to be considered.

This distinguished and philosophic Jew, whose resemblance to Plato, both in richness of diction and sublimity of sentiment, gave birth to the Greek proverb, ἢ Πλάτων φιλωνίζει, ἢ Φίλων πλατωνίζει, has, indeed, exercised upon the Jewish doctrines an extraordinary degree of mystical refinement:

[a] See the translation by L'Estrange, p. 5, who appears to have hit on the true meaning of the original; and compare the preceding sentences, in which the characters of the two brothers are described.

he is also pronounced, by some of the highest authorities, to have been entirely ignorant both of the language and customs of the Jews; and consequently to have fallen into gross errors in his representation of the doctrines of their religion[a]. And yet from two detached passages in this author's writings, one of which is so completely irrelevant, that it were idle even to notice it, Dr. Priestley does not hesitate to decide upon the notion entertained by the Jews of his day respecting the nature of sacrificial atonement. He also asserts, indeed, that in *no* part of his works does he suggest any idea in the slightest degree resembling the modern notion of atonement. To hazard this assertion, is to confess an entire ignorance of the writings of this author; for, on the contrary, so congenial are his sentiments and language to those of the first Christian writers, on the subject of the *corruption of man's nature*, the *natural insufficiency of our best works*, the necessity of an *intercessor*, a *redeemer*, and *ransom for sin*, together with the appointment of the divine ΛΟΓΟΣ, for these purposes, that the learned Bryant has been led to conclude that he must actually have derived these doctrines from the sources of Evangelical knowledge. That he had, indeed, the opportunity of doing so, from an intimate intercourse with St. Peter, is attested by *Hieronymus* (*Catalog. Scriptor. Eccles.*), *Photius* (*Biblioth.* cv.), and *Suidas* (*Historic.*), by whom, as well as by *Eusebius*, (*Hist. Eccles.* lib. ii.) it is affirmed, that the beautiful eulogium contained in this writer's treatise, Περὶ Βίου Θεωρ. was pronounced on the Apostolic Christians settled at Alexandria, who were the followers of St. Mark, the disciple of Peter. The arguments of Dr. Allix, however, in his *Judgment of the Jewish Church*, &c., (p. 76—83,) though they may justly be deemed invalid, as to the *impossibility* of Philo's intercourse with the first Christians, for which he contends in opposition to the above authorities, yet seem sufficient to warrant us in pronouncing, that, however similar his notions and expressions may be to those of the early Christians, they

[a] See *Photius Biblioth.* cv. ed. 1635. p. 7, ed. 1658.—And *Grotius*, in Matt. —*Thes. Temp. Jos. Scalig. Animad.* xxvi. 18.

yet were not derived from Christian sources; and that, consequently, they exhibit the doctrines of the Jewish church; such, at least, as they were held by the Jews of Alexandria in his day.

But to instance a few of the numerous passages in the works of this author, of the import above alluded to.—He informs us, (Περὶ Φυτουργ. p. 217, ed. 1640,) that "man was made in the image of God"—that he was placed in a state of perfect happiness, (ibid. pp. 219, 220, & Νομ. Ἱερ. Ἀλλην. pp. 56, 57,)—but that, "having disgraced and deformed his likeness, by his fall from virtue, he likewise fell from happiness; and from an immortal state, was deservedly doomed to misery and death," (Περὶ Εὐγεν. p. 906,)—that being now "naturally prone to vice," (Θει. Πραγ. Κληρ. p. 522,) and so degenerate, "that even his virtues are of no value, but through the goodness and favour of God," (Περὶ τοῦ τὸ Χειρ. p. 166,)—mankind are, consequently, obliged "to trust to this alone for the purification of the soul; and must not imagine, that they are themselves capable, without the divine favour and influence, to purge and wash away the stains which deform their nature." (Περὶ τῶν Ὀνειρ. pp. 1111, 1112.) And so great does he represent this corruption of the human mind, as to exclaim, "no man of sound judgment, observing the actions of men, can refrain from calling aloud on the only Saviour God, to remove this burden of iniquity, and, by appointing some *ransom, and redemption for the soul,* (λύτρα καὶ σῶστρα καταθεὶς τῆς ψυχῆς,) to restore it to its original liberty." (Περὶ Συγχ. Διαλ. p. 333.) "For a race, by nature thus carried headlong to sin," he pronounces "some mode of *propitiation* to be necessary," (Περὶ Φυγαδ. p. 465,)—and for this purpose, he says, "an *advocate and intercessor* for men" (Ἱκέτης τοῦ θνητοῦ) has been appointed, viz. "the Divine *Logos*, that Archangel, the *first born son* of God, ordained by him to stand as a *mediator* (Μεθόριος) between the creature and the Creator, acting as a surety to each party (ἀμφοτέροις ὁμηρεύων) and proclaiming peace to all the world, that through his intercession men might have a firm faith in God:" (Θει. Πραγ. Κληρ. p.

509:)—that same Λόγος, who is also called by him "an *High Priest*, free from all sin;" (Περὶ Φυγαδ. p. 466, and Περὶ τῶν Ὀνειρ. p. 597;) of whose mediation he acknowledges the intercession of Aaron to have been but a type; (Περὶ Φυγαδ. p. 446, and Θει. Πραγ. Κληρ. p. 508;) and whom he describes to be that "substitute and representation" of the Deity, (ὕπαρχος Θεοῦ,) through whom he is related in the Old Testament to have conversed with man. (Περὶ τῶν Ὀνειρ. p. 600.)—And, when he speaks of that part of the Law, wherein it is said, that the man of guilt should fly to an appointed city of refuge, and not be acquitted, till the *death of the High Priest*, he confesses, (Περὶ Φυγαδ. pp. 465, 466,) that by this the Levitical High Priest cannot be literally meant, but that he must be in this case the type of one far greater: for "that the High Priest alluded to, is not a man, but the sacred *Logos*, who is incapable of all sin, and who is said to have his head anointed with oil:" and that the death of *this High Priest* is that which is here intended:—thus admitting the death of the *Logos*, whom he describes as the *anointed*, and allows to be typified by the Jewish High Priest, to be the means of recovery from a state of spiritual bondage, and of giving liberty to the soul. It is true, he allegorizes away this meaning again, according to his usual custom. But, whilst he refines upon the doctrine, he at the same time testifies its existence in his day.

The reader will now judge, whether this writer deemed "repentance and good works *sufficient* for divine acceptance," or whether he entertained "any ideas resembling those that are suggested by the modern doctrine of atonement." Dr. Priestley however contends, that he considered sacrifices but as *gifts;* and this he infers from the account given by him, of the preference of Abel's sacrifice to that of Cain: viz. that, "instead of inanimate things, he offered animate; instead of young animals, those that were grown to their full size; instead of the leanest, the fattest," &c.—Dr. Priestley should at the same time have stated, that the whole of the account given by this writer of the history of Cain and Abel,

is one continued allegory: that by the birth of the two brothers, he understands "the rise of two opposite principles in the soul; one ascribing all to the natural powers of the individual, and thence represented by *Cain*, which signifies *possession;* the other referring all to God, and thence denominated *Abel*" (Περὶ τῶν Ἱερουργ. p. 130): that this latter principle he also holds to be implied in the *occupation* of Abel, inasmuch "as by a tender of sheep, is meant a controller of the brute powers of the soul; and that Abel, therefore, from his pious reference of all to God, is properly described as a *Shepherd;* and Cain, on the contrary, from the deriving all from his own individual exertions, is called a tiller of the ground." (Ibid. pp. 136, 137.) The sacrifice of Abel consequently denotes the offering of the pious and devout affections of the heart; this being "what is meant by the firstlings of the flock, and the fat thereof," (ibid. pp. 137. 145. 154,) whilst that of Cain, on the other hand, represents an offering, destitute of those affections, an offering of impiety, inasmuch "as the fruits of the earth import the selfish feelings: their being offered *after certain days*, indicates the backwardness of the offerer; and the *fruits*, simply, and not the *first-fruits*, shew that the first honour was held back from the Creator, and given to the creature." (Ibid. pp. 137. 141, 142. 145.) And in this sense it is, that Abel is said by this writer, "neither to have offered the same things, nor in the same way; but instead of inanimate, things animate; instead of young and inferior animals, the matured and choicest:" in other words, that the most animated and vigorous sentiments of homage are requisite to constitute an acceptable act of devotion.

In this light the due value of Dr. Priestley's quotation from this writer, as applied to the present question, may easily be estimated. But, had Dr. Priestley looked to that part of this author's works, in which he treats expressly of the animals offered in sacrifice, he would have seen, that he describes the sacrifice for sin as being the appointed means of "obtaining pardon, and escaping the evil consequence of sin,"—

κακῶν ἀπαλλαγὴ—κακῶν φυγὴ—ἀμνηστίαν ἀδικημάτων σιτεῖσθαι: (Περὶ Ζώων. pp. 838. 843:) and that in the case of an injury committed, he represents the reparation made to the person injured, joined to contrition for the offence and supplication of pardon from the Deity, as not sufficient to obtain the divine forgiveness, without offering an animal in expiation. (Ibid. p. 844.)—Had Dr. Priestley, indeed, asserted that this writer's notion of sacrifice was that of a symbolical and mystical representation, he had given a fair account of the matter. For, when he informs us, that "the blood of the victim was poured in a circle round the altar, because a circle is the most perfect figure; and that the soul which is figured by the blood should through the entire circle of thought and action worship God:" when he tells us, that "the victim was separated into parts, to admonish us, that, in order to the true worship of the Deity, his nature must be considered and weighed in its distinct parts and separate perfections; (ibid. p. 839;) it will readily be admitted, that he soars into regions, whither a plain understanding will not find it easy to follow him. But to have stated this, would not have answered the purpose of Dr. Priestley's argument: because this high strain of mysticism would have clearly disqualified him, as an evidence on behalf of Dr. Priestley's, or of *any* intelligible, theory of sacrifice.

Indeed, with respect to this ancient writer, the truth seems to be[a], that, viewing the Jewish system without that light which alone could give it shape and meaning, he found it impossible to account for it on any sound principles of reason. He, therefore, made his religion bend to his philosophy, and veiled in allegory whatever would not admit a satisfactory literal solution. And this he must have found still more necessary, if what is related concerning his intercourse with the early Christians be well founded. For, in his contro-

[a] The above observation may supply an answer to many, who have objected against the alleged existence of a doctrine of vicarious atonement amongst the early Jews the silence of Philo upon that head, even when treating expressly upon the choice of victims for sacrifice. See particularly *Scripture Account of Sacrifices*, App. p. 17.

versies with them, the sacrificial system, which they would not fail to press upon him as requiring and receiving a full completion in the sacrifice of Christ, he would have found himself compelled to spiritualize, so as to give it a distinct and independent import.

Now, if to these considerations be added, what has been already stated, that this writer had not the means of being perfectly acquainted with the nature of the Hebrew rites, it will follow, that his testimony cannot be expected to bear strongly upon the present question. The same has been already shewn with respect to that of Josephus. So far, however, as they both do apply to the subject, instead of justifying Dr. Priestley's position, they are found to make directly against it. Their silence on the subject of the vicarious import of animal sacrifice cannot, for the reasons alleged, be urged by Dr. Priestley as an argument in support of that part of his system, which denies the existence of that notion amongst the Jews: whilst the explicit declarations of Josephus, on the expiatory virtue of sacrifice; and those of Philo, on the necessity of *mediation* and *propitiation* to render even our good works acceptable to a God offended at the corruption of our nature, and of some means of *ransom* and *redemption* to restore man to his lost estate, sufficiently evince the existence of those great leading principles of the doctrine of atonement, *expiation*, and *propitiation*, which Dr. Priestley utterly denies to have had any place amongst the Jews in the days of these two celebrated writers.

The value of Dr. Priestley's assertions concerning these writers, as well as of those respecting Jews of later date, being now sufficiently ascertained, I shall conclude this long discussion with a few remarks on the ideas entertained by the ancient heathens, with regard to the *nature*, and *efficacy*, of their sacrifices. To adduce arguments for the purpose of shewing that they deemed their animal sacrifices, not only of *expiatory*, but of a strictly *vicarious* nature, will, to those who are conversant with the history and writings of the ancients, appear a waste of time. But, as Dr. Priestley, in the

rage of refutation, has contended even against this position, it may not be useless to cite a few authorities, which may throw additional light, if not upon a fact which is too glaring to receive it, at least upon the pretensions to historical and classical information, of the writer who controverts that fact. What has been already urged in Number V. might perhaps be thought abundant upon this head; but as the testimony of Cæsar respecting the Gauls, in p. 84, is the only one which goes to the precise point of the *substitution of the victim to suffer death in place of the transgressor*, it may not be amiss to add the testimonies of Herodotus, (lib. ii. cap. 39,) and of Plutarch, (*Isid. et Osir.* p. 363, tom. ii. ed. 1620,) respecting the Egyptian practice of imprecating on the head of the victim those evils which the offerers wished to avert from themselves: as also of Servius, (*Æn.* 3. 57,) and Suidas, (in voc. περίψημα,) ascribing the same sacrificial sentiment; the first to the Massilienses, and the second to the Grecian states. Hesychius, likewise, in substituting for the word περίψημα (*an expiatory* or *redeeming sacrifice*) the word ἀντίψυχον, (as has been noticed, p. 83,) marks, with sufficient clearness, that the expiation was made by offering *life for life*. And, not to dwell upon the well known passage in Plautus [a], (*Epid.* p. 412, ed. 1577,) which clearly defines the *expiation* as effected by a *vicarious suffering;* or, upon that in Porphyry [b], (*De Abstin.* lib. iv. p. 396, ed. 1620,) in which it is asserted to have been the general tradition, that animal sacrifices were resorted to in such cases as required *life for life*, ψυχὴν ἀντὶ ψυχῆς; it may be sufficient to state one authority from Ovid, who, in the sixth book of his *Fasti*, particularly describes the sacrificed animal as a *vicarious substitute*, the several parts of which were given as *equivalents*, or though not strictly such, yet hoped to be graciously accepted as such, *in place of the offerer:*

[a] Men' *piaculum* oportet fieri propter stultitiam tuam,
Ut *meum tergum stultitiæ tuæ subdas succedaneum?*

[b] Τινὲς δέ τινας καιροὺς πρῶτον ἱερεῖαν θῦσαι μυθίονται ψυχὴν ἀντὶ ψυχῆς αἰτουμένους.

Cor pro corde, precor, pro fibris sumite fibras,
Hanc animam vobis pro meliore damus.

The observations contained in this Number, joined to those in Numbers V. IX. XXII. and XXIII., when contrasted with the position maintained by Dr. Priestley, *that in no nation, ancient or modern, Jew or Heathen, has any idea of a doctrine of atonement, or of any requisite for forgiveness, save repentance and reformation, ever existed,*—may enable the reader to form a just estimate of that writer's competency, and may, perhaps, suggest an useful caution in the admission of his assertions.

NO. XXXIV.—ON *H.* TAYLOR'S OBJECTION OF THE WANT OF A *LITERAL* CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE MOSAIC SACRIFICE AND THE DEATH OF CHRIST.

PAGE 21. (b).—H. Taylor goes so far as to use even this argument gravely. (*Ben. Mord.* p. 811—814.)

Indeed, the bold liberties which this writer has been urged to take with the language of Scripture, and the trifling distinctions to which he has been driven for the purpose of divesting the death of Christ of the characters of the *sin-offering* prescribed by *the law*, render it desirable that his whole argument upon this particular point should be laid before the reader. When ingenuity, like that of this author, is forced into such straits, the inference is instructive.

"It is true," (he says,) "that the author of the Epistle to the *Hebrews* labours to show a similarity between the *Mosaic* and the *Christian* sacrifices; which, no doubt, there was; and to make out the analogy, uses *very hard figures:* as when he compares the sprinkling the blood of the victim, to the sprinkling our hearts from an evil conscience; and the tabernacle to the body of Christ; and the flesh of Christ to the veil which opened the way into the Sanctum Sanctorum; and calls it a new and a living way; and considers Christ both as the High-Priest and Victim. But, were the analogy ever so exact, it would not make the expressions *literal:* and

in many particulars there is no manner of likeness between them. For, in the sacrifice of Christ there was *no salting with salt, no imposition of hands, no blood sprinkled by the Priest, in which consisted the atonement; for, the atonement was not made by the death of the victim, but by the sprinkling of the blood; since the offender did not offer him to God, nor begged forgiveness of his sins:* all which things were customary, and most if not all of them necessary, in a *Mosaic* expiatory sacrifice of a victim. But this was not the case with Christ. He was crucified and slain, as a common malefactor."

"If it be said, that Christ was the *sacrificer*, and he offered himself up to God; it should be considered, that the sacrifices of the Mosaic law were offered to gain forgiveness to the person who sacrificed: but this could not be true of Christ, for he had no sin to be forgiven."

"If it be said, that he sacrificed as a *Priest*, to gain forgiveness for *others;* it should be observed, that, according to the Mosaic law, he was incapable of such an office: for the law requires, that the priests should be of the *tribe of Levi*, or the *family of Aaron. But he* (Christ) *of whom these things are spoken, pertaineth to another tribe, of which no man gave attendance at the altar. For it is evident that our Lord sprang out of Judah, of which tribe Moses spake nothing concerning the priesthood.* (*Hebr.* vii. 13, 14.) And, therefore, St. Paul, who was aware of this objection, when he speaks of Christ as a Priest, tells us, that he was a priest of a superior order to the Aaronical priesthood, *being a priest for ever after the order of Melchisedek.* (ver. 17.) This is a plain concession, that, according to the Mosaic law, Christ was incapable as a priest to offer any sacrifice. But supposing he had been of the tribe of Levi, the case would have been just the same with regard to all mankind, except the Jews: for the Jewish sacrifices did not extend beyond the circumcision. The sacrifice of Christ could not, therefore, be a propitiatory sacrifice, according to the Mosaic law; and much less a propitiation for the sins of the whole world."

"*If it was therefore a literal offering or sacrifice made by Christ as a* PRIEST, *it was of a higher nature, and of a prior and superior dispensation to the Mosaic; such as was offered in the days of Melchisedek, the Priest of the most high God.* But, we have *no reason to think* that any offerings before the law were meant to be *expiatory*, but *all of them eucharistical*."

Thus, after labouring to prove, that St. Paul was extravagant in his comparison of the Christian and Mosaic sacrifices, and that all his *hard figures* had not enabled him to make out a resemblance between them; and labouring to prove this by shewing, that Christ was neither, literally, a Mosaic victim nor a Mosaic priest, (a point which no person was ever mad enough to contend for,)—thus, I say, after all this, our author in his concluding paragraph admits the whole nature and force of the Christian sacrifice, and the true distinction which points out the reason why it should not conform in every minute ceremonial with the formalities of the Mosaic; namely, that it was *of a higher nature, and of a prior and superior dispensation.* For, as to the accompanying observation intended to do away the effect of this admission; viz. that *there is no reason to think, that any offerings before the law were meant to be expiatory;* this is a mere *gratis dictum*, the contradiction of which, it is hoped, is satisfactorily made out in other parts of this work. And thus it appears, upon the whole, that on a single gratuitous assumption the author rests the entire weight of the preceding argument; and on its strength he has presumed to set up his own doctrines in opposition to those of St. Paul. Whether, then, in the present instance, this author, ingenious and learned as he undoubtedly is, deserves more to be condemned for his trifling as a reasoner, or for his presumption as a critic, it is not an easy matter to decide.

NO. XXXV.—ON THE ARGUMENTS BY WHICH IT IS ATTEMPTED TO PROVE THE *PASSOVER* NOT TO BE A *SACRIFICE*.

PAGE 21. (c).—It is a curious fact, that the declaration of St. Paul, (1 Cor. v. 7,) that *Christ our Passover is* SACRIFICED *for us*, is adduced by Dr. Priestley, (*Theol. Rep.* vol. i. p. 215,) as a convincing proof that Christ was not sacrificed at all. It follows, he says, "from the allusion to the Paschal lamb," contained in this passage and others of the New Testament, "that the death of Christ is called a sacrifice, *only by way of figure;* because these two" (namely, sacrifice, and the Paschal lamb,) "are *quite different and inconsistent* ideas:" and the argument by which he endeavours to establish this is not less extraordinary than the position itself, as it brings forward an instance in which one of these *totally different and inconsistent* ideas is expressly called in the Old Testament by the name of the other; the Passover being, in the passage which he quotes from Exod. xii. 27, directly termed *the Sacrifice of the Lord's Passover.*——This seems an odd species of logic. Dr. Priestley, however, hopes to mend the argument by asserting, that "this is the *only* place in the Old Testament, in which the Paschal lamb is termed a sacrifice;" and that here, "it could be so called, only in some secondary and partial, and not in the proper and primary sense of the word:" and for these reasons—namely, that "there was no priest employed upon the occasion; no altar made use of; no burning; nor any part offered to the Lord: all which circumstances (he adds) were essential to every proper sacrifice."—Now, in answer to these several assertions, I am obliged to state the direct contradiction of each: for 1st, the passage in Exodus xii. 27, is *not* the only one, in which the Paschal lamb is termed זבח, a *sacrifice;* it being expressly so called, in no less than four passages in Deuteronomy, (xvi. 2. 4, 5, 6,) and also in Exodus, xxxiv. 25, and its parallel, passage, xxiii. 18.—2. A Priest *was* employed.—3. An altar *was* made use of.—4. There *was* a burning, and a part offered to the Lord: the inwards being burnt upon the altar,

and the blood poured out at the foot thereof.—Dr. Priestley adds, for the completion of his proof, that "the Paschal lamb is very far from having been ever called a *sin-offering*, or said to be killed on the account of sin." But, neither is the *burnt-offering* "ever called a *sin-offering;*" nor is the animal slain in any of the various kinds of peace offering, whether in the votive, the free-will, or the sacrifice of thanksgiving, ever "said to be killed on account of sin." In other words, one species of sacrifice is not the same with, nor to be called by the name of another.—I agree with Dr. Priestley in this position; and shall not dispute with him any conclusion he may draw from so productive a premiss.

But so evident is it that the Passover was truly a sacrifice, that even Sykes himself (whose work on Redemption has been the great armory, whence Dr. Priestley and the other combatants of that doctrine have derived their principal weapons of attack) found it impossible to deny the position. He accordingly fully admits the point. (*Essay on Sacrifices*, p. 41.) And, indeed, whoever considers what are the essential characters of a sacrifice, can have little difficulty upon this head, as the Passover will be found to possess them all.

1. It was a *Corban*, or *offering brought to the Tabernacle or Temple*, as we find it expressly enjoined in Deut. xvi. 2. 5, 6, and exemplified at the solemn Passover in the reign of Josiah, 2 Chron. xxxv. 5, 6. 10, 11. That the *tabernacle*, or *temple*, is intended by the expressions used in the passage of Deuteronomy above referred to, and not Jerusalem at large, is evident from this, that the very same expressions are employed, when speaking of all the sacrifices and offerings, in Deut. xii. 5, 6. 11. 14, where it is manifest that the temple, the peculiar *habitation* of God, is necessarily meant. This still farther appears from 1 Kings, viii. 29, and 2 Chron. vii. 16. Moreover, we find the Passover expressly called a *Corban* (Numb. ix. 6, 7. 13): and it is certain that nothing was so called, but what was brought and offered up to God at the tabernacle or temple. See *Cudw. Int. Syst. Discourse,*

&c., p. 13. We may also add, that it is actually specified by Maimonides, as the reason why the Jews of later times cannot kill the Paschal lamb, that they have *no temple* to offer it in[a]. See *Ainsw.* on Exod. xii. 8.——2. The blood of the Paschal lamb was poured out, sprinkled, and offered at the altar by the Priests, in like manner as the blood of the victims usually slain in sacrifice, as appears from Exod. xxiii. 18, and xxxiv. 25.—2 Chron. xxx. 15, 16, and xxxv. 11. And in this sprinkling of the blood consisted, as we are told by the Jewish doctors, the very essence of a sacrifice. See *Cudw.* ut supra, p. 10.——3. The fat and the entrails were burnt upon the altar, as may be collected from the accounts given of the ceremony of the Passover in the passages already referred to; as also from the declarations of the Jewish doctors, the descriptions of the Paschal sacrifice in the Misna of the Talmud, and the testimony of the Karraites, who are known to reject all the Talmudical traditions not founded on Scripture[b]. Thus, then, all the distinguishing characters of a sacrifice[c], we find to belong to the offering of the Paschal

[a] Bishop Patrick in a note on Exod. xii. 21, makes the following observation:—"Here it may be fit to note, that the lamb being first killed in Egypt, it was killed in every man's house, for they had no altar there, nor any other place where they had liberty to kill it. But after they came to the land of Canaan, it was not lawful to sacrifice it anywhere, but in the place which God appointed for his worship, *Deut.* xvi. 2. From which *Maimonides* concludes, that whatsoever they did with *other sacrifices*, yet *this* could not be offered in the *high places*, but only at the *temple*. And it is likely they did so in the wilderness, the tabernacle being newly erected at the keeping of the second Passover, *Numb.* ix. 5."

[b] See *Cudw. Int. Syst. Disc.*, &c., pp. 12. 14, 15, 16.—See also *Beausobre's Introd.* pp. 134, 135, ed. 1790. —and *Sykes's Essay on Sacrifices*, p. 41.

[c] "*Pascha* nimirum erat *sacrificium* proprie dictum, Exod. xxiii. 18; xxxiv. 25. Hinc Pascha θύεσθαι dicitur, Marc. xiv. 22. Sed præcipuum est, quod sanguis agni a sacerdote spargebatur, 2 Par. xxx. 16; xxxv. 11, in quo *radix*, seu *essentia*, *sacrificii* est, inquit canon Judæorum notissimus. Adde, quod in Egypto, ubi nullum erat altare ad quod spargeretur sanguis, huic tamen analogum fuit, quod postes illinebant sanguine agni. Deinde Pascha in loco sacro mactari oportuit, Deut. xvi. 5."—*Poli Syn.* in Exod. xii. 27.—In like manner Bishop Patrick expresses himself on the subject of the Passover. "It is" (he observes) "frequently called by the name of a *sacrifice*, Exod. xxiii. 18; xxxiv. 25. Deut. xvi. 4, 5, 6.—And it is called a *Corban*; which is

lamb. It was brought to the temple, as a *Corban*, or sacred offering to the Lord. It was slain in the courts of the temple; and the blood was received by the priests, and handed to the High Priest; who, pouring it forth, and sprinkling it before the altar, offered it together with the fat and entrails, which were burnt upon the altar.

One circumstance, indeed, has been urged, which wears the appearance of an objection; namely, that the Paschal lamb was slain not by the priest, but by the person who brought it to the temple. Philo, in his *Life of Moses*, (p. 686,) has stated this, as distinguishing the Passover from all other sacrifices (which, by the way, clearly implies that he considers that to be a sacrifice as well as the rest; and so, indeed, he expressly calls it, Πάνδημος ΘΥΣΙΑ — *De Sept. et Fest.* p. 1190). In this, however, as in many other particulars of the Jewish rites, Philo is manifestly mistaken, this being by no means peculiar to the Passover; for, that, in every kind of sacrifice, the individual that offered it might kill the victim, is evident from the instance of the burnt-offering, in Levit. i. 4, 5; from that of the peace-offering, iii. 2; and from that of the sin-offering, iv. 24: the proper duty of the priests being only to sprinkle the blood, and to place upon the altar whatever was to be offered[a].—It must certainly be admitted, that the ceremony of laying hands upon the head of the victim, which was usual in other sacrifices, was not adopted in that of the Passover. This distinction, however, at the same time that it is noticed by Sykes, (*Essay*, &c., p. 41,) is sufficiently accounted for by that writer, inasmuch as "the Paschal lamb was the sacrifice of a *company:* and where a company are concerned, no one can act for the whole unless there be a proper *representative;* as the elders of a congregation are

a name given only to those things which were brought to be offered up to God. See *Numb.* ix. 13, where as it is called *Corban*, so the same word is used for *bringing* it, which is commonly used about other sacrifices. And it further appears to have been properly a *sacrifice*, by the rites belonging to it: for the blood of it was sprinkled by the priests, 2 *Chron.* xxx. 16; xxxv. 11."—*Patr.* on Exod. xii. 27.

[a] See Levit. i. 4—9; iii. 2—5; iv. 24—26. See also the Jewish doctors, as quoted by Cudworth, *Discourse*, &c., pp. 11, 12, and *Jennings's Jew. Antiq.* vol. ii. p. 191.

for the congregation, or persons deputed are for those who depute them, or governors may be for their people."

If farther confirmation can be yet wanted to shew that the Passover was truly a sacrifice, we are supplied with this by the express testimony of Josephus; who, in the third book of his *Antiquities*, treating of the subject of sacrifices, calls it the *sacrifice* which the Israelites had been ordered to *sacrifice* when leaving the land of Egypt—*τὴν* ΘΥΣΙΑΝ, *ἣν τότε ἐξιόντας Αἰγύπτου* ΘΥΣΑΙ *προεῖπον ἡμᾶς*, ΠΑΣΧΑ *λεγομένην*[a].—The authority of Josephus, himself a priest, and one of the most intelligent of his nation, will hardly be disputed as to what was considered by the Jews to be a *sacrifice* in his day.

Thus, then, upon the whole, it appears, that, when St. Paul declares that *Christ our Passover has been sacrificed for us*, there can be no question, that he means a true and effective *sacrifice;* and that Christ has been to Christians that species of sacrifice, which the *Passover* had been to the Jews.

The question now arises, What was the nature of that sacrifice? The name of the institution, and the circumstances of its appointment, fully explain its import: the original word, פסח, signifying to *pass over*, not merely in the sense of *change of place*, but in the sense of *sparing*, passing without injury: Jehovah in his work of destruction having passed over, and left in safety, the houses of the Israelites, on the door-posts of which the blood of the sacrificed lamb was sprinkled, whilst he slew the first born in all the houses of the Egyptians.

Now, that the blood of the sacrificed lamb had any natural virtue, whereby the family, on whose door-posts it was sprinkled, might be preserved from the plague; or that Jehovah[b], in passing, needed any such signal to distinguish be-

[a] *Antiq. Jud.* lib. iii. c. x.—*Josephi Opera*, p. 93. A.

[b] *Ἐμέλλεν οὖν ὁ Θεὸς πλανᾶσθαι εἰ μὴ τὸ σημεῖον τοῦτο ἐπὶ τῶν θυρῶν ἐγεγόνει; οὐ φημὶ ἐγὼ, ἀλλ' ὅτι προεικήσουσι τὴν μέλλουσαν δι' αἵματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ γενήσεσθαι σωτηρίαν τῷ γένει τῶν ἀνθρώπων. Just. Mart.* Thirlb. p. 374.

Patrick on Exod. xii. 13, remarks that the blood was "a *sign*, by which the *Israelites* were assured of safety and deliverance."—And, indeed, the words of the original are, *the blood shall be* TO YOU *for a token*.—Patrick adds from Epiphanius, that there was a memorial of the transaction preserved even among the Egyptians themselves, though ignorant of the original of the rite. For at

tween the Egyptians and the Israelites, (although the philosophy of Dr. Priestley has not scrupled to admit the supposition, see *Th. Rep.* vol. i. p. 215,)—it cannot be necessary to controvert. For what purpose, then, can we conceive such a ceremony to have been instituted, but as a sensible token of the fulfilment of the divine promise of protection and deliverance? And, are we not, from the language of Scripture, fully authorized to pronounce, that it was, through this, intended as a typical sign of protection from the divine justice, by the blood of Christ, which, in reference to this, is called, in Hebr. xii. 24, "the blood of sprinkling?" Indeed the analogy is so forcible, that Cudworth does not hesitate to pronounce the slaying of the Paschal lamb, in its first institution, to be an expiatory sacrifice; the blood of the lamb sprinkled upon the door-posts of the houses, being the appointed means of preservation, by Jehovah's passing over. In confirmation also of the typical import of the ceremony, he notices a very extraordinary passage, quoted by Justin Martyr, in his dialogue with Trypho, from the ancient copies of the Bible; in which Ezra expounds, in a speech made before the celebration of the Passover, the mystery of it as clearly relating to Christ; and which Justin concludes, was at a very early day expunged from the Hebrew copies by the Jews, as too manifestly favouring the cause of Christianity. The passage is too remarkable to omit. "*This passover*," saith Ezra to the people, "*is our Saviour and refuge*[a]; and

the Equinox, (which was the time of the Passover,) they marked their cattle, and their trees, and one another, ἐκ μίλτιως, with red ochre, or some such thing, which they fancied would be a preservative to them. See *Patrick* as above.

[a] Καὶ εἶπεν Ἐσδρας τῷ Δαῷ· Τοῦτο τὸ πάσχα ὁ σωτὴρ ἡμῶν, καὶ ἡ καταφυγὴ ἡμῶν. Καὶ ἐὰν διανοηθῆτε, καὶ ἀναβῇ ὑμῶν ἐπὶ τὴν καρδίαν, ὅτι μέλλομεν αὐτὸν ταπεινοῦν ἐν σημείῳ, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ἐλπίσωμεν ἐπ' αὐτὸν, οὐ μὴ ἐρημωθῇ ὁ τόπος αὐτὸς εἰς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον, λέγει ὁ Θεὸς τῶν δυνάμεων· Ἐὰν δὲ μὴ πιστεύσητε αὐτῷ, μηδὲ εἰσακούσητε τοῦ κηρύγματος αὐτοῦ, ἔσεσθε ἐπίχαρμα τοῖς ἔθνεσι. *Just. Mart.* Thirlb. pp. 292, 293.)—Justin says that this passage was among the ἐξηγήσεις ὧν ἐξηγήσατο Ἐσδρας εἰς τὸν νόμον τὸν περὶ τοῦ πάσχα: and hence Mr. Whitaker concludes (*Origin of Arianism*, p. 305) that it originally stood in Ezra, vi. 19—22, and probably between the 20th and 21st verses. It must however be confessed, that the reasons assigned by the learned Commentator on the passage here quoted by Justin, leave some reason to doubt its having existed in any genuine copy of the Old Testament. Grabe gives it as

if you can feel a firm persuasion that we are about to humble and degrade him in this sign, and afterwards should place our sure trust and hope in him, then this place shall never be made desolate, saith the Lord of hosts: but if you do not believe in him, nor listen to that which he shall announce, ye shall be a derision to all nations." (*Cudw. Int. Syst. Disc.* p. 16.) L'Enfant thinks the words of St. Paul, 1 Cor. v. 7, are a direct allusion to the first sentence of the passage here cited.—See *Doddridge* on 1 Cor. v. 7. Allix in his *Judgment of the Jew. Ch.* p. 333, says, that when John the Baptist speaks of *the Lamb, which takes away the sins of the world*, the type of the Paschal lamb is alluded to: and that this appears the more clearly from two things taught amongst the Jews:—1. That the Shechinah delivered Israel out of Egypt: 2. That the Shechinah was typified by the Paschal lamb.—But, in proof that the Paschal lamb was a type of Christ, it is not necessary to resort to Jewish traditions. Scripture supplies the most decisive testimonies on the point. St. John and St. Paul both directly assert it, (John xix. 36; 1 Cor. v. 7,) and our Lord himself seems to affirm it in his institution of the Eucharist at the last supper. (Matt. xxvi. 26.) But whoever wishes to see this point fully examined, may consult *Wits. Œcon. Fœd.* de Paschate; or the selection from that work in *Jennings's Jew. Ant.* vol. ii. pp. 201—208; or a yet more brief, and perhaps not less satisfactory review of the subject, in *Beausob. and L'Enfant's Introd.* p. 133—138.

Dr. Priestley's mode of evading the force of the passage in 1 Cor. v. 7, as a proof that the death of Christ was a sacrifice, has been stated in the beginning of this Number. I shall conclude it by noticing a different mode, adopted by a celebrated fellow-labourer of his in the work of refining away the fair and natural meaning of Scripture language, Dr. Sykes. In the words, *Christ our Passover is sacrificed for*

his opinion, that the sentence which Justin thus testifies to have stood in the ancient copies of Ezra, is rather to be considered as having crept in from a marginal addition by some early Christian, than as having been expunged from the later copies by Jewish fraud. See also *Wolf. Bibl. Hebr.* vol. ii. p. 85.

us, a plain unbiassed understanding would find it difficult *not* to discover that the Passover is affirmed to be a *sacrifice;* and that, in some corresponding sense, Christ is said to be *sacrificed* for us. Dr. Priestley, as we have seen, avoids the latter position, by a direct denial of the former. Dr. Sykes, on the other hand, admits the former, and yet peremptorily rejects the latter. Now though Dr. Priestley's assertion, that the Passover is not here pronounced to be a sacrifice, may appear sufficiently bold; yet the position, that it is called a *sacrifice*, and that Christ is not in the same sentence said to be *sacrificed*, seems a flight of criticism still more worthy of our admiration. On what ground an exposition so extraordinary is founded, it is natural to inquire. Christ, we are told, is called our *Passover*, inasmuch as by his means our sins are *passed over*, just as by means of the Paschal lamb the children of Israel were passed over in Egypt. So far is well. But how is he said to be *sacrificed* for us?—why, *by not being sacrificed at all;* but, *by being compared to the Paschal lamb, which was a sacrifice!* Here is true logic, and rational criticism.—If the reader should doubt this to be a fair representation of Dr. Sykes's argument, I refer him to the learned Doctor himself, *Scripture Doctrine of Redemption*, No. 640, p. 220.

In justification of what has been advanced in the preceding Number (p. 196,) on the signification of the word פסח, I subjoin the following observations.

This Hebrew word, which we translate *Passover*, was rendered by almost all the early interpreters, in the sense which the English word implies; namely *passing over*. Josephus, who calls it πάσχα, and sometimes φάσκα, expressly affirms, that the Hebrew word signifies ὑπερβασία, or *passing over:* in commemoration of God's having *passed over* (ὑπερβὰς) the Hebrews, when he smote the Egyptians with his plague. (*Antiq.* p. 65.)—Philo, in two distinct parts of his works, explains the word by the term διάβασις, which he uses unequi-

vocally in the sense of *passing over*, i. e. from place to place. (*Opera*, pp. 392. 439.) And, again, in p. 686, he employs the term τὰ διαβατήρια, the *passings over*, or from place to place.—Aquila in his version renders the word by ὑπέρβασις, *a passing over*, using nearly the same term with Josephus.—And Jerome adopts the word *transitus*, as the just equivalent of the Hebrew.

Thus far there appears a perfect agreement amongst the ancient versions; affording at the same time a full justification of the phrase by which we render the Hebrew term in our common English Bibles. Some commentators, however, and those of no mean note, for example, Vitringa, Lowth, Dathe, and Rosenmüller, have raised doubts as to the propriety of the sense conveyed by the word *passover*, in explication of the original term פסח. The difficulties that weigh with the two last are, however, of a nature, to which I cannot help thinking these critics have attached an importance beyond what is justly due. That the Arabic language does not ascribe the sense of *transitio* to the word, seems by no means a proof that it cannot admit that meaning, as these authors contend. (*Dath.* and *Rosenm.* on Exod. xii. 11, and *Dathe* more fully, in *Glass. Phil. Sacr.* pp. 968, 969.) Objections drawn from the kindred dialects ought to be admitted, only in the case of such words as are in themselves of doubtful signification, receiving no illustration either from corresponding passages, or from early versions. Very different is the case of the term in question. Not only, as we have seen, do some of the earliest and most competent translators attribute to it the sense already stated, but several passages of Scripture justify that sense by a corresponding use of the *verb* from which the word is derived. This will appear by considering the several verses of the twelfth chapter of Exodus, in which the institution of the Passover is prescribed, and the reason of its designation by that term expressly assigned.

The communication is first made to Moses by Jehovah.—11. "It is the Lord's *Passover*. (פסח.)—12. For I will pass

(ועברתי) through the land of Egypt this night, and will smite all the first born in the land of Egypt.—13. And the blood shall be to you for a token upon the houses where you are: and when I see the blood, I will *pass* over you, (ופסחתי עלכם) and the plague shall not be upon you for destruction, whilst I smite the land of Egypt."—Again, in verse 23, this communication of Jehovah is conveyed by Moses to the elders of the people in the following words:—"For the Lord will pass (ועבר) through, to smite the Egyptians, and when he seeth the blood, &c., the Lord will *pass* over the door (ופסח יהוה על הפתח) and will not suffer the destruction (or destroying plague) to come into your houses to smite you."—And, lastly, in the 27th verse, when Moses instructs them as to the manner in which they are to explain the rite to their descendants, he tells them that they shall say, "It is the sacrifice of the Lord's *passover* (זבח פסח) who *passed* (פסח) over the houses of the children of Israel in Egypt, when he smote the Egyptians and delivered our houses."

Now, it is evident, that if the *verb* פסח has been rightly interpreted throughout these passages, the *noun* derived from it has been rightly explained.—Let us, then, here consult the versions. The Septuagint, which uses the Hebrew term throughout for the *noun*, (viz. πάσχα—and so through the Pentateuch, but in Chron. φάσεκ,) employs different words in rendering the *verb*. In verse 23. it renders by παρελεύσεται, the very same word by which it translates the verb עבר in the same verse. That the LXX, therefore, admitted the word to bear the sense of *transitus*, or *passing over*, there can be no question. They have, it is true, translated the verb by the word σκεπάζω, in the 13th and 27th verses: but the sense in which they intend that word may well be doubted, when we find it employed by them in 1 Samuel, xxiii. 26, to denote the *tumultuous and eager haste* of David to accomplish his escape. If, however, we suppose it in this place to imply *protection* or *preservation*, the Seventy have then substituted the effect of that act of *passing over* for the act itself: and felt themselves justified in doing so, as they had, at the same time, secured

the word against abuse by giving (as has been mentioned) its literal acceptation. In like manner we find that the other Greek translators, Aquila, Theodotion, and Symmachus, have rendered the participle פסוח by *ὑπερβαίνων* (*passing over*) in Isa. xxxi. 5, where the term is commonly conceived to be used in direct reference to its application here. The LXX there use the term *περιποιήσεται*, instead of which Ms. Pachom. reads *περιβήσεται*, which Bishop Lowth deems the true reading.

There are versions, however, yet to be noted, which assign to the word פסח, as it occurs in Exod. xii., a sense different from that which we have hitherto assigned. In verse 11, the Targum and Persic both render the noun by *pardon, sparing mercy.* Sacrificium *propitiationis* (*Arab.*)—Sacrif. pro *misericordiâ* coram Domino (*Ch.*)—And again, verses 13. 23. 27. *Syr. Arab. Pers.* and *Targ.* render the verb in the same sense, that of *sparing;* quod *misertus* est (*Ch.*), *propitiatus* (*Syr. Arab.*), with which, as we have hinted, the *σκέπασε* of the LXX possibly concurs.—The *Complutensian*, in deference to the above authorities, has interpreted the verb throughout this entire chapter by the words *misereri, parcere;* and many respectable commentators have adopted the same interpretation.

But, how does this connect with the sense of *passing over*, supported by the former versions? Perhaps, a little attention to the radical meaning of the verb פסח may point out that connexion. Fagius, *in locum*, says, that the primary signification of the verb פסח is *saltare, transilire;* unde et *claudum* Hebræi פסח appellant, quod cum ingreditur, quasi *saltare* et *subsilire* videtur. Hence, he adds, the name is derived a *saltu* angeli devastatoris: and he adduces the authority of R. D. Kimchi to this head. That of R. Sol. Jarchi, adduced by Dr. Geddes, is more precise. "Oblatio ista (agni paschalis) vocatur *Pesach*, propter *saltum*, quo sanctus ille BENEDICTUS transibat domos Israelitarum inter domos Egyptiorum, et saliebat de Egyptio in Egyptium: Israelita autem intermedius incolumis relinquebatur." This primary sense of

springing rapidly, or *with a bound*, is that which is admitted generally by Hebrew scholars, and seems undoubtedly to be the true one. If, then, we consider it in this light, Jehovah, who is represented as carrying with him the destroying plague, in mercy to the Israelite, passes rapidly over his house, and thereby saves it from the destruction which is borne along to the mansion of the Egyptian, on which it is allowed to rest and execute its fatal work. Thus, the *passing* of Jehovah *over* (that is, his *rapidly* passing over) the houses of the Israelites, and the *sparing* or *showing mercy* to the Israelites, become naturally connected; and, therefore, either might reasonably be used by interpreters, as the signification of the term in this part of Scripture.

From this view of the case it appears, that Dr. Geddes, in his translation, and still more in his *Critical Remarks*, was not very far from a just *idea* of this subject: but, unfortunately for himself, (from a quaintness, a love of singularity, and a total destitution of taste, which always made even what was right, appear wrong in his hands—nullum quod tetigit non deformavit—) he clothed this just idea in a dress so grotesque, that even he himself was afterwards brought to see and admit the ludicrousness of the garb which he had fixed upon this part of Holy Writ.—It is curious enough to trace the origin of the ridiculous epithet *skip-offering*, which has been adopted by this translator, in the writings of one of the most elegant and classical of our Hebrew critics, the celebrated Bishop Lowth; who expressly describes "the common notion of God's passing over the houses of the Israelites to be, that seeing the blood, he passed over, or *skipped* those houses," &c.

This last named critic, following the steps of Vitringa, has in a note upon Isaiah xxxi. 5. given an explanation of the term פָּסַח, with which the signification of the English word *Pass-over* is totally at variance. Both he and Vitringa admit the primary sense of the verb to be that of *springing forward*, or *leaping forward, with rapidity*, as it has been before explained; and seem to have altogether adopted the exposition

of the word which we have quoted from Fagius. But the notion entertained by these distinguished critics, that two agents were concerned in the preservation of the Israelites on the night of the passover, has led them to assign to the word, as applied in Exodus, the signification of *covering*, i. e. *protecting by covering* (as *Vitringa*), or *springing forward to cover and protect* (as *Lowth*). "Here are manifestly" (says the Bishop) "two distinct agents, with which the notion of *passing over* is not consistent; for that supposes but one agent. The two agents are the destroying angel passing through to smite every house; and Jehovah the protector, keeping pace with him; and who, seeing the door of the Israelite marked with the blood, the token prescribed, leaps forward, throws himself with a sudden motion in the way, opposes the destroying angel, and covers and protects that house against the destroying angel, nor suffers him to smite it."

Here is, undoubtedly, an imposing picture of the transaction, presented to the imagination of the reader; but certainly without any foundation, save what exists in the fancy of the writer An inaccurate translation, indeed, of the 23d verse seems to afford some colour to this view of the transaction; ולא יתן המשחית לבא אל־בתיכם לנגף, being rendered in our common version, "And will not suffer THE DESTROYER to come into your houses to smite you." Rosenmüller attributes this wrong translation to the Septuagint.—"LXX verterunt ὁ ὀλοθρεύων, secuti Judæorum opinionem, tribuentium angelo cuidam, fati ministro, fulgura, pestem, et similia hominibus fatalia: quod commentum et multi Christiani interpretes repetierunt. Sed nil tale in textu." *Schol. in Exod.* xii. 23. Rosenmüller is undoubtedly right in asserting, that there is nothing whatever in the text to justify the idea of a second agent. Whoever reads over the entire chapter with any degree of care, will see, that the Jehovah, who prescribes the rite, is himself the agent throughout, without the least intimation of any other being concerned. For, as to the verse above referred to, its true translation, which I have given in a former part of this discussion, removes at once every sem-

blance of support which it could be supposed to afford to the contrary opinion: the word משחית, (the same which is used in the 13th verse as well as in the 23d,) signifying *perditio*, *vastatio*, *corruptio*, *exterminatio*, (as see *Pol. Syn.* also *Vatabl.* on Exod. xii. 13,) and the נגף למשחית of the 13th verse, signifying exactly the same as the משחית לנגף of the 23d, *i. e.* in both places, the *destroying plague*. Besides, it must be remarked, that the expression *suffer* in the 23d verse, which seems to imply a distinct agent who would enter the house of the Israelite if not prevented, has no authority from the original; the strict translation being "he will not *give*," or "*cause*," (לא יתן); the word נתן never being used in the sense of *permitting*, without the ל marking the dative case of that to which the permission was granted: but the word משחית not only wants the sign of the dative here, but has actually that of the accusative (את) in Ms. 69. of Kennicott's.

It appears, then, upon the whole, that the fancy of a two-fold agent indulged by Vitringa, Lowth, and some other commentators, derives no support whatever from the text of Exodus: and, therefore, the objections, which that fancy alone suggested in opposition to the explanation which has been given of the word פסח, fall to the ground; whilst the admissions of those writers, as to the primary acceptation of the word, must be allowed to stand in confirmation of those very conclusions which they were desirous to overturn.

The passage in Isaiah, indeed, which they were engaged in elucidating, in some degree naturally led them to the view of the subject which we have just noticed. The Prophet having there described Jehovah as protecting Jerusalem, in like manner as mother birds protect by hovering over their young; and this being impossible to be conveyed by a term which merely implied *passing over*, and which, so far from indicating an overshadowing protection, on the contrary necessarily induced an exposure of the defenceless young, and this only the more sudden the more rapid was the transition; the commentators deemed it indispensable to extend the meaning of the word פסח (here employed) beyond the latter sense, and to give to it

such a signification as would admit the former; and perceiving a strong similarity between the application of the term here, and to the deliverance in Egypt, they endeavoured to explain it in such a sense as would embrace both transactions; and were, accordingly, led to that interpretation of the term, which required the twofold agency of which we have spoken. But, why recur upon every occasion to the *primary sense* of a word? Are there not in every language numerous words, in which the *derivative* becomes the prevalent and appropriate sense? And, if we suppose the deliverance from Egypt to have been alluded to by the Prophet, (which, as well from the general similitude of subject, as particularly from the use of the terms פסח and הציל which are conjointly used in speaking of the passover and its effect in Exod. xii. 27, seems scarcely to admit of doubt,) what could be more fit than to adopt that form of expression, which, from its familiar association with the deliverance from Egyptian bondage, had long been employed to designate that deliverance, without any reference whatever to its primary acceptation? In other words, was it not most natural, that any providential preservation or deliverance of the Jewish people should be called by the word *Pesach*, the term used to denominate that recorded act whereby the first great preservation and deliverance of Israel was effected? Might not, then, the Prophet have properly and beautifully employed the word פסח, in the passage referred to, in the sense of God's acting again as a protector and deliverer of his people, in like manner as he had done at the time of the פסח? This gives new beauty to the original passage, and relieves the comparison between its subject and the deliverance in Egypt from all embarrassment; whilst it retains all that attractive imagery, with which the prophet embellishes the original idea. The passage would then stand thus:—

> As the *mother*-birds hovering *over their young;*
> So shall Jehovah, *God* of hosts, protect Jerusalem,
> Protecting and delivering, preserving (*as by a second* PASSOVER) and rescuing her.

Bishop Stock, in his translation, has much disfigured the beauty of this passage; neither displaying taste in the expression, nor judgment in the criticism:—*Birds* protecting the *winged race*, being neither elegant nor quite intelligible: and HOPPING *round and over*, which is rather an odd signification of the word פסוח, being a still odder reason for translating the word by FLYING *round.*

Some have charged the Greeks with corrupting the original word פסח *Pesach*, by writing it πάσχα; and have seemed to intimate that the word was so used by them as if it were derived from πάσχω *patior*, intimating the *sufferings* of our Lord, of which the slaying of the passover was a type. That such an *allusion* may have sometimes been made, as might afford some apparent justification to the charge, there seems reason to admit. (See *Glass. Phil. Sacr.* i. 692; also *Greg. Naz.* Serm. de Pasch. and *Wolf. Cur. Phil.* i. 365.) Yet, the fact is, that the פסח of the Hebrew is written פסחא *Pascha* in the Chaldee, from which the πάσχα of the Greek has immediately flowed.

On the subject of the word *Passover*, I shall only add the following enumeration of its various applications:—1. It signifies the *passing over* of Jehovah, who spared the Israelites when he smote the first-born of the Egyptians. 2. It signifies, by a metonymy, the *lamb slain* in memory of that deliverance. 3. It signifies the *feast day* on which the paschal lamb was slain—viz. the 14th of the first month. 4. and lastly, It signifies the entire continuance and the whole employment of the festival, which commenced with the slaying of the lamb, and continued for seven days.

NO. XXXVI.—ON THE MEANING OF THE WORD TRANSLATED *ATONEMENT* IN THE OLD TESTAMENT.

PAGE 22. (a).—The meaning of the word כפר, the original of the term *atonement* in the Old Testament, has been modelled, like that of other Scripture phrases, so as to fall in with the theories of those, who are more anxious that Scripture should

speak their language, than that they should speak the language of Scripture. The common artifice, by which the terms of Revelation have been discharged of all appropriate meaning, has been here employed with considerable effect. By a comparison of the various passages in which the term occurs, its most general signification is first explored; and *in* this *generic* sense it is afterwards explained, in all the *particular* cases of its application. The manner in which Dr. Taylor has exercised this strange species of criticism on the word *atonement*, in his *Scripture Doctrine*, has been already noticed, pp. 177—182. One or two additional remarks will more fully explain the contrivance, by which this writer has been enabled to shape this expression to his purpose.

Having laid it down as a principle, "that those passages in the Levitical law, in which atonement is said to be made for persons by sacrifice, supply not so many *different* instances of a known sense of the word, atonement, but are to be considered as exhibiting one single instance of a sense which is doubtful;" (*Script. Doct.* ch. iv. § 69;) he pronounces, (ch. v. § 70,) that "the texts which are to be examined, are those, where the word is used extra-levitically, or with no relation to sacrifices; that we may be able to judge what it imports when applied to them." And agreeably to these notions he conducts his inquiry. Now, what is this, but to pronounce first upon the nature of the thing unknown, and then to engage in its investigation? The meaning of the term, in the several instances of its Levitical application, though as yet supposed unknown, is presumed to be the same in all: and this, notwithstanding that these cases of its application must be as different as its objects,—persons, and things; moral and ceremonial disqualifications.

But, not content with thus deciding on the *uniformity* of an *unknown* signification, he proceeds to discover the meaning of the term in those passages which relate to sacrifice, by examining it in others in which it has *no such relation*. The result of this singularly critical examination is, that from 37 texts, which treat of extra-levitical atonements, it may be in-

ferred "that the means of making atonement for sin in different cases are widely different; being sometimes by the sole goodness of God, sometimes by the prayers of good men, sometimes by repentance, sometimes by disciplinary visitation, sometimes by signal acts of justice and virtue: and that any mean, whereby sinners are reformed, and the judgments of God averted, is atoning, or making atonement, for their sins." (Cap. 6. § 112.) What then follows respecting the *Levitical* atonement? Not, that the word, which when used extra-levitically is taken in various senses according to the natural efficacy of the different means employed, is to be applied in its Levitical designation in a sense yet different from these, agreeably to the difference of means introduced by the Levitical institutions: quite the contrary. When specifically restricted to an appropriate purpose, it ceases to have any distinguishing character; and the term, whose signification, when it had no relation to sacrifice, was diversified with the nature of the means and the circumstances of the occasion, is, upon assuming this new relation, pronounced incapable of any new and characteristic meaning. This argument furnishes a striking instance of that species of sophism, which, from a partial, concludes a total agreement. Having discovered, by a review of those passages which treat of extra-levitical atonements, that these and the sacrifices which were offered for sin agreed in their *effect;* namely, in procuring the pardon of sin, or the removal of those calamities which had been inflicted as the punishment of it; the writer at once pronounces the extra-levitical and the sacrificial atonements to have been of the same *nature* throughout; without regarding the utter dissimilarity of the means employed, and without considering that the very question as to the *nature* of the atonement, is a question involving the *means* through which it was effected.

But, whilst Dr. Taylor has thus endeavoured to overturn the generally received notion of atonement, by an examination of such passages as treat of those atonements which were *not* sacrificial, Dr. Priestley professes to have carefully re-

viewed all those instances of atonement which *were* sacrificial; and from this review to have deduced the inference, that the sacrificial atonement merely implies, "the making of any thing *clean* or *holy*, so as to be fit to be used in the service of God; or, when applied to a person, fit to come into the presence of God: God being considered, as in a peculiar manner, the king and the sovereign of the Israelitish nation, and, as it were, keeping a court amongst them." (*Hist. of Cor.* vol. i. p. 193.) Dr. Priestley, by this representation of the matter, endeavours to remove from view whatever might lead the mind to the idea of *propitiating* the Deity; and, by taking care to place the condition of *persons* and *things* on the same ground, he utterly discards the notion of offence and reconciliation. But, in order to effect this, he has been obliged wholly to overlook the force of the original word, which is translated atonement, as well as of that which the LXX have used as its equivalent.

The term כִּפֶּר, in its primary sense, signifies to *smear*, or *cover* with *pitch*, as appears from Gen. vi. 14: and from this covering with pitch, it has been metaphorically transferred to things of a different nature; insomuch that, in all the 37 instances of extra-levitical atonement adduced by Dr. Taylor, he asserts that the word כִּפֶּר retains something of this original sense (*Script. Doctrine*, ch. vi. § 115); and, agreeably to this, he pronounces "atonement for sin to be the covering of sin." This position seems fully confirmed by Nehem. iv. 45; Psal. xxxii. 1; lxxxv. 2; and other passages in Scripture; in which the pardon of sin is expressed by its being covered, and the punishment of it by its not being covered. And Schindler, in his *Lexicon Pentaglotton*, having in like manner fixed the general signification of the word to be *texit, operuit*, modifies this generic signification according to the change of subject, thus:—de facie, seu irâ, *placavit, reconciliavit;* de peccato, *remisit, condonavit, expiavit;* de sordibus, *expurgavit;* de aliis, *abstulit, removit.*

Agreeably to this explanation of the word, in which Hebrew critics almost universally concur, the LXX render it by

ἐξιλάσκομαι, to *appease*, or make *propitious*, and the ancient Latin by *exorare*, and sometimes *deprecari*: (See *Sabatier's Vet. Ital.*) the concealing, and removing from view, whatever is offensive and displeasing to a person, being necessary to reconcile him and render him propitious. And, indeed, in a sense agreeable to this, that of bringing into a state of concord and reconciliation, the word *atonement* itself had been originally used by our old English writers; with whom, according to Junius, Skinner, and Johnson, it was written *at-one-ment*, signifying *to be at one*, or to *come to an agreement*: and in this very sense we find it used by our own translators, in Levit. xvi. 16. 20, where, speaking of the act whereby the High Priest was directed to make atonement for the holy place, they immediately after call it *reconciling* the holy place.

But Dr. Priestley has not only neglected the original and strict signification of the term implying sacrificial atonement, and imposed upon it a sense which at best is but secondary and remote; he has also decided on a partial and hasty view of the subject, even as confined to the English translation: for surely, although it be in every case of atonement evidently implied, that the thing or person atoned for was thereby cleansed, and so rendered fit for the service of God; it must likewise be admitted, that by this they were rendered pleasing to God, having been before in a state impure and unfit for his service, and being now rendered objects of his approbation and acceptance as fit instruments of his worship. The fallacy of Dr. Priestley's interpretation consists in this, that he assumes that to be the sole end of the atonement, which, although an undoubted consequence from it, was inseparably connected with, and subservient to, another and more important effect: the atonement indeed purifying, so as to qualify for the service and worship of God; but this purification consisting in the removal of that, which unfitted and disqualified for such sacred purposes; bringing what before was undeserving the divine regard into a state of agreement with the divine purity, and rendering it the object of the divine

approbation. To make atonement, then, to God, was to remove what was offensive; and thus, by conciliating the divine favour, to sanctify for the divine service.

This general meaning of the expression, modified by the circumstance of its application, will lead us to its true value and force in each particular instance. Thus, in the atonements at the *consecration* of the tabernacle, altars, vessels, and priests; the several instruments and persons destined for the offices of worship, being in their natural state unworthy of this sacred use, were thereby purified from all natural pollution, and rendered fit objects of the divine acceptance. The same may be applied to those atonements appointed for *restoring* persons to the privileges of public worship, who had been disqualified by circumstances of external impurity; such as were occasioned by natural infirmities, diseases, and accidental events. But whilst in these cases, in which moral character could have no concern, the purifying rite of atonement was enjoined, to render both things and persons worthy and approved instruments of the divine worship; so in those where moral character *was* concerned, the atonement made by the sacrifice for sin qualified the transgressor for the divine service, by removing what had been offensive from the sight of him, *who is of purer eyes than to behold iniquity;* the repentance of the offender, aided by the pious observance of the enjoined rite, averting the divine displeasure, and effecting a reconciliation with his offended Sovereign: whilst those who were guilty of a presumptuous and deliberate defiance of the divine authority were cut off from all connexion with their God, and no atonement whatever was allowed for their transgressions. Episcopius seems to state the case very satisfactorily—"Sacrificia *pro peccato*, ea erant quæ offerebantur ad impuritates expiandas, sive eæ essent *morales*, sive *physicæ* aut potius *ceremoniales*. *Morales impuritates* voco, istas quæ animorum sunt: id est, quæ *culpam* aliquam ex animæ sive ignorantia, sive errore, sive imbecillitate ortam in se habent: impuritates enim, quæ per superbiam, &c. contrahebantur, sacrificiis expiari non poterant. *Physicas* sive *ce-*

remoniales impuritates voco, fæditates, sive maculas illas corporis, quæ *nulla culpa* hominis contrahi possunt; quales sunt quæ ex leprosi, mortui contractu," &c.—*Inst. Theol.* Lib. III. Sect. II. cap. iii. vol. i. p. 71.

This view of the matter seems to give to the whole of the Levitical atonement a consistent and satisfactory meaning. The atonement, in all cases, producing the effect of fitting for the divine service:—this, in such as involved no consideration of moral character, (as in the consecration of inanimate things, or the atonement for persons labouring under corporeal impurities,) could consist only in the removal of the external impurity, for in such cases this impediment alone existed: whilst in those in which moral character *was* concerned, as in cases of sin, whereby man, having incurred the displeasure of his God, had disqualified himself for the offices of his worship, the unfitness could have been removed only by such means as, at the same time, removed that displeasure, and restored the offender to the divine favour:—or, in other words, the *atonement* was in such cases an act of *propitiation*. And to such cases it is, that it may be applied in the strict sense of the word *reconciliation;* so that the doctrine of *atonement*, so far as relates to sin, is nothing more than the doctrine of *reconciliation*.

As to the *manner* in which the sacrifice for sin may be supposed to have *operated* to the effecting of this reconciliation, this is of no concern to the present inquiry. That a reconciliation *was* thereby effected, insomuch that the penalty of the transgression was remitted, and the offender restored to the privileges which he had forfeited by his offence, is abundantly manifest. The instances in Scripture, in which the effect of the *atonement* is expressly described as the removal of the divine displeasure, are too numerous to be recited. Let a few suffice.—In Exod. xxxii. 30, 32, Moses, addressing the Israelites after the great crime which they had committed in worshipping the golden calf, says, *Ye have sinned a great sin;* and *now I will go up unto the Lord; peradventure I shall make an* ATONEMENT FOR YOUR SIN: and

these words he immediately after explains, by his prayer to God, that he might *forgive their sin.* Again, we find a stop put to an infliction of punishment, by the atonement made by Aaron for the people in the rebellion of Korah. *And Moses said, take a censer; and go quickly into the congregation, and make an atonement for them; for there is wrath gone out from the Lord; the plague is begun: and Aaron took as Moses commanded him; and made an atonement for the people—and the plague was stayed.* Numb. xvi. 46, 47, 48. The atonement made by Phinehas, and the effect of it, are not less remarkable: God says of him, he *hath* TURNED MY WRATH AWAY *from the children of Israel, (while he was zealous for my sake among them,) that I consumed not the children of Israel in my jealousy—he was zealous for his God, and made an* ATONEMENT *for the children of Israel.* Numb. xxv. 11. 13.

The instances of atonement here adduced, are not, indeed, of the sacrificial kind; but they equally serve to evince the Scripture sense of the term, in cases of transgression, to be that of reconciling the offended Deity, by averting his displeasure: so that, when the atonement for sin is said to be made by sacrifice, no doubt can remain, that the sacrifice was strictly a sacrifice of *propitiation.* Agreeably to this conclusion, we find it expressly declared, in the several cases of piacular oblations for transgression of the divine commands, that the sin, for which atonement was made by those oblations should be *forgiven.* [a]

Dr. Priestley and H. Taylor have of late endeavoured to subvert this notion, by representing sacrifices merely as *gifts,* and atonement as nothing but a ceremonial *purifying and setting apart* from common use, for the divine service, without any idea whatever of propitiation: see *Theol. Repos.* vol. i. p. 199—205, and *B. Mord.* p. 799—805. How far this theory is invalidated by the observations contained in the

[a] See Levit. iv. 20. 26. 31. 35; v. 10. 13. 16. 18; vi. 7; xix. 22. Numb. xv. 25, 26. 28. Consult also Hallet's Notes and Discourses, vol. ii. p. 270—274.

present Number, it remains for the reader to judge. I shall only add, that Dr. Sykes, whose authority both these writers are in general very willing to acknowledge, does not hesitate to pronounce the sacrificial meaning of the word כפרת *atonement* to contain the notion of *propitiation;* deriving it, as has been here done, from the original signification of the word כפר, *to cover*, that is, "to remove or take away anger or offence, by so covering it that it may not appear:" (*Essay on Sacrifices*, pp. 152. 158, 159:) and "to *make atonement for sins*," he says, "is to do something by the means of which a man obtains pardon of them." (p. 306.)

How strongly the propitiatory import of the sacrificial atonement, contended for in this note, was attributed to it by modern Jews, has been already amply detailed in Number XXXIII.—In Dr. Laurence's *Sermon on the Metaphorical Character of the Apostolical Style*, (pp. 17. 32,) there are some good observations on the Targum of Jonathan, tending to confirm the position, that the ideas of *atonement*, and of *forgiveness*, were held by the Jews in the time of our Saviour, as perfectly equivalent.

NO. XXXVII.—ON THE EFFICACY OF THE *MOSAIC ATONEMENT* AS APPLIED TO CASES OF *MORAL* TRANSGRESSION.

PAGE 22. (b).—For the purpose of reducing the sacrificial atonement to the simple notion of *external purification*, it has been thought necessary to deny the appointment of any expiation for the transgressor of the *moral* law. It has been argued, that those *sins* and *iniquities*, for which it is in several instances expressly said that *forgiveness* was procured by the atonement, "do not, in the language of the Old Testament, necessarily imply a deviation from *moral* rectitude, or a transgression of the *moral* law; but are frequently used, when nothing more can be understood, than a privation of that bodily purity, which the *ceremonial* law required; as we read of the *iniquity of the sanctuary*, (Numb. xviii. 1,) and of the *iniquity of the holy things;* (Exod. xxviii. 38;) and as we

find the ashes of the burnt heifer, though applied only for the purification of external uncleanness, expressly called 'the ashes of the burnt heifer of purification for *sin*;' (Numb. xix. 7;) and, in like manner, the oblation required from him who had recovered from a leprosy, a *sin*-offering; the unclean person, though free from blame in a *moral* point of view, yet in the eye of the *law* being deemed a sinner." These observations, it is but fair to confess, are to be found in the pages of one of the ablest advocates of the doctrine of *atonement*. It is also urged that the sins for which atonements were appointed, were, at most, but *sins of ignorance*, to which scarcely any moral character could attach, and which deserved to be ranked in the same class with mere natural or accidental infirmities. This latter point is largely insisted on by writers who oppose the received doctrine of atonement; and it is particularly enforced by a writer in *Theol. Rep.* vol. iii. who signs himself Eusebius, and who professes to enter fully into an examination of the several cases of atonement recorded in the Old Testament.

In reply to the first of these arguments, let it be remarked, 1. That the expressions so much relied on, *iniquity of the holy things*, *iniquity of the sanctuary*, mean merely the *profanation*, or *improper use* of the holy things, &c.; so that the iniquity here refers to the *persons* making this improper use of the holy things, not to the *things* themselves: and thus the entire objection, derived from the use of this expression, falls to the ground. This appears, as well from the force of the term in the original, which is translated, *iniquity;* as from the context of the passages referred to. The Hebrew word עון being derived from עוה, the strict signification of which is *to turn, or be turned, aside from the proper state or destination*, applies with peculiar propriety to the improper, or profane use of the holy things of the sanctuary. And this sense is supported by the passages in which the expression occurs; the Priests *bearing the iniquity of the Sanctuary*, (Numb. xviii. 1,) and Aaron *bearing the iniquity of the holy things*, (Ex. xxviii. 38,) manifestly relating, and being understood by

every commentator to relate, to the care to be taken that no improper use or legal defilement should profane the sacred things; inasmuch as, in such case, it would rest with Aaron, and with the priests, to bear the punishment of, or make atonement for, such profanation. Thus Jarchi on Numb. xviii. 1. "Upon you I will bring the punishment of the strangers, that shall sin concerning the sanctified things that are delivered unto you." Houbigant translates the words in Numb. *sustinebit sanctuarii noxas; i. e.* as he explains it, reus erit delicti in sanctuarium admissi,—and in Exodus, *suscipiet maculas donorum.*—See also *Ainsworth, Patrick, Calmet, Le Clerc, Dathius,* and, in short, all the commentators, who concur in this interpretation; and in like manner explain the passage in Exodus: see likewise Levit. xvi. 16—19.

But as the word *iniquity,* thus applied to the sacred *things,* will not prove, that by *sin,* in the Levitical law, nothing more was intended than *external defilement;* so neither will, 2. The application of the term *sin* and *sin-offering* to *persons* labouring under mere *corporeal impurities.* Respecting the case of the burnt heifer, in which, though intended solely for the purification of external uncleanness, the ashes are expressly called *the ashes of the burnt heifer of purification for sin,* it must be noted, that the argument here is chiefly derived from the words of the translation, without attending sufficiently to the original; the words in the Hebrew signifying literally, *the ashes of the burnt sin-offering.*[a] *Purification for sin,* then, is not the language of the original; and from this, consequently, nothing can be inferred. But, even admitting that the corporeal impurities arising from leprosy, puerpery, contact of the dead, and other such causes, are spoken of as *sins committed* by the persons labouring under them, in like manner as the direct and voluntary transgressions of the divine commands; admitting that it is pronounced of the former, equally as of the latter, that, in virtue

[a] See *Ainsworth, Patrick,* and *Dathe,* on Numb. xix. 17, also *Richie's Pecul. Doctr.* vol. i. p. 212.

of the atonement, *the sin which had been* COMMITTED *was* FORGIVEN *them;* admitting that the sin-offering, on these occasions, looked solely to the uncleanness, without having any respect to the *general* sinfulness and unworthiness of the person seeking to be restored to the privileges of the public worship of God; and admitting that, in looking to the particular instance of uncleanness, it could not have been intended (as the later Jews explain it, see p. 173 [a]) through that, to have referred to that original guilt incurring the penalty of death, from which this and the other infirmities of man's nature had taken their rise; or to some specific crime, by which these bodily inflictions had been incurred [b]:—admitting, I say, all these things, (which however it would be extremely difficult to prove,) and, consequently, admitting that the terms, *sin*, and *sin-offering*, as applied to *these*, could merely signify external uncleanness, and the appointed means of removing it; yet can this furnish no inference whatever affecting those cases, in which the disqualification to be removed by the sin-offering is expressly stated to be, *not* that of external uncleanness, but a disqualification resulting from a transgression of the divine commands. This, however it may be called a *legal* offence, cannot be thereby divested of its intrinsic nature, but must still inevitably remain a *moral* transgression. And when atonement is said to be made for *sins committed against any of the commandments of the Lord*, it must surely be a strange species of interpretation that can confound such sins with mere external pollution, and the *forgiveness* granted to such offences with the mere cleansing from an accidental impurity. It will appear yet more strange, when we come to notice, under the next head, some specific violations of the moral law, for which atonements were appointed.

But it is contended, that those transgressions of the divine commands, for which atonements were appointed, were merely

[a] See also *Ainsworth*, on Numb. xix. 16. Lev. xii. 7, and xiv. 32. 34. 49; and *Jennings's Jew. Antiq.* vol. i. p. 322.

[b] See *Episcopius*, de lepra, *Inst. Theol.* L. III. sect. ii. cap. 3. § 33. —also p. 173 of this volume.

sins of ignorance; to which, as the writer in the *Theol. Rep.* pronounces, scarcely any moral character could attach; and which, therefore, might justly be ranked in the same class with the former cases of accidental defilement. As this argument has been a good deal relied on, it becomes necessary to consider, more particularly, the nature of those transgressions for which atonements were appointed, and the force of that expression in the original, which has been usually understood as implying sins of ignorance.

And 1. it must certainly be admitted, that sins of *ignorance*, in the direct sense of the word, are intended by the expression, since we find it expressly stated in some places that *they wist it not;* and, again, that the sins were *done without their knowledge* and *were hidden from them*, and had *come to their knowledge* after they were committed. (Levit. iv. 13, 14. 23. 28; v. 2, 3. 17, 18; Numb. xv. 24.) Yet, even here, the ignorance intended cannot have been of a nature absolute and invincible, but such as the clear promulgation of their law, and their strict obligation to study it day and night, rendered them accountable for, and which was consequently in a certain degree culpable. Thus Houbigant, on Lev. iv. 2. Nos per *imprudentiam*, ut multi alii per *errorem;* melius quam Vulgatus, per *ignorantiam*. Nam leges per Mosen promulgatas, et sæpe iteratas, *ignorare* Israelitæ non poterant. This is also agreeable to the general language of Scripture; in which, crimes said to be committed by persons, κατὰ ἄγνοιαν, *in ignorance*, are nevertheless represented strictly as crimes, inasmuch as that ignorance might have been removed by a careful and candid search after their duty; and thus, being voluntary, their ignorance itself was criminal. See Acts iii. 17, where the Jews who crucified Christ are said to have acted κατὰ ἄγνοιαν. St. Paul also ascribes the enormous wickedness of the Heathen world to *the ignorance that was in them*, Eph. iv. 18. And their vicious desires, St. Peter calls, ἐν τῇ ἀγνοίᾳ ἐπιθυμίαις, *lusts in ignorance*, 1 Pet. i. 14.[a]

[a] See also Acts, xvii. 30; Rom. x. 3; 1 Tim. i. 13; and numerous other passages of the New Testament.

Thus, then, even though the expression in the original were confined to sins of ignorance, yet would it not follow, that it meant such acts as were incapable of all moral character, and might be classed with mere corporeal infirmities, to which the notion of punishment could not possibly attach. But that the expression, besides sins of ignorance, includes likewise all such as were the consequence of human frailty and inconsideration, whether committed knowingly and wilfully, or otherwise, will appear from considering the true force of the original term שגגה, or משגה, which, together with its root שגג, שגה, or שוג, is found, in numerous passages of Scripture, to signify the species of offence here described, in opposition to that which involves a deliberate and presumptuous contempt of God's authority. Cocceius thus explains it—"Si, putantes licitum, fecerint illicitum, *ignorantiâ* verbi: aut, si *præoccupatus* egerit, quod *novit esse illicitum*." The word, he says, as it occurs in Numb. xv. 22. 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, is directly opposed to ביד רמה, in verse 30, sinning *with a high hand*, that is, deliberately and presumptuously. He also explains it, as implying a full and entire engrossment of mind and affection, producing a temporary oblivion of what is right: which is nothing more than the common effect of any passion which has taken strong hold of the mind. For this he instances Isai. xxviii. 7. In like manner Dr. Taylor, in his *Concordance*, understands the word—"שגג, to err, to do what is wrong, through ignorance, mistake, bad advice, or persuasion—or *through the violence of some strong passion or affection*." Dr. Richie, also, (*Pecul. Doct.* vol. i. pp. 226, 227,) adduces a great number of passages to prove, that the word in question "denotes any sin, which doth not proceed from a deliberate contempt of authority, but from human frailty or infirmity only." See also *Hammond*, *Le Clerc*, and *Rosenmüller*, in Hebr. ix. 7,—where they supply numerous instances to prove, that both ἀγνοεῖν, and שגה, are used in the sense here given, as extending to all sins that were not of the class of presumptuous, or such as by the law were necessarily to be punished with death. Rosenmüller adds, that for *every*

sin, except those to which death was annexed, atonement was made on the day of expiation. Now it is remarkable, that, for the sins atoned for on that day, the very word which is used by the Apostle in his Epistle to the Hebrews, (ix. 7,) is ἀγνοήματα.[a] But, in fact, the opposition already alluded to

[a] *Schleusner*, in his *Spicileg. Lexic. in Int. Græc. V. T.* p. 3, thus explains the words ἀγνοίω and ἀγνόημα. "Ἀγνοίω notat simpliciter *pecco*, sine adjunctâ notione *ignorantiæ*. Erravit Bielius, qui ἀγνοεῖν tantum *ex ignorantia peccare* notare dicit. Cf. *Sirac.* v. 18. ἐν μεγάλῳ καὶ μικρῷ μὴ ἀγνοεῖ, μηδὲ ἴν: h. e. nullum plane peccatum committe, nec grave nec leve. Hæc notio etiam ex Hebraicis verbis שגג, אשם, et שגה, quibus ἀγνοεῖν in verss. Græc. respondet, apparet."—"Ἀγνοήματα, *peccata* simpliciter. 1 Macc. xiii. 39. ubi cum vocabulo ἁμαρτήματα permutatur. (Cf. Levit. xxvi. 39. ubi Hebraicum עון Aqu. ἄγνοιαν reddit.) Locum e Philone huc facientum dedit cl. Loesnerus ad Hebr. ix. 7. Sic ἀγνωμονεῖν apud *Xen. Hist. Græc.* I. 7. 10. simpliciter *inique agere* notat: ubi bene præcipit S. R. Morus, verba apud Græcos, vi originis scientiam aut inscientiam experimentia, ut in omnibus linguis, notare virtutes et vitia, quæ illam scientiam et inscientiam, vel necessario, vel plerumque, sequi soleant."

Loesner also remarks thus on the words, ὑπὲρ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν τοῦ λαοῦ ΑΓΝΟΗΜΑΤΩΝ, in Hebr. ix. 7.—"Apud Alexandrinos Interpp. locis pluribus ἄγνοιας vel ἀγνοήματα de *peccatis* et *delictis* quibusvis ad exprimendum Hebraicum חטאה dici, ignotum esse harum literarum amantibus non potest. Adjungamus *Philonem* lib. de *Plant. Noe.* p. 229. c. scribentem, Θυσίαι ὑπομιμνήσκουσι τὰς ἑκάστων ΑΓΝΟΙΑΣ τι καὶ διαμαρτίας, victimæ in memoriam revocant singulorum peccata et delicta."

The observations also of *Danzius*, on the word ἀγνοήματα in the aforementioned passage of Hebr. deserve particularly to be attended to. "*Peccata* quæ *expianda* sunt, vocantur hic ἀγνοήματα. Quæ *Socinianis* haud alia sunt, quam *quæ vel ignorantiâ sive oblivione juris alicujus divini, ex vel ignorantiâ facti et circumstantiarum, vel etiam ex humanâ quâdam imbecillitate proficiscuntur*. Equidem concedendum omnino est, ἀγνοήματα hinc inde in scriptis sacris ac profanis pro hujus generis extare peccatis. Quod autem et *voluntaria* ac *graviora* haud raro denotet, satis superque docent dicta Psal. xxv. 7. ubi פשע (quod quam magnum designet peccatum, mox dicturi sumus) LXX reddiderunt per ἄγνοιαν. Hoseæ, iv. 15, spiritualis Israelitarum scortatio per verbum ἀγνοῖω, pro Ebraico זנה positum, exprimitur; quæ sane leve ac ex ignorantiâ commissum peccatum non fuit: prout ex toto hoc capite satis clare apparet. Etiam Jud. v. 19, 20. pro quibusvis delictis idem vocabulum ponitur. Hinc et Syrus interpres pro ἀγνοήμασι Apostoli in loco citato, (viz. Hebr. ix. 7,) posuit ܫܓܝܐ: quâ voce quævis designantur peccata (vide Matt. xviii. 35), etiam illud ab Adamo perpetratum (vid. Rom. v. 16. sqq.), quod certe nec leve fuit, nec ex ignorantiâ commissum. Imo ex collatione loci Lev. xvi. sole lucidius patet, hic sub voce τῶν ἀγνοημάτων omnis generis contineri peccata. Siquidem ibi satis perspicue docetur, *omnia* peccata, in anniversario isto sacrificio expiari. Et quidem omnia illa, quæ supra vocibus עון, פשע, ac חטאה erant expressa. Atque sub se continent quidquid omnino venit sub *peccati* nomine." The writer then proceeds, from a strict investigation of the exact sense of these Hebrew

in Numb. xv. 27. 30, seems at once to decide the point. For there we find the sins implied by the word שגגה, directly opposed to sins of *presumption;* that is, to such as proceeded, *not* from human frailty, but from a deliberate and audacious defiance of the divine authority; which appears to be the true meaning of *presumptuous sins,* as may be collected from Numb. xv. 30, 31; Exod. xxi. 14;—and v. 2. compared with xviii. 11; Deut. i. 42, 43; xvii. 12, 13; xviii. 22; and various other passages. See *Pec. Doct.* vol. i. pp. 229, 230; also *Maim. Mor. Nev.* part. 3. cap. 1. And hence it appears, that, so far as the force of the original term is considered, the efficacy of the atonement was extended to all sins which flowed from the infirmities and passions of human nature; and was withheld only from those which sprang from a presumptuous defiance of the Creator.

The word ἀκουσίως, used by the LXX in the translation of the term, though it seems to imply an *involuntary act,* is yet by no means inconsistent with this exposition. The force of this term, as applied by the LXX, is evidently not incompatible with a perfect consciousness of the crime committed, and is used only in opposition to ἑκουσίως, by which they everywhere describe such an act as is entirely spontaneous and deliberate, which, in the words of Episcopius, is performed, *plenâ voluntate;* or, as he again explains it, which *is done wilfully,* and *with a fixed and deliberate purpose of transgression.* (*Inst. Theol.* lib. iii. sect. ii. cap. 3. § 9. 14.) Ἀκουσίως, then, is not to be considered as denoting an act, strictly speaking, *involuntary;* but as opposed to what was *deliberate* and *wilful:* it is, therefore, applied with propriety to all sins of *infirmity.* The use of the word ἑκουσίως in Hebr. x. 26 throws abundant light on the force of this ex-

words, as well as from a copious enumeration of the opinions of the great Jewish doctors, to confirm his position, that in the word ἀγνοήματα, as used by the Apostle, (Heb. ix. 7,) *sins of every description* are indiscriminately alluded to. See *Danz. Funct. Pontif. Max. in Adyt. Anniv.* in *Meuschen Nov. Test. ex Talm.* p. 1007—1012.

pression. See *Ainsworth* on Lev. iv. 2. See also the authorities adduced by *Elsner, Observat. Sacr.* vol. i. p. 494.

But, 2dly, the conclusion, which has been here derived from the signification of the original word, is fully confirmed by the cases of atonement referred to in the text; since the offences there described are clearly such as can by no means be brought within the description of sins of *ignorance:* it being impossible that a man could deny, or keep back, that which was entrusted to him by another; or take from another his property by violence or deceit; or deny upon oath, and withhold from the proper owner, what he had found, without a consciousness of the guilt. Besides, it is to be observed, that, neither in these, nor in the case of the bond-maid, is it said that the sin was *committed in ignorance;* but, on the contrary, the very expressions used in the original, unequivocally mark a consciousness of crime in the several instances alluded to; as may be seen particularly in *Outram De Sacrif.* lib. i. cap. xiii. § 4, where this point is fully established in opposition to Episcopius. These crimes, indeed, of fraud, perjury, violent injustice, and debauchery, the writer in the *Theol. Rep.* seems disposed to treat as venial offences, being criminal, as he says, *but in a low degree.* (Vol. iii. p. 412.) But, for the purpose of proving that no atonements were appointed for transgressions of the moral law, it would be necessary to shew that these acts were not *in any degree* criminal: this, however, he has not attempted; and he is, consequently, in the conclusion compelled to admit, (p. 414,) that the Levitical atonements extended to violations of the moral law. Sykes also, it must be observed, is obliged to confess, that the cases here alluded to are cases of "known and open wickedness." (*Script. Doct. of Redemp.* p. 331.) Hallet expressly says, "It is *certain*, that there were sacrifices under the law appointed to make atonement for *moral* evil and for *moral* guilt; particularly *lying, theft, fraud, extortion, perjury,* as it is written, Lev. vi. 1, 2, &c."—*Notes and Discourses,* vol. ii. pp. 277, 278.

Now, that these atonements, in cases of moral transgression,

involved a real and literal remission of the offence, that is, of the penalty annexed to it, will appear from considering not only the rigorous sanction of the Mosaic law in general, by which he, *who did not continue in* ALL *the words of the law to do them*, was pronounced *accursed*, (Gal. iii. 10; Deut. xxvii. 26,) and consequently subjected to the severest temporary inflictions; but also the particular cases, in which the piacular sacrifices are directly stated to have procured a release from the temporal punishments specifically annexed to the transgression: as in the cases of fraud, false-swearing, &c., which, with the punishments annexed by the law, and the remission procured by the piacular oblation, may be seen enumerated by Grotius, (*De Satisfact. Chr.* cap. x.,) and still more fully by Richie. (*Pecul. Doct.* vol. i. pp. 232—252.) Houbigant also speaks of it as a matter beyond question, that, in such offences as admitted of expiation under the Mosaic law, a release from the temporal penalty of the transgression was the necessary result of the atonement: on Levit. v. 4, he describes the effect of the atonement to be, "ut post expiationem religione factam, non sit amplius legum civilium pœnis obnoxius." Hallet says, that the sacrifices "procured for the offender a deliverance from that punishment of *moral guilt*, which was appointed by the law;" and he instances the case of *theft*, in which, though the offender was liable to be cut off by the miraculous judgment of God, yet the sacrifice had the virtue of releasing from that immediate death, which the law had denounced against that particular sin.—*Notes and Disc.* pp. 276—278.

That the remission of sins obtained by the Levitical sacrifices was a remission only of temporal punishments, cannot weaken the general argument; as the sanctions of the law, under which the sacrifices were offered, were themselves but temporary. The remission of the penalty due to the transgression was still real and substantial: the punishment was averted from the offender, who conformed to the appointed rite; and the sacrificial atonement was, consequently, in such cases, an act of propitiation. The sacrifices of the law, in-

deed, considered *merely* as the performance of a ceremonial duty, could operate only to the reversal of a *ceremonial* forfeiture, or the remission of a *temporal* punishment: that is, they could propitiate God only in his temporal relation to his chosen people, as their Sovereign: and for this plain reason,—because the ostensible performance of the rite being but an act of external submission and homage, when not accompanied with an internal submission of mind and a sincere repentance, it could acquit the offender only in reference to that external law, which exacted obedience to God as a civil prince. In such cases, the Jewish sacrifices, merely as legal observances, operated only to the temporal benefits annexed by the Levitical institution to those expressions of allegiance: but, as genuine and sincere acts of worship and penitence, whenever the piety of the offerer rendered them such, they must likewise have operated to procure that spiritual remission and acceptance, which, antecedent to and independent of the Levitical ordinances, they are found in several parts of Scripture to have been effectual to obtain.

The author of the *Scripture Account of Sacrifices* (p. 168) thus reasons upon this subject:—"This people, (the Jews,) as to their inward state, were doubtless under the same control, both of the law of nature and of the divine Providence, as they were before the *law;* this having introduced no change in this respect. They were consequently entitled to the pardon of *all* their sins, of what nature soever, upon the same terms as before." And then he goes on to shew, that, with the sacrifices of the law, they continued to offer such also as had been customary in the Patriarchal times. And, in proof of this, he adduces instances from the law itself, in which such sacrifices are referred to and recognised. They appear manifestly alluded to in the two first chapters of Leviticus, in which the language marks the offering to be of a purely voluntary nature, and merely prescribes the *manner* in which such an offering was to be made: whereas, when *specific* legal and moral offences are to be expiated, the law *commands* the offering, and the specific nature of it. He adduces also the

cases of David, and of Eli's house, to shew that Scripture supplies instances of "sacrifices offered out of the occasions prescribed by the law, for averting the divine displeasure upon the occasion of sin." (P. 173.) What this writer justly remarks concerning sacrifices distinct from those prescribed by the law, I would apply to all; and consider the penitent and devout sentiments of the offerer, as extending the efficacy of the Levitical sacrifice to the full range of those benefits, which, before the Levitical institution, were conferred on similar genuine acts of worship.

Nor let it be objected to this, that the Apostle has pronounced of the Levitical offerings, that they *could not make perfect as pertaining to the conscience.* (Hebr. ix. 9; x. 1.) The sacred writer here evidently speaks in comparison. He marks the inferiority of the *figure* to the *substance*, and the total insufficiency of the type, considered independently of that from which its entire virtue was derived, to obtain a perfect remission. It might, indeed, he argues, by virtue of the positive institution, effect an external and ceremonial purification; but beyond this it could have no power. *The blood of bulls and of goats could not*, of itself, *take away sins.* It could not render the mere Mosaic worshipper PERFECT *as to conscience.* It can have no such operation, but as connected, in the eye of faith, with that more precious blood-shedding, which can *purge the conscience from dead works to serve the living God.* It could not, says Peirce, on Hebr. ix. 9, "with reference to the conscience, make perfect the worshipper, who *only* worshipped with meat and drink offerings and washings, &c."—In this view of the subject, the remarks contained in this Number seem no way inconsistent with the language of the Apostle.

One observation more, arising from the passage of the Apostle here referred to, I would wish to offer.—In pointing out the inferiority of the Mosaic to the Christian institution, we find the writer, in the tenth chapter, not only *asserting* the inefficacy of the Mosaic sacrifice for the full and perfect remission of sins, but taking considerable pains to *prove* it.

Now from this it seems, that the Jews themselves, so far from confining their legal atonements to the mere effect of *ceremonial* purification, were too prone to attribute to them the virtue of a *perfect* remission of all moral guilt. Of this there can be no question as to the later Jews. Maimonides expressly says in his treatise, *De Pœnit.* cap. i. § 2, that "the scape-goat made atonement for all the transgressions of the law, both the lighter and the more heavy transgressions, whether done presumptuously or ignorantly: all are expiated by the scape-goat, if, indeed, the party repent." I would remark here, that though Maimonides evidently stretches the virtue of the atonement beyond the limits of the law, (presumptuous sins not admitting of expiation,) yet he seems to have reasoned on a right principle, in attributing to the sincere and pious sentiments of the offerer the power of extending the efficacy of the atonement to those moral offences, which the legal sin-offering, *by itself*, could never reach.

NO. XXXVIII.—ON THE *VICARIOUS IMPORT* OF THE MOSAIC SACRIFICES.

PAGE 23. (c).—I have, in the page here referred to, used the expression vicarious *import*, rather than *vicarious*, to avoid furnishing any colour to the idle charge, made against the doctrine of atonement, of supposing a real substitution in the room of the offender, and a literal translation of his guilt and punishment to the immolated victim; a thing utterly incomprehensible, as neither *guilt* nor *punishment* can be conceived, but with reference to *consciousness*, which cannot be transferred. But to be exposed to *suffering*, in consequence of another's guilt; and thereby, at the same time, to *represent* to the offender, and to release him from, the punishment due to his transgression, involves no contradiction whatever. In this sense, the suffering of the animal may be conceived a substitute for the punishment of the offender; inasmuch as it is in virtue of that suffering that the sinner is released. If it be asked, what connexion can subsist between

the death of the animal and the acquittal of the sinner? I answer, without hesitation, I know not. To unfold divine truths by human philosophy, belongs to those who hold opinions widely different from mine on the subject of atonement. To the Christian it should be sufficient, that Scripture has clearly pronounced this connexion to subsist. That the death of the animal could possess no such intrinsic virtue is manifest; but that divine appointment could bestow upon it this expiatory power, will not surely be denied: and as to the fact of such appointment, as well as its reference to that great Event from which this virtue was derived, the word of Revelation furnishes abundant evidence, as I trust appears from the second of the Discourses contained in this volume.

Now, that the offering of the animal slain in sacrifice may be considered vicarious in the sense here assigned, that is, vicarious in *symbol*, (or as representing the penal effects of the offerer's demerits, and his release from the deserved punishment in consequence of the death of the victim,)—seems to require little proof, beyond the passages of Scripture referred to in the text. If farther evidence should, however, be required, we shall find it in a more particular examination of that most solemn service of the yearly atonement, described in pp. 41, 42, of this volume. Meanwhile, it may be worth while to inquire, how far the arguments urged in opposition to the vicarious nature of the Mosaic sacrifices will operate against *this* acceptation. And, for this purpose, it will be sufficient to examine the objections, as stated by Sykes, and H. Taylor; inasmuch as the industry of the former, and the subtilty of the latter, have left none of the arguments of Socinus, Crellius, or the other learned antagonists of the doctrine of atonement, unnoticed or unimproved; and the skirmishing writers of the present day have done nothing more than retail, with diminished force, the same objections.

They are all reduced by Sykes and Taylor under the following heads:—1. It is nowhere *said* in the Old Testament, that the life of the victim was given *as a vicarious substitute* for the life of him who offered it. 2. The atonement was not

made by the *death* of the animal, but by the sprinkling of the blood at the altar. 3. No atonement *could* be made, where *life* was forfeited. 4. Atonements were made by the sacrifice of animals in some cases where *no guilt was involved.* And 5. Atonements were sometimes made *without the death* of an animal, or any blood-shedding whatever[a].—This is the sum total of the arguments, collected by the industry of these writers, against the notion of the vicarious nature of sacrifice: and it must be remembered, that Sykes applies these to the idea, that "the taking away the life of the animal was designed to put the offerer in mind of his demerits," no less than to the idea, that "the life of the animal was given in lieu of the life of the sinner;" (pp. 120, 121,) so that they may fairly be replied to, on the principle of atonement here contended for.

Now, to the first of these objections it may be answered, that it is again and again asserted in the Old Testament, that, in cases where punishment had been incurred, and even where (as we shall see hereafter) life itself was forfeited, the due oblation of an animal in sacrifice was effectual to procure the reversal of the forfeiture, and the pardon of the offender; that is, the death of the animal was so far represented as standing in place of the offender's punishment, and in some cases even of his death, that through it, no matter how operating, the offerer was enabled to escape. This, however, is not deemed sufficient. Some precise and appropriate phrase, unequivocally marking a strict vicarious substitution, is still required. But as a strict vicarious substitution, or literal equivalent, is not contended for, no such notion belonging to the doctrine of atonement, it is not necessary that any such phrase should be produced. The words, כפר, and נשא, in their sacrificial application, sufficiently *admit* the *vicarious import;* and the description of the sacrificial ceremony and its consequences, especially in the instance of the scape-goat,

[a] See *Sykes's Essay on Sacr.* pp. 121—141. *Ben. Mord.* pp. 797—799, and *Crell. contra Grot.* cap. x.

positively *prove* it; and beyond this nothing farther can be required.

But it is curious to remark, that both Sykes and Taylor, in their eagerness to demonstrate that the sacrificial terms conveyed nothing whatever of a vicarious import, have urged an objection, which rebounds with decisive force against their own opinion. "The life of the animal," say they, "is never called, in the Old Testament, a *ransom;* nor is there any such expression, as λύτρον, ἀντίλυτρον, ἀντίψυχον, *equivalent, exchange, substitute,* &c." *Essay on Sacr.* p. 134. *B. Mord.* p. 197.—Now, not to speak of their criticisms on the expressions in the *original,* (particularly on the word כפר,) which merely go to prove that these words do not *necessarily* convey such ideas, inasmuch as, being of a more extended signification, they are not in *all* cases applied exactly in this sense—an argument, which will easily strip most Hebrew terms of their true and definite meaning, being, as they are denominated by Grotius, (*De Satis. Chr.* cap. viii. § 2, 3,) πολύσημοι—not to speak, I say, of such criticisms, nor to urge the unfairness of concluding against the meaning of the original, from the language used in the Greek translation; have not these writers, by admitting that the words λύτρον, ἀντίλυτρον, &c., if applied to the Mosaic sacrifices, would have conveyed the idea of vicarious substitution, thereby established the force of these expressions, when applied in the New Testament to the death of Christ, (Matt. xx. 28; Mark x. 46; 1 Tim. ii. 6,) which being expressly said to be a sacrifice for the sins of men, and being that true and *substantial* Sacrifice, which those of the law but faintly and imperfectly represented, consequently reflects back upon them its attributes and qualities, though in an inferior degree?

Again, *secondly,* it is contended, that the atonement was not made by the *death* of the animal, but by the sprinkling of the blood.—True; and by this very sprinkling of the blood before the altar, it was, that, according to the prescribed rites of sacrifice, the *life* of the animal was *offered;* as appears

from the express letter of the law, which declares *the life to be in the blood*, and subjoins, as a consequence from this, that *it is the blood* (the vehicle of life, or, as it is called a few verses after, the life itself) *that maketh an atonement for the soul*, or life, of the offerer. See *Ainsworth* and *Patrick*, on Levit. xvii. 11; and for the concurrent opinions of all the Jewish doctors on this head, see *Outram, De Sacrif.* lib. i. cap. xxii. § 11.—The rendering of the above verse of Leviticus in the Old Italic version is remarkable: *Anima enim omnis carnis sanguis ejus est: et ego dedi eum vobis, exorare pro animabus vestris; sanguis enim ejus pro animâ exorabit. Sabatier. Vet. Ital.* And even Dr. Geddes's translation is decidedly in favour of the sense in which the passage has been applied in this Number. "*For the life of all flesh being in the blood, it is my will, that by it an atonement shall be made, at the altar, for your lives.*"

But, *thirdly*, the sacrifice could not have implied any thing vicarious, as no atonement could be made where life was forfeited.—There is no argument advanced by the opponents of the doctrine of atonement with greater confidence than this, and there is none which abounds with greater fallacies. It is untrue, in point of fact; it is sophistical, in point of reasoning; and it is impertinent, in point of application.

1. It is untrue; for atonements *were* made in cases where *without atonement* life was forfeited. This appears, at once, from the passage of Levit. last referred to; which positively asserts the atonement to be made for the *life* of the offerer: it also appears from the unbending rigour of the law in general, which seems to have denounced death against every violation of it, (see Deut. xxvii. 26; Ezek. xviii. 19—23; Gal. iii. 10; James ii. 10,) and, in particular, from the specific cases, of *perjury*, (Levit. vi. 3,) and of *profane swearing*, (v. 4,) for which atonements were appointed, notwithstanding the strict sentence of the law was death, (Exod. xx. 7, and Levit. xxiv. 16,)—see on this *Grot. De Satisf.* cap. x. § 3. *Hallet's Notes and Disc.* pp. 275—278, and *Richie's Pecul.*

Doct. vol. i. pp. 245—249. 280. This last writer, it is to be observed, though opposing the doctrine of vicarious suffering, and wishing to avail himself of the objection here urged, yet finds himself not at liberty to advance farther than to state, that *it seldom happened* that death was denounced against any offences for which atonement was appointed.

2. It is sophistical; for, from the circumstances of atonement not being appointed in those cases in which death was peremptorily denounced, it is inferred, that no atonement could be made where life was forfeited; whereas the true statement of the proposition evidently is, that life was forfeited where no atonement was permitted to be made. It is true, indeed, that death is not expressly denounced in those cases in which atonements were allowed; but this was *because* the atonement was permitted to arrest the sentence of the law; as appears particularly from this, that, where the prescribed atonement was not made, the law, no longer suspended in its natural operation, pronounced the sentence of death. The real nature of the case seems to be this: the rigid tendency of the law being to secure obedience, on pain of forfeiture of life, all such offences as were of so aggravated a kind as to preclude forgiveness were left under the original sentence of the law, whilst such as were attended with circumstances of mitigation were forgiven on the condition of a public and humble acknowledgment of the offence, by complying with certain prescribed modes of atonement. It should be remembered, also, that the law was not given at different times, so as that its denunciations and atonements should be promulged at different periods; both were announced at the same time, and, therefore, in such cases as admitted of pardon, the penalty being superseded by the atonement, the punishment strictly due to the offence is not denounced, and can only be collected now from the general tendency of the law, from some collateral bearings of the Mosaic code, or from the inflictions which actually followed on the neglect of the atonement. The whole strength of the present objection

rests then upon this :—that we have not both the atonement prescribed, and the punishment denounced; that is, the punishment both remitted, and denounced, at the same time.

But I have dwelt too long upon this; especially when, 3dly, the whole argument is inapplicable. For even they, who hold the doctrine of a vicarious *punishment*, feel it not necessary to contend that the evil inflicted on the victim should be exactly the same in quality and degree, with that denounced against the offender; as it depends, they say, upon the will of the legislator, what satisfaction he will accept in place of the punishment of the offender, see *Outram, De Sacr.* lib. i. cap. xxi. § 1, 2. 9. But still less will this argument apply, where vicarious *punishment* is not contended for, but merely an emblematic substitute, the result of institution, and which in no respect involves the notion of an equivalent.

Fourthly, The atonement by animal sacrifice, in cases not involving moral guilt, can only prove, that there were sacrifices which were not vicarious, inasmuch as there were some that were not for sin: but it by no means follows, that, where moral guilt *was* involved, the sacrifice was not vicarious. Now it is only in this latter case that the notion of a vicarious sacrifice is contended for, or is, indeed, conceivable. And, accordingly, it is only in such cases that we find those ceremonies used, which mark the vicarious import of the sacrifice. The symbolical translation of sins, and the consequent pollution of the victim, are confined to those sacrifices which were offered confessedly in expiation of sins; the most eminent of which were those offered on the day of expiation, and those for the High Priest, and for the entire congregation, (Lev. xvi. 15—28; iv. 3—12, and 13—22,) in all of which, the pollution caused by the symbolical transfer of sins is expressed by the burning of the victim without the camp: see *Outr. De Sacr.* lib. i. cap. xvii. § 1, 2. Thus it appears, that the very mode of sacrifice, as well as the occasion of its being offered, clearly ascertained the case of its vicarious import.

But it deserves to be considered, whether even the cases of the *puerpera*, the leper, and the Nazarite, on which, as they seem to imply nothing of *crime*, Sykes and other writers of that class lay so much stress, do not bear such a relation to sin, as to justify the oblation of the animal sacrifice in the view here contended for. It deserves to be considered, whether the pains of childbearing, and all diseases of the human body, (of which leprosy in the Eastern countries was deemed the most grievous,) being the signal consequences of that apostasy which had entailed these calamities on the children of Adam, it might not be proper, on occasion of a deliverance from these remarkable effects of sin, that there should be this sensible representation of that death, which was the desert of it in general, and an humble acknowledgment of that personal demerit, which had actually exposed the offerer on so many occasions to the severest punishment. That this was the notion entertained by the Jewish doctors, with the additional circumstance of the imputation of actual crime, in these cases of human suffering, has been already shewn, p. 173.—See also *Vitringa* on Isai. liii. 4. There seems likewise good ground to think, that the idea of distempers as penal inflictions for sins, was prevalent in the earliest ages even among the heathen, see *Harris's Comment. on the* liiid *ch. of Isai.* p. 235; also *Martini*, as quoted by *Rosenm. Schol. in Jesai.* p. 909. The case of the Nazarite, it must be confessed, seems more difficult to be reconciled to the principle here laid down. And yet, if with Lightfoot (*Hor. Hebr.* in Luc. i. 15) it be admitted, that "the law of the Nazarites had a reference to Adam, while under the prohibition in his state of innocence," and that it was "designed in commemoration of the state of innocence before the fall," (an idea for which he finds strong support in the traditions of the Jews,) it may seem not unreasonable to conclude, that the sacrifice offered by the Nazarite *polluted by the* DEAD, was intended to commemorate that death which was the consequence of Adam's fall from innocence, and which was now

become the desert of sinful man. And thus the case of the Nazarite, as well as those of the *puerpera* and the leper, seems sufficiently reducible to the notion of sacrifice here laid down. But, be this as it may, it is clear, that, to prove that a sacrifice may be vicarious, it is not necessary to shew that every sacrifice is so; no more than, for the purpose of proving that there are sacrifices for sins, it is necessary to shew that every sacrifice is of that nature.

We come now to the *fifth*, and last, objection; in which it is urged, that, atonements for sin being made in some cases without any animal sacrifice, but merely by an offering of flour, by piacular sacrifice it could never be intended to imply the vicarious substitution of a life. To this the answer is obvious, that although no vicarious substitution of a life could be conceived, where life was not given at all, yet from this it cannot follow, that, where a life *was* given, it might not admit a vicarious import. It should be remembered, that the case here alluded to was a case of necessity; and that this offering of flour was accepted, *only* where the offerer was so poor, that he could not by any possibility procure an animal for sacrifice. Can then any thing be inferred from a case, such as this, in which the offerer must have been altogether precluded from engaging in any form of worship, and shut out from all legal communion with his God, or indulged in this inferior sort of offering? Besides, is it not natural to conceive, that this offering of flour being indulged to the poor man, in the place of the animal sacrifice; which, had he been able, he was bound to offer, he should consider it but as a substitute for the animal sacrifice, and that, being burnt and destroyed upon the altar, he might naturally regard it, as a symbol and representation of that destruction which was due to his own demerits? And to all this it may be added, that this individual might be taught to look to the animal sacrifices, offered for *all the sins* of *all the people* on the day of atonement, for the full and complete consummation of those less perfect atonements, which alone he had been able to make.

These constitute the sum total of the arguments, which have been urged against the vicarious nature of the legal piacular atonements. How far they are conclusive against the notion of their *vicarious import* here contended for, it is not difficult to judge. It deserves to be noted, that, in the examination of these arguments, I have allowed them the full benefit of the advantage which their authors have artfully sought for them; namely, that of appreciating their value as applied to the sacrifices of the law, considered independently of that great Sacrifice, which these were but intended to prefigure, and from which alone they derived whatever virtue they possessed. When we come hereafter to consider them as connected with that event in which their true significancy lay, we shall find the observations which have been here made acquiring a tenfold strength.

What the opinions of the Jewish writers are upon the subject of this Number, has been already explained in Number XXXIII. Whoever wishes for a more extensive review of the testimonies which they supply, on the three points,—the translation of the offerer's sins,—the consequent pollution of the animal,—and the redemption of the sinner by the substitution of the victim,—may consult *Outram, De Sacrif.* lib. i. cap. xxii. § 4—12.

NO. XXXIX.—ON THE IMPOSITION OF HANDS UPON THE HEAD OF THE VICTIM.

PAGE 23. ([d]).—The ceremony of the imposition of hands upon the head of the victim has been usually considered, in the case of piacular sacrifices, as a symbolical translation of the sins of the offender upon the head of the sacrifice, and as a mode of deprecating the evil due to his transgressions. So we find it represented by *Abarbanel*, in the introduction to his commentary on Leviticus (*De Viel.* p. 301): and so the ceremony of the Scape Goat in Levit. xvi. 21, seems directly to assert. And it is certain, that the practice of imprecating on the head of the victim the evils which the sacrificer wished

to avert from himself was usual amongst the heathen; as appears, particularly, from *Herodotus*, (lib. ii. cap. xxxix.,) who relates this of the Egyptians, and at the same time asserts that no Egyptian would so much as "taste the head of any animal," but, under the influence of this religious custom, flung it into the river. This interpretation of the ceremony of the imposition of hands, in the Mosaic sacrifice, is, however, strongly contested by certain writers, and particularly by Sykes, (*Essay on Sacrif.* pp. 25—50,) and the author of the *Scripture Account of Sacrifices*, (Append. p. 10,) who contend that this ceremony was not confined to piacular sacrifices, but was also used in those which were eucharistical, "in which commemoration was made, not of sins, but of mercies:" it was not, therefore, say they, always accompanied with confession of sins, but with praise, or thanksgiving, or, in short, such concomitant as suited the nature and intention of the particular sacrifice. But, in order to prove that it was not attended with acknowledgment of sin, in sacrifices not piacular, it is necessary to shew that in none but piacular was there any reference whatever to sin. In these, indeed, the pardon of sin is the appropriate object; but that in our expressions of praise and thanksgiving, acknowledgment should be made of our own unworthiness, and of the general desert of sin, seems not unreasonable. That even the eucharistic sacrifices, then, might bear some relation to sin, especially if animal sacrifice in its first institution was designed to represent that death which had been introduced by sin, will perhaps not be deemed improbable. And in confirmation of this, it is certain, that the Jewish doctors combine, in all cases, confession of sins with imposition of hands. "Where there is no confession of sins," say they, "there is no imposition of hands."—See *Outram*, *De Sacr.* lib. i. cap. xv. § 8.

But, be this as it may, it is at all events clear, that, if the ceremony be admitted to have had, in each kind of sacrifice, the signification suited to its peculiar nature and intention, it necessarily follows, that, when used in piacular sacrifices,

it implied a reference to, and acknowledgment of, sin: confession of sins being always undoubtedly connected with piacular sacrifices; as appears from Levit. v. 5; xvi. 21; and Numb. v. 7. The particular forms of confession, used in the different kinds of piacular sacrifice, are also handed down to us by the Jewish writers; and are given by Outram. (*De Sacr.* lib. i. cap. xv. § 10, 11.) The form prescribed for the individual, presenting his own sacrifice, seems particularly significant: "O God, I have sinned, I have done perversely, I have trespassed before thee, and have done so and so. Lo! now I repent, and am truly sorry for my misdeeds. *Let then this victim be my expiation.*" Which last words were accompanied by the action of laying hands on the head of the victim, and were considered by the Jews, as we have seen from several authorities, in pp. 168, 169, to be equivalent to this: "Let the evils, which in justice should have fallen on my head, light upon the head of this victim." See *Outram, De Sacr.* lib. i. cap. xxii. § 5, 6. 9.

Now, that this imposition of hands, joined to the confession of sins, was intended symbolically to transfer the sins of the offerer on the head of the victim, and consequently to point it out as the substitute for the offender, and as the accepted medium of expiation, will appear from the bare recital of the ceremony, as prescribed on the day of expiation. *Aaron shall lay both his hands upon the head of the live goat, and confess all the iniquities of the children of Israel, and all their transgressions in all their sins,* PUTTING THEM UPON THE HEAD *of the goat—and the goat shall* BEAR UPON HIM ALL THEIR INIQUITIES, &c. (Levit. xvi. 21, 22.) The sins of the people being thus transferred to the animal, it is afterwards represented to be so *polluted*, as to pollute the person that carried it away (Lev. xvi. 26); and, by the entire ceremony, expiation is made for the sins of the people. Now it is to be remarked, that this is the *only passage* in the entire Scripture, in which the meaning of the ceremony of laying hands on the head of the victim is directly explained: and from this, one would naturally think, there could be no diffi-

culty in understanding its true import in all other cases of piacular sacrifice.

But the ingenuity of the writers above mentioned is not to be silenced so easily. The goat, says Dr. Sykes, (*Essay*, p. 37,) was so polluted, that it was *not sacrificed*, but sent away: "it was not, then, to transfer sins upon the sacrifice, that hands were laid upon the head of the victim: as men would not offer unto God, what they knew to be polluted." In this notion, of the pollution of the scape-goat rendering it unfit to be offered in sacrifice, H. Taylor concurs with Sykes. (*Ben. Mord.* pp. 827, 828.)

Now, to the objection here urged it may be answered, 1. that the scape-goat was actually a *part of the sin-offering* for the people, as is shewn more particularly in page 42, and Number LXXI; and as is confessed by the author of the *Scripture Account of Sacrifices*, (Append. p. 12,) who agrees with Sykes in the main part of his objection; and as may be directly collected from Levit. xvi. 5. 10, in which the *two goats* are called a *sin-offering*, and the scape-goat is described as *presented before the Lord, to make an atonement with him.* See *Patrick* on these verses.

Secondly, Even admitting the scape-goat to have been entirely distinct from the sin-offering; since the same ceremony, which is allowed by Sykes and H. Taylor to be a proof that the scape-goat was polluted by the translation of the people's sins; namely, the person who carried it away being obliged to wash, before he was again admitted into the camp; since, I say, this same ceremony was prescribed with respect to the bullock and the goat which had been *sacrificed* as sin-offerings, it follows, that they likewise were polluted; and that, therefore, there was a translation of sins to the animals, that were actually sacrificed in expiation of those sins. Now this translation being accompanied with, is also to be considered as expressed by, the imposition of hands; a ceremony which it was the less necessary specially to prescribe here, as this was already enjoined for all cases of piacular sacrifice, in Levit. ch. iv.—and that this ceremony did take

place we can have no doubt, not only from this general direction in the 4th chapter, but also from the express testimonies of the Jewish writers on this head, (*Ainsw. on Levit.* xvi. 6. 11,) and from the description in 2 Chron. xxix. 23, of the sacrifice offered by Hezekiah, *to make an atonement for all Israel.—They brought forth the he-goats for the sin-offering, before the king and the congregation, and they* LAID THEIR HANDS UPON THEM—*and the priests killed them, &c.*

Thirdly, The entire of the notion, that what was *polluted* (as it is symbolically called) by sin, could not be offered to God, is founded in a mistake, arising from the not distinguishing between the natural[a] impurities and blemishes of the animal, (which with good reason unfitted it for a sincere and respectful expression of devotion,) and that emblematical defilement, which arose out of the very act of worship, and existed but in the imagination of the worshipper. It should be remarked, also, that this notion of the defilement of the victim by the transfer of the offerer's sins, so far from being inconsistent with the Mosaic precepts, concerning the pure and unblemished state of the animal chosen for sacrifice, (Ex. xii. 5; Lev. xxii. 21; Num. xix. 2; Mal. i. 14, &c.,) as is urged by Sykes and H. Taylor, and by Dr. Priestley, (*Theol. Rep.* vol. i. p. 213,) seems absolutely to require and presuppose this purity, the more clearly to convey the idea that the pollution was the sole result of the translated defilement of the sinner. In like manner we are told in the New Testament, that Christ *was made a curse*, and also *sin* (or a sin-offering) *for us;* whilst, to make it more clear that *all* this was the effect of our sin, it is added that he *knew no sin* himself. And, indeed, they who consider the pollution of the victim as naturally irreconcileable with the notion of

[a] The word in the original used to denote the perfect state of the animals to be offered in sacrifice is תמים, which *Rosenm.* explains by "*perfectum*, i. e. sine vitio et defectu corporis, sine ægritudine et membrorum debilitate; id quod Græc. ἄμωμον, quod Alexandrini hic habent." *Josephus* (*Antiq.* lib. iii. cap. x.) calls these animals ὁλόκληρα καὶ κατὰ μηδὲν λελωβημένα, *entire and without blemish.* *Herodotus* also (lib. ii. cap. xl.) testifies, that the animals offered by the Egyptians were of the like description: τοὺς καθαροὺς ἔρσενας τῶν βοῶν καὶ τοὺς μόσχους οἱ πάντες Αἰγύπτιοι θύουσι.

a sacrifice, as Dr. Priestley evidently does, would do well to attend to the καθάρματα of the ancients, who, whilst they required for their gods the τελεία θυσία, the most perfect animals for sacrifice, (see *Potter on the Religion of Greece*, ch. iv. and *Outr. De Sacr.* lib. i. cap. ix. § 3,) at the same time sought to appease them by offering up human victims, whom they had first loaded with imprecations, and whom they in consequence deemed so polluted with the sins of those for whom they were to be offered, that the word κάθαρμα became synonymous to what was most execrable and impure, and with the Latins was rendered by the word SCELUS, as if to mark the very extreme aud essence of what was sinful. See *Stephanus* on κάθαρμα, and *Suidas* on the words κάθαρμα and περίψημα.

It must be confessed, indeed, that the author of the *Scrip. Account of Sacr.* has gone upon grounds entirely different from the above named authors. He positively denies, that either the scape-goat, or the bullock, incurred any pollution whatever; and maintains, that the washing of the persons who carried them away indicated no pollution of the victims, inasmuch as the same washing was prescribed in cases of *holiness*, not of *pollution*. (App. p. 11.) But, besides that this author is singular in his notion that the scape-goat was not polluted, he proceeds altogether upon a wrong acceptation of those passages, which relate to persons and things that came into contact with the sin-offering; it being commonly translated, in Levit. vi. 18, and elsewhere, *he that toucheth them* (the sin-offerings) *shall be* HOLY, whereas it should be rendered, as Wall properly observes, in quite a different sense, *shall be* SANCTIFIED, or CLEANSED, shall be under an obligation, or necessity, of cleansing himself, as the LXX understand it, ἁγιασθήσεται. See *Wall's Critical Notes*, Levit. vi. 18, where this point is most satisfactorily treated.

Upon the whole, then, there appears no reasonable objection against the idea, that the imposition of hands, in piacular

sacrifices, denoted an emblematical transfer of guilt[a]; and that the ceremony consequently implied the desire, that the evil due to the sinner might be averted, by what was to fall on the head of the victim. This receives farther confirmation from the consideration of other parts of Scripture, in which this ceremony of imposition of hands was used without any reference to sacrifice. In Levit. xxiv. 14, 15, we find this action prescribed in the case of the blasphemer, before he was put to death; it being at the same time added, that *whosoever curseth his God shall bear his sin:* thus, as it were, expressing, by this significant action, that the evil consequences of his sin should *fall upon his head:* and in these words, Maimonides expressly says, the blasphemer was marked out for punishment by those who laid their hands upon his head, "thy blood be upon thine own head," (see *Outram, De Sacr.* lib. i. cap. xv. § 8,) "as if to say, the punishment of this sin fall upon thyself, and not on us and the rest of the people." The expressions also in Josh. ii. 19; 2 Sam. i. 16; Esth. ix. 25; Ps. vii. 16; and several other passages of the Old Testament, respecting evils *falling upon the head* of the person to suffer, may give still farther strength to these observations.

It deserves to be remarked, that the sacrifice referred to in the passage cited in the text was that of a *burnt offering*, or *holocaust;* and as the language in which it is spoken of, as

[a] Dr. Geddes's authority, when it happens to be on the side of orthodoxy, is not without its weight; because, having no very strong bias in that direction, there remains only the *vis veri* to account for his having taken it. I therefore willingly accept his assistance on this subject of the imposition of hands upon the head of the victim. He renders *Levit.* i. 4. *And he shall lay his hand upon the head of the victim, that it may be an acceptable atonement for him.* And on the words, *lay his hand*, &c., he subjoins this remark:—"Thereby devoting it to God; and TRANSFERRING, as it were, HIS OWN GUILT UPON THE VICTIM." A mere typical rite, (he adds,) derived, probably, from the legal custom of the accusing witness laying his hand upon the head of the criminal. As to Dr. Geddes's mode of explaining the matter I am indifferent. *Valeat quantum.* His admission of the *emblematical transfer of guilt upon the victim* I am perfectly contented with: and, indeed, his illustration, by the witness pointing out the object with whom the guilt lay, does not tend much to weaken the significancy of the action.

being *accepted for* the offerer, *to make atonement for him*, obviously falls in with the interpretation here given of the ceremony of laying hands on the head of the victim, it appears that it was not only in the case of the *sin-offering* enjoined by the law, that this action was connected with an acknowledgment of sin, but with respect also to that kind of sacrifice which existed *before* the law; and which, as not arising out of the law, is accordingly not now prescribed; but is spoken of in the very opening of the sacrificial code, as already in familiar use, and offered at the will of the individual: *If any man bring an offering—a burnt sacrifice*, &c.—That the burnt sacrifice was offered in expiation of sins, has, indeed, been doubted; but so strongly is the reference to sin marked in the description of this sacrifice, that Dr. Priestley, on the supposition of its being a *voluntary* offering, feels himself compelled even to admit it as a consequence, "that in *every* sacrifice the offerer was considered as a sinner, and that the sacrifice had respect to him in that character," (*Theol. Rep.* vol. i. pp. 204, 205,)—a conclusion, so directly subversive of his notion of sacrifices as mere gifts, that, in order to escape from it, he is obliged to deny, in opposition to every commentator, that the burnt-sacrifice here spoken of was a *voluntary* offering. Now, that the word, לרצנו, should not be translated, as it is in our common version, *of his own voluntary will*, I admit with Dr. Priestley: it should be rendered, as appears from the use of the word immediately after, and in other parts of Scripture, as well as from the Greek, the Chaldee, the Syriac, and the Arabic versions, *for his acceptance*[a]. See *Houbig.* *Ainsw.* and *Purver.* But the present version of this word is far from being the strength of the cause. The manner in which the subject is introduced, and the entire of the context, place it beyond doubt, that the sacrifice spoken of was the voluntary burnt-offering of an individual. And thus Dr. Priestley's argument holds good against himself, and he admits that in every sacrifice there

[a] The words, לרצנו לפני יהוה, *Rosenm.* renders, *ut acceptus sit Deo, Dei favorem sibi conciliet.* *Levit.* i. 3.

was a reference to sin. On the *expiatory* nature of the burnt-offering we shall see more hereafter, in Number LXVII.

NO. XL.—ON THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE PROOF OF THE *PROPITIATORY* NATURE OF THE MOSAIC SACRIFICES, INDEPENDENT OF THE ARGUMENT WHICH ESTABLISHES THEIR *VICARIOUS IMPORT*.

PAGE 23. (f).—That the Jewish sacrifices were *propitiatory*, or, in other words, that in consequence of the sacrifice of the animal, and in virtue of it either immediately or remotely, the pardon of the offender was procured, is all that my argument requires, in the place referred to by the present Number. The *vicarious import* of the sacrifice seems indeed sufficiently established by shewing, as has been done, that the sins of the offender were transferred in symbol to the victim, and, immediately after, expiated by the death of the animal, to which they had been so transferred. But this has been an argument ex abundanti; and has been introduced, rather for the purpose of evincing the futility of the objections so confidently relied on, than as *essential* to the present inquiry. The *effect* of propitiation is all that the argument absolutely demands. For further discussion of this important subject, I refer the reader to Number XLII.

NO. XLI.—ON THE DIVINE INSTITUTION OF SACRIFICE: AND THE TRACES THEREOF DISCOVERABLE IN THE HEATHEN CORRUPTIONS OF THE RITE.

PAGE 23. (h).—That the rite of sacrifice was not an invention of man, but an ordinance of God; that, however, in passing among the nations of the earth, it might have become deformed by idolatrous practices, it yet had not sprung from an idolatrous source,—it is the principal object of the second of the Discourses contained in this volume, and of many

of the Dissertations which are to follow, to establish[a]. I shall not, therefore, here enter upon a discussion of this question, but confine myself merely to a few extracts from Eusebius, with some accompanying observations upon this subject.

That learned writer, having deduced from the Scripture account of the sacrifices of Abel, Noah, and Abraham, and from the sacrificial institutions by Moses, the fact of a divine appointment, proceeds to explain the nature and true intent of the rite in the following manner:—"Whilst men had no victim that was more excellent, more precious, and more worthy of God, animals were made the price and ransom[b] of their souls. And their substituting these animals in their own room bore, indeed, some affinity to their suffering themselves; in which sense all the ancient worshippers and friends of God made use of them. The Holy Spirit had taught them, that there should one day come a VICTIM, more venerable, more holy, and more worthy of God. He had likewise instructed them how to point him out to the world by types and shadows. And thus they became prophets, and were not ignorant of their having been chosen out to represent to mankind the things which God resolved to accomplish."[c]—In other words, he pronounces, that the ancient sacrifices, those

[a] *Dr. Randolph,* in his interesting and valuable volume of Advent Sermons, has expressed himself with felicity upon this subject.—"From those who presumptuously deride the doctrine of Atonement, we would ask some reasonable solution of the origin of sacrifice. Will they make it consistent with any natural idea, will they discover in the blood of an innocent victim, any thing recommendatory in itself of the offerer's suit and devotions? Though they should clear away, what they term, a load of superstition from the Christian worship, they will find it encumbering every altar of their favourite natural religion; they will find these absurdities forming the significant and generally indispensable part of all religious ceremonies: and however disgraced, as we are ready to allow, with every abominable pollution, though retaining nothing to perfect the service, or to purify the offering, still in its expiatory form, in its propitiatory hopes, the sacrifice of heathen nations preserves the features of that sacred and solemn office, which was ordained to keep up the remembrance of guilt, till the full and perfect sacrifice, oblation, and satisfaction was made by an eternal Mediator, for the sins of the whole world." *Sermons during Advent,* pp. 46, 47.

[b] "Λύτρα τῆς ἑαυτῶν ζωῆς, καὶ ἀντίψυχα."

[c] *Euseb. Demonst. Evang.* lib. i. cap. x. p. 36. The whole of the tenth chapter is well worth attention.

prescribed to the patriarchs, and those enjoined by the law, were types and figures, and known to be such, of that one great Sacrifice, which was, at a future day, to be offered upon the cross for the sins of the whole human race.

Of the practices which grew out of this original institution, and of the abuses to which it led amongst the heathen world, perhaps the most remarkable may be discovered in the account of the *mystical offering* of the Phenicians recorded by the same writer from *Sanchoniatho;* which, as well from the extraordinary circumstances of the transaction itself, as from the interesting and important bearing given to it by a late ingenious writer, I here submit to the reader in the words of the historian.

[a] "It was an established custom amongst the ancients," (speaking of the Phenicians,) "on any calamitous or danger-

[a] "Ἔθος ἦν τοῖς παλαιοῖς ἐν ταῖς μεγάλαις συμφοραῖς τῶν κινδύνων, ἀντὶ τῆς πάντων φθορᾶς, τὸ ἠγαπημένον τῶν τέκνων τοὺς κρατοῦντας ἢ πόλεως, ἢ ἔθνους, εἰς σφαγὴν ἱλασιδόναι λύτρον τοῖς τιμωροῖς δαίμοσι. Κατισφάττοντο δὲ οἱ διδόμενοι ΜΥΣΤΙΚΩΣ.—Κρόνος τοίνυν, ὃν οἱ Φοίνικες Ἰσραὴλ προσαγορεύουσι, βασιλεύων τῆς χώρας, καὶ ὕστερον μετὰ τὴν τοῦ βίου τελευτὴν εἰς τὸν τοῦ Κρόνου ἀστέρα καθιερωθείς, ἐξ ἐπιχωρίας Νύμφης, Ἀνωβρὲτ λεγομένης, υἱὸν ἔχων μονογενῆ, ὃν διὰ τοῦτο Ἰεοὺδ ἰκάλουν (τοῦ μονογενοῦς οὕτως ἔτι καὶ νῦν καλουμένου παρὰ τοῖς Φοίνιξι), κινδύνων ἐκ πολέμου μιγίστων κατειληφότων τὴν χώραν, βασιλικῷ κοσμήσας σχήματι τὸν υἱὸν, βωμόν τε κατασκευασάμενος κατέθυσε. *Euseb. Præp. Evang.* lib. i. cap. x. p. 40, and lib. iv. cap. xvi. pp. 156, 157.

It will be remarked here that the word Ἰσραὴλ, in this extract of Eusebius, I have written *Il* in the translation.—This I have done upon the authority of the ablest critics. *Grotius, Vossius,* and others, are of opinion, that the transcriber of Eusebius meeting with ΗΛ (*Il*) supposed it to be a contraction of the word Ἰσραὴλ (*Israel*) often abridged thus in the MSS. of the Greek Christian writers, and wrote it at full length as we now find it. This is confirmed by the circumstance of *Kronus* being elsewhere called *Il,* as we learn from Eusebius himself (pp. 36, 37).—On this see *Grotius* in Deut. xviii. 10. *Vossius De Idol.* lib. i. cap. xviii. p. 143. *Marsham. Can. Chron.* p. 79; and *Bryant's Observat. on Hist.* p. 288. The last named writer says, "Kronus, originally esteemed the supreme deity, as is manifest from his being called *Il* and *Ilus.* It was the same name as the *El* of the Hebrews; and according to St. Jerome was one of the ten names of God. *Phœnicibus Il, qui Hebræis El, quod est unum de decem nominibus Dei.* Damascius, in the life of Isidorus, as it occurs in Photius, mentions that Kronus was worshipped by the people of those parts, under the name of *El.* Φοίνικες καὶ Σύροι τὸν Κρόνον Ἦλ, καὶ Βῆλ, καὶ Βολάθην ἱστορεμάζουσι." *Observations,* &c. p. 289.—It should be observed that the אל (*El*) of the Hebrews is written איל (*Il*) in Syriac; and consequently is the *Il* of the Phenicians: so that *Il* and *El* are, without doubt, the same name.

It should not, however, be dissembled, that *Stillingfleet* (after Scaliger and others) is of opinion, that the word might have been written *Israel* by Eusebius, as we now find it, and that by

ous emergency, for the ruler of the state to offer up, in prevention of the general ruin, the most dearly beloved of his children, as a ransom to avert the divine vengeance. And they who were devoted for this purpose were offered *mystically*. For *Kronus*, truly, whom the *Phenicians* call *Il*, and who after his death was translated with divine honours to the star which bears his name, having, whilst he ruled over that people, begotten by a nymph of the country, named Anobret, an only son, thence *entitled Jeud*, (it being to this day usual with the Phenicians so to denominate an only son,) had, when the nation was endangered from a most perilous war, after dressing up his son in the emblems of royalty, offered him as a sacrifice on an altar specially prepared for the purpose."

On the Phenician rites, and particularly upon their *mystical* offering here described, the late very learned Mr. *Bryant* has offered some curious and striking observations, from which I have made the following selection, which, I trust will not be unacceptable to the reader.

After speaking of the sacrifices customary with various nations, especially their human sacrifices, he goes on to say,— "These nations had certainly a notion of a *federal* and an *expiatory* sacrifice. It was derived to them by tradition; and though originally founded in truth, yet, being by degrees darkened and misapplied, it gave rise to the worst of profanations, and was the source of the basest and most unnatural cruelty. I have shewn at large that *human victims* were very common among the *Phenicians:* and *Philo Byblius* tells us from *Sanchoniatho*, that in some of their sacrifices there was a particular mystery: 'they who were devoted for this purpose, were offered *mystically;*' that is, under a *mystical representation:* and he proceeds to inform us, that

that Abraham might have been intended. (*Orig. Sacr.* p. 371.) He has not, however, advanced any thing to place this matter beyond doubt. And the authority of Eusebius himself, as already given, with the other references that have been noticed, renders it highly probable that *Il* was the word as originally written. *Vossius* also (p. 143) remarks, "Parum credibile est, Phœnices pro Deo summo, hoc est Molocho, sive Saturno, habituros *Israelem*, parentem gentis vicinæ, maximeque exosæ; quod satis sacra testatur historia."

it was in consequence of an example which had been set this people by the god Kronus, who in a time of distress offered up his only son to his father Ouranus."[a]—He observes, that there is something in the account so very extraordinary as to deserve most particular attention; and, after quoting the passage from Eusebius, which I have given at full length in page 246, he remarks, that "if nothing more be meant by it, than that a king of the country sacrificed his son, and that the people afterwards copied his example, it supplies a cruel precedent too blindly followed, but contains nothing in it of a *mystery*."—"When a fact" (he adds) "is supposed to have a *mystical* reference, there should be something more than a bare imitation. Whatever may have been alluded to under this typical representation, it was, I believe, but imperfectly understood by the Phenicians; and is derived to us still more obscurely, by being transmitted through a secondary channel."[b]

Our author, having cleared the history from some obscurities and apparent contradictions, proceeds to his final result:—"This is the only instance of any sacrifice in the Gentile world, which is said to be *mystical;* and it was attended with circumstances which are very extraordinary. *Kronus*, we find, was the same with *El*, and *Elioun:* and he is termed Ὕψιστος and Ὑψουράνιος. He is, moreover, said to have the *Elohim* for his coadjutors: Σύμμαχοι Ἰλου, τοῦ Κρόνου, Ἐλωεὶμ ἐπεκλήθησαν. (*Præp. Evang.* p. 37.) He had no father[c] to make any offering to; for he was the father of

[a] It is to be noted that *Eusebius* has given this account of the matter, in a passage different from that which I have already quoted from him. Λαμεῦ δὲ γινομένου, καὶ φθορᾶς, τὸν ἰαυτοῦ μονογενῆ υἱὸν Κρόνος Οὐρανῷ πατρὶ ὁλοκαρπεῖ. *Præp. Evang.* p. 38.

[b] *Bryant* here alludes to the circumstance of our not being possessed of *Sanchoniatho's* history itself, but merely of a fragment of a Greek translation of it by *Philo Byblius*, handed down to us by *Eusebius;* who, as well as the translator, appear to have mixed with the original some observations of their own. On this fragment of *Sanchoniatho*, see *Goguet's Orig. of Laws*, vol. i. pp. 370—384; *Banier's Mythology, &c.* vol. i. pp. 88—102; and particularly *Boch. Phaleg.* (Opera, tom. i. pp. 771—777.)

[c] This seems a direct contradiction to what has been just before quoted from Eusebius. Bryant, however, explains this by shewing, that, in truth, *Ouranus*, the father, to whom *Kronus* is said to

all, and termed Κύριος Οὐρανοῦ, with the confession of the author, by whom the account is given. These sacrifices, therefore, had *no reference to any thing past*, but alluded to a great event to be accomplished afterwards. They were instituted, probably, in consequence of a prophetic tradition, which, I imagine, had been preserved in the family of *Esau*, and transmitted through his posterity to the people of *Canaan*. The account is mixed with much extraneous matter, but, divesting it of fable, we may arrive at the truth which is concealed beneath. The mystical sacrifice of the *Phenicians* had these requisites: that *a prince was to offer it:* and *his only son was to be the victim:* and as I have shewn that this could not relate to any thing *prior*, let us consider what is said upon the subject, as *future*, and attend to the consequence. For, if the sacrifice of the *Phenicians* was a type of *another* to come, the nature of this last will be known from the representation by which it was prefigured. According to this, *El*, the *supreme* Deity, whose associates were the *Elohim*, was in process of time to have a son; ἀγαπητὸν, well beloved; μονογενῆ, his only begotten: who was to be conceived, as some render it[a], of *grace*, but according to my interpretation, of

have offered up his only son, is the same as *El*, or *Elioun*, or *Kronus*, being only another title for the same person. This also he asserts to be the same with the Ἥλιος of the Greeks, and refers to *Servius* in Virg. Æneid. lib. i. de Belo Phœnice, "Omnes in illis partibus *Solem* colunt, qui ipsorum linguâ HEL dicitur." *Bryant's Observ.* &c. p. 290. —Servius adds to this quotation from him by Bryant what deserves to be noticed: "Unde" (ex HEL scil.) "et Ἥλιος. Ergo, additâ digamma, et in fine factâ derivatione a sole, Regi imposuit nomen BELI."—This last formation by the digamma, Vossius however rejects. Belus, he says, came from Βῆλ, contracted from Βάαλ, from which Βααλσάμην and other words. *Voss. de Idol.* lib. ii. cap. iv. tom. i. pp. 322, 323.—See the whole of that chapter of Vossius.

[a] "I cannot help thinking that *Anobret* is the same as *Ouranus*; and however it may have been by the Greeks differently constructed, and represented as the name of a woman, yet it is reducible to the same elements with *Ouranus*; and is from the same radix, though differently modified. I take it to have been originally *Ain Ober*, the *fountain of light*, the word אור being rendered variously, *Aur*, *Aver*, *Aber*, *Ober*."—Now *Ouranus*, Bryant had before derived in like manner, making it, the transposition of *Ain Aur* or *Our*, the *fountain of light*; written *Our ain*, and thence by the Greeks *Ouranos*.—*Bryant's Observ.* &c. pp. 285. 291.—Bochart, however, derives the word *An-*

the fountain of light. He was to be called *Jeoud*[a], whatever that name may relate to; and to be *offered up as a sacrifice to his father,* λύτρον, by way of *satisfaction,* and *redemption,* τιμωροῖς δαίμοσι, *to atone for the sins of others,* and *avert the just vengeance of God;* ἀντὶ τῆς πάντων φθορᾶς, *to prevent universal corruption,* and at the same time *general ruin.* And, it is farther remarkable, *he was to make this grand sacrifice,* βασιλικῷ σχήματι κεκοσμημένος, *invested with the emblems of royalty.*—These, surely, are very strong expressions; and the whole is an aggregate of circumstances highly significant, which cannot be the result of chance. All that I have requested to be allowed me in the process of this recital, is this simple supposition, that *this mystical sacrifice was a type of something to come.* How truly it corresponds to that which I imagine it alludes to, I submit to the reader's judgment. I think it must necessarily be esteemed a most wonderful piece of history."—*Bryant's Observations on various Parts of Ancient History,* pp. 286—292.

A most wonderful piece of history, undoubtedly, this must be confessed to be: and a most wonderful resemblance to the one great and final Sacrifice is it thus made to present to the view. One impediment, however, in the way of a full and entire assent to the conclusion of the learned writer, arises from the consideration, that, if we suppose this mystical sacrifice of the Phenicians to have contained the typical allusion contended for, we must then admit, that among that most idolatrous and abandoned people, (as we learn from the Scripture history the people of Canaan or Phenicia were,) a more exact delineation of the great future Sacrifice was handed down by tradition, than was at the same early age vouchsafed to the favoured nation of the Jews. The prophetic tradition, giving birth to the institution, had probably, Bryant observes,

obret differently: thus, חן־עוברת, *Anoberet,* i. e. *ex gratiâ concipiens:* which, he says, is a just appellation for *Sara,* the wife of *Abraham.*—*Boch. Phal.* (Opera, tom. i. p. 712.)

[a] The Hebrew word יחיד, *Jehid,* signifies *unicus, solitarius,* and is frequently applied to an only son. It is the very word used of Isaac in Gen. xxii. 2.

been preserved in the family of Esau, and so transmitted through his posterity to the people of Canaan. But was it not at least as likely that such a tradition would have been preserved in the family of Isaac, and so transmitted through his posterity to the people of the Jews? I am, upon the whole, therefore, rather disposed to think, that this sacrifice of the Phenicians grew out of the intended sacrifice of Isaac by Abraham, to which the circumstances of the history seem to correspond in many particulars.

First, it is remarkable, that the very name by which God describes Isaac, when he issues his order to Abraham to offer him in sacrifice, is יחיד[a], *Jehid*, agreeing with the Phenician name *Jeud* given to the son of Kronus. Again, if *Anobret* has been justly explained by Bochart, as signifying "ex gratiâ concipiens," no epithet could be with greater propriety applied to *Sara*, the wife of Abraham; of whom the apostle says, "Through faith Sara received strength to conceive,—when she was past age." Again, that Abraham should be spoken of by the Phenicians, as a king, who reigned in those parts, is not unlikely, considering his great possessions and rank[b] amongst the surrounding people: and if the name assigned by the history be actually *Israel*, or *Ιλ, as the abbreviation of *Israel*, little doubt can then remain as to its application, there being nothing unreasonable (notwithstanding *Vossius's* remark noticed in p. 247) in supposing him called by the title of the famous Patriarch whose progenitor he was, and from whom a whole people took its name. Even if we should suppose the true reading to be *Il*, as equivalent to the *El* of the Hebrews, and so consider him as ranked amongst the divinities of the Phenicians, as the other parts of the history undoubtedly describe *Kronus* to have been, there is nothing in this so very surprising; especially when it is remembered, that *Kronus* is related to have been advanced from a mortal to the heavens. There is also an expression

[a] "Take now thy son (יחידך), thine only son." Gen. xxii. 2.

[b] See Gen. xxiii. 6, where Abraham is addressed as a king. "Thou art a mighty prince among us."

used of Abraham in Gen. xxiii. 6, which, by a slight variation of the rendering, would actually represent him as *a supreme God*, in perfect correspondence with all that we have seen applied to *Kronus*. The expression I allude to is נשיא אלהים, which is strictly rendered a *prince of God*, a known Hebraism for a MIGHTY *prince*, as it is accordingly given in the common Bible, the literal English being placed in the margin. Now this might with equal accuracy (אלהים being a plural word) be rendered, *a prince of* GODS, and would accordingly, by those who held a plurality of gods, as the Canaanites did, be so rendered: and thence he would come to be considered as *supreme*, or *chief among the gods*. And accordingly we find the *Elohim* described as the associates of *Kronus*: Σύμμαχοι Ἰλου τοῦ Κρόνου Ἐλωὲιμ ἐπεκλήθησαν. (*Euseb. Præp. Evang.* p. 37.) But yet farther, another circumstance remains to be noticed, which seems to give confirmation to the idea, that *Abraham* was the *Kronus* of *Sanchoniatho*. We are told of *Kronus* by this writer, (*Præp. Ev.* p. 38,) that he was the author of the rite of *circumcision*. Καὶ τὰ αἰδοῖα περιτέμνεται ταυτὸ ποιῆσαι καὶ τοὺς ἅμ' αὐτῷ συμμάχους καταναγκάσας. *Etiam pudenda sibi ipse circumcidit, sociosque omnes ad simile factum per vim adigit.* This exactly corresponds to what is said of Abraham, in Gen. xvii. 27.—See *Stilling. Orig. Sacr.* pp. 371, 372. *Shuckford's Connection*, i. pp. 326, 327, and particularly *Bochart Phaleg.* tom. i. pp. 711, 712.

Thus, upon the whole, it appears to me, that the reference of the *mystical sacrifice* of the Phenicians to the intended sacrifice of Isaac by Abraham is natural[a] and striking. Nor,

[a] This application of the history of *Sanchoniatho* (as reported by *Eusebius*) to the circumstances of the birth and intended sacrifice of Isaac recorded by Moses, will appear yet more satisfactory to him who will take the trouble of consulting either *Stillingfleet*, or *Bochart*, on the whole of the Phenician Theogony, as derived from *Sanchoniatho*. Those writers abundantly prove, that the particulars of that Theogony are borrowed from the facts referred to in the Mosaic history, and its various fables founded upon the mistake or perversion of the language of the Hebrew records.—*Stilling. Orig. Sacr.* pp. 368—372. *Boch. Phal.* Opera, tom. i. pp. 704—712. See also *Banier's Myth.* vol. i. pp. 88—101, and *Goguet's Origin of Laws*, &c. vol. i. pp.

perhaps, after all, do I, in holding this opinion, differ very substantially from the learned Mr. Bryant; inasmuch as that intended sacrifice is acknowledged to have been typical of a great Sacrifice to come; and it may reasonably be supposed, that a tradition[a] of its *mystical* nature would pass down

370—384. *President Kirwan* likewise, in a learned paper *On the Origin of Polytheism*, &c. (in the 11th volume of the *Trans. of the Royal Irish Acad.*) has treated of this subject. Some of these writers indeed, particularly Goguet, have doubted whether Sanchoniatho was acquainted with the sacred books. But to the main point with which we are concerned, it seems to be of little consequence, whether the facts *as* they are reported by Moses, or the general tradition of those facts, formed the ground-work of the Phenician mythology.

It should be noted, that Bishop Cumberland, in his *Sanchoniatho*, pp. 134—150, maintains an opinion, directly repugnant to that which has been advanced in this number, on the subject of the *Phenician* sacrifice. But it must be observed, that the learned Bishop's arguments are founded on the want of a *perfect* agreement between the particulars of Abraham's history, and those of Kronus as detailed by Sanchoniatho: whereas nothing more ought to be expected in such a case, than that vague and general resemblance, which commonly obtains between truth and the fabulous representation of it. Of such resemblance, the features will be found, in the instance before us, to be marked with peculiar strength. But the fear of tracing the idolatrous practices of the Phenicians, especially that most horrid practice of human sacrifice, to the origin of a divine command, rendered this excellent prelate the less quick-sighted in discovering such similitude. Indeed, the professed object for which he entered upon his Review of Sanchoniatho's history must in a great degree detract from the value of his researches upon that subject. The account given by his biographer and panegyrist Mr. Payne, states of him, that "he detested nothing so much as Popery, was affected with the apprehensions of it to the last degree, and was jealous almost to an excess of every thing that he suspected to favour it: that this depravation of Christianity ran much in his thoughts, and the enquiry how religion came at first to degenerate into idolatry, put him upon the searches that produced the work in question; inasmuch as the oldest account of idolatry he believed was to be found in Sanchoniatho's fragment; and as leading to the discovery of the original of Idolatry he accordingly made it the subject of his study." *Preface to Cumb. Sanch.* pp. x. xxviii. With a preconceived system, and a predominant terror, even the mind of Cumberland was not likely to pursue a steady and unbiassed course. The melancholy prospect of affairs in the reign of James the Second, his biographer remarks, had inspired him with extraordinary horrors.

[a] Were we to accept of Bishop Warburton's idea of the scenical nature of the intended sacrifice of Isaac, representing by action instead of words the future sacrifice of Christ, (whose *day*, as that writer urges, Abraham was by this enabled to *see*,) we might here positively pronounce, that a precise notion of that future sacrifice did actually exist in the time of Abraham: and that a foundation for the tradition was thus laid in an anticipated view of that great event. But without going so far as this ingenious writer would lead us, may it not fairly be presumed, that in some manner or other, that patriarch, who enjoyed frequent communication with the Deity, was favoured with the knowledge of the general import of this

through the branches of the Abrahamic family, and so by the line of Esau descend to the inhabitants of the land of Canaan. And thus, eventually, the Phenician sacrifice, founded upon the typical sacrifice of Isaac, would derive from that, a relation to the great Offering of which it was the model; and, from its correspondence with the type, acquire that correspondence with the thing typified, for which Mr. Bryant contends, but in a form more direct.

Thus, then, in this *mystical sacrifice of the Phenicians*, which, taken in all its parts, is certainly the most remarkable that history records amongst the heathen nations, we find, notwithstanding the numerous fictions and corruptions that disturb the resemblance, marked and obvious traces of a rite originating in the divine command, (as the intended sacrifice of Isaac indisputably was,) and terminating in that one grand and comprehensive Offering, which was the primary object and the final consummation of the sacrificial institution.

NO. XLII.—ON THE DEATH OF CHRIST AS A TRUE *PROPITIATORY SACRIFICE* FOR THE SINS OF MANKIND.

PAGE 24. (a).—Not only are the sacrificial terms of the law applied to the death of Christ, as has been shewn in Numbers XXV. XXVI. XXVII. XXVIII. XXIX., but others, which open up more fully the true nature of atonement, are superadded in the description of that great Sacrifice, as possessing, in truth and reality, that expiatory virtue, which the sacrifices of the law but relatively enjoyed, and but imperfectly reflected. Reasonable as this seems, and arising out of the very nature of the case, yet has it not failed to furnish matter of cavil to disputatious criticism: the very want of those expressions, which in strictness could belong only to the true propitiatory sacrifice of Christ, being made a ground of ob-

mysterious transaction, and that from him there passed to his immediate descendants the notion of a mysterious reference at least, if not of the exact nature of its object? On this subject, see *Warb. Div. Leg.* ii. pp. 589—614; and *Stebbing's Examination of Warburton*, pp. 137—149; and his *History of Abraham*.

jection against the propitiatory nature of the Mosaic atonement. Of this we have already seen an instance in page 230, with respect to the words[a] λύτρον, and ἀντίλυτρον. The expression, BEARING SIN, furnishes another: the author of the *Scripture Account of Sacrifices*, (p. 146,) urging the omission of this phrase in the case of the legal sacrifices, as an argument against the vicarious nature of the Levitical atonement.

Such arguments, however, only recoil upon the objectors, inasmuch as they supply a reluctant testimony in favour of the received sense of these expressions, when applied to that sacrifice, to which they *properly* appertained. But from this these critics seem to entertain no apprehension: and their mode of reasoning is certainly a bold exercise of logic. From the *want* of such expressions, *as being of vicarious import*, they conclude against the vicarious nature of the Mosaic sacrifices: and, this point gained, they return, and triumphantly conclude *against the vicarious import* of these expressions in that Sacrifice to which they *are* applied. Not to disturb these acute reasoners in the enjoyment of their triumph, let us consider whether the terms employed in describing the death of Christ, as a propitiatory sacrifice, be sufficiently precise and significant to remove all doubt with respect to its true nature and operation.

To enumerate the various passages of Scripture, in which the death of Christ is represented to have been a *sacrifice*, and the effect of this sacrifice to have been strictly *propitiatory*, must lead to a prolix detail, and is the less necessary in this place, as most of them are to be found occasionally noticed in the course of this inquiry; especially in p. 144, and Numbers XXV. XXVI. XXVII. XXVIII. There are some, however, which, as throwing a stronger light upon the nature and import of the Christian sacrifice, demand our more particular attention; and the more so, because, from

[a] In addition to what has been already offered upon the meaning of these words, I beg to refer the reader to the judicious observations, in Dr. Nares's *Remarks on the Version of the New Testament by the Unitarians*, pp. 125—130; and to those of Danzius, in his treatise *De* ΛΥΤΡΩι. *Meusch. Nov. Test. ex Talm.* pp. 869, 870.

their decisive testimony in favour of the received doctrine of atonement, the utmost stretch of ingenuity has been exerted to weaken their force, and divert their application. Of these, the most distinguished is the description of the sufferings and death of Christ, in the liiid chapter of Isaiah. We there find this great personage represented as one, on whom *the Lord hath laid the iniquity of us all;* as one, who *was numbered with transgressors, and bare the sins of many;* as one, who consequently *was wounded for our transgressions*, and *bruised for our iniquities;* and who, in *making his soul an* (אשם) *offering for sin*, suffered *the chastisement of our peace, and healed* us *by his stripes.* Thus we have, here, a clear and full explanation of the nature and efficacy of the sacrifice offered for us by our blessed Redeemer. And, as this part of Scripture not only seems designed to disclose the whole scheme and essence of the Christian atonement, but, from the frequent and familiar references made to it by the writers in the New Testament, appears to be recognised by them as furnishing the true basis of its exposition; it becomes necessary to examine, with scrupulous attention, the exact force of the expressions, and the precise meaning of the Prophet. For this purpose, I shall begin with laying before the reader the last nine verses of the chapter, as they are rendered by Bishop Lowth in his admirable translation, with the readings of the ancient versions, and some occasional explanations by Vitringa, Dathe, and other expositors.

4. Surely our infirmities he hath borne[a]:
   And our sorrows he hath[1] carried[b] them:
   Yet we thought him judicially stricken;
   Smitten of God and afflicted.
5. But he was wounded for our transgressions;
   Was smitten for our iniquities:
   The chastisement[2], by which our peace is effected, was laid upon him;
   And by his bruises we are healed.

[a] נשא. [b] סבל.

6. We all of us like sheep have strayed:
We have turned aside, every one to his own way;
And Jehovah hath made to light[3] upon him the iniquity of us all.
7. It was exacted[4], and he was made answerable; and he opened not his mouth:
As a lamb that is led to the slaughter;
And as a sheep before her shearers
Is dumb: so he opened not his mouth.
8. By an oppressive judgment he was taken off;
And his manner of life who would declare?
For he was cut off from the land of the living;
For[5] the transgression of my people he was smitten to death.
9. And his grave, &c.
Although he had done no wrong,
Neither was there any guile in his mouth.
10. Yet it pleased Jehovah to crush him with affliction.
If his soul shall make a propitiatory sacrifice[6],
He shall see a seed, &c.
11. Of[7] the travail of his soul he shall see (the fruit), and be satisfied.
By the knowledge of him shall my servant justify[8] many;
For the punishment of their iniquities he shall[9] bear.[a]
12. Therefore will I distribute to him the many for his portion,
And the mighty people shall he share for his spoil:
Because he poured out his soul unto death;
And was numbered with the transgressors:
And he[10] bare[b] the sin of many:
And made intercession for the transgressors.

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[1] (*Carried.*) Bajulavit. *Vitr.*—Sustinet. *Dath.* and *Doederl.* —τοὺς πόνους ὑπέμεινε. *Symm.*—also *Aq.* and *Theod.*—See *Crit. Sac.* tom. iv. p. 5306.

[a] סבל. [b] נשא.

[2] (*Chastisement.*) Pœna exemplaris ad impetrandam nobis reconciliationem cum Deo. *Vitr.*—Ejus castigatio nostræ cum Deo reconciliationis causa facta est. *Dath.*—Mulcta correctionis nostræ ei imposita fuit. *Tig.*—מוסר, pœna publica ad deterrendos spectantes a peccando, exemplo pœnarum, ut Ezek. v. 15. *Gusset. Lex.* p. 332. Pœna exemplaris, quâ alius moneatur et cohibeatur a peccando. Παράδειγμα. *Cocc. Lex.*—Michaelis (in loc.) likewise supplies many authorities in support of the translation given by Lowth and Vitringa.—*Castigatio salutis nostræ super ipsum*, patet esse sensus verborum ex iis quæ sequuntur, ובחבורתו נרפא לנו *plaga sua curatio nobis fit*, dum ille insons acerbissimos dolores sustinuit, nos sontes a peccatorum pœnis liberi manebamus, quasi Jehova ipsi nostrorum peccatorum pœnas luendas imposuerit. *Rosenm.*—N.B. the LXX version, παιδεία, which seems the principal ground of Mr. Dodson's objection to the Bishop's translation, supplies no argument against it, inasmuch as this expression is frequently used by the LXX in the sense here contended for: see Levit. xxvi. 18. 23. 28; Deut. xi. 2; xxi. 18; xxii. 18; 1 Kings xii. 11. 14; 2 Chr. x. 11. 14; Ps. vi. 1; xxxviii. 1; xxxix. 11; cxviii. 18; Prov. iii. 11; xiii. 24; xix. 18; xxii. 15; Isai. xxvi. 16; Jer. ii. 19. 30; v. 3; x. 24; xxx. 11. 14; xxxi. 18; xlvi. 28; Ezek. v. 15; xxiii. 48; Wisd. iii. 5; Hos. vii. 12. These passages, in which the words παιδεία and παιδεύω, are used by the LXX to express the Hebrew מיסר, and יסר, are all instances of their application in the sense of *chastisement:* to these there might be added many examples of the Greek word, used in this sense, from the book of Ecclesiasticus; and we find one passage in the book of Job, (xxxvii. 13,) in which the Greek translator has employed the word παιδεία, as expressive of the Hebrew שבט, a *rod;* so familiarly did they connect with it the notion of correction.—The word is also frequently used in this sense by the writers of the New Testament: see *Schleusn. Lex.* on παιδεία and παιδεύω.

[3] (*Made to light upon him the iniquity of us all.*) Fecit incurrere in ipsum pœnam iniquitatis omnium nostrum.

Vitr.—Jova ab eo exegit pœnam peccatorum nostrorum omnium. *Dath.*—Καὶ Κύριος παρέδωκεν αὐτὸν ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις ἡμῶν, is the present reading of the LXX: and the *Old Italic* as given by Augustin, as well as the several readings collected by Sabatier, follow this very nearly: rendering it *Dominus eum tradidit propter iniquitates nostras:* but *Symm.* corresponds with the received reading, Κύριος καταντῆσαι ἐποίησεν εἰς αὐτὸν τὴν ἀνομίαν πάντων ἡμῶν. The *Syriac* reads, Dominus fecit ut occurrerent in eum peccata nostra. The *Vulgate*, Dominus fecit occurrere in eum iniquitatem omnium nostrûm: and Castellio, Jova in eum omnium nostrûm crimen conjecit. Crellius, indeed, to avoid the force of this clause, translates it, Deum, per Christum, iniquitati omnium nostrûm occurrisse: and is refuted by Outram, lib. ii. cap. v. § 3.—*Rosenmüller* renders the words, incursare in eum jussit crimina nostrûm omnium, h. e. pœnas impietati nostræ debitas illum unice perferre jussit Jehova. And upon the whole of the 4th, 5th, and 6th verses, he gives this general exposition: Quem nos ob sua crimina atrocissimis malis a Deo affectum existimavimus, illum eos dolores sustinuisse nunc intelligimus, qui nobis pro peccatis subeundi fuerunt.

[4] (*It was exacted.*) Exigebatur debitum. *Vitr.*—Exactionem sustinuit, vel solutio exacta fuit. *Michaelis.*—Exigitur debitum, et ille ad diem respondit. *Dath.*—Mr. Dodson seems, upon very slender grounds, to object to Bishop Lowth's translation of this clause. Dr. Taylor having, in his Concordance, pronounced the word נגש, to be a forensic term, signifying, he was *brought forth*, and *Symmachus* having rendered it by the word προσηνέχθη, appear but weak reasons for deciding this point: especially as the word προσηνέχθη might have been used by *Symm.* in the sacrificial sense, in which it so frequently occurs: and that it was so in this instance, is highly probable from the rendering of the *Vulgate; oblatus est, he was offered:*—and though this does not come up to the Bishop's idea, yet still less does it favour that, which Mr. Dodson has adduced it to support.—For the numerous and weighty arguments, supporting the Bishop's translation of

the word נגש, see *Vitr.* and *Poole's Syn.*—see also *Calasio's Concord.* where under Number II. not fewer than twenty-one passages are cited, which coincide with this application of the word. One authority more I shall only add: it is that of the Jews themselves, who allow that נגש signifies, to *demand rigorously what is due.* Of this see a strong proof in the words of Kimchi, quoted in *White's Comm. on Isai.*

[5] (*For.*) It is curious to observe the way in which *Mr. Dodson*, who, in his note on verse 11, charges the Bishop with "early prejudices and an undue attachment to established systems," has laboured to distort the obvious meaning of this passage, manifestly in support of a system, though not an established one. FOR *the wickedness of my people*, he would translate THROUGH *the wickedness*, &c., upon little better grounds than that it *may* be so translated: for as to the authority of the LXX rendering the preposition מ by ἀπὸ, which is his principal argument, it yields him no support; the word ἀπὸ being frequently used in the sense of *propter*, as is satisfactorily shewn by Schleusner, (*Lex.* Number 17,) who cites several instances to prove it, and amongst them Ex. vi. 9; Deut. vii. 7; Prov. xx. 4; Nah. iii. 11; evincing its agreement with the preposition מ in this respect: to the same purport see *Biel's Lexic. in LXX*, on the word: and accordingly, ἀπὸ is in this very place translated *ob*, by *Procupius;* (*Crit. Sac.* vol. iv. p. 5300;) and *Sym.* renders the words by ΔΙΑ τὴν ἀδικίαν. But, that the word does in this place imply *propter*, the antecedent and *impulsive* cause, is not only fully proved by Vitringa, and Poole on verse 5, (see also *Nold. Concord.* p. 467,) but is even admitted by Crellius in his *Answer to Grotius*, p. 25. Nay, what is more, Mr. Dodson himself has, in verse 5, allowed to the *very same* expression which occurs here מפשע, the signification, which in this place he refuses to it; translating with the Bishop and the other Commentators, *he was wounded for our transgressions.* Perhaps prejudice and attachment to system *may* sometimes stray beyond the pale of the establishment: and tempting as those emoluments may appear, which an established church

has to bestow, (*Dods. Let. to Dr. Sturges*, p. 24,) there *may* be passions, which influence the human breast, with a sway not less powerful than that of avarice. I say not this, from disrespect to Mr. Dodson, whose well-meant, and in many respects ably executed, plan of reconciling the distinguished prophet of the Old with the writers of the New Testament, deserves well of every friend of Christianity. But on most occasions, it may not be amiss to consider, whether prejudice may not lie at more than one side of a question, and whether he who is animated by an ardent spirit of opposition to established opinions, may not be influenced (though perhaps unconsciously) by other feelings than a love of truth.

[6] On this clause see Number XXVII.: and in addition to the observations there offered upon the passage, I would recommend to the learned reader the copious discussion of its structure and meaning by *Danzius* in his treatise *De* ΛΥΤΡΩι, *Meusch. Nov. Test. ex Talm.* pp. 851—854.

[7] (*Of.*) In this, the Bishop (as well as Mr. Dodson, and our present English version) departs from the uniformity of the preposition ב, throughout this entire section. PROPTER laborem animæ suæ videbit. *Vitr.*—PROPTER has quas perpessus est afflictiones. *Dath.*—PROPTER labores ipsius. *Rosenm.*—So Crellius himself explains the word, in his *Answer to Grotius*, p. 25.—The LXX version of this book, which (as has been already observed in p. 150, and is admitted also by Mr. Dodson, pref. p. vii.) is in many parts erroneous and even absurd,—and from which, Vitringa remarks on verse 11, "but little aid is to be looked for in this book," (see also the testimony of *Zuinglius* in *Glass. Phil. Sac.* continued by *Bauer*, p. 250,)—is here totally unintelligible: but the *Vulgate* renders the clause, PRO eo quod laboravit anima ejus: and the *Doway*, agreeably to this, translates, *FOR THAT his soul has laboured*, &c.—in which it has the advantage of the Protestant English versions.

[8] (*Justify.*) Justitiam adferet multis. *Vitr.*—Justificationem conciliabit multis. *Cocc.*—Justitiam dabit multis: i. e. justificabit multos. *Michael.*—Justificabit ipse multos. *Vulg.*—Mr. Dodson, indeed, renders it, "turn many to

righteousness;" and quotes the authority of *Taylor's Concord.* and Dan. xii. 3. He cites Grotius also, who on this occasion is the less to be attended to, as he most unaccountably applies the prophecy to Jeremiah, so as to render this sense of the word unavoidable. See *Vitr.* particularly on this word.—Cloppenb. asserts, that the most usual signification of the word הצדיק, as of the Greek δικαιόω, is to *absolve*, to *acquit:* see *Poole's Syn.* Justification, he says, is opposed to *condemnation*, and is a forensic term, signifying *acquittal.* Albert, on Rom. viii. 33, (*Observ. Phil.*,) says of δικαιόω, it is a forensic term, implying a declaration of acquittal, of the person charged with any crime, and answers to the word הצדיק. Parkhurst in like manner explains it as being a forensic term, implying to absolve from past offences, and corresponding to הציד, for which, he says, the LXX have used it in this sense, in Deut. xxv. 1; 1 Kin. viii. 32; 2 Chr. vi. 23; Isai. v. 23;—he might have added Exod. xxiii. 7; Ps. lxxxii. 3; Prov. xvii. 15; and many others which may be collected from *Trommius* and *Calasio.* The passage last referred to, places *justification* (הצדיק, δικαιόω) in direct opposition to *condemnation:—he that justifieth the wicked, and he that condemneth the just, even they both are an abomination to the Lord.*—Isai. l. 8. supplies a strong example of the same opposition. See also *Schleusner* on δικαιόω, which, corresponding to צדק, is used, he says, "in a forensic sense: and signifies to be acquitted, to be pronounced innocent, and is put in opposition to καταδικάζεσθαι;" of which he furnishes several instances.

[9] (*For the punishment of their iniquities he shall bear.*) Siquidem eorum peccata bajulavit. *Vitr.*—Nam pro peccatis eorum satisfecit. *Dath.*—Nam pœnas eorum sustinuit. *Doederl.*—Et iniquitates eorum ipse portabit. *Vulg.*—Peccata illorum ipse sustinebit. *Old Italic* as given by August. *Sabat.* in loc.—Mr. Dodson contends against the propriety of the Bishop's translation; and maintains, that the words will bear no other meaning than, "their iniquities he shall *bear away.*" In this he considers himself supported by the authority of the LXX, who render, Καὶ τὰς ἁμαρτίας αὐτῶν

αὐτὸς ΑΝΟΙΣΕΙ. He does not, however, state, that *Sym.* translates the clause, τὰς ἀσεβείας αὐτῶν αὐτὸς ΥΠΕΝΕΓΚΕΙ: (*Crit. Sac.* tom. iv. p. 5300:)—and besides, as we shall see hereafter, the word ἀναφέρω yields him no support. Bishop Stock renders, "Of their iniquities he shall *bear the weight*:" in which he agrees with Rosenmüller, who says, "De formula hac bene monuit Martini, peccata propter mala, quæ sibi adjuncta habent, ab Orientalibus ut grave onus repræsentari, quo premantur, qui iis se inquinaverint, in cujus rei testimonium adducit locum Thren. v. 7. et ex Corano plura loca. Hinc apud Arabes, inquit, verbum, quod proprie est, *grave onus sustinuit*, dicitur pro, *crimine gravatus fuit*: itemque *sarcina* vocabulum solenne est de criminibus eorumque pœnis."

[10] (*He bare*, &c.) Peccatum multorum *tulit*. *Vitr.*—Pro multorum peccatis *satisfecit*. *Dath.*—Multorum pœnas *sustinuit*. *Doederl.*—Peccata multorum *tulit*. *Vulg.*—Peccata multorum *sustinuit*. *August.*—*pertulit*. *Cypr.*—and both add, after the LXX, et propter iniquitates eorum traditus est: *Sabat.* in loc.—Mr. Dodson objects, as in verse 11, and renders it, he *took away* the sins, &c.

I have thought it necessary to take this accurate survey of this celebrated prophecy; and to state, thus fully, the various renderings of the most respectable versions, and commentators; lest any pretence should remain, that, in deriving my arguments from this part of Scripture, I had, either unguardedly, or uncandidly, built on any inaccuracy in our common English translation. The plain result of the whole is obviously this: That the righteous servant of Jehovah, having no sin himself, was to submit to be treated as the vilest of sinners; and, having the burden of our transgressions laid upon him, to suffer on account of them; and, by offering up his life a propitiatory sacrifice, like to those under the law, to procure for us a release from the punishment which was

due to our offences. And thus from that prophet, justly called Evangelical, who was the first commissioned to lift up the veil that covered the mystery of our redemption, and to draw it forth to open view from beneath the shade of Jewish ceremonies, and types, through which it had been hitherto but faintly discerned,—we have a description of that great propitiatory Sacrifice, whereby our salvation has been effected, as plain as it is possible for language to convey it. That Christ is the person described by the prophet throughout this chapter, cannot with any *Christian* be a matter of question. St. Matthew (viii. 17) and St. Peter (1 Ep. ii. 24) directly recognise the prophecy as applied to Christ: and yet more decisive is the passage, in Acts viii. 35; in which, the eunuch reading this very chapter, and demanding of Philip, *of whom speaketh the prophet this?* it is said, that *Philip began at the same scripture, and preached unto him Jesus.*

Indeed, so evident and undeniable is the application to Christ, that Dr. Priestley himself, whilst he is laboriously employed in withdrawing from the support of Christianity most of the prophecies of the Old Testament, (which, he says, Christians, by "*following too closely the writers of the New Testament*," have been erroneously led to attribute to Christ, *Theol. Rep.* vol. v. p. 213,) yet pronounces it impossible to explain this of any other but Jesus Christ (p. 226); and considers the application of it to Jeremiah by Grotius as not deserving a refutation. White also, who, in his *Commentary on Isaiah*, professes to follow *Grotius* as his oracle, is yet obliged to abandon him in his explication of this prophecy, which he says cannot possibly belong to any other than Christ: and this he thinks so evident, that he concurs with A. Lapide, in pronouncing, that "this chapter may justly challenge for its title, *The Passion of Jesus Christ according to Isaiah*." See also *Kenicott's Dissert.* vol. ii. p. 373.

But, whilst Christ is of necessity allowed to be the subject of this prophecy, the propitiatory sacrifice, which he is here represented as offering for the sins of men, is utterly rejected. And for the purpose of doing away the force of the

expressions, which so clearly convey this idea, the adversaries of the doctrine of atonement have directed against this part of Scripture their principal attacks. What has been already advanced in Number XXVII. may shew how impotent have been their attempts to prove that Christ is not here described, as an אשם, or *sacrifice for sin.* And their endeavours to evince that this sacrifice is not likewise described as one truly *propitiatory*, we shall find to be equally unsupported by just argument, or fair and rational criticism.

The usual method of proceeding has been, to single out one expression from this entire passage, and, by undermining its signification, to shake the whole context into ruins. The person, who is made an אשם, or *sin-offering*, is said to *bear the sins of many.* Now, it is contended, that to BEAR *sins*, signifies merely to bear them *away*, or remove them; and that, consequently, nothing more is meant here, than "the removing away from us our sins and iniquities by forgiveness."[a] In support of this position, the application of the prophet's words by St. Matthew, (viii. 17,) and the force of the expressions which in this prophecy are rendered by the words, *bearing* sins, are urged as unanswerable arguments.

1. It is said, that "the words in the 4th verse, *our infirmities he hath borne, and our sorrows he hath carried them*, are expressly interpreted by St. Matthew, of the miraculous cures performed by our Saviour on the sick: and as the *taking* our infirmities, and *bearing* our sicknesses, cannot mean the *suffering* those infirmities and sicknesses, but only the bearing them *away*, or *removing* them, so the bearing our iniquities is likewise to be understood, as removing them away from us by forgiveness."

It must be owned, that this passage of St. Matthew has given great difficulty to commentators. His applying, what the prophet seems to say of *sins*, to *bodily infirmities;* and the *bearing* of the former, to the *curing* of the latter; has created no small degree of perplexity. Some have, accord-

[a] *B. Mord.* p. 825, see also *Taylor's Key*, No. 162. *Mr. Dodson's* notes on this chapter of Isaiah—and particularly *Crell. Resp. ad Grot.* p. 24, &c.

ingly, contended [a], that St. Matthew has applied the prophecy merely in accommodation; in which case, he supplies no authority as to the precise meaning of the words of the prophet: others [b] again, that the expressions admit that full and comprehensive signification, that will include both bodily and spiritual diseases, and which consequently received a two-fold fulfilment: others [c] again, that Christ might be said to have *suffered* the diseases, which he removed; from the anxious care, and bodily harassing, with which he laboured to remedy them, *bearing* them, as it were, through sympathy and toil: and Bishop Pearce is so far dissatisfied with all of these expositions, that he is led to concede the probability, that the passage in Matthew is an interpolation. Now, if these several commentators, acquiescing in the received, have proceeded on an erroneous, acceptation of the passages in Isaiah and Matthew, we shall have little reason to wonder at the difficulties which they have had to encounter in reconciling the prophet and the evangelist. It must surely, then, be worth our while to try whether a closer examination of the original passages will not enable us to effect this point.

For this purpose, it must first be observed, that all the commentators have gone upon the supposition, that the prophet, in the 4th verse, which is that quoted by St. Matthew, speaks only of the sufferings of Christ on account of our *sins:* into which they have been led, partly by the Greek version, ἁμαρτίας; and partly by the supposition, that St. Peter refers to this same passage, when he speaks of Christ's *bearing our* SINS *upon the cross.* But the reference of St. Peter is not to this 4th verse, but to the 11th and 12th: the words of St. Peter, τὰς ἁμαρτίας αὐτὸς ἀνήνεγκε, corresponding to the original in both these verses, and being the very same used by the LXX: τὰς ἁμαρτίας αὐτὸς ἀνοίσει, and αὐτὸς ἁμαρτίας ἀνήνεγκε, being their translation of them respectively.

[a] See *Calixt. Ernest. Schol. Proph.* p. 230.—*Sykes's Essay on Christ. Rel.* p. 231.—*Beausob. Rosenm.* and *Wakefield,* in loc.

[b] See *Hamm. Whitby, Le Clerc,* and *Lightfoot,* in loc.

[c] See *Vitr.* on Isai. liii. 4, and *Raphel. Grot.* and *Doddridge,* in locum.

Again, with regard to the word, ἁμαρτίας, which is now found in the Greek version of the 4th verse, there seems little reason to doubt from what Dr. Kennicott has advanced, in his *Diss. Gen.* § 79, that this is a corruption, which has crept into the later copies of the Greek; the old *Italic*, (as collected from Augustin, Tertullian, and Athanasius,) as well as St. Matthew, reading the word, ἀσθενείας, and thereby proving the early state of that version. Besides Dr. Owen (*Modes of Quot.* p. 31) mentions two MSS. that read at this day ἀσθενείας, and one μαλακίας: and from the collection in which the late Dr. Holmes was engaged, if happily it should be prosecuted, it is not unlikely that more may appear to justify this reading. I find, also, that in 93 instances, in which the word here translated ἁμαρτία, or its kindred verb, is found in the Old Testament in any sense that is not entirely foreign from the passage before us, there occurs but this one in which the word is so rendered; it being, in all other cases, expressed by ἀσθένεια, μαλακία, or some word denoting bodily disease. See *Calas. Conc.* on חלה, No. 1. That the Jews themselves considered this passage of Isaiah as referring to bodily diseases, appears from *Whitby*, and *Lightfoot*, *Hor. Heb.* on Matt. viii. 17, and also *Poole's Syn.* on Isaiah liii. 4. *Pes.* and *Alsch.* And that the word חליני is to be taken in this sense, appears not only from the authority of the Jews, but from that of most of the ancient translations; being rendered by *Munster* and the *Tigurine*, *infirmitates;* and *morbos*, by *Tremellius*, *Piscator*, and *Castalio.—Iren.* and *August.*, who give us the early Latin version from the Greek, read *infirmitates;* and *Tertullian*, *imbecillitates. Cocceius*, and all the lexicons, explain it in the same sense; and the several passages, in which it occurs in the Old Testament, as collected both by *Taylor* and *Calasio*, place the matter beyond dispute. So that the word *infirmities*, by which Lowth, and Vitringa, in agreement with the old English versions, have rendered it in this place, cannot possibly be rejected. Mr. Dodson entirely concurs in this interpretation: and Ken-

nicott asserts positively, that the word always denotes *bodily diseases.* (*Diss. Gen.* § 79.) Dathe, and Doederlein, indeed, explain it by the general expressions, *mala*, and *miseriam;* but Doederlein at the same time admits, that *morbus* is its literal signification.

Having thus ascertained the true sense of the word חלינו, we next proceed to נשא; which, I agree with Mr. Dodson, is not here to be rendered in any other sense, than that of *tollo, aufero.* This, *when not connected with* SINS, INIQUITIES, &c., is not infrequently its signification. Dr. Kennicott (*Diss. Gen.* § 79) takes it in this place in the sense of *abstulit;* and thus Tertullian expressly reads the word from the early Latin. So that the first clause, חלינו הוא נשא, will then run, *surely our infirmities he hath taken, i. e. taken away,* exactly corresponding to St. Matthew's translation and application of the words: and thus *Cocc.* (on נשא, No. I.) expressly renders it: "*Morbos nostros ipse tulit, i. e.* ferens abstulit."

But the second, or antithetical clause, ומכאביו סבלם relates, as we shall see, not to bodily pains and distempers, but to the diseases and torments of the mind. That the word מכאב is to be taken in this sense, Kennicott affirms. (*Diss. Gen.* § 79.) It is evidently so interpreted, Ps. xxxii. 10. *Many* SORROWS *shall be to the wicked:* and again, Ps. xxxviii. 17, where the Psalmist, grieving for his sins, says, *My* SORROW *is continually before me:* and again, Ps. lxix. 29. *But I am poor and* SORROWFUL: and again in Proverbs xiv. 13. *The heart is* SORROWFUL: and Eccles. i. 18. *He that increaseth knowledge, increaseth* SORROW: and ii. 18. *What hath man of all his labour, of the vexation of his heart? For all his days are* SORROWS: and Isai. lxv. 14. *My servants shall sing for joy, but ye shall cry for* SORROW *of heart:* and Jerem. xxx. 15. *Thy* SORROW *is incurable, for the multitude of thine iniquity.* Agreeably to this, the word is translated by Bishop Lowth, and by our common and most of the early English versions, *sorrows.* The Vulg. Vitr. and Dath. render

it by *dolores;* and the LXX by ὀδυνᾶται.—Πόνος which is the word used by Sym.[a] Aquil. and Theod. (see *Procop. Crit. Sac.* tom. iv. pp. 5299, 5300,) agrees with this, signifying, according to Hesychius, ἄλγος ἐνέργημα ὀδύνης, and being used commonly in this sense in the Greek of the Old Testament. Yet, in opposition to all this, Mr. Dodson contends, that the Hebrew word is here to be rendered SICKNESSES: and this, upon no better ground, than that the word *may* signify bodily disorders, as well as diseases of the mind: and in support of this assertion, he refers to *Taylor's Concordance.* But, on consulting both *Taylor* and *Calasio,* I find, that of about thirty passages of Scripture, in which, exclusive of the one at present before us, the word מכאב or its kindred verb is found, there is scarcely one that bears any relation whatever to bodily disease[b]: and there is but one, (Job xxxiii. 19,) in which the LXX have rendered it by any word implying corporeal ailment. In this one place they have used the word μαλακία, which, however, they do not always apply to bodily disease; and which they have employed in the 3d verse of this very chapter, εἰδὼς φέρειν μαλακίαν, where Mr. Dodson renders the words, *acquainted with* GRIEF. But it is particularly worthy of remark, that this word מכאבים, which Mr. Dodson in this 4th verse would translate *sicknesses,* he has himself rendered in the preceding verse, in the description to which this immediately refers, by the word SORROWS, and yet pronounces this expression utterly inapplicable here:

[a] Symmachus renders, τοὺς πόνους ὑπέμεινε; as see p. 257 of this volume. It is observable, that the rendering of the word מכאב, in this place, by ΠΟΝΟΣ, in the versions of Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion, has been omitted in *Trommius's Concordance,* in the *Lexicon Græcum ad Hexapla,* in *Biel's Lexicon in LXX,* &c., and in *Schleusner's Spicilegium* intended as an addition to the Lexicon of Biel. Trommius, indeed, notices this rendering of the word מאב by Symmachus in Job xvi. 6, and xxxiii. 19; and of the word עמל by Aquila in Job xvi. 2, and by both Aquila and Symmachus in Ps. xiv. But none of these instances have been cited by Biel.—A *complete* Concordance for the fragments of Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion, seems still a desideratum.

[b] And what is singular, the very authority to which Mr. Dodson refers, pronounces decisively against him in the passage before us, rendering the word by *sorrows* in this 4th verse as well as in the verse which precedes it. See *Taylor's Concord.* on מאב, Nos. 23. 25.

thus allowing the person spoken of, to be *a man of sorrows*, in one verse; and denying that the *same* expression, which was there used, referred to those *sorrows*, in the next, where it came to be explained what and whence these sorrows were.

The secret, however, of this inconsistency of criticism lies in the Hebrew verb, annexed to this word.—The verb סבל, to *bear*, in the sense of *bearing a burden*, could not be applied to *sicknesses*, as it might to *sorrows:* and as the object with those who deny that Christ suffered on our account, is to deprive the verb of this signification, the reason of contending for the adjunct *sickness*, in opposition to such a weight of evidence, is sufficiently obvious. The word, סבל, however, Mr. Dodson cannot prove to be taken here in the sense of *removing*. He says, "it has been already proved by many learned men," and refers to Crellius, Whiston, and Taylor. But in what manner these learned men have proved it, we shall presently see. In his answer to Dr. Sturges, p. 21, he advances, indeed, his own reasons in defence of his exposition of the word סבל: but, except the citation from Isai. xlvi. 4, which shall be noticed hereafter, his whole argument turns upon the supposition, that the Hebrew word, with which it is connected, as well as its corresponding expression in St. Matthew, is to be understood as signifying bodily disorders: in which case, he says, "סבל must be considered as synonymous to נשא." All this, then, together with the accompanying remark concerning the use of the word ἐβάστασεν by Hippocrates, must fall with the hypothesis on which it is built; and the strength of this hypothesis has been now sufficiently ascertained.

But, to proceed with the verb סבל.—The word, or its derivative noun, occurs in 26 passages of the Old Testament, one of which is the verse now under examination: two others relate to sins: one, the 11th verse of this chapter; the other, Lament. v. 7, both of which we shall hereafter discuss more particularly: and the remaining 23 belong literally to *bearing burdens on the shoulder;* and so strictly and exclusively is this signification appropriated to the word, that we find

the bearers of burdens employed in the work of the Temple, called (2 Chr. ii. 2. 18; xxxiv. 13) סבלים, סבל איש; by the LXX, ὑποφόροι; and in one passage, it is even used to express a *yoke*, (Isai. x. 27,) LXX, ζυγός: see *Calas.* and *Kircher:* see also *Buxt. Cocc.* and *Schindl.* who seems decisive on the point. Buxtorf supplies several instances of the application of the word, from the *Jerusalem Targum;* all of which coincide with the sense here contended for. Schindler quotes a remarkable use of the word, in the Syriac translation of St. Mark, v. 26, it being there applied to the woman who is said to have SUFFERED *many things* (παθοῦσα πολλὰ) *of the physicians.* For other instances of a similar use of the word in the Syriac, see Schaaf's *Test. Syriac,* 1 Cor. xiii. 7; 2 Tim. ii. 9; 1 Pet. iii. 17; also Schaaf's *Lexicon Syriac.* on the word ܣܒܠ. Now, when, in addition to all these authorities, we find the Greek versions uniformly given to the word, in this place, the sense of *sustaining* or *suffering,* (ὑπέμεινεν being, as we have already seen, the reading of Aq. Sym. and Theodot.; and the LXX expressing both the noun and verb by the one word, δδυνᾶται:) the Latin versions also rendering it in like manner; (the old Italic as given by August. strictly following the LXX, pro nobis in doloribus est; the Vulg. Pagn. and Piscat. expressing the word by *portavit;* Montan. and Tremell. by *bajulavit;* Munst, by *sustinuit;* and Castal. by *toleravit:*) and our own English translation supported in the same sense by the most eminent biblical scholars, Vitr. Lowth. Dath. Doederl. and Rosenmüller; it is natural to inquire what arguments have been used by those learned men to whom Mr. Dodson refers us for his *proof.*

But the reader will be surprised to find, that, confidently as Mr. Dodson has appealed to them, they furnish *no proof at all.* Mr. Whiston merely translates the passage as Mr. Dodson has done, without advancing a single reason in support of it: (see *Boyle's Lectures,* fol. ed. vol. ii. pp. 270. 281.) Dr. Taylor (*Key,* &c. § 162) only says, that סבל will *admit* the sense of *carrying off,* or *away;* and, in support of this, he instances one solitary passage from Isai. xlvi. 4, which a

single glance will prove not to convey this sense[a]. And as to Crellius, he even confesses that he cannot find in the Old Testament a single instance of the use of the word, סבל, in the sense of bearing *away*; and is obliged to confine himself to the repetition of the argument of Socinus, derived from the application of this passage by St. Matthew to *bodily diseases*, which Christ *could* be said to bear, only in the sense of bearing away[b]. But, to suppose *this* clause applied by St. Matthew to bodily diseases, is a *petitio principii;* the sense, in which it was understood by the Evangelist, being part of the question in dispute. And that it was differently understood and applied by him, will, I trust, presently appear. Thus we find these learned men, to whom Mr. Dodson has referred for a complete proof of the point he wishes to establish, fulfilling his engagement in a manner not very satisfactory. Mr. Whiston offers *no* proof. Dr. Taylor gives a single, and inapplicable instance. And Crellius begs the question, admitting at the same time the general language of Scripture to be against him. This may furnish a useful hint to unsuspecting readers.—But to proceed.

That this second clause in the 4th verse relates not to Christ's *removing the sicknesses*, but to his actually *bearing the sorrows* of men, has, I trust, been sufficiently established. Let us now consider the corresponding clause in St. Matthew's quotation, τὰς νόσους ἐβάστασεν. This has commonly been referred, it must be confessed, to bodily diseases; but, whether the occasion on which it is introduced, joined to the certainty that the preceding clause is applied in this sense, may not have led to this interpretation of the words, is worthy of inquiry. That the word νόσος is primarily ap-

[a] It is particularly remarkable also, that Dr. Taylor, in his *Concordance*, has not only not adduced a single passage in which the sense of *bearing* otherwise than *as a burden* is conveyed; but he actually *explains* the word in this sense: —"to *bear*, or *carry a burden*, as a porter." In the passage at present in dispute, indeed, he introduces the sense of bearing *away:* but then he does this avowedly on the supposition, that this passage is to be explained by the *diseases* spoken of by St. Matthew.

[b] See *Crell. Resp. ad Gr.* p. 24; also *Socin. de Jes. Chr.* pars 2. cap. 4. *Opera*, tom. ii. p. 149.

plied to bodily diseases, there can be no question. Dr. Kennicott contends (*Diss. Gen.* § 79) that it is used here to express diseases of the mind. In this he adopts the notion of Grot. on Matt. viii. 17: and certain passages both in the Old and New Testament undoubtedly apply the word in this sense. Thus Ps. ciii. verse 3. *Who forgiveth all thine iniquities; who healeth all thy* DISEASES. Wisd. xvii. 8. *They that promised to drive away terrors and troubles from a* SICK *soul.* Also, 1 Tim. vi. 4. *He is proud,* DOTING (or rather DISTRACTED, νοσῶν) *about questions and strifes of words.* Schleusner also explains the word νοσέω, as metaphorically applied to the mind; and quotes, in confirmation of this, Ælian, and Julius Pollux. To the same purpose Elsner (*Observ. Sac.* tom. ii. p. 307) appeals to Plutarch, Lucian, &c. And, if νόσος, as all Lexicons agree, corresponds to the *morbus* of the Latins, there can be no question of its occasional application to the disorders of the mind.

Now, if the word be taken in this sense in this passage of Matthew, it will exactly agree with the *sorrows*, or *sufferings* of Isaiah. Or if, supposing it to denote bodily disease, it be used by metonymy (as Vitringa, on Isai. liii. 4, explains it) for *pains and afflictions*, the cause being put for the effect: or if again, with Glassius, (*Phil. Sacr. Dath.* p. 972,) Doederlein, (on Isai. liii. 4,) and other distinguished Biblical critics, it be supposed merely to express the *punishment of sins*, bodily diseases being viewed by the Jews familiarly in that light; or if, waving these interpretations, which some may consider as too strongly figurative, the word be taken in its largest sense, as comprehending *ills* and *afflictions* in general, without regarding what their cause might be,—it will equally correspond with the expression of the prophet.

And, that it is to be taken in this large sense, and by no means to be confined to mere bodily disease, is yet farther confirmed by the emphatical verb βαστάζειν, which is connected with it, and which so adequately conveys the force of the Hebrew, סבל. "In this word," *Grotius* (on Matt. viii. 17)

remarks, "as in the Hebrew סבל, and its corresponding ܣܒܠ[a] which is here used by the Syriac version, is contained the force of *burden* and *suffering*." Thus Matt. again, (xx. 12,) *have* BORNE *the burden and heat of the day.* And Luke, (xiv. 27,) *Whosoever doth not* BEAR *his cross.* John, (xvi. 12,) *But he cannot* BEAR *them now.* Acts, (xv. 10,) *A yoke on the neck of the disciples, which neither our fathers nor we were able to* BEAR. And in the same sense we find it used by St. Paul, (Gal. vi. 2,) BEAR *ye one another's* BURDENS; also, (v. 10,) *He that troubleth you shall* BEAR *his judgment:* and again, (Rom. xv. 1,) *We that are strong ought to* BEAR *the infirmities of the weak.* It must be unnecessary to cite more passages. There are, in all, 26 in the New Testament, in which the word βαστάζω, occurs, exclusive of this of Matt. viii. 17: and in no instance is the sense any other, than that of *bearing*, or *lifting* as a *burden.* (See *Steph. Concord.*) The four passages which are adduced by Taylor, (*Key*, 162,) viz. Mark xiv. 13; Luke vii. 14; Joh. xii. 6; and xx. 15, all of them imply this very idea: for even though the thing spoken of were eventually to be carried *away*, yet this necessarily requires that it should be *carried* or *borne*, as a burden. But what makes this objection the more extraordinary is, that the carrying *away* is not necessarily implied in any one of them: the carrying (bajulare, *Vulg.* and *Tertull.* and *Cod. Brix.*) the pitcher of water, which is spoken of in one; and the bearing the dead man's bier, that is referred to in another; conveying simply the idea of *bearing.* The two passages in John also, one relating to Judas bearing the bag, and the other to the taking away the body of Jesus, are by no means conclusive: the interpretation of *carrying away*, or *stealing*, what was put into the bag, though supported by B. Pearce and others, being but conjectural, and standing without any support from the Scripture use of the word: and *lifting* being

[a] On the force of the Syriac word ܣܒܠ consult *Schaaf. Lexic. Syriac.* So emphatical is this word, that the noun ܡܣܒܠܢܐ derived from it, is used to signify *onus, pondus, sarcina,* &c.

all that is necessarily meant with respect to the body of Christ, notwithstanding that the *consequence* of that lifting was the carrying it away, and that our version, attending to the general sense more than to the strict letter, has rendered it, *borne him hence.*

I will only remark, in addition, that Dr. Taylor has contrived to exhibit a much more numerous array of texts in support of his sense of the word βαστάζω, than those here examined. He has cited not fewer than ten. But this is a sort of *deceptio visus;* there being but the four above referred to in which the term occurs. The word ἐβάστασε he had joined with two others, ἔλαβε and ἀνήνεγκε, and pursued the investigation of them jointly: thus the text in which *any* of these words was contained became necessary to be cited, and appeared to be applied to *all.* Whether this be an accurate mode of examining the signification of words, which may differ in meaning or force; or whether it may not tend to make a false impression on the hasty reader, by presenting to his *view* a greater number of authorities, than really exist, in support of a particular acceptation, it would not be amiss for those who are used to *talk largely* about candour to consider. This digression, though it somewhat retards the course of the argument, I thought it right to make, as, perhaps, there is nothing more useful than to put young readers on their guard against the arts of controversy. To proceed.

The use of the word βαστάζω in the Old Testament, by the LXX, Sym. and Aq. confirms the acceptation here contended for. (See [a] *Trom. Concord.* and *Biel.*) Amongst profane

[a] It is to be observed, that it is not only the Concordance itself that is to be consulted, but more particularly, *Montfaucon's Lexic. Græc. ad Hexapla,* which Trommius has placed at the end of his Concordance, and which is to be esteemed as a most valuable collection from the fragments of Aquila, Symmachus, and Theodotion. Of this Lexicon, as well as of the labours of Trommius, Biel has freely availed himself, in the compilation of his valuable *Lexicon in LXX et alios Interp.* &c. From these works it will be seen, that Aquila has employed the words βάσταγμα and βαστάζω, for the Hebrew סבל in Exod. i. 11, and for עמס in Zech. xii. 3:—and that Symmachus has applied it to the word סבל in Exod. i. 11, and Ps. lxxx. 7. Now these instances from *Aquila* and *Symmachus* are singularly important upon the present occasion,

writers, also, we find additional authorities. Albert (*Observ. Phil.* on John xvi. 12) supplies a strong instance from Epictetus. Raphelius likewise, (on John xx. 15,) although his mistake respecting the meaning of Matt. viii. 17. has led him to give the force of *asportare* to the word, adduces another equally strong from Polybius. In conformity with this acceptation, also, we find Tremellius's and Schaaf's versions from the Syriac, and Beza's from the Greek, as well as the Vulg. and the Old Latin, render the word by *portat;* the plain and direct meaning of which is to *bear as a burden.* It may be likewise remarked, that Rosenmüller, although embarrassed with the notion that νόσους here implies bodily disease, is yet obliged by the force of the verb βαστάζω, to apply it in the above signification, notwithstanding that it makes little less than nonsense of the passage: ONERI *sanandi morbos nostros,* HUMEROS SUPPOSUIT, is his explication of the words.

If the remarks which have been made be just, the result of the whole is, that the Prophet and the Evangelist entirely agree. They use the same language, and in the same sense: and the translation which Bishop Lowth has given, will, with a slight variation, accurately convey the sense of both. *Our infirmities he hath borne* (away); *and our sorrows, he hath carried them:* or, as Dr. Kennicott translates both, *Morbos nostros abstulit, et ægritudines nostras portavit.* And this last is very nearly the version of the *Old Latin,* as given by Tertullian, (see *Sabatier* on Isai. liii. 4,) *Imbecillitates nostras aufert, et languores nostros portat;* or, as Ambros., *ægritudines nostras portavit;* and it is accurately conveyed by the old version of Coverdale, which Dr. Kennicott (*Diss. Gen.* p. 45. note a.) does not scruple in many instances to

because the original word which they have thus rendered, is the word סבל, which I have already endeavoured to shew, unequivocally implies the *bearing of a burden;* and also because the version of the former is eminently distinguished by its *literal* agreement with the original Hebrew (as see particularly *Dath. Opusc. Dissert. in Aquil.* p. 1—15). The words סבל and βαστάζω thus appear exactly to correspond.—See also *Stockius's Lexicon in Nov. Test.* and *Pasor's Greek Lexicon* edited by *Schoettgen.*

prefer to our present English translation, *He only* TAKETH AWAY *our* INFIRMITE, *and* BEARETH *our* PAINE.[a] Thus are Isaiah and Matthew perfectly reconciled: the first clause in each, relating to DISEASES REMOVED; and the second, to SUFFERINGS ENDURED. For it should be remarked, in addition to what has been already said, that ἔλαβε and ἐβάστασε in Matthew bear to each other the proportion of the verbs נשא and סבל in Isaiah: the former in each of these pairs being generic, πολύσημον, and extending to all modes of *taking* or *bearing*, *on*, or *away:* and the latter being specific, and confined to the single mode of *bearing as a burden.* And now, by the same steps, by which the Prophet and the Evangelist have been reconciled, we find the original objection derived from St. Matthew's application of the prophecy completely removed; since we now see, that the *bearing*, applied by the Evangelist to *bodily disease*, is widely different from that which the Prophet has applied to *sins;* so that no conclusion can be drawn from the former use of the word, which shall be prejudicial to its commonly received sense in the latter relation.

One point yet, however, demands explanation. It will be said, that, by this exposition, the prophet is no longer supposed to confine himself to the view of our redemption by Christ's sufferings and death; but to take in also the consideration of his miraculous cures: and the Evangelist, on the other hand, is represented as not attending merely to the cures performed by Christ, with which alone he was immediately concerned; but as introducing the mention of his suffering for our sins, with which his subject had no natural connexion.

[a] The late Principal Campbell has, I find, been led by a close examination of the subject to the translation of the Evangelist which has been here contended for: "*He hath himself* CARRIED OFF *our* INFIRMITIES, *and* BORNE *our* DISTRESSES." In his note on the passage, he falls, indeed, into the common mistake of supposing, that St. Peter and St. Matthew refer to the same part of the prophecy of Isaiah; remarking, that "we should rather call that the *fulfilment* of the prophecy, which is mentioned 1 Pet. ii. 24."—*Campbell's Four Gospels*, vol. iii. p. 66, and vol. iv. p. 74.

Now, to this I reply, first, with regard to the prophet, that it is not surprising, that so distinguishing a characteristic of the Messiah, as that of his *healing all manner of diseases with a word*, and one which this prophet has elsewhere (xxxv. 5) depicted so strongly, that our Saviour repeats his very words, (*Batt's Diss.* 2d edit. p. 109,) and refers to them in proof that he was the Messiah; (Matt. xi. 4. and *Beausobre* in loc.;) it is not, I say, surprising, that this characteristic of Christ should be described by the prophet. And that it should be introduced in this place, where the prophet's main object seems to be to unfold the plan of our redemption, and to represent the Messiah as suffering for the sins of men, will not appear in any degree unnatural, when it is considered, that the Jews familiarly connected the ideas of sin and disease; the latter being considered by them the temporal[a] punishment of the former. So that he, who was described, as averting, by what he was to *suffer*, the penal consequences of sin, would naturally be looked to, as removing, by what he was to *perform*, its temporal effects: and thus the mention of the one would reasonably connect with that of the other; the whole of the prophetic representation becoming, as Kennicott happily expresses it, "Descriptio Messiæ benevolentissime et agentis et patientis." (*Diss. Gen.* § 79.)

That the Evangelist, on the other hand, though speaking more immediately of the removal of bodily diseases, should at the same time quote that member of the prophecy which related to the more important part of Christ's office, that of saving men from their sins, will appear equally reasonable, if it be recollected, that the sole object, in referring to the pro-

[a] For abundant proof of this see *Whitby* on Matt. viii. 17, and particularly on ix. 2. See also *Grot. Beausob.* and *Rosenm.* on Matt. ix. 2. *Drusius* on the same, *Crit. Sac.* tom. vi. p. 288; and *Doederl.* on Isaiah liii. 4. *Martini* also on the same passage observes, "Ipsa vero dicendi formula interpretanda est ex opinione constante tum populorum antiquiorum omnium, tum maximè Orientalium, quâ graviores calamitates quascunque, sive illæ morbis et corporis cruciatibus, sive aliis adversitatibus continerentur, immediate ad Deum, peccatorum vindicem referre, easque tanquam pœnas ab irato numine inflictas, considerare solebant." See *Rosenm.* on Isaiah liii. 4.

phet concerning Jesus, was to prove him to be the Messiah; and that the distinguishing characteristic of the Messiah was, *to give knowledge of salvation unto his people by the remission of their sins.* (Luke i. 77.) So that the Evangelist may be considered as holding this leading character primarily in view; and, at the same time that he marks to the Jews the fulfilment of one part of the prophecy, by the healing of their bodily distempers, or, as Dr. Taylor well expresses it, represents our Lord, as acting one part of his saving work described by the prophet, he directs their attention to that other greater object of our Saviour's mission, on which the prophet had principally enlarged; namely, the procuring forgiveness of their sins by his suffering. And thus, the present fulfilment of the prophecy was, at the same time, a designation of the person, and a pledge of the future more ample completion of the prediction. Grotius, notwithstanding that he has fallen into the common error respecting the word חליו in Isaiah, and the supposition that St. Peter and St. Matthew refer to the same part of the prophecy, deserves particularly to be consulted on this passage of Matthew. Cocceius also, in his Lexicon, (on the word סבל,) gives this excellent explanation; "he hath taken on himself (suscepit) our sorrows or sufferings, eventually to bear them away, as he has now testified by the carrying away our bodily distempers."

If it should be asked, why, if it were a principal object with the Evangelist to point out the great character of the Messiah as suffering for sins, he did not proceed to cite those other parts of the prophecy, which are still more explicit on that head; I answer, that, having to address himself to those who were perfectly conversant in the prophecies, he here, as elsewhere, contents himself with referring to a prediction, with the particulars of which he supposes his readers to be familiarly acquainted; merely directing them to the person of whom it treats, and then leaving it to themselves to carry on the parallel between the prophecy and the farther verification of it in Jesus. On St. Matthew's peculiar mode of citing

the prophecies, see some excellent observations of Dr. Townson. *Disc.* iv. Sect. ii. § 5. and Sect. iv. § 3.

If, after all that has been said, any doubt should yet remain as to the propriety of thus connecting together, either in the Prophet or the Evangelist, the healing of diseases and the forgiveness of sins, I would beg of the reader to attend particularly to the circumstance of their being connected together frequently by our Lord himself. Thus, he says to the sick of the palsy, when he healed him, *thy sins be forgiven thee.* (Matt. ix. 2.) And, that bodily diseases were not only deemed by the Jews, but were in reality, under the first dispensation, in many instances, the punishment of sin, we may fairly infer from John v. 14, where Jesus said to him whom he had *made whole, Sin no more, lest a worse thing come unto thee.* It should be observed, also, that what in Mark iv. 12 is expressed, *and their sins should be forgiven them,* is given in Matt. xiii. 15, *and I should heal them.* See also James v. 15, and Isaiah xxxiii. 24, and observe the maledictions against the transgressors of the law in Deut. xxviii. 21. See, also, in addition to the authors named in p. 285, *Grot.* on John v. 14; *Glass. Phil. Sac. a Dath.* p. 972; and *Le Clerc;* and particularly *Poole's Syn.* on Matt. ix. 2.

I have dwelt thus long upon this head, because there is no point on which the adversaries, not only of the doctrine of atonement, but of that of the divine inspiration of the Evangelists, rely more triumphantly, than on the supposed disagreement between St. Matthew and the prophet from whom he quotes in the passage before us.

We come now to the SECOND head of objection; namely, that the words in the original, which are rendered by *bearing sins,* do not admit the signification of *suffering for* them, but are, both in this prophecy, and elsewhere throughout the Old Testament, understood in the sense of *taking them away.*

The two words, which are used by the prophet to express *bearing* sin, are, as we have seen, p. 257, סבל in the 11th verse, and נשא in the 12th. Let us then inquire, in what

sense these words are used in other parts of the Old Testament. The word נשא, it is true, as we have already seen with respect to the 4th verse, is often applied in the signification of *bearing away;* but being (like the word *bear* in English, which has no less than 38 different acceptations in *Johnson's Dict.*) capable of various meanings, according to the nature of the subject with which it is connected; so we find it, when joined with the word *sin*, constantly used throughout Scripture, either in the sense of *forgiving* it, on the one hand; or of *sustaining*, either directly or in figure, the penal consequences of it, on the other. Of this latter sense, I find not less than 37 instances, exclusive of this chapter of Isaiah; in all of which, "bearing the burden of sins, so as to be rendered liable to suffer on account of them," seems clearly and unequivocally expressed. In most cases, it implies *punishment* endured, or incurred: whilst, in some few, it imports no more than a representation of that punishment; as in the case of the scape-goat, and in that of Ezekiel lying upon his side, and thereby *bearing the iniquity, i. e.* representing the punishment[a] due to the iniquity, *of the house of Israel.* But in no one of all this number can it be said to admit the signification of carrying *away*, unless *perhaps* in the case of the scape-goat, Lev. xvi. 22, and in that of the priests, Ex. xxviii. 38, and Lev. x. 17; and of these no more can be alleged, than that they *may* be so interpreted. See on these at large, pp. 283—290.

To these instances of the word נשא, connected with חטא, עון, *sins, iniquities*, &c., may fairly be added those in which it stands combined with the words כלמה, חרפה, *disgrace, reproach, shame*, &c., of which there are 18 to be found: and in all of them, as before, the word is used in the sense of *enduring, suffering.* The idea, therefore, of a *burden to be sustained*, is evidently contained in all these passages. Of the former sense of the word, when connected with *sins, iniquities, offences*, either expressed or understood, namely, that of *forgiving*, there are 22; in all which cases, the nomi-

[a] See *Newcome, Munst. Vatabl.* and *Clarius* on Ezek. iv. 4, 5.

native to the verb נשא is the person who was to grant forgiveness. To *forgive*, then, on the part of him, who had the power so to do; and to *sustain*, on the part of him, who was deemed either actually or figuratively the offender, seem to exhaust the significations of the word נשא, when connected with *sins*, *transgressions*, and words of that import. In conformity with this induction, Schindler (*Lex. Pentag.* in נשא, No. III.) affirms, that this verb, when joined with the word *sin*, always signifies either to *forgive* it; or to *bear* it, *i. e.* to suffer for it: *remittere, condonare;* vel *luere, dare pœnas.*

Now, it has been commonly taken for granted, and Socinus even assumes it as the foundation of his argument, (*De Jes. Chr.* pars 2, cap. 4,) that this signification of *forgiveness*, which evidently is not the radical meaning of the word, has been derived from the more general one of *bearing away*, *removing*. But this seems to have had no just foundation: *bearing away*, necessarily implying something of a burden to be carried, it seems difficult to reconcile such a phrase with the notion of that Being, to whom this act of forgiveness is attributed, throughout the Old Testament. May not the word have passed to this acceptation, through its primary sense of *bearing;* namely, *suffering*, through patience, *enduring*, or *bearing* WITH? And it is remarkable that Cocceius, at the same time that he complies with the general idea, of referring the signification of the word in the sense of *forgiving sin* to its acceptation of *tollere, auferre*, admits, that "in this phrase is contained the notion of *bearing; ferendi*, nempe per *patientiam*." (*Lexic.* on נשא Number IX.) It is certain that the mercy of God is represented throughout Scripture, as being that of *long-suffering*, and of great patience. See Ps. lxxxvi. 15, and particularly Ex. xxxiv. 6, 7, and Numb. xiv. 18, where this very character is joined with the word נשא, as that under which the Deity is represented as forgiving iniquity. And it is deserving of remark, that, in the verse following the passage in Numbers, the forgiveness expressed by the word נשא is described to be of that nature which implies *patient endurance;* for it is said, *as*

thou hast forgiven נשאתה, *this people*, FROM EGYPT EVEN UNTIL NOW. Agreeably to this reasoning, Houbigant translates the word נשא, in both the last passages, *parcere*. Thus, then, upon the whole, the generic signification of the word נשא, *when applied to sins*, seems to be that of *bearing, suffering, enduring:* and then, on the part of the sinner, it implies, *bearing the burden*, or penal consequences of transgression; and on the part of him against whom the offence has been committed, *bearing with*, and patiently enduring it.

We are now enabled to form a judgment of the fairness of Dr. Taylor's criticism, (*Key*, No. 162,) on which Mr. Dodson (Isai. liii. 4) and all the writers who oppose the doctrine of Christ's vicarious suffering so confidently rely. We here see, that the language of Scripture furnishes no authority for translating the word נשא, when connected with *iniquities*, in the sense of *bearing* AWAY. Dr. Taylor, indeed, adduces instances of this use of the term; but they are almost all inapplicable to the present case; none of them relating to *iniquities*, except the three which have been already alluded to in p. 281, *viz.* Ex. xxviii. 38; Lev. x. 17; and xvi. 22. If, then, these three be found not to justify his explication, he is left without a single passage, of that great number in which this word is used in reference to iniquities, to support his interpretation.

Now, as to the first of these, in which Aaron is said to *bear the iniquity of the holy things;* besides that the iniquity here spoken of, being a *profanation* of the holy things, scarcely supplies an instance of עון, in the *direct* sense of iniquity, combined with the verb; there seems no reason whatever to doubt, that נשא is here to be taken in its usual signification of *bearing the blame of, being made answerable for;* as in the passage in Numb. xviii. 1, which exactly corresponds to this, and as Houbigant here translates it, *suscipient* maculas donorum. See Number XXXVII. pp. 221, 222: and in addition to the authorities there named, *Munst. Vatabl. Clar. Fag.* and *Grot.* on Numb. xviii. 1. It must be

remarked, also, that the word ἐξαίρω [a], used in this passage by the LXX as equivalent to נשא, furnishes no support to the objection; the term applied by the LXX to express the same thing in the parallel passage in Numb. xviii. 1, being λαμβάνω, which is the term commonly made use of by them to render נשא in those cases, where bearing the burden of sins by suffering for them, is understood. See on this p. 300.

The word נשא, in the second passage, Levit. x. 17, has been pronounced, upon the authority of the LXX, which renders לשאת here ἵνα ἀφέλητε, to relate to the *priests*, and consequently to signify, not *bearing*, but, bearing *away*. But, even admitting the word in this place to be connected with the priests, and not with the victim, yet would it not thence necessarily follow, that the word could be used only in the sense of *bearing away;* it having appeared, from what has been just said, that in its strict sense it might be applied with propriety even to the priests; and in this way we find it explained by *Jun.* and *Trem.* who thus expound it in this place: "ut a cœtu iniquitatem in vos transferatis et recipiatis expiandam;" and, at the same time, to denote the manner in which this bearing the sins of the congregation was understood, refer to Levit. xvi. 21, 22, in which the priest is described as personating the people, laying his hands on the head of the victim, and whilst he placed the sins of the people thereon, making confession in their name, and as their representative, so that he might be considered as bearing their sins, until he placed them upon the head of the goat.

[a] If the use of the word ἐξαίρω by the Seventy, for the Hebrew נשא, supplied a proof that they understood the original word in the sense of *bearing* AWAY, then must they have understood Levit. ix. 22 in the sense of *Aaron's bearing* AWAY *his hand*, and Numb. xxiv. 2 in the sense of *Balaam's bearing* AWAY *his eyes;* for in both of these places have they rendered נשא by ἐξαίρω. But this, it is clear, would make actual nonsense of those passages: the sense being manifestly that of *lifting up* in both. In this sense, indeed, it will be found upon examination, that the word ἐξαίρω has been applied by the LXX, in every case where it has been substituted for the Hebrew נשא throughout the Bible: the only places where it has been so used being these which follow:—Gen. xxix. 1; Ex. xxviii. 38; Lev. ix. 22; Numb. xxiv. 2; Jer. li. 9; Ezek. i. 19, 20, 21; iii. 14; x. 16; xx. 15. 23; Dan. ii. 35; Zech. v. 7.

In like manner Patrick,—"the priest here, by eating of the sin-offering, receiving the guilt upon himself, may well be thought to prefigure One, who should be both priest and sacrifice for sin." Houbigant translates, "quâ plebis iniquitatem *subeatis;*" and Stanhope (*Boyle's Lect.* fol. vol. i. p. 779) likewise explains it, by the priests "taking the sin upon themselves." Vatablus, again, who also refers the word נשא to the priests, and yet does not explain it in the sense of *bearing*, that is *sustaining*, interprets it in the absolute signification of *forgiveness*, without hinting that this was to be effected in the sense of bearing *away*: "*that you should forgive*," he says, "that is, declare the forgiveness of," &c. And, indeed, it is remarkable, that the only passages in which the LXX have rendered נשא, when connected with sins, by the verb ἀφαιρέω, are, besides the present one, these two, Ex. xxxiv. 7, and Numb. xiv. 18: in both of which God is represented as *long-suffering and* FORGIVING *iniquity*, &c., and in which, what has been said in pp. 282, 283, may perhaps be sufficient to shew that the sense of bearing *away* is not included. So that, were we to argue from analogy, the word ἀφέλητε in this place, referred by the LXX to the priests, should be taken in the sense of *forgiveness*, simply: in which sense [a] it is also used by the LXX in Ex. xxxiv. 9, where the original is סלח, *condono*. And thus, no argument arises in favour of the signification of bearing *away*.

But, moreover, the sense of the word ἀφαιρέω, in the application of it by the LXX, is not to be concluded from its ordinary derivation. We find it, all through Levit. and Numb., especially in the 18th chapter of the latter, used to express the *offering* heave-offerings and wave-offerings to the Lord: and it seems remarkable, that, in that chapter, special directions are given, that all such parts of the offerings, as are to be waved and presented to the Lord, should be eaten by the priests; and with respect to these the word

[a] It should be observed also that in Ps. xxxii. 6, where נשא is undoubtedly used in this sense of *forgiveness*, and is accordingly rendered by the LXX ἀφίημι, the word used by Symmachus is ἀφαιρέω.

ἀφαιρέω is constantly used, and they are declared to be most holy. (See *Munst. Fag. Vatab. Clar.* in Numb. xviii. 8.) These things certainly bear a strong resemblance to the particulars of the passage in Leviticus. But this I do not offer, as fixing the meaning of the LXX in this place. The word ἁμαρτίαν following the verb in the sense of *iniquity*, עון, seems inconsistent with this application of the word ἀφαιρέω here. It serves, however, to shew, that the use of the word ἀφέλητε by the LXX, is not decisive of their rendering the original in the sense of *bearing away*. And, indeed, when the word ΑΠΟφέρω has been used by them as a translation of נשא, in a sense manifestly different from that of bearing *away*, (see pp. 301, 302,) the mere derivation of the word ἀφαιρέω should not be deemed demonstrative of their applying *it* in that sense.

But, besides, there seems no sufficient reason for rendering the sentence so as to apply the expression to the *priests*, and not to the *sin-offering*. Commentators, indeed, seem generally to have assumed this point; and *Crellius*, (tom. i. p. 20,) in his answer to *Grotius*, builds on it with perfect confidence. The system, likewise, of the author of the *Scrip. Acc. of Sac.* is in a great measure founded upon it (pp. 123. 145). But excepting only the authority of the LXX, there appears no ground whatever for this interpretation; and, accordingly, not only does Grotius (*De Satisfact. Chr.* cap. i. § 10) positively affirm that this passage affords an instance of "the *victim* being said to bear the iniquity of the offerer," but even Sykes himself, at the same time that he notices the version of the LXX, seems to admit the same. (*Ess. on Sac.* p. 144.) And I will venture to say, that whoever attends carefully to the original will see good reason to concur in this interpretation. The passage exactly corresponds in structure with that in Lev. xvii. 11: and the comparison may throw light upon the subject. Here, the priests are rebuked for not having eaten the sin-offering, and the reason is assigned; *for it is most holy, and God hath given it to you, to bear* (לשאת, for the bearing) *the iniquity of the congregation*, &c.

There the Jews are ordered not to eat blood, and the reason is assigned; *for the life of the flesh is in the blood, and I have given it to you upon the altar, to make atonement* (לכפר, for the making atonement) *for your souls*, &c. Now, because the word *you* happens to lie nearest to the verb לכפר in this sentence, are we to infer, that the *persons spoken to*, were to make the atonement, and not the *blood*, which, though it happens to be placed farthest from the verb, is yet the subject evidently carried through the whole sentence, and is immediately after pronounced to be that which made the atonement? Yet this is the reasoning applied to the former passage, which is precisely parallel.

Indeed, I cannot help thinking that the whole of this passage in Lev. x. 17, has been hitherto misunderstood; and although, independent of the explanation which I am about to offer, the sense of the word *bear* which I contend for seems already sufficiently established, yet, since this is an interpretation which appears generally to have been overlooked, I must beg to propose it here. Moses rebukes the sons of Aaron, because they had not eaten the sin-offering, as he had before commanded should be done, in the 6th chapter. Now, in that chapter he had directed that the offering for the *priests* should *not* be eaten, but should be entirely consumed with fire (verse 23); but that the sin-offering for the *people should* be eaten by the priests (verse 26). In the 9th chapter we find Aaron, under the direction of Moses, presenting a sin-offering for himself, and another for the people; but, instead of obeying Moses's commands respecting the *sin-offering for the people* by eating it, he had burned *it*, as well as the sin-offering for himself. This is the occasion of Moses's displeasure, (x. 16,) and he reminds the sons of Aaron, (verse 17,) that the goat being the sin-offering *for the people*, being appointed to *bear the iniquity of the* CONGREGATION, (not that of the priests,) it should *therefore* have been eaten. The force of the passage then is not, *God hath given it* YOU *to* (eat, that by so doing ye might) *bear* (away) *the iniquity of the congregation*, &c., but, *God hath given*

you IT (to eat, *it* being the offering appointed to bear, or, as is the strict translation,) *for the bearing* (in whatever sense the sacrifice was usually conceived to bear) *the iniquity of the* CONGREGATION. This seems the most obvious and intelligible construction of this passage; and, if this be admitted, it is evident that this text furnishes no support to the opinions of those who object to the sense of the word *bear* contended for in this Number.

As little support will the remaining text supply, which relates to the scape-goat, Lev. xvi. 22. That the scape-goat was represented as going into the wilderness, whilst he symbolically *bore* the sins of the people, which had been laid upon him, is certain; and that he *consequently* bore them *away*, is equally certain; but, that it thence follows, that the *word* used to express his bearing those sins must of itself signify to bear *away*, seems an unwarrantable conclusion. Their being borne *away*, was a necessary consequence of the goat's *going away*, whilst the symbolical burden lay upon his head; and therefore proves nothing as to the meaning of the word here rendered to *bear*. Any word, which implied the sustaining a burden in any way, might have here been equally applied, unless it at the same time conveyed the notion of standing still under the burden, of which, language (so far as I know) does not supply an instance. So that, in fact, the argument here seems to amount to this: that the word, *bear*, leads the mind to bearing *away*, *when the word* AWAY *is connected with it*:—a position which it is not necessary to combat.

It deserves also to be remarked, that the LXX have not here used any of those terms, which might be supposed to countenance the sense of bearing away. Ἀναφέρω, ἀποφέρω, ἀφαιρέω, ἐξαίρω, (which Dr. Taylor, and those who adopt his notions, are so desirous of bringing forward on other occasions, as proving the Septuagint interpretation of נשׂא in that sense,) are all rejected by the LXX in this case; in which, if bearing *away* were intended, these, or some word which might mark that meaning, would most naturally have been

adopted; and λαμβάνω, by which נשא is constantly rendered by the LXX in those cases where the actual sustaining of sins and their consequences is concerned, is the term employed.

We have now seen what is the full amount of Dr. Taylor's objections against our account of the Scripture acceptation of the word נשא, *when applied to sins.* The three instances, whose value we have just considered, being all that he is able to oppose to a collection of 34 passages, which unequivocally apply the world נשא to the SUSTAINING *of sin*, or its consequences; together with 18 more, which, without exception, combine the word in the same sense with the terms *shame*, *reproach*, &c. And it is curious to observe, that it is from a signification of the word established upon such grounds and in opposition to such evidence, that he has deduced the force of the expression when applied to the *forgiveness* of iniquities; contending that it derives this signification from its more general meaning of bearing *away*, previously ascertained in the way we have described.

Crellius, who is appealed to by Mr. Dodson on the signification of this word נשא, as he was before on that of סבל, (see pp. 270. 273,) adds but little strength to the cause. He mentions, indeed, an admission by Grotius, and an interpretation by Vatablus; but he refers us for the complete proof to *Socinus*, as Mr. Dodson had referred us to *him.* Socinus is to prove the point by examples, "prolatis exemplis." (*Crell. Resp. ad Grot.* p. 24.) Now, the examples adduced by *Socinus*, to prove that the word נשא, applied to sins, may properly be translated in the sense of bearing away, are the two which have been already noticed in p. 282, viz. Exod. xxxiv. 7, and Numb. xiv. 18. And these, he says, clearly prove it, *because* here the word is applied in the sense of *forgiving*, and that was done by bearing *away* or *removing* sins, or their punishment. See *Socin. Opera De Jes. Chr.* pars 2, cap. 4, pp. 148, 149. But, surely, since the *dictum* of this father of Socinianism was at last to decide the point,

it had been sufficient had he at once *affirmed* it, without the circuitous form of an example.

Sykes, indeed, has discovered, as he thinks, *one* instance, which clearly establishes the acceptation of the word in the sense of *bearing* AWAY *iniquity:* it is that of Exod. x. 17. And I confess, were I confined to a single passage for the proof of the opposite, I think it is the one I should select, as marking, most decidedly, that this word has *not* acquired the sense of *forgiving,* though the signification of *bearing away.* Pharaoh says unto Moses, FORGIVE (שא) *I pray thee my sin only this once, and intreat the Lord that he may* TAKE AWAY (יסר) *from me this death.* Now, if the word שא were rendered, with Dr. Sykes, *take away,* it must then be, *take away the punishment* of my sin; taking away the sin itself being unintelligible, and this being the very sense in which the word is said to acquire the force of forgiveness. See *Socin. Opera,* tom. 2, p. 149. But, surely, to desire Moses to take away his punishment, and, after that, to entreat the Lord that he would take away the same punishment, seem not perfectly consistent. Whereas, if we suppose the word *forgiveness* to convey the force of *enduring, bearing with,* all is perfectly natural: and Moses, having *thus* forgiven the *sin* of Pharaoh, might reasonably be called on to entreat, that the Lord would remit the *punishment.* Besides, it is observable, that, where the punishment is spoken of, there the word used is not נשא, but הסיר, which unequivocally signifies, *to take away.*

What then is the result of this unavoidably prolix inquiry? *That the word* נשא, *when connected with the word* SINS, *or* INIQUITIES, *is throughout the entire of the Bible to be understood in one of these two significations:* BEARING, *i. e. sustaining, on the one hand; and* FORGIVING, *on the other: and, that, in neither of these applications does there seem any reason for interpreting it in the sense of bearing* AWAY: *nor has any one unequivocal instance of its use, in that sense, ever been adduced.*

So far as to the word נשא. The meaning of סבל is, if possible, yet more evident: being used, as we have already seen, pp. 270, 271, in *every* passage, where it is not connected with the word *sins*, or *sorrows*, in the literal sense of *bearing a burden;* and we can have but little difficulty in discovering its signification, where it is so connected. In its reference to *sorrows*, it has also been specially examined, and the result, as we have seen, has confirmed its general application. Its relation to *sins* is exemplified but in two passages, one of which occurs in the 11th verse of the chapter of Isaiah under consideration, and the other is to be found in Lament. v. 7. Now, it happens that this last passage is such, that the meaning of the word cannot be misunderstood. *Our fathers have sinned, and are not; and we have borne* (סבלנו) *their iniquities;* or, as *Dr. Blayney* renders it, we have *undergone the punishment of* their iniquities. The force of the word סבל, then, will not admit of question: and if any additional strength were wanting to the argument concerning the verb נשא, *this* word סבל standing connected with *iniquity* in the 11th verse, exactly as נשא is with *sin* in the 12th, would abundantly supply it. That נשא, indeed, in all cases where the sense of *forgiveness* is not admissible, has the force of סבל when used in relation to *sins*, will readily appear on examination. Their correspondence is particularly remarkable in the parallel application of the two words in the passage of Lamentations just cited, and in those of Numb. xiv. 33, and Ezek. xviii. 19, 20; in which נשא is used to express the sons' *bearing* the wickedness of their fathers, in precisely the same sense in which סבל is applied in the former.

These two words then, נשא and סבל, being clearly used in the common sense of *bearing sins*, in the 11th and 12th verses of this chapter of Isaiah, it remains yet to ascertain what is the Scripture notion conveyed by that phrase. Now, this is evidently, in all cases, *the suffering, or being liable to suffer, some infliction on account of sin, which, in the case of the offender himself, would properly be called punishment.*

This I take to be the universal meaning of the phrase. The familiar use of the words עון, חטאה *iniquity, sin,* for the *punishment*[a] *of iniquity,* or, as I would prefer to call it, the *suffering due to iniquity,* fully justifies this explication of the phrase: and so obtrusive is its force, that we find this meaning conceded to the expression, even by Sykes, (*Essay on Sac.* p. 146,) Crellius, (*Resp. ad Grot.* p. 20,) and Socinus himself. (*De Jes. Chr.* pars ii. cap. 4.)

But, although the phrase of *bearing sin* is admitted by all to mean, *bearing the punishment or consequences of sin,* in the case where a man's own sin is spoken of, yet it is denied that it admits that signification where the sin of another is concerned: see *Scrip. Acc. of Sacr.* p. 142. Now, in answer to this it is sufficient to refer to the use of the expression in Lament. v. 7, compared with Jer. xxxi. 29, 30; and to the application of it also in Ezek. xviii. 19, 20; and in Numb. xiv. 33. In all of these, the sons are spoken of, as *bearing the sins* of their fathers; and in none can it be pretended that they were to bear them in the sense of bearing them *away,* or in any other sense than in that of *suffering for* them: and the original term employed to express this is, סבל in the passage in Lamentations, and נשא in all the rest. Dr. Blaney translates the passage in Lamentations,—*Our fathers have sinned, but they are no more, and* WE HAVE UNDERGONE THE PUNISHMENT OF THEIR INIQUITIES. Dathe renders the expression, both here, and in Ezekiel, by LUERE *peccata;* and at the same time affirms, (on Jer. xxxi. 29,) that the meaning of the proverb adduced both in Jeremiah and Ezekiel is, "that God punishes the sins of the fathers in the children." The proverb, to which he alludes, is that of *the fathers having eaten a sour grape, and the children's teeth being set on edge.* The time is approaching, Jeremiah says, in which this shall

[a] See 2 Kings, vii. 9, and Zech. xiv. 19, and besides all the ancient commentators, consult *Bishop Lowth* on Isai. xl. 2; *Dr. Blayney* on Jer. li. 6; and *Primate Newcome* on Hos. x. 13;—the last of whom subjoins the remark, that "this particular metonymy, of the cause for the effect, was natural among the Jews, whose law abounded with temporal sanctions, which God often inflicted."

not be any longer, *but every man shall* DIE FOR HIS OWN INIQUITY. And this time, he subjoins, is to be under the *new covenant*, which was to be made with the Jewish people, and which was to differ from that which preceded, in that God was not, as hitherto, to visit the sins of the fathers upon the children, but to visit each individual for his own transgressions.

The same subject is more largely and explicitly treated by Ezekiel. The proverb used by Jeremiah is repeated by this prophet; and, as Primate Newcome observes, it is well rendered by the *Chaldee*,—"The fathers have sinned, and the sons are smitten." This, he says, refers to the second commandment; and, on the peculiar principles of the Jewish dispensation, he admits the reasonableness of it as a judicial infliction. Dr. Blayney, indeed, thinks otherwise; although he has expressly translated the passage in Lamentations, *We have undergone the* PUNISHMENT *of their iniquities.* This seems not consistent. Yet he peremptorily rejects the notion of this as *judicial* infliction. Had Dr. Blayney, however, considered, that the penalties thus inflicted were such as belonged to the old covenant, namely temporal, he would have seen no difficulty in this dispensation, as affecting the equity of God's proceedings; nor would he have been reduced to the inconsistency of calling that a *punishment*, in one place, which he contends cannot be a *judicial* infliction in another.

Let us follow the prophet a little farther:—he declares, as Jeremiah had done, that this shall no longer be. The judicial dispensation of the new covenant shall be of a different nature. In future, *the soul that sinneth*, IT *shall die—if a man be just he shall live;* but *if he hath done abominations*, HE *shall surely die; his blood shall be upon* HIM (upon his own head)—and *yet ye say, why?* DOTH NOT THE SON BEAR THE INIQUITY OF THE FATHER? The prophet replies; True, but this shall no longer be: *when the son hath done judyment and justice he shall surely live. The soul that sinneth,* IT *shall die; the son shall not bear* (נשא) *the iniquity of the father, neither shall the father bear* (נשא) *the iniquity of the*

son. The passage from Numbers, in which the sons are said to *bear* (נשא) the abominations of their fathers, exactly accords[a] with those which we have now considered: and it appears incontestably from the whole, that *to bear the sins of others*[b], is an expression familiarly used, to denote the *suffering evils, inflicted on account of those sins.*

I will not contend that this should be called suffering the *punishment* of those sins, because the idea of punishment cannot be abstracted from that of *guilt:* and in this respect I differ from many respectable authorities, and even from Dr. Blayney, who, as we have seen, uses the word *punishment* in his translation. But it is evident that it is, notwithstanding, a judicial infliction; and it may perhaps be figuratively denominated *punishment*, if thereby be implied a reference to the actual transgressor, and if that suffering which was *due* to the offender himself be understood; and which, *if* inflicted on him, would then take the name of punishment. In no other sense can the suffering inflicted on one, on account of the transgressions of another, be called a punishment; and, in this light, the bearing the punishment of another's sins, is to be understood as bearing that which, in relation to the sins, and to the sinner, admits the name of punishment, but with respect to the individual on whom it is actually inflicted,

[a] Hammond, on 1 Pet. ii. 24, supported by the *Chaldee* and *Fagius*, renders the passage here, *bear the punishment of your sins:*—see also *Ainsworth*, on Numb. xiv. 33.

[b] The observations of *Martini* on this subject deserve to be quoted. "Quicunque nimirum malis atque incommodis tolerandis aliorum miseriam avertit, eorumque salutem promovet, quâcunque demum ratione id fiat, is pœnas peccatorum eorum luere, tanquam piaculum pro iis apud Deum intercedere dicitur, ut hominibus priscis fere omnibus, ita inprimis Hebræis. Eadem fere ratio est formulæ Arabibus frequentissimæ, *redemptio tua sit anima mea*, scil. apud Deum, h. e. acerba quævis, quin ipsius adeo mortis discrimen subire non recusarem, modo te juvare, liberationem a periculis, salutem atque incolumitatem tibi præstare possem. Ad explorationem vero ejusmodi formularum si pervenire velis, redeundum omnino est ad opinionem, ut veterum populorum omnium, ita inprimis Hebræorum, ex quâ calamitates quascunque, præsertim atrociores, tanquam pœnas peccatorum ab ipsis diis præsentibus inflictas considerare solebant, easque non aliâ ratione averti posse putabant, quam si victima innocens loco hominis ejusmodi pœnas subeundo, numinis infesti iram sedasset."—See *Rosenm.* on Isai. liii. 6.

abstractedly considered, can be viewed but in the light of suffering. Thus the expression may fairly be explained. It is, however, upon the whole, to be wished, that the word *punishment* had not been used: the meaning is substantially the same without it; and the adoption of it has furnished the principal ground of cavil to the adversaries of the doctrine of atonement, who affect to consider the word as applied in its strict signification, and, consequently, as implying the transfer of actual guilt. I could therefore wish that such distinguished scholars, as Bishop Lowth, Primate Newcome, and Dr. Blayney, had not sanctioned the expression.

That the term *punishment*, indeed, has frequently been used, where infliction only, without any reference to guilt in the individual sufferer, was intended, must be allowed. Cicero affords us a memorable instance of this; "Silent leges inter arma; nec se expectari jubent, cum ei qui expectare velit, ante *injusta pœna* luenda sit, quam justa repetenda." The application of the word is yet more justifiable, where the sufferings endured have a relation to the guilt of another, on whom had they been inflicted they would have received the name of punishment in its strictest sense. They are, to use an expression of Crellius, the *materia pœnæ* with respect to the offender; and when borne by another in his stead, that other may in a *qualified sense* be said to bear the punishment of the offender, as bearing that burden of suffering, which was due to him as the punishment of his offence. And thus in all cases, except where *forgiveness* is intended, the expression נשא עון, or סבל עון, is to be understood: namely, as *sustaining*, or *bearing the burden of that* MATERIA PŒNÆ, *which was due to the offences*, either of the individual who suffered, or of him on whose account, and in whose place, he suffered. In this sense we may justify the use of the expression *bearing* PUNISHMENT, in cases of a vicarious nature; but, to avoid all cavil, and misrepresentation of the phrase, it were better, perhaps, to adopt the phrase of *suffering for sins*.

This view of the subject completely removes all those objections derived from a rigorous acceptation of the nature of

punishment, which have been urged by Socinus, and Crellius, and repeated by every dissenter from the received doctrine of atonement since their day. And it is curious to observe, that Dr. Benson, though contending for the notion of Christ's bearing our sins in the sense of bearing them away, and supporting this on the ground of Dr. Taylor's interpretation of נשא, סבל, and the corresponding Greek words in that sense, is yet obliged to admit the justness of the explication here proposed. "*Sin*," he says, "is frequently, in Scripture, put for *sufferings*, or *afflictions*. *Bearing iniquity*, or *sin*, is likewise *bearing punishment*, or *enduring affliction*: and when that punishment, or affliction, was death; then *bearing iniquity*, or *sin*, and being *put to death*, were phrases of like import." And he admits, in consequence of this reasoning, that Christ's *bearing our sins*, or, as he thinks right to call it, "bearing them *away*, was by his suffering *death;* WHICH, TO US, IS THE PENALTY OF SIN." (*Benson* on 1 Pet. ii. 24.) So that we seem to have the authority of Dr. Benson for saying, that Christ *bore our sins* by *suffering the penalty due to them*.

It has now, I trust, sufficiently appeared, that the expressions used in this chapter of Isaiah to denote *bearing sins* are elsewhere in Scripture employed to signify, not *bearing* them *away*, in the indefinite sense of *removing them*, but *sustaining them as a burden, by suffering their penal consequences;* and this, not only where the individual was *punished* for his *own* sins, but where he *suffered* for the sins of *others*. We may now, therefore, proceed to inquire into the true meaning of the phrase, in the prophecy before us: and, indeed, so manifest is its application in this place, that, were it even ambiguous in other parts of Scripture, this alone might suffice to determine its import: so that, but for the extraordinary efforts that have been employed to perplex and pervert the obvious meaning of the words, it could not have been necessary to look beyond the passage itself, to ascertain their genuine signification to be that which has just been stated. In the description here given by the prophet we are furnished with a

clear and accurate definition of words, and a full explanation of the nature of the thing. We are told, that God *made the iniquities of us all to fall upon him*, who is said to have *borne the iniquities of many:* thus is the *bearing of our iniquities* explained to be, the *bearing them laid on as a burden;* and though a reference is undoubtedly intended to the laying the iniquities of the Jewish people on the head of the scape-goat, which was done (as is urged by Socinus, Crellius, Taylor, and other writers who adopt their notions) that they might be borne, or carried, *away;* yet this does not prevent them from being borne *as a burden.* The great object in *bearing our sins*, was certainly to bear them *away;* but the manner in which they were borne, so as to be ultimately borne away by Him who died for us, was by his enduring the afflictions and sufferings which were due to them; by his being *numbered with the transgressors;* treated as if he had been the actual transgresssor; *and made answerable* for us; and, consequently, *wounded for our transgressions*, and *smitten for our iniquities*, in such manner, that *our peace was effected by* his chastisement, and *we healed by his bruises;* he having *borne* our *iniquities*, having suffered that which was the penalty due to them on our part, and having *offered himself a sacrifice for sin* on our account.

Now, it deserves particularly to be remarked, that these strong and decided expressions, which are clearly explanatory of the manner in which our sins are to be *borne*, and borne *away*, are but little attended to by the Socinian expositors, whilst they endeavour, by a detached examination of the words denoting the *bearing of sins*, and by directing our attention to the ceremony of the scape-goat, to exclude from the view those accompanying circumstances, which so plainly mark a vicarious suffering, and a strict propitiatory atonement. In contending, however, for the reference to the scape-goat in the expression *bearing sins*[a], as it is here used, these writers furnish us with an additional argument in proof

[a] See *Socin. Opera*, tom. ii. p. 149; *Taylor's Key*, § 162. *Crell. Resp. ad Gr.* p. 21; and

of the scape-goat having been a *sin-offering;* (see pp. 238. 255;) he, who was to *bear our sins*, and to procure our pardon, being here described expressly as a *sacrifice for sin*, אשם. *Some* arguments, indeed, are offered by Socinus, (*Opera*, tom. ii. pp. 150, 151. 153,) and Crellius, (*Resp. ad Gr.* pp. 23—30,) to weaken the force of the expressive passages of the prophet's description above referred to. But, after what has been said, it is unnecessary to add to the length of this discussion, by a refutation, which must instantly present itself, on the principles already laid down.

To bring, then, this tedious investigation to a conclusion, it appears: 1. That neither the expressions used by Isaiah in the 4th verse, nor the application made of them by St. Matthew, are in any degree inconsistent with the acceptation of the phrase, *bearing sins*, here employed by the prophet, in the sense of *sustaining* or *undergoing the burden of them, by suffering for them:* 2. That the use of the expression in other parts of the Old Testament, so far from opposing, justifies and confirms this acceptation: and, 3. That the minute description of the sufferings of Christ, their cause, and their effects, which here accompanies this phrase, not only establishes this interpretation, but fully unfolds the whole nature of the Christian atonement, by shewing that Christ has suffered, in our place, what was due to our transgressions; and that by, and in virtue of, his sufferings our reconciliation with God has been effected.

I have gone thus extensively into the examination of this point, both because it has of late been the practice of those writers who oppose the doctrine of atonement to assume familiarly, and *pro concesso*, that the expression *bearing sins* signified in all cases, where personal punishment was not involved, nothing more than bearing them *away*, or *removing* them; and because this chapter of Isaiah contains the whole scheme and substance of the Christian atonement. Indeed, so ample and comprehensive is the description here given, that the writers of the New Testament seem to have had it perpetually in view, insomuch that there is scarcely a passage

either in the Gospels, or Epistles, relating to the sacrificial nature, and atoning virtue, of the death of Christ, that may not obviously be traced to this exemplar: so that in fortifying this part of Scripture, we establish the foundation of the entire system. It will, consequently, be the less necessary to inquire minutely into those texts in the New Testament which relate to the same subject. We cannot but recognise the features of the prophetic detail, and, consequently, apply the evidence of the prophet's explanation, when we are told, in the words of our Lord, that *the Son of man came to* GIVE HIS LIFE A RANSOM FOR MANY, Matt. xx. 28: that, as St. Paul expresses it, *he* GAVE HIMSELF A RANSOM FOR ALL, 1 Tim. ii. 6: that *he was* OFFERED TO BEAR THE SINS OF MANY, Heb. ix. 28: that God *made* HIM *to be* SIN FOR US, WHO KNEW NO SIN, 2 Cor. v. 21: that *Christ* REDEEMED US *from the curse of the law*, BEING MADE A CURSE FOR US, Gal. iii. 13: that he SUFFERED FOR SINS, THE JUST FOR THE UNJUST, 1 Pet. iii. 18: that he DIED FOR THE UNGODLY, Rom. v. 6: that he GAVE HIMSELF FOR US, Tit. ii. 14: that he DIED FOR OUR SINS, 1 Cor. xv. 3; and *was* DELIVERED FOR OUR OFFENCES, Rom. iv. 25: that he GAVE HIMSELF FOR US AN OFFERING AND A SACRIFICE TO GOD, Eph. v. 2: that *we are* RECONCILED TO GOD BY THE DEATH *of his Son*, Rom. v. 10: that his *blood was shed* FOR MANY, FOR THE REMISSION OF SINS, Matt. xxvi. 28.—These, and many others, directly refer us to the prophet; and seem but partial reflections of what we had previously so fully placed before our view.

One passage, however, there is, which deserves a more particular attention; because, being an acknowledged translation of the most important part of the prophetic description, it has, jointly with the prophecy, experienced the severity of Socinian criticism. It is that passage in 1 Pet. ii. 24, where it is said of Christ, that he, *his own self*, BARE OUR SINS, *in his own body, on the tree.* This has been referred to the 4th verse of the liiid ch. of Isaiah; but, as we have already seen, (p. 266,) on grounds totally erroneous. With the same view, namely, that of weakening the force of the prophecy, the use

of the word ἀνήνεγκε by the apostle to express the *bearing sins*, of the prophet, has been largely insisted on. The word ἀναφέρω, it is contended, is to be understood in the sense of bearing[a] *away:* and Dr. Benson, on 1 Pet. ii. 24, positively asserts, that the word ἀναφέρω is never used by the LXX, in any of those places in the Old Testament, where *bearing iniquity* is taken in the sense of *bearing punishment*, or *enduring affliction*. Now, as St. Peter's words may fairly be considered as a translation of the words of the prophet, or, rather, as an adoption of the language of the LXX, (see p. 266,) it becomes necessary to examine the force of the expressions here used, as being a strong authority respecting the true meaning of the original passage in the prophet. And in this examination we shall find abundant confirmation of the conclusion we have already arrived at.

The word ἀναφέρω, which strictly signifies to bear, or carry, *up;* and is, therefore, commonly applied in the sense of *offering up* a victim, as *carrying it up* to the altar; and may with equal propriety be applied to Christ bearing *up* with him, *in his own body, τὰς ἁμαρτίας ἡμῶν ἐπὶ ξύλον, our sins to the cross*, (see *Schleusn. Lex.* and *Hamm.* in locum)—admits, of course, the signification of *bearing as a burden;* and, joined with the word *sins*, as it is here, it corresponds to the Hebrew נשא, or סבל, in the sense of *bearing their punishment*, or *sustaining the burden of suffering* which they impose. In this very sense the LXX have used it, in direct opposition to Dr. Benson's assertion: for, in Numb. xiv. 33, where the sons are said *to bear the whoredoms*, or idolatrous sins, of their fathers, the word used by the LXX to express the Hebrew נשא, is ἀναφέρω: now the Chaldee, in this place, employs the word קבל, which is universally allowed to signify *suscipere*, to *undergo*, or *sustain*, (see *Buxt. Lex.*,) and translates the whole passage thus, *They shall bear your sins, and I will visit the iniquities of the fathers in the children.* Munster, Vatablus, Fagius, and Clarius, pronounce the ex-

[a] See *Dodson* on Isai. liii. 11; also and *Crell. Resp. ad Gr.* p. 21. *Socin. De Jes. Chr.* pars 2. cap. vi.;

pression to be a Hebraism, for *suffering the punishment* of the fathers' sins. Houbigant expressly translates, *pœnas luent*. That this passage, also, is precisely of the same import with those in Lament. v. 7, and Ezek. xviii. 19, 20, where *suffering for sins* is expressly marked out, has been already noticed. (pp. 292—294.) Now, in these passages manifestly denoting the very same thing, *bearing sins*, in the same way and on the same account, the version of the LXX is ὑπέσχε in the former; and λαμβάνω in the latter. The force of ὑπέσχε requires no confirmation: if it did, its application in Ps. lxxxix. 50, the only remaining place where it is used by the LXX, would supply it. And λαμβάνω is the expression commonly applied by the LXX, throughout Leviticus, to express the *bearing of sin*, in those cases in which the offender was to suffer the actual punishment of his transgressions. And in the very next verse, we find the word ἀναφέρω applied to denote the bearing these very sins in the persons of the offenders themselves, which, they had been told in the preceding verse, their sons should likewise bear, ἀνοίσουσι. So that these expressions, ἀναφέρω, and λαμβάνω, being employed by the LXX in passages precisely parallel, furnish a complete contradiction to Dr. Benson's assertion.

Indeed the LXX seem to have used the compounds of φέρω, without much attention to the force of the adjoined preposition. This is evident in their use of the word ἀποφέρω, for the Hebrew נשא, in Lev. xx. 19, where the sin was not to be borne *away*, as the word would strictly imply, but to be *borne* by suffering the punishment of death: and likewise, in Ezek. xxxii. 30, where BEARING *shame*, is applied by the prophet in the same sense. And in this passage, whilst the *Vatic.* reads ἀποφέρω, the *Alex.* reads λαμβάνω: thus using the two words indifferently; although λαμβάνω is employed by the LXX, almost universally, in cases implying the actual *sustaining* of guilt and suffering. Now, even if the word ΑΠΟφέρω[a] has been used by the LXX for נשא, in the simple sense of φέρω, and in no other, throughout the Bible;

[a] Biel, on the word ἀποφέρω, remarks, that the Doric ἄποισι is expounded by Phavorinus νομίσει, *reportabis*: thus it appears, that the force of the preposition

upon what ground is it to be argued, that 'ANAφέρω cannot be used by them in the same sense; and particularly, when it is employed by them in the translation of the same Hebrew word, and similarly connected with the same subject, *sins?* But, to decide the acceptation of the word by the LXX, it will be sufficient to observe, that, of 133 passages of the Old Testament, in which, exclusive of those of Isaiah at present under consideration, it is used as a translation of the Hebrew, it never once occurs in the sense of bearing *away;* (see *Trom. Concord.;*) and that in those places in which it occurs in the relation of *bearing sins*, it is given as equivalent to the words נשא, and סבל; being employed to render the former in Numb. xiv. 33, and Isai. liii. 12: and the latter, ibid. liii. 11. And these three are the only passages in which the word is found so related.

Now, in addition to what has been already said, on the words translated *bearing sins*, in these passages, and, especially on the word סבל, let it be remarked, that the word ὑπένεγκε, is used by *Symm.* for the ἀνοίσει of the LXX, in the last-mentioned text: and that the very word, סבל, which in the 11th verse is translated, ἀναφέρω, by the LXX, is by the same, rendered in the 4th verse, in the sense of *sustaining;* the term employed by them being ὀδυνᾶται, *enduring grief*, or *affliction;* as if they had said ὀδύνας, or πόνους 'ΥΠΕΜΕΙΝΕΝ, which is the expression used by *Aq. Symm.* and *Theod.* in this place. Now, as St. Peter, in his description of Christ's bearing our sins, not only refers to Isaiah, but evidently quotes his very words, and quotes them in the language of the LXX, we can have no question of his stating them in the same sense in which *they* manifestly used them; and that when he says, that Christ *bore*[a] *our sins, in his own body, on*

is, in some cases, entirely lost in the compound: and, accordingly, the word sometimes signifies *ad*duco.

[a] The Syriac rendering of the passage is remarkable.

ܘܣܒܠ ܚܛܗܝܢ ܟܠܗܘܢ:
ܘܐܣܩ ܐܢܘܢ ܒܦܓܪܗ ܠܨܠܝܒܐ.

Et PORTAVIT *peccata nostra omnia, et sustulit illa in corpore suo ad crucem.* Here the word ܣܒܠ, *portabat quasi pondus*, is unequivocal and decisive.—N. B. *Schaaf* has rendered the Syriac, CUM *corpore suo;* whilst it more naturally admits the rendering, IN *corpore suo*, agreeably to the common translation.

(or to) *the cross*, he means to mark, that Christ actually bore the burden of our sins, and suffered for them all that he endured in his last agonies. That there may also have been implied a reference, in the word ἀναφέρω, to its sacrificial import so familiar both with the LXX and the New Testament, I see no reason to deny. This by no means interferes with what has been now urged, but rather confirms it, and explains more fully the manner in which our sins were borne by our Lord, namely, as by a sacrifice. So that the entire force of the passage may be, as Whitby has stated it; *he bare our sins in his own body, offered* (as) *upon an altar for us:* and by this interpretation we find a perfect correspondence with the only remaining passage in the New Testament, in which the phrase ἁμαρτίας ἀναφέρειν is found; namely, Hebr. ix. 28, where it is said, that *Christ was once* OFFERED, *to bear the sins of many.*

The observations contained in this Number will enable us to form a just estimate of Dr. Priestley's position;—that neither in the Old Testament, nor in those parts of the New, where it might most naturally be expected, namely, in the discourses of our Lord and his apostles, as recorded in the Gospels and Acts, do we find any trace of the doctrine of atonement. On this Dr. Priestley observes, with no little confidence, in the *Theol. Rep.* vol. i. pp. 327—353, and again in his *Hist. of Cor.* vol. i. pp. 158—164. Surely, in answer to such an assertion nothing more can be necessary, than to recite the prophecy of Isaiah which has just been examined, and in which it is manifest that the whole scheme of the doctrine of atonement is minutely set forth: so manifest, indeed, that, notwithstanding his assertion, Dr. Priestley is compelled to confess, (*Theol. Rep.* vol. i. p. 530,) that "this prophecy *seems* to represent the death of Christ, in the light of a satisfaction for sin."

But the emptiness of the position is not more clearly evinced by this passage, and other parts of the *Old* Testament which might be adduced, than by the language of our

Saviour and his apostles, in those very parts of the *New* Testament, to which this writer chooses to confine his search, the Gospels and Acts. For, when the angel declares to Joseph, that *his name shall be called Jesus, for he shall save his people from their sins*, Matt. i. 21: when John, who was sent to announce the Messiah, and to prepare men for his reception, and from whom a sketch at least of our Saviour's character and of the nature of his mission might be expected, proclaims him *the Lamb of God which taketh away the sins of the world*, (Joh. i. 29,) thus directing the attention of his hearers to the notion of sacrifice and atonement; (see Number XXV.;) when we find St. John (xi. 50, 51, 52) relating the saying of Caiaphas, that it was expedient *that one man should die* FOR *the people*, AND THAT THE WHOLE NATION PERISH NOT; and remarking on this, that Caiaphas had said this under a prophetic impulse, for that *Jesus should die for that nation*, AND NOT FOR THAT NATION ONLY, *but that also he should gather together in one the children of God, that were scattered abroad;* when we find our Lord himself declare, that he *came to give his life a ransom for many;* (Matt. xx. 28;) and again, at the last supper, an occasion which might be supposed to call for some explanation of the nature and benefits of the death which he was then about to suffer, using these remarkable words; *This is my blood of the new testament, which is shed for many for the remission of sins;* (Matt. xxvi. 28;) which words Dr. Priestley himself admits (*Theol. Rep.* vol. i. pp. 345, 346) to imply, "that the death of Christ in some respects resembles a sin-offering under the law;"—when, I say, these passages are to be found, all referring, more or less directly, to the notion of atonement; when it is considered, also, that this notion of atonement was rendered perfectly familiar by the law; and when to these reflections it is added, that the prophecy of Isaiah, to which reference is made in some, possibly in all of these, had, by describing Christ as a *sin-offering*, already pointed out the connexion between the atonements of the law, and the death of Christ;

there seems little foundation for the assertion, that nothing whatever appears in the Gospels or Acts, to justify the notion of atonement.

But admitting, for the sake of argument, that no instance to justify such a notion did occur; what is thence to be inferred? Are the many and clear declarations on this head, in the Epistles of St. Paul, St. Peter, and St. John, to be pronounced surreptitious? Or, have these writers broached doctrines, for which they had no authority? Let Dr. Priestley take his choice. If he adopt neither part of the alternative, his argument goes for nothing.

But why, it may still be urged, are not the communications upon this subject as frequent, and forcible in the Gospels and Acts, as in the Epistles? Why did not our Lord himself unfold to his hearers, in its fullest extent, this great and important object of his mission?—Why, I ask in return, did he not, at his first coming, openly declare that he was the Messiah? Why did he not also fully unfold that other great doctrine, which it was a principal (or as Dr. Priestley will have it, *Hist. of Cor.* vol. i. p. 175, the sole) "object of his mission to ascertain and exemplify, namely, that of a resurrection and a future state?" The ignorance of the Jews at large, and even of the apostles themselves, on this head, is notorious, and is well enlarged upon by Mr. Veysie (*Bampt. Lect. Serm.* pp. 188—198). There seems, then, at least, as much reason for our Lord's rectifying their errors, and supplying them with specific instructions on this head, as there could be on the subject of atonement.

But, besides, there appears a satisfactory reason, why the doctrine of atonement is not so fully explained, and so frequently insisted on, in the discourses of our Lord and his apostles, as in the Epistles to the early converts. Until it was clearly established, that Jesus was the Messiah; and until, by his resurrection crowning all his miraculous acts, it was made manifest that he, who had been crucified by the Jews, was HE who was to save them and all mankind from their sins, it must have been premature and useless to ex-

plain *how* this was to be effected. To gain assent to plain facts, was found a sufficient trial for the incredulity, and rooted prejudices, of the Jews in the first instance. Even to his immediate followers our Lord declares, *I have many things to say to you, but ye cannot bear them now:* Joh. xvi. 12. And, accordingly, both he, and they, afterwards, following his example, proceeded by first establishing the *fact* of his divine mission, before they insisted upon its *end* and *design*, which involved matters more difficult of apprehension and acceptance. Besides, it should be observed that the discourses of our Lord and his apostles were generally addressed to persons to whom the ideas of atonement were familiar; whereas the Epistles were directed to those who were not acquainted with the principles of the Mosaic atonement; excepting only that addressed to the Hebrews, in which the writer solely endeavours to prove that the death of Christ falls in with those notions of atonement, which were already familiar to the persons whom he addressed.

But Dr. Priestley is not content to confine himself to those parts of Scripture, where a full communication of the doctrine of atonement was *least* likely to be made. Having from long experience learnt the value of a confident assertion, he does not scruple to lay down a position yet bolder than the former; namely, "that in no part either of the Old or New Testament, do we ever find asserted, or explained, the *principle* on which the doctrine of atonement is founded: but that, on the contrary, it is a sentiment everywhere abounding, that repentance, and a good life, are *of themselves* sufficient to recommend us to the favour of God." (*Theol. Rep.* vol. i. p. 263.) How little truth there is in the latter part of the assertion, has been already considered, in Numbers IX. and XVIII. That the former part is equally destitute of foundation, will require but little proof. The entire language of the Epistles is a direct contradiction to it. The very prophecy, which has been the principal subject of this Number, overturns it. It is in vain that Dr. Priestley endeavours to shelter this assertion under an extreme and

exaggerated statement of what the principle of atonement is; namely, "that sin is of so heinous a nature, that God *cannot* pardon it without an *adequate* satisfaction being made to his justice."

It is an artifice not confined to Dr. Priestley, to propound the doctrine in these rigorous and overcharged terms; and, at the same time, to combat it in its more moderate and qualified acceptation: thus insensibly transferring to the latter, the sentiments of repugnance excited by the former. But, that God's displeasure against sin is such, that he has ordained that the sinner shall not be admitted to reconciliation and favour, but in virtue of that great Sacrifice, which has been offered for the sins of men, exemplifying the desert of guilt, and manifesting God's righteous abhorrence of those sins which required so severe a condition of their forgiveness; that this, I say, is everywhere the language of Scripture, cannot possibly be denied. And it is to no purpose that Dr. Priestley endeavours, by a strained interpretation, to remove the evidence of a single text, when almost every sentence, that relates to the nature of our salvation, conveys the same ideas. That text, however, which Dr. Priestley has laboured to prove, in opposition to the author of *Jesus Christ the Mediator*, not to be auxiliary to the doctrine of atonement, I feel little hesitation in re-stating, as explanatory of its true nature and import. *Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness, for the remission of past sins, through the forbearance of God: to declare, I say, at this time his righteousness, that he might be* JUST, *and* (i. e. although) *the* JUSTIFIER *of him that believeth in Jesus*, Rom. iii. 25, 26[a].

[a] I had, in the former editions of this work, adopted Primate Newcome's explanation of the word δικαιοσύνη; conceiving the idea of *justification*, or *method of justification*, to be better calculated than that of *righteousness* (the term employed by the common version) to convey an adequate sense of the original. On perusing the observations of Dr. Nares, in his *Remarks on the Unitarian Version of the New Testament*, pp. 150—153, I am now induced to alter my opinion: being fully satisfied, that that learned and ingenious writer has caught the true spirit of the original passage; and that the

To argue here, as is done by Dr. Priestley and others, that the word δίκαιος, cannot mean *just* with regard to *punishment*,

object of the inspired reasoner is not so much to shew, how, in the method adopted for the remission of sins, *mercy* was to be displayed, as how, notwithstanding this display of mercy, *justice* was to be maintained. In either view the sense undoubtedly terminates in the same point, the reconciling with each other the two attributes of mercy and justice; but the emphasis of the argument takes opposite directions; and that, in the view which Dr. Nares has preferred, it takes the right direction, must be manifest on considering, that, in the remission of sins, mercy is the quality that immediately presents itself, whilst justice might seem to be for the time superseded. On this principle of interpretation, the sentence will stand thus:—*Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, for the manifestation of his* JUSTICE (his just and righteous dealing) *concerning the remission of past sins, through the forbearance of God: for the manifestation, at this time, of his* JUSTICE, *that he might be* JUST, *and* (i. e. although) *the* JUSTIFIER *of him that believeth in Jesus.* The *justice* of the Deity, or his regard to what is *righteous* and *just*, is thus declared not to have been departed from in the scheme of redemption: this scheme bearing a twofold relation to sinners, in such a manner, that, whilst it manifested the *mercy* of God, it should at the same time in no degree lay a ground for the impeachment of his *justice*. This view of the case will be found exactly to agree with what has been already advanced at p. 140 of this volume. The reader, who will turn to the *Annotations of Diodati*, p. 117, will be pleased with the observations which he will there find upon this subject.

Having been led by the discussion of this text to the mention of Dr. Nares's work, I cannot avoid expressing my regret, that the present edition has travelled thus far on its way to the public eye, without those aids which an earlier appearance of that valuable performance would have secured to it. Being, like that respectable writer, engaged in the endeavour to vindicate the purity of Scripture truth from Unitarian misrepresentation, I am naturally desirous to avail myself of the exertions of so distinguished a fellow-labourer. That these volumes, therefore, and the cause which they support, may not be altogether deprived of the advantages of such co-operation on the subjects which have been already discussed in the foregoing sheets, I shall here subjoin a reference to those parts of Dr. Nares's work which bear upon the same subjects, and bestow upon them additional enforcement and illustration. I beg, then, to direct the reader's attention to pp. 60—124. 173, 174. 181, 182. 217. 220, on the doctrine of the *pre-existence* treated of in Number I.:—to pp. 126—130. 231—236. 154—164, on the *ransom* or *price of redemption* treated of in Number XXV., on the sense in which Christ is said to have been made a *sacrifice for sin*, and a *sin-offering*, as in Number XXVII. pp. 152—157, and Number XXIX., and to have died *for us*, as in Number XXX.:—to pp. 144—154, on the meaning of *propitiation*, as treated of in Number XXVI., and of *Atonement* as in Number XXVIII.: and, lastly, to pp. 131—140, on the meaning of the phrase *bearing sins*, which has been treated of in the present Number.

I have referred the reader to the discussion of these several subjects in Dr. Nares's work, not only because the view which has been taken of them in the preceding Numbers will be found thereby to receive ample confirmation; but, more especially, because the arguments employed by the learned author are shaped in such a manner, as to meet the Unitarian objections in that form,

will avail but little in evading the force of this passage. Admitting even that it signifies, as Dr. Priestley contends, *righteous*, the argument remains much the same; since, in this view, the reasoning of St. Paul goes to reconcile with the *righteous* dealings of God, which, in respect of sin, must lead to punishment,—that forgiveness granted through Christ's propitiation, whereby the sinner was treated as if he had not offended, or was *justified*. This sense of the word *just*, namely, acting agreeably to what is right and equitable, cannot be objected to by Dr. Priestley, it being that which he himself adopts, in his violent application of the word, as relating to the Jews, compared with the Gentiles.

Dr. Doddridge deserves particularly to be consulted on this passage. See also *Raphelius*. The interpretation of δίκαιος in the sense of *merciful*, adopted by Hammond, Taylor, Rosenmüller, and others, seems entirely arbitrary. Whitby says, that the word occurs above eighty times in the New Testament, and not once in that sense.

The single instance adduced in support of this interpretation is itself destitute of support. It is that of Matt. i. 19.—

in which they have made their latest appearance, and which has been given to them by the joint labours and collective erudition of the party. In the year 1801, a challenge had been thrown out to the Unitarians, in the first edition of the present work, (see pp. 115, 116 of this volume,) calling upon them for an avowed translation of the Scriptures on their peculiar principles. Whether it has been in compliance with this demand, or not, that they have given to the world their *Improved Version of the New Testament*, is of little consequence. But it is of great consequence, that they have been brought to reduce their vague and fluctuating notions of what the New Testament contains, to some one determined form; and that they have afforded to the able author of the *Remarks* upon their version an opportunity of exposing the futility of the criticisms, the fallaciousness of the reasonings, the unsoundness of the doctrines, and the shallowness of the information, which have combined to produce this elaborate specimen of Unitarian exposition. Spanheim has said, Controversiæ quæ cum hodiernis Socinianis, vel Anti-Trinitariis etiam extra familiam Socini, intercedunt, sive *numero* suo, sive controversorum capitum *momento*, sive adversariorum *fuco* et larvâ quadam pietatis, sive argutiarum nonnunquam *subtilitate*, sive Socinianæ luis *contagio*, in gravissimis merito censentur. (*Select. De Relig. Cont.* p. 132.) If this observation of Spanheim is admitted to be a just one, the friends of Christianity cannot surely be too thankful to the compilers of the *Improved Version*, for bringing together into one view the entire congeries of their cavils on the New Testament; nor to the *Remarker* upon those cavils, for their complete and triumphant refutation.

Joseph being a just man, and not willing to make Mary a public example, was minded to put her away privily. Now this means clearly, not, that Joseph being a *merciful*[a] man, and *therefore* not willing, &c., but, that being a *just* man, that is, actuated by a sense of right and duty, he determined to put her away according to the law, in Deut. xxiv. 1: and *yet*, at the same time, not willing to make her a public example, he determined to do it privately. See *Lightfoot* and *Bishop Pearce* on this passage.

That the force of *tamen*, *yet*, or *nevertheless*, which has been here ascribed to the word καὶ, is given to it both by the New Testament and profane writers, has been abundantly shewn by *Raphel.* tom. ii. p. 519. *Palairet*, pp. 41. 96. 221. 236. *Elsner*, tom. i. p. 293, and *Krebsius*, p. 147.—See also *Schleusner Lex. in Nov. Test.* Numb. XI. and the observations at p. 140 of this volume.

NO. XLIII. — ON THE *INCONSISTENCY* OF THE REASONING WHEREBY THE DEATH OF CHRIST IS MAINTAINED TO HAVE BEEN BUT *FIGURATIVELY* A SACRIFICE.

PAGE 24. (b).—It has been well remarked, that there is great inconsistency in the arguments of some writers upon this subject. They represent the death of Christ, not as a *proper*, but merely as a *figurative*, sacrifice; and establish this by proving, that it cannot be *either*. For, whilst they argue that it is not a *proper* sacrifice, upon principles which tend to shew that *no such* sacrifice can exist, they prove at the same

[a] Campbell, although, from his not discerning the adversative relation of the members of the verse, Matt. i. 19, he has not ascribed to the word the signification of *just* in this place, is yet obliged to confess that he has "not seen sufficient evidence for rendering it *humane*, or *merciful*": *Four Gospels*, &c. vol. iv. pp. 6, 7.—The force of the Syriac word which is here used for δίκαιος, seems not to have been sufficiently attended to in the decision of this question: if the learned reader will take the trouble of examining the several passages in the Syriac New Testament, where the word ܙܕܝܩ, or its emphatic ܙܕܝܩܐ, occurs, he will be satisfied that in every case where it does not signify *just* in the most rigorous sense, it at least implies that which is founded in *right*. For its use in the former acceptation, see John v. 30; vii. 24; Rom. ii. 5; iii. 26; 2 Thess. i. 5; 2 Tim. iv. 8; Apoc. xix. 2.

time that it is not a sacrifice *figuratively*, since every figure presupposes reality. The writers of the New Testament, who perpetually apply the sacrificial terms to the death of Christ, must surely have been under a strange mistake, since neither in a proper, nor in a figurative sense, did those terms admit of such application.

Upon the whole, the opposers of the proper sacrifice of Christ, on the ground of *necessary inefficacy*, are reduced to this alternative;—that no proper sacrifice for sin ever existed, and that, consequently, in no sense whatever, not even in figure, is the death of Christ to be considered as a sacrifice;—or, that the efficacy, which they deny to the sacrifice of Christ, belonged to the offering of a brute animal.

Besides, if they allow the sacrifices under the law to have been proper sacrifices, whilst that of Christ was only figurative, then, since the Apostle has declared the former to have been but types and shadows of the latter, it follows, that the proper and real sacrifices were but types and shadows of the improper and figurative.

On the pretence of *figurative* allusion, in the sacrificial terms of the New Testament, which has been, already, so much enlarged upon in several parts of this work, *Dr. Laurence*, in his discourse on *The Metaphorical Character of the Apostolical Style*, has thrown out some valuable ideas, which well deserve to be considered.

NO. XLIV.—ON THE NATURE OF THE *SACRIFICE FOR SIN.*

PAGE 24. (c).—I have not scrupled to adopt, in the page here referred to, the definition of the *sacrifice for sin*, as it stands in the 2d vol. of *Theol. Rep.* Numb. 1: to the judicious author of which paper I am indebted for some valuable reflections on this subject. On the true nature of the sacrifice for sin, see also, *Hallet's Discourses*, 2d vol. p. 293. Although both these writers, in adopting the *premial* scheme of atonement, endeavour to establish a principle entirely different from that contended for in these discourses, yet are the ob-

servations of both upon the subject of atonement particularly worthy of attention.

NO. XLV.—ON THE EFFECT OF THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT IN PRODUCING SENTIMENTS FAVOURABLE TO VIRTUE AND RELIGION.

PAGE 26. (a).—Dr. Priestley (*Theol. Rep.* vol. i. p. 419) offers, upon this head, some very extraordinary remarks. He admits, that "the apprehensions of the divine justice, and of the evil and demerit of sin," excited by the scheme of redemption here maintained, are "sentiments of powerful effect in promoting repentance and reformation." But, he adds, that "in proportion as any opinion raises our idea of the justice of God, it must sink our idea of the divine mercy [a]: and since a sense of the mercy of God is, at least, as powerful an inducement to repentance, and as efficacious a motive to a holy life, *especially with ingenuous minds*, as the apprehension of his justice, what the doctrine of atonement gains on the one hand, it loses on the other."

Now does Dr. Priestley *seriously* think, that the abstract love of excellence, or the hope of distant reward, can produce upon the minds of men impressions as powerful as the habitual fear of offending? That the desire of happiness acts upon us but through the medium of present inquietude; that we seek after it, only in the degree in which we feel uneasy from the want of it; and that fear is in itself, however remote its object, an instant and perpetually acting stimulus,

[a] Bishop Watson, in speaking of that arrogant and dogmatical theology, that decrees the rejection of the doctrine of atonement, as *inconsistent* with the divine attribute of *mercy*, uses the following just observations:—"We know assuredly, that God delighteth not in blood; that he hath no cruelty, no vengeance, no malignity, no infirmity of any passion in his nature; but we do *not* know, whether the requisition of an atonement for transgression may not be an *emanation of his infinite mercy*, rather than a *demand of his infinite justice*. We do *not* know, whether it may not be the very best means of preserving the innocence and happiness not only of us, but of all other free and intelligent beings. We do *not* know, whether the suffering of an innocent person may not be productive of a degree of good, infinitely surpassing the evil of such sufferance; nor whether such a quantum of good could, by any other means, have been produced."—*Two Apologies*, &c., pp. 466, 467.

Dr. Priestley is too well acquainted with the nature of the human mind not to admit. And, I apprehend, he would consider that civil government but badly secured, which rested upon no other support than that of gratitude and the hope of reward, rejecting altogether the succour of judicial infliction. But, besides, in comparing the effects upon the human mind, of gratitude for the divine mercies, and fear of the divine justice, it is to be remembered, that one great advantage, which we ascribe to the latter, is this; that those humble feelings, which the apprehension of the great demerit of sin and of the punishment due to our offences must naturally excite, dispose us the more readily to place our whole reliance on God, and, not *presuming* on our own exertions, to seek in all cases his sustaining aid. Farther, admitting that the bulk of mankind, (who, after all, and not merely *ingenuous minds*, are, as Dr. Priestley confesses, "the persons to be wrought upon,") were as strongly influenced by love of the goodness of God as by fear of his justice, it by no means follows, that "the doctrine of atonement must lose in one way what it gains in another:" because it is *not* true, that "the fear of the divine justice must sink our ideas of the divine mercy." On the contrary, the greater the misery from which men have been released, the greater must be their gratitude to their Deliverer. And thus, whilst the divine rectitude rendered it unavoidable that the offender should be treated in a different manner from the obedient, the mercy which devised a method whereby that rectitude should remain uninfringed, and yet the offender forgiven, cannot but awaken the strongest feelings of gratitude and love.

Dr. Priestley, however, contends that even the advantage ascribed to the doctrine of atonement, namely, that of exciting apprehensions of the divine justice and of the evil and demerit of sin, does not strictly belong to it; "for, that severity should work upon men, the offenders themselves should *feel* [a] it. Now, this I cannot understand. It seems much

[a] The "ne non timere quidem sine aliquo timore" of Tully, seems an idea quite inconceivable to Dr. Priestley.—On this subject I beg to direct the

the same as to say, that, in order to feel the horror of falling down a precipice, on the edge of which he hangs, a man must be actually dashed down the steep. Will not the danger produce sensations of terror? And will not the person who snatches me from that danger be viewed with gratitude, as having rescued me from destruction? Or is it necessary that I should *not be saved*, in order to know from what I *have been saved?* Can any thing impress us with a stronger sense of God's hatred to sin, of the severe punishment due to it, and of the danger to which we are consequently exposed if we comply not with his terms of forgiveness, than his appointing the sacrifice of his only begotten Son, as the condition on which alone he has thought it right to grant us forgiveness? Do we not in this see every thing to excite our fear? do we not see every thing to awaken our gratitude?

NO. XLVI.—ON THE SUPPOSITION THAT SACRIFICE ORIGINATED IN *PRIESTCRAFT.*

PAGE 29. (a).—Some of those objectors, who call themselves enlightened, but whose opinions would scarcely deserve notice were it not to mark their absurdity, have sagaciously conjectured, that sacrifice was the invention of priestcraft. Morgan, (*Moral. Phil.* p. 236,) and Tindal, (*Christ. as old as the Creat.* p. 79,) exult in this discovery. But, in the elevation of their triumph, they have totally forgotten to inform us who were the priests in the days of Cain and Abel: or, if we consent to set aside the history of that first sacrifice, in compliance with the dislike which such gentlemen entertain for the Book in which it is contained, we have still to learn of

reader's attention to the words of the late Bishop Porteus, and particularly to the striking and beautiful expression in the concluding clause, taken from *Scott's Christian Life*:—"By accepting the death of Christ instead of ours, by laying on him the iniquity of us all, God certainly gave us the most astonishing proof of his mercy: and yet, by accepting no less a sacrifice than that of his own Son, he has, by this most expressive and tremendous act, signified to the whole world such extreme indignation at sin, as may well alarm, even while he saves us, and make us *tremble at his severity, even while we are within the arms of his mercy.*" Porteus's Sermons, ii. p. 56.

them, in what manner the fathers and heads of families (by whom even Morgan himself confesses, sacrifices were first offered) contrived to convert the oblation of *their own* flocks and fruits into a gainful traffic. And, indeed, after all, the priests, or, as he calls them, "holy butchers," whom Tindal wittily represents, "as sharing with their gods, and reserving the best bits for themselves," seem to have possessed a very extraordinary taste: the *skin* of the burnt-offering among the Jews, (*Levit.* vii. 8,) and the *skin* and *feet* among the heathens, (*Pott. Antiq.* vol. i. book ii. ch. 3,) being the best bits, which the priests *cunningly* reserved for their own use [a].

Such impotent cavils, contemptible as they are, may yet be considered of value in this light:—they imply an admission, that the invention of sacrifice on principles of natural reason is utterly inconceivable; since, if any such principles could be pointed out, these writers, whose main object is to undermine the fabric of Revelation, would gladly have resorted to them, in preference to suppositions so frivolous and absurd.

NO. XLVII.—ON THE SUPPOSITION THAT THE MOSAIC SACRIFICES ORIGINATED IN HUMAN INVENTION.

PAGE 29. (b).—Among the supporters of this opinion there are undoubtedly to be reckoned many distinguished names: Maimonides, R. Levi Ben Gerson, and Abarbanel, amongst the Jews; and amongst the early Christians, Justin Martyr, the author of the questions and answers to the Orthodox in his works, Irenæus, Tertullian, Chrysostom, Theodoret, and Cyril of Alexandria; who all concur in pronouncing the divine institution of the Mosaic sacrifices to have been an accommodation to the prejudices of the Jewish people, who had been trained up in the practice of sacrifice among the Egyptians; to the latter of whom Porphyry attributes the invention of sacrifice; whilst others ascribe its origin to the

[a] See *Delany's Revel. Exam.* vol. i. pp. 86, 87, and *Kennicott's Two Dissert.* pp. 204, 205.

Phenicians. To the above names are to be added, of later date, those of Grotius, Spencer, and Warburton.

But to suppose that these most solemn rites of worship should have been ordained by a God of infinite wisdom and purity—by a God, who presents himself to the Jews, in the character of a king jealous of his glory—merely in compliance with the absurdities of pagan superstition, seems a notion little worthy of the names that have been mentioned. To imagine, also, that the sacrifices of the patriarchs could have received the divine approbation, without the authority of divine institution, is to contradict the general tenor and express language of Scripture; which supplies various instances, in which God resented, and severely punished, every species of *will-worship*, (as for example, in the case of Nadab and Abihu, who were struck dead for burning incense with strange fire,) and which expressly condemns, in Matt. xv. 9, and Coloss. ii. 22, 23, that ἐθελοθρησκεία, which sprang from the devices and inventions of men.

Spencer, indeed, who has most laboriously defended this notion of the human invention of sacrifices, in his book *De Leg. Hebr.*, has endeavoured to prove, (lib. iii. diss. ii. cap. 4, sect. 2,) that St. Paul speaks of will-worship [a] without dis-

[a] An argument, which has been used by Spencer in support of this opinion, deserves particularly to be exposed. In speaking of the notion, of the sacrifice of Abel having been the consequence of a divine institution and command, he thus expresses himself: "Sententia hæc erroris inde manifesta est quod hoc ipso in commate, (Heb. xi. 4,) illius oblata, non debita, sed δῶρα, ab Apostolo appellentur: nam *inde* patet, Abelis oblationem e pio voluntatis propriæ motu, potius quam legis alicujus præscripto prodisse." *Spenc. De Leg. Hebr.* ii. 769.—Here it is directly contended, that the authority of the writer to the Hebrews gives support to the assertion that the offering of Abel was purely voluntary; and this is deduced from the force of the term δῶρα employed by that writer in the passage of the epistles above referred to. But the learned author is altogether inexcusable in drawing such a conclusion: inasmuch as it can hardly be supposed, that he was unaware of the sense, in which the writer to the Hebrews has applied the term δῶρα, in *every other passage*, in which it occurs throughout the Epistle; namely, as referring to oblations under the Mosaic law, which consequently were the result of specific institution, and in which no one part even of the ceremonial of the oblation was left to the free choice of the offerer. Nor can it easily be believed, that the author could have been ignorant, that in above seventy passages of the Old Testament the word δῶρα is used by the LXX for the Hebrew קרבן; in every

approbation. In this, however, he is completely answered by Witsius[a]: and with respect to the circumstance of resemblance between the Jewish religion and those of the ancient heathen nations, on which the reasoning of Spencer through the entire of his voluminous work is founded, Shuckford asserts, that, so far is it from justifying the inference which he has drawn, namely, that God had instituted the one in imitation of the other, the direct contrary is the legitimate conclusion; inasmuch as "no one ceremony can be produced, common to the religion of Abraham or Moses, and to that of the heathen nations, but that it may be proved, that it was used by Abraham or Moses, or by some of the true worshippers of God, earlier than by any of the heathen nations." (*Connection*, &c., vol. i. p. 317.)

It is to be remarked, that to those, who have been already named as supporting the hypothesis of the human invention of sacrifice, are to be added, in general, the writers of the popish church; who, in order to justify *their* will-worship, or appointment of religious rites without divine institution, allege the example of the Patriarchs in the case of sacrifices, and the approbation bestowed by God upon these acts of worship, though destitute of the sanctions of his command.

One writer of that church (a writer, however, whom she will not be very ambitious to claim) has, indeed, carried this point yet further; inasmuch as he contends not only for the human invention of sacrifice, but for its mere human adoption into the Jewish ritual, without any divine sanction or authority whatever. The words of this writer, which, I confess, I think worth quoting, merely for the same reason for which the Spartan father exhibited his drunken Helot, are these:—

one of which passages nearly, the oblation under the prescription of the Levitical ritual is intended to be conveyed; and indeed the word קרבן is the most general name for the sacrifices under the Mosaic law. See what is said on this word in Number LXII.—The true and obvious reason, why the writer to the Hebrews uses the term δῶρα, is, because it is the very term employed by the Seventy in describing the offerings of both Cain and Abel in Gen. iv. 4, 5. The author of the Epistle treating of the same subject naturally uses the same language.

[a] *Misc. Sac.* lib. ii. diss. ii. § 2—7. See also *Heideg. Hist. Patriarch. Exercit.* iii. § 52. tom. i.

"That the Supreme Being would imperiously require of mankind bloody victims, and even point out the particular animals that were to be immolated upon his altar, it is, to me, highly incredible; but that superstition, the child of ignorance and fear, should think of offering such sacrifices, it is not at all wonderful: nor need we think it strange, that Moses, although a wise legislator, in this indulged the humour of so gross and carnal a people as were the Israelites. All the nations around them offered similar victims, from the banks of the Euphrates to the banks of the Nile. The Egyptians, in particular, among whom they had so long sojourned, not only sacrificed animals to their gods, but selected the best of their kind. Indeed, I have ever been convinced, since I was capable of reflection, that the whole sacrificial and ceremonial laws of Moses were chiefly borrowed from the priests of Egypt, but prudently accommodated by the Hebrew legislator to the relative situation of his own people, divested of profane licentiousness and barefaced idolatry, and restrained to the worship of one supreme God, who created the heavens and the earth, and whom HE WAS PLEASED TO CALL IEUE, IAO, OR JEHOVAH!"[a]

[a] *Geddes's Critical Remarks on the Hebrew Scriptures*, p. 309. The observations which this extraordinary writer, who wishes to be distinguished by the title of a CATHOLIC CHRISTIAN, subjoins to the passage above referred to, will serve still farther to shew the true nature of his claims to that denomination.—"This name, (he says, alluding to the name Jehovah,) I think, he (Moses) must have learnt in Midian: that he could not learn it in Egypt, is clear from this, that the name was not known there before he announced it as the name of the *God of the Hebrews*; and Jehovah himself is made to say, on Mount Sinai, that he had never till then manifested himself by that name: but that the name before that was known in Midian, nay, that it was the name of the Deity, whom Jethro principally, or perhaps exclusively, worshipped, to me appears very probable from several circumstances." Having enumerated these circumstances, which enable him to pronounce that Moses had put a gross falsehood into the mouth of Jehovah upon this subject, he concludes thus:—"From all this I think it probable, that the name Jehovah was known in Midian, Moab, and Syria, before the mission of Moses; and that Moses may have borrowed it thence.—*Those who literally believe what is related in the third chapter of Exodus* will sneer at this remark; and they are welcome so to do: I will never be angry with any one for *believing either too much or too little.*"

Now, if we follow this writer to his *Remarks* upon the third chapter of Exodus, we shall learn what it is that

And again, this same enlightened expositor of Holy Writ unfolds, much to the credit of the Jewish legislator, the great

he considers as *believing just enough.* Moses, in that chapter, informs us of "the angel of the Lord appearing to him in a flame of fire out of the midst of a bush;"—and of the divine mission then expressly conveyed to him by God himself speaking out of the burning bush, and describing himself as "the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob."—Now, what says Dr. Geddes on this? "That in his apprehension, there might, in this particular apparition, be no other angel or messenger, than an *uncommon luminous appearance in a bush of briars;* which attracted the attention of Moses, and might be considered by him as a divine call to return to Egypt for the purpose of delivering his brethren from their iron bondage." Then having *proved* the propriety of calling this *luminous appearance in the bush of briars,* the *angel of the Lord* and even *God* himself, from the passage in the Psalmist, "The Lord maketh the winds his messengers, and flames of fire his ministers;" and recollecting the necessity of explaining how this *luminous appearance,* or *flaming angel,* was enabled to hold in the name of the Most High a long and distinct conversation with Moses, he boldly faces about and meets the difficulty at once.—"But can it be believed, that the whole dialogue, contained in this and the following chapters, is founded upon the single phenomenon of a fiery meteor or luminous appearance in a bush of briars? What may appear credible or incredible to others, I know not: but I know, that *I can believe this, sooner than believe that God and Moses verbally conversed together in the manner here related, on the bare authority of a Jewish historian who lived no one can well tell when or where: and who seems to have been as fond of the marvellous as any Jew of any age.* But let every one judge for himself, as he has an undoubted right to do; and believe as much, or as little, as pleaseth him.—*My belief is my own.*"

Such is Dr. Geddes's enlightened view of this part of Scripture, on which the claim of the Jewish legislator to a divine mission is founded. He states, indeed, with a modesty truly becoming, that his belief upon the subject is purely *his own.* So, I will venture to add for him, it will ever remain. For although some may be found, whose reach of philosophical reflection may just serve to enable them with Dr. Geddes to reject the narrative of Moses as a fabrication, and his pretensions to a divine mission as an imposture; yet that nice discriminating taste in miracles, that could catch the flavour of a nearer approach to credibility in the case of a burning bush of briars carrying on a long conversation in the name of the Almighty, than in the case of that great Being directly communicating his will and issuing his commands to one of his intelligent creatures respecting a great religious dispensation to be introduced into the world by human agency,—is likely to secure to Dr. G. an eminence in singularity from which he is in no great danger of experiencing the slightest disturbance.

I cannot, however, yet dismiss this subject, and still less can I dismiss one so serious with an air of levity. However ludicrous and however contemptible the wild fancies and the impotent scoffs of this traducer of Scripture truths may be, yet the awful importance of that sacred book with which he has connected himself in the capacity of translator, bestows upon his labours, by association, a consequence, which (barely) rescues them from present neglect, though it cannot operate to secure them from future oblivion. In the declaration of his creed, (*Pref. to Crit. Rem.* p. vi.,) and in the vindication of himself from the charge of infidelity, he affirms, "the gospel of

advantages attending his imposition of Egyptian ceremonies as matter of divine ordinance upon his people. "This con-

Jesus to be his religious code; and *his* doctrines to be his dearest delight:" he professes himself to be "a sincere though unworthy disciple of Christ."—"*Christian* (he says) is my name, and *Catholic* my surname. Rather than renounce these glorious titles, I would shed my blood," &c. Now in what does this *Catholic Christianity* consist? Not merely as we have seen in denying the divine mission of Moses, and in charging the messenger of that dispensation, which was the forerunner of Christianity, with the fabrication of the most gross and infamous falsehoods, but in attributing to our Lord himself a participation in those falsehoods by their adoption and application to his own purposes in his conferences with the Jews. For the establishment of this, it will be sufficient to appeal to our Lord's solemn attestation to the truth of Moses's narrative of the transaction alluded to. "And as touching the dead, that they rise: have ye not read in THE BOOK OF MOSES, how in the bush GOD SPAKE UNTO HIM, saying, I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob?" (Mark xii. 26.)—What the *Catholic Christianity* of Dr. G. amounts to, may be sufficiently inferred from the comparison of this single passage with the positions which he maintains in direct opposition to the authority of our Lord himself.

But, it will appear still more satisfactory from a short summary of his services in the cause of Holy Writ, presented to us by the pen of an accurate and judicious writer, in the pages of a well-known periodical publication. —"The method taken by this *Catholic Christian*, of strengthening the foundation of the faith of Christians, seems very extraordinary. For it consists in tearing up all the foundations, which the learning and the piety of the divines of former ages had been employed to lay. It would perhaps be doing more justice to his great enterprise, to say, that it is an attempt to tear up the foundations which the SPIRIT OF GOD has laid. He attacks the credit of Moses, in every part of his character; as an historian, a legislator, and a moralist. Whether Moses was himself the writer of the Pentateuch, is, with Dr. G., a matter of doubt. But the writer, whoever he might be, is one, he tells us, who upon all occasions gives in to the marvellous, adorns his narrative with *fictions* of the interference of the Deity, when every thing happened in a natural way; and at other times dresses up fable in the garb of true history. The history of the creation is, according to him, a fabulous cosmogony. The story of the Fall, a mere *Mythos*, in which nothing but the imagination of commentators, possessing more piety than judgment, could have discovered either a seducing Devil, or the promise of a Saviour. It is a fable, he asserts, intended for the purpose of persuading the vulgar, that knowledge is the root of all evil, and the desire of it a crime. Moses, was, it seems, a man of great talents, as Numa and Lycurgus were. But, like them, he was a false pretender to personal intercourse with the Deity, with whom he had no immediate communication. He had the art to take advantage of rare but natural occurrences, to persuade the Israelites that the immediate power of God was exerted to accomplish his projects. When a violent wind *happened* to lay dry the head of the gulf of Suez, he persuaded them that God had made a passage for them through the sea; and the narrative of their march is embellished with circumstances of mere fiction. In the delivery of the Decalogue he took advantage of a thunder storm, to persuade the people that Jehovah had descended upon Mount Sinai; and he counterfeited the voice of God by a person, in the height of the storm,

cession must have been extremely agreeable to a sensual, groveling people. The transition from the habits which they had contracted in Egypt was an easy one. The object of their worship was changed, BUT LITTLE OF ITS MODE: FOR IT IS NOT NOW A QUESTION AMONG THE LEARNED, whether a great part of their ritual were not derived from that nation." (*Geddes's Preface to Genesis*, p. xiii.) Thus easily is the whole matter settled by this modest, cautious, and pious commentator.

Now what says Dr. Priestley upon this question, which has been *so completely set at rest by the learned?* "They who suppose that Moses himself was the author of the institutions, civil or religious, that bear his name, and that in framing them he borrowed much from the Egyptians, or other ancient

speaking through a trumpet. He presumes even that God had no immediate hand in delivering the Israelites from the Egyptian bondage. The story of Balaam and his *ass* has had a parallel in certain incidents of *Dr. Geddes's* own life. The laws of Moses are full of pious frauds. His animal sacrifices were institutions of ignorance and superstition. The conquest of Canaan was a project of unjust ambition, executed with cruelty; and the morality of the Decalogue itself is not without its imperfections.—In the end he comes to this very plain confession,—'The God of Moses, Jehovah, if he really be such as he is described in the Pentateuch, is not the God whom I adore, nor the God whom I could love,'" &c. (*Brit. Critic*, vol. xix. pp. 3, 4.)

Such are the views of the Hebrew Scriptures entertained by the man who undertook to be their translator; and who to these qualifications for the task superadded those of a low and ludicrous cast of mind, a vulgar taste, and an almost total unacquaintance with the idiom of the English language. Whether, then, upon the whole, I have dealt unjustly by this writer, in exemplifying his profane ravings by the brutal intoxication of the Spartan slave, and in conceiving the bare exhibition of the one to be sufficient like that of the other to inspire horror and disgust, I leave to the candid reader to determine. If, however, any taste can be so far vitiated, or any judgment so weak, as to admit to serious and respectful consideration that perversion of the sacred volume which he would dignify with the title of a translation, I would recommend at the same time a perusal of the learned and judicious strictures upon that work contained in the XIVth and XIXth volumes of the journal from which the above extract has been made; a journal, to which every friend of good order and true religion in the community must feel himself deeply indebted. As a powerful antidote against the poison of the work, *Dr. Graves's Lectures on the Four last Books of the Pentateuch*, whilst embracing much larger and more important objects, may be most usefully applied. In this valuable performance the authenticity and truth of the Mosaic history are established; the theological, moral, and political principles of the Jewish law are elucidated; and all are, with ability and success, vindicated against the objections of infidels and gainsayers.

nations, MUST NEVER HAVE COMPARED THEM TOGETHER. Otherwise they could not but have perceived many circumstances in which they differ most essentially from them all." He then proceeds, through a *dissertation* of some length, to point out the most striking of those differences: and among these he notices the sacrificial discrepancies as not the least important.

"Sacrificing (he says) was a mode of worship more ancient than idolatry or the institutions of Moses; but among the heathens various superstitious customs were introduced respecting it, which were all excluded from the religion of the Hebrews." Having evinced this by a great variety of instances, he observes,—"As Moses did not adopt any of the heathen customs, it is equally evident that they borrowed nothing from him with respect to sacrifices. With them we find no such distinction of sacrifices as is made in the books of Moses, such as *burnt-offerings*, *sin-offerings*, *trespass-offerings*, and *peace-offerings*, or of the *heaving* or *waving* of the sacrifices. Those particulars, therefore, he could not have had from them, whether we can discover any reason for them or not. They either had their origin in the time of Moses, or, which is most probable, were prior to his time, and to the existence of idolatry."—"Lastly, (he remarks,) among *all the heathens*, and especially in the time of Moses, HUMAN SACRIFICES were considered as the most acceptable to the gods: but in the laws of Moses, nothing is mentioned with greater abhorrence; and it is expressly declared to have been a principal cause of the expulsion of the idolatrous inhabitants of Canaan. The right of the Divine Being to claim such sacrifices is intimated by the command to sacrifice Isaac, but it was declined, and a ram substituted in his place. Also, when the Divine Being claimed the first-born of all the Israelites, in the place of those of the Egyptians which were destroyed, none of them were sacrificed; but the service of the Levites was accepted instead of them: and whereas there were not Levites enow for that purpose, the rest were redeemed by the sacrifice of brute animals, which evinced the

determination of the Divine Being in no case to accept of that of men."

He finishes the entire disquisition by saying, "It may now, surely, be concluded from this general view of the subject, that the two systems, viz. that of *Moses*, and that of the *heathens*, were not derived from each other: and the superiority of that of Moses is so great, that, considering his circumstances and those of his nation at the time, we cannot err in pronouncing, that THEY COULD NOT HAVE HAD ANY HUMAN, BUT MUST HAVE HAD A DIVINE ORIGIN. *Nor can any thing be said of Mr. Langles and others who assert that the books of Moses were copied, or in any other way derived, from the works of other Eastern nations, more favourable than that they had never read them.*"[a]

Such is Dr. Priestley's opinion upon the subject, on which Dr. Geddes comforts himself with having the unanimous suffrage of the learned in his favour. In truth, the absurdity of Dr. Geddes's notions on this subject, exposed as they have so frequently been when advanced by other infidel writers, (for with such I must beg leave to class this *Catholic* translator of the "BOOKS HELD SACRED,") I should not have deemed entitled to any specific refutation: but I could not resist the opportunity of confronting him with a brother critic, equally removed from the trammels of received opinions, and equally intrepid in exercising the right of free inquiry in the face of whatever consequences might result.—*When Greek meets Greek*——

There is another writer also, for the purpose of confronting whose opinions with those of Dr. Priestley I have been the more desirous of making the foregoing extracts from this

[a] *A Dissertation in which are demonstrated the Originality and superior Excellence of the* MOSAIC INSTITUTIONS, contained in Dr. Priestley's *Notes on all the Books of Scripture*, vol. i. pp. 373—400. See also the Preface, p. xii., in which Dr P. uses these words:—"The divine mission of Moses and that of Jesus are inseparably connected; and the religion of the Hebrews and that of the Christians are parts of the same scheme; so that the separation of them is impossible. That Dr. Geddes, and some others, should have been of a different opinion, appears to me most extraordinary."

author's *Dissertation ;*—and that is no other than Dr. Priestley himself. Whoever will be at the trouble of perusing his positions relative to sacrifices contained in Number V. of this Work, and also his observations on their origin alluded to in the Number which follows this, will have no small reason to be surprised at the orthodox complexion of the arguments which have just been cited. For the striking inconsistency which will present itself upon such a comparison, it may not perhaps be difficult to account. I am willing (and with much satisfaction in the reflection) to believe, that, as Dr. Priestley approached the close of life, and was enabled, by being withdrawn from the fermentation of controversy and party, to view these awful subjects with the calmness, deliberation, and seriousness, which they demand, his religious opinions might have undergone some change, and made some approach to that soberer interpretation of Scripture which at an earlier period he had with almost unaccountable pertinacity resisted. I think I can discover strong signs of this in the comparative moderation of his last work, *Notes on all the Books of Scripture ;* but especially in the *Dissertation on the Originality and superior Excellence of the Mosaic Institutions,* from which I have made the foregoing quotations; and which (although I cannot concur in the entire of its contents) I would strongly recommend, as containing a judicious summary of the internal evidence of the divine origin of the Mosaic institutions.

NO. XLVIII.—SACRIFICES EXPLAINED AS *GIFTS* BY VARIOUS WRITERS.

PAGE 29. (c).—Spencer maintains this theory of sacrifice: *De Leg. Hebr.* lib. iii. diss. ii. cap. 3. sect. 1, 2. pp. 762, 763. Mr. Coventry, in the fifth discourse of his *Philem. and Hydasp.* pp. 91, 92. 108, 109, adopts the same idea, clothing it, in his manner, with circumstances tending to disparage and vilify the entire rite. The author of the *Scripture Account of Sacrifices* proposes what he deems a different theory;

but which is distinguished from this, by a line so faint, as scarcely to be discerned. "*Religious gifts*," he says, "should be kept carefully distinct from gifts *weakly* presented to God, as men would offer gifts to one another:" and he explains sacrifices to be "sacred gifts, of things received first from God, and presented back to him for an external expression of gratitude, acknowledgment, faith, and every pious sentiment." (pp. 78—82, and *Postsc.* p. 21.) This notion, however, seems to have no just connexion with any species of sacrifice, but the eucharistic. And however the sentiment of gratitude might have led to an offering of things inanimate, it could not have suggested the idea of the slaying of an animal, as was done by Abel at the beginning. Besides, this notion of sacrifice includes the idea of *property*, and is consequently not conceivable, without admitting an actual experience of the gratifying effect produced by gifts upon men: and thus it falls under the objection urged in Number LI. against the idea of *gifts* in general.

Dr. Priestley has adopted a similar theory, asserting that sacrifices arose from anthropomorphitical notions of God, and are to be considered originally as *gifts* of gratitude. Like the last named author, he endeavours to support his notion, from the practice of gifts of homage to great persons in early times; and, like him, he considers, of course, an offering for sin as differing in *no* respect from any other sort of oblation. The progress of the rite of sacrifice, as growing out of the notion of gifts, he has traced in a circumstantial and elaborate detail, (*Th. Rep.* vol. i. pp. 195—201,) which, whoever wishes to be convinced of the utter improbability of the theory in its most plausible colouring, may take the trouble to consult.

H. Taylor, (*B. Mord.* pp. 799—804,) in like manner, deduces sacrifices from the notion of gifts; pronouncing them to have been nothing but free-will offerings of the first fruits of the earth, or fold: and he expressly defines sacrifice to be "a sacred gift, set apart to God, whereby the sacrificer shewed his readiness to part with his property to religious uses, and

thereby openly and publicly manifested his worship of God. He thus totally excludes the received notion of atonement: and, agreeably to this, he subjoins, that "atonement and propitiation had *no* other meaning or design, than to *purify*, or *sanctify*, or *set apart*, any person or thing to the service of God, by separating them from common use."

It is evident, that every explication here given of the theory of gifts carries with it the idea of a *bribe* to God to procure his favour. In some it is disguised under the appearance of an expression of gratitude, or homage, but *this* is evidently the essential ingredient, especially in all such sacrifices as were of a deprecatory nature. But, that such a notion neither was likely to obtain in the days of the first recorded sacrifice, nor has any connexion with the ideas known to be universally attached in later days to an animal *piacular* sacrifice, it will not require much thought to discover.

NO. XLIX.—SACRIFICES CONSIDERED AS FEDERAL RITES.

PAGE 29. (d).—Sykes, in his *Essay on Sac.* p. 59, explains sacrifices as "federal rites;" and represents them, as "implying, the entering into friendship with God; or the renewal of that friendship, when broken by the violation of former stipulations:" and in p. 73 he says, that the origin of sacrifices may be accounted for on the supposition, "that eating and drinking together were the known ordinary symbols of friendship, and were the usual rites of engaging in covenants and leagues;" this mode of entering into friendship and forming leagues with each other, being transferred by the ancients to their gods: and, in confirmation of this, he adduces instances from Homer, Virgil, Max. Tyr. and others, to show, that they imagined that their gods did actually eat with them, as they ate with their gods. Thus, according to Sykes, Cain and Abel must both have eaten of the offerings which they brought: and this, indeed, he positively asserts, p. 179. But not only have we no authority from Scripture to presume this,

but, as we shall see in Number LII., there is good reason to suppose directly the contrary.

It should follow, also, from this theory, that all those who offered sacrifices, antecedently to the Mosaic institution, must in completion of the ceremony have feasted upon the offering. Of this, however, no intimation whatever is given in Scripture. Jacob, indeed, is said to have called his brethren to eat bread: but it by no means follows, that this was part of the *sacrificial* ceremony. That he should invite his friends to partake in the solemnity of the sacrifice, and afterwards entertain them, is perfectly natural, and conveys no notion whatever of *feasting with God at his table.* But, besides, the holocaust, or burnt offering, was such as rendered it impossible that the sacrificer could feast upon it; the whole of the animal being consumed upon the altar: and that animal sacrifices, both before and a long time after the flood, were of this kind, is generally acknowledged. (*Script. Acc. of Sac. postsc.* p. 32.) This difficulty, indeed, Sykes endeavours to evade, by saying, that the holocaust being deprecatory and offered on account of sins, it was to be entirely consumed by the offerer, and no part reserved for his own use, in confession that he did not think himself worthy to be admitted to eat of what was offered to God. (*Essay*, p. 232.) But now, if holocausts were the first sacrifices, it will scarcely be admitted, that an institution, which, for many ages after its commencement, absolutely precluded the possibility of feasting upon what was offered, should yet have taken its rise from that very idea. And, besides, if the renewal of friendship, to be expressed by the symbol of eating with God, were the true signification of the sacrifice, to what species of sacrifice could it more properly apply, than to that whose precise object was *reconciliation?*

It deserves also to be remarked, that almost all the instances by which Sykes supports his theory are drawn from early heathen practices. Now, it is notorious, that animals unfit for food were sacrificed in several parts of the heathen world. Thus, horses were sacrificed to the Sun; wolves to

Mars; asses to Priapus; and dogs to Hecate. Besides, it is not easy to conceive, had eating and drinking with God been at any time the prevalent idea of sacrifice, how a custom so abhorrent from this notion, as that of human sacrifice, could ever have had birth. Nor will it suffice to say, that this was a gross abuse of later days, when the original idea of sacrifice had been obscured and perverted. (*Essay*, p. 347.) The sacrifice of Isaac, commanded by God himself, was surely not of this description: and it will not be asserted that this was a sacrifice intended to be eaten: nor does it appear that Abraham had prepared any meat or drink offering to accompany it.—*B. Mord.* p. 814.

Upon the whole of Dr. Sykes's reasoning in support of this theory it may be said, that he has transposed cause and effect, and inverted the order and series of the events. For whilst, from the custom of contracting leagues and friendships by eating and drinking at the same table, he deduces the practice of feasting upon the sacrifice, and thence concludes this to be the very essence and origin of the rite, he seems to have taken a course directly opposite to the true one; inasmuch as, in the first sacrifices, *no* part being reserved, it was not until long after the establishment of the rite, when many were invited to partake in the sacrifice, that feasting became connected with the ceremony; and having thus acquired a sacred import by association, it was probably transferred to compacts and covenants amongst men, to bestow solemnity upon the act. See *Scrip. Acc. of Sacr. postsc.* p. 33.—Whoever wishes to see a full and perfect refutation of this theory of Dr. Sykes, may consult the second appendix of Dr. Richie's *Criticism upon modern Notions of Sacrifice.*

It must, indeed, be confessed, that names of still higher authority are to be found on the side of the opinion which Sykes has adopted. Mede and Cudworth, in the course of their respective arguments to establish the Eucharist as a *federal rite*, had, long before the age of this writer, maintained the doctrine which he contends for: and in this

they were followed, and their reasonings repeated, by Dr. Waterland, in his *Nature, Obligation, and Efficacy of the Christian Sacrament considered.* The main strength of the argument is marshalled by Mede in the four following reasons, which the reader, from the great celebrity of that writer, will naturally be desirous to see.

"First, *Every sacrifice*, saith our Saviour, Mark ix. 49, *is salted with salt.* This *salt* is called, Levit. ii. 13, *the salt of the covenant of God;* that is, a symbol of the perpetuity thereof. Now, if the *salt*, which seasoned the sacrifice, were *sal fœderis Dei, the salt of the covenant of God*, what was the sacrament itself but *epulum fœderis, the feast of the covenant?*—Secondly, Moses calls the blood of the burnt offerings and peace offerings, wherewith he sprinkled the children of Israel when they received the Law, *The blood of the covenant which the Lord had made with them: This is*, saith he, *the blood of the Covenant which the Lord hath made with you*, Exod. xxiv. 8.—Thirdly, But, above all, this may most evidently be evinced out of the 50th psalm, the whole argument whereof is concerning sacrifices: there God saith, verse 5, *Gather my saints together unto me, which make covenant with me by sacrifice:* and verse 16, of the sacrifices of the wicked, *Unto the wicked God saith, what hast thou to do to declare my statutes, and take my covenant in thy mouth, seeing thou hatest instruction?* &c.—Fourthly, I add in this last place, for a further confirmation, that when God was to make a covenant with Abram, Gen. xv., he commanded him to offer a sacrifice, verse 9, *Offer unto me* (so it should be termed) *a heifer, a she goat, and a ram, each of three years old, a turtle dove, and a young pigeon.* All which he offered accordingly, and *divided* them in the midst, laying each piece or moiety one against the other; and when the sun went down, God, in the likeness of a smoking furnace and burning lamp, *passed between the pieces*, and so (as the text says) *made a covenant with Abram, saying, Unto thy seed will I give this land*, &c. By which rite of *passing between the parts*, God condescended to the

manner of men." The author then proceeds to show, that this custom of dividing the sacrifice and passing between the parts was usual with the Gentiles, and not unknown among the Jews: and, upon the whole, he concludes, as a matter decisively established, that sacrifices were in their nature and essence "*federal feasts*, wherein God deigneth to entertain man to eat and drink with or before him, in token of favour and reconcilement." (*Works of Joseph Mede*, pp. 170—172.)

The opinions and arguments of a divine so learned, and a reasoner so profound, as Joseph Mede, should not be approached but with reverence: yet upon close examination it must be evident that this great man has here arrived at a conclusion not warranted by his premises. For, as to his first argument, it manifestly proves no more than this, that the Jewish sacrifices, which were all offered under and in reference to *the* covenant which God had originally made with the Jews, (Lev. ii. 13, and Ex. xxiv.,) were always accompanied with that which was considered to be a symbol of the perpetuity of that covenant. In this there was evidently nothing *federal*, nothing which marked the entering into a present covenant, or even the renewing of an old one; but simply a significant and forcible assurance of the faithfulness of that great Being with whom the national covenant of the Jews had been originally entered into.

If this reasoning be just, and I apprehend it cannot be controverted, the whole strength of the cause is gone: for the remaining arguments, although they undoubtedly establish this, that *some* sacrifices were of the nature of *federal rites*, yet they establish no more: so that the *general* nature of sacrifice remains altogether unaffected. In those cases, also, where the sacrifice appears to have had a federal aspect, the true state of the matter is probably this, that where there was a covenant, there was a sacrifice also to give solemnity and obligation to the covenant; sacrifice being the most solemn act of devotion, and therefore naturally to be called in for the enforcement of the religious observance of any compact engaged in. Thus, the sacrifice, being but the ac-

companiment of the covenant, does not necessarily partake of its nature. In other words, although it be admitted, that where there was a covenant there was also a sacrifice, it by no means follows, that wherever there was a sacrifice there was also a covenant. That *some* sacrifices, therefore, had a federal relation, proves nothing as to the nature of sacrifice in general: and the conclusion, which we had before arrived at, remains, consequently, unshaken by the reasons which have been adduced by Mede.—Bishop Pearce's *Two Letters to Dr. Waterland* may be read with advantage upon this subject; although they contain many particulars in which the reflecting reader will probably not concur.

NO. L.—BISHOP WARBURTON'S THEORY OF THE ORIGIN OF SACRIFICE.

PAGE 30. (a).—Bishop Warburton (*Div. Leg.* B. ix. ch. 2) represents the whole of sacrifice as symbolical. The offerings of first-fruits he holds to be an action expressive of gratitude and homage: and in this way he accounts for the origin of such sacrifices as were eucharistic. But, aware of the insufficiency of the theory, which places the entire system of sacrifice on the ground of gifts, he proceeds to explain the nature of expiatory sacrifice in the manner described in the page to which this Number refers.

It is to be lamented, that an ingenious writer, of whom I have had occasion in another place to speak in terms of commendation, should, in his view of the bishop's opinions upon this subject, have permitted himself to give support to that, which is certainly not among the most tenable of his lordship's notions;—namely, the idea of the human origin of sacrifice. This, too, (though probably not so intended by the author,) has been done in a way which has a powerful tendency to mislead the unwary reader: the professed object being to exhibit an impartial enumeration of the arguments on both sides of the question, whilst, in truth, a preponderating weight has been studiously cast in favour of one.

I allude to *Mr. Pearson's critical Essay;* in the 4th section of which the reasonings of Spencer and Warburton, in defence of the heathenish origin and subsequent divine adoption of the rite of sacrifice, are treated with a complacency which they but ill deserve. The reasonings themselves, as they are elsewhere in this work largely discussed, I shall not here stop to consider.

NO. LI.—THE SUPPOSITION THAT SACRIFICES ORIGINATED IN THE IDEA OF GIFTS, ERRONEOUS.

PAGE 30. (b).—Dr. Rutherforth, in a communication to Dr. Kennicott, collects from Gen. iv. 20, that the introduction of *property*, or exclusive right, amongst mankind, is not to be fixed higher than the time of Jabal, the eighth from Adam. He is there said to have been the father, or first inventor, of מקנה: that is, says Rutherforth, not, as we translate it, *the father of such as have cattle*, (for he was clearly not the first of such, Abel having been a keeper of sheep long before,) but of *private property;* the word מקנה signifying strictly *possession* of any sort, and being so rendered in the Syriac version. (*Kennic. Two Dissert.* App. p. 252—254.) In addition to this it may be remarked, that the word מקנה seems to have been applied to *cattle*, merely because cattle were, in the earliest ages, the only kind of *possession;* and that, when there is nothing in the context to determine the word to that application, it can be considered only in its original and proper sense, namely, *possession*.

But whether this idea be right or not, it is obvious that a community of goods must have for some time prevailed in the world; and that, consequently, the very notion of a gift, and all experience of its effect upon men, must have been for a length of time unknown. And if the opinion be right, that sacrifice existed before Abel, and was coeval with the fall; it becomes yet more manifest, that observation of the efficacy of gifts could not have given birth to the practice, there being no subjects in the world upon which Adam could

make such observation. Besides, as Kennicott remarks, (*Two Diss.* p. 207,) "no being has a right to the lives of other beings, but the Creator, or those on whom he confers that right;" if then God had not given Abel such a right, (and that he did not confer it even for the purposes of necessary food, will appear from the succeeding Number,) even the existence of the notion of property, and the familiar use and experience of gifts, could not have led him to take away the life of the animal as a gift to the Almighty; nor, if they could have done so, can we conceive that such an offering would have been graciously accepted.

NO. LII.—ON THE DATE OF THE PERMISSION OF ANIMAL FOOD TO MAN.

PAGE 30. (c).—The permission of animal food evidently appears from Scripture to take its date from the age of Noah: the express grant of animal food then made, clearly evincing that it was not in use before. This opinion is not only founded in the obvious sense of the passage, Gen. ix. 3, but has the support of commentators, the most distinguished for their learning and candid investigation of the sacred text[a]. But, as ingenious refinements have been employed to torture away the plain and direct sense of Scripture upon this head, it becomes necessary to take a brief review of the arguments upon the question.

Two grants were made; one to Adam, and one to Noah. To Adam it was said, Gen. i. 29, 30, *Behold, I have given you every herb bearing seed, which is upon the face of all the earth; and every tree, in the which is the fruit of a tree, bearing seed, to you it shall be for meat; and to every beast of the earth, and to every fowl of the air, and to every thing that creepeth upon the earth, wherein there is life, I have given every green herb for meat.* Again, to Noah it is said, Gen. ix. 3, *Every moving thing that liveth shall be meat for*

[a] See *Munst. Vatab. Clar. Grot.* and *Le Clerc.* on Gen. ix. 3; also *Shuckf. Connect.* vol. i. p. 81, and *Kennic. Two Diss.* p. 70.

you; EVEN AS THE GREEN HERB HAVE I GIVEN YOU ALL THINGS. Now, whilst the obvious inference from the former of these passages is, that God's original grant of the use of his creatures for food, was confined to the vegetable creation; the conclusion to be drawn from the latter is found to be precisely similar, inasmuch as, had animal food been before permitted for the use of man, there had been no occasion for the specific grant to that purpose now made to Noah. And, in perfect agreement with this reasoning, we find the Scripture history of the period antecedent to the flood entirely silent concerning the use of animal food.

Dr. Sykes, however, can see nothing in the first grant to Adam, "but a general declaration of a sufficient provision for all creatures;" nor in the second to Noah, "but a command to slay before they eat flesh:" flesh having from the first been used for food. (*Essay*, &c., pp. 177, 178.) In support of these extraordinary positions he employs arguments not less extraordinary.

1. He contends, that the former grant is necessarily to be understood with certain limitations; for that, as some creatures were not formed for living on herbs, and some herbs were of a poisonous quality, the grant cannot be supposed to extend to *every* green herb; and hence he infers, that the grant cannot be interpreted as enjoining or prohibiting any particular species of food; and that, consequently, animal food may be included. (p. 169—171.) But it seems rather a strange inference, even admitting the existence of noxious vegetables at the time of the grant, that, because it must in propriety be *limited* to a certain description of the things generally permitted, it might therefore be *extended* to a class of things never once named; or that, because a full power was given to man over *all herbs*, to take of them as he pleased for food, whilst *some* would not answer for that purpose, the dominion given was not, therefore, to relate to *herbs*, but generally to *all things* that might serve for human sustenance.

But, 2, he maintains, that, at all events, this grant of *herb*

and *tree* for the food of man does not *exclude* any other sort of food which might be proper for him. And, to establish this, he endeavours to show (p. 171—177) that the declaration to Noah did not contain a grant to eat animal food in general, but only some particular sorts of it, such as are included in the word רמש, by which he understands creeping things, or such animals as are not comprehended under the denominations of beast and fowl; so that, admitting this to be a grant of something new, it was yet by no means inconsistent with the supposition, that sheep, oxen, goats, and such like animals, had been eaten from the first. Now, this directly contradicts his former argument. For if, as that maintains, the grant to Adam was but a general declaration of abundant provision, and consequently leaving man at full liberty to use all creatures for food, why introduce a permission at this time respecting a particular species of creatures?

But besides, רמש does not imply a particular species of animals, but denotes *all*, of whatever kind, *that move*. That this is the true acceptation of the word may be collected from Cocceius, and Schindler, as well as Nachmanides, (who is quoted by Fagius, *Crit. Sac.* on Gen. i. 29,) and the several authorities in *Pool's Syn.* on Gen. ix. 3: and so manifest does it appear from the original in various instances, that it requires no small degree of charity not to believe that Dr. Sykes has wilfully closed his eyes against its true meaning. His words are particularly deserving of remark. "*Throughout the law of Moses*, it is *certain*, that it (רמש) *never* takes in, or includes, beasts of the earth, or birds of the air, but a third species of animals different from the other two:" and this third species he conjectures to be, "all such, either fish or reptiles, that not having feet glide along." (p. 173.) Now the direct contrary of all this is *certain:* and had Dr. Sykes, in his accurate survey of the entire law of Moses, but allowed his eye to glance on the words contained in Gen. vii. 21, he probably would not have been quite so peremptory. ALL FLESH *died*, that *moveth* (הרמש) *upon the earth; both of fowl, and of cattle, and of beasts, and of every creeping thing*

(שרץ) *that creepeth* (השרץ) *upon the earth.* Here the *creeping things* are specially named, and included, together with all other creatures, under the general word רמש. And it is particularly deserving of notice, that in the 11th chapter of Levit., in which the different species of animals are accurately pointed out, those that are properly called *creeping things* are mentioned no less than eleven times, and in every instance expressed by the word שרץ: and yet from this very chapter, overlooking these numerous and decisive instances, Dr. Sykes quotes, in support of his opinion, the use of the word רמש in the two following verses: *Neither shall you defile yourselves with any manner of creeping thing* (שרץ) *that moveth* (הרמש) *upon the earth*, verse 44.—And again, *this is the law of the beasts, and of the fowls, and of every living creature that moveth* (הרמש) *in the waters*, verse 46. Here, because the word רמש, which is a description of *all* moving things, (as has been shown above, and may be proved from various other instances,—see *Jenn. Jew. Antiq.* vol. i. p. 306,) is found connected with reptiles and fishes, it is at once pronounced to be appropriate to them; notwithstanding that through the entire chapter, whose object it is carefully to distinguish the different kinds of animals, it is never once used in the numerous passages referring specially to the reptile and fishy tribes as their proper appellation, and is translated in these two verses by the LXX in its true generic sense, κινούμενος, *that moveth.* So that Dr. Sykes might with as good reason have inferred, that, because *creeping things* are occasionally called *living creatures*, *living creatures* must, consequently, mean *creeping things.* To say the truth, if Dr. Sykes had been desirous to discover a part of Scripture, completely subversive of his interpretation of the word רמש, he could not have made a happier selection than the very chapter of Leviticus to which he has referred.

But, to leave no doubt, that the grant made to Noah was a permission for the first time of animal food, we find an express description of the manner in which this sort of food was to be used immediately subjoined: *But flesh with the*

life thereof, which is the blood thereof, shall ye not eat. Now, if animal food had been before in use, this injunction seems unaccountable, unless on the supposition, that it had been the practice, before the flood, to feed on the flesh of animals that had not been duly killed for the purpose; and Dr. Sykes's argument, which maintains, that this prohibition merely tended to prevent the eating such animals as died of themselves, or the eating the animal without having duly killed it, must rest entirely on the presumption that such had been the practice before. But on what ground he has assumed this, he has not thought proper to inform us: and the certainty, that, before the flood, animals were *killed* for sacrifice, seems not consistent with the supposition. It is curious to observe, that this argument adduced by Sykes falls in with one of the strange conceits of the Jewish Rabbins; it being a tradition of theirs, that there were seven precepts handed down by the sons of Noah to their posterity, six of which had been given to Adam, and the seventh was this to Noah, "about not eating flesh, which was cut from any animal alive." See *Patrick's Preface to Job*—also *Jennings's Jew. Antiq.* vol. i. p. 147.

It must be confessed, however, that arguments of a nature widely different from these of Sykes have been urged in opposition to the interpretation of the several grants to Adam, and to Noah, contended for in this note. Heidegger, in his *Historia Patriarch. Exercit.* xv. § 9. vol. i., maintains, that the passage, Gen. i. 29, 30, is to be thus translated: *Behold, I have given you every herb bearing seed*, &c. (*to you it shall be for meat*); NAY ALSO, *every beast of the earth, and every fowl of the earth, and every thing that creepeth upon the earth wherein there is life*, WITH *every green herb for meat.* This translation he defends, on the ground of the occasional use of the preposition ב, in the *inclusive*, or *copulative*, sense; whence he holds himself justified in explaining it here, as the mark of the *accusative*, not of the *dative* case. In support of this acceptation, he also produces some names highly distinguished in the annals of sacred criticism, viz. Capellus,

Cocceius, and Bochart. And to reconcile this interpretation with the grant to Noah, which seems inconsistent with the idea that the right to animal food had been conveyed before the time of that patriarch, he considers this second grant but as a *repetition* of the first to Adam, and that the words, *even as the green herb have I given you all things*, are not to be understood as conveying now, *for the first time*, a right to the use of all creatures, similar to that which had been before granted with respect to the herbs and fruits, but merely as confirming the grant formerly made, of the green herb and of all living creatures, without distinction.

Now, although the particle ל is used in some few parts of Scripture, in the sense here ascribed to it by Heidegger, yet if we examine the instances in which it is so applied, (all of which may be seen at one view in *Noldius Concord. Particul. Ebr.* pp. 398. 401,) we shall find, that it stands in those cases combined and related in such manner as to give a new modification to its general and ordinary meaning. But, surely, in the present case, no such modifying relation exists. On the contrary, the very frame and analogy of the sentence seem to determine the word to its usual *dative* signification. Having occurred twice in the 29th verse, and in both places manifestly in this sense (לכם, *to you*,) it then immediately follows in direct connexion, and this connexion marked most unequivocally by the copulative particle ו, (ולכל) so as to determine unavoidably the continuance of its application in the same sense. The word את, likewise, succeeds to the clauses enumerating the animal tribes in the 30th verse, precisely in the same manner in which it followed that relating to the human kind, in the preceding verse: and as, there, it is admitted to be the mark of the accusative, specifying the things allotted to the sustenance of the *human* species; so here, it is evidently to be used in the same sense, specifying those things that are appointed for the support of the *brute* creation. This analogy, however, Heidegger is compelled by his interpretation to overturn; and whilst he allows to the word this signification through the whole of the preceding verse,

he here abruptly and arbitrarily changes its application, and attributes to it the force of WITH, which is necessary to make sense of the passage, according to his mode of translating it.

How then does the matter stand? In two passages exactly corresponding, and immediately connected, the preposition ב, and the particle את, are arbitrarily applied in different senses, to make out the translation of Heidegger; whilst on the commonly received interpretation the analogy is preserved throughout, and the same uniform meaning is attributed to each particle in the corresponding clauses. Indeed, the version contended for by Heidegger is, upon the whole, so violent and unnatural, that it requires but to read the passage in the original, to be convinced that it is inadmissible; and perhaps nothing but the respectability of the names that appear in its support could justify its serious investigation. One advantage, however, manifestly attends the notice of it in the present discussion. It proves that the learned writers, who defend this interpretation, consider the commonly received version as utterly irreconcileable with the notion, that the first grant to Adam conveyed the permission of animal food. For if any of the arguments used by Dr. Sykes, and others, to show that it could be so understood, were deemed by these writers to have any value, they surely would not have resorted to this new and unwarrantable translation in support of that position.

In addition to what has been said, it may be proper to remark, that this new version of Gen. i. 29, 30, is so far from receiving any countenance from the Jewish writers, that they are nearly unanimous in the opinion, that the right of eating flesh was not granted until the time of Noah. See particularly *Abenezra*, and *Sol. Jarchi*, in their annotations on this part of Scripture. Heidegger also confesses, that the Christian Fathers, nearly without exception, concur in the same opinion. *Hist. Patriarch. Exercit.* xv. § 3.

Objections, however, are drawn from the history of Abel's sacrifice; and from the distinction of animals into clean and

unclean, antecedent to the flood. It is said, that as Abel's sacrifice had been of the firstlings of his flock, and as it had never been customary to offer any thing to God, but what was useful to man, it may fairly be concluded that animals were used for food even in the time of Abel. *Heideg. Hist. Patr. Exer.* xv. § 25.—To this the reply is obvious: that the principle here laid down is accommodated to particular theories of sacrifice: to such as place their origin and virtue in the notion of a gift to the Deity, or of a self-denial on the part of the offerer; and therefore the argument presupposes the very thing in question, namely, the origin and nature of sacrifice. But, besides, the conclusion will not follow, even admitting the principle; since Abel's flock might be kept for the advantages of the milk and wool, and thus what he offered was useful to himself. Nor to this can it reasonably be objected, that, by the practice of the law, the *male* firstlings were offered, and that therefore Abel's offering could have deprived him only of the wool, the use of which might not yet have been learned: for it cannot with propriety be contended, that the first and most simple form of sacrifice should be explained by the usages of succeeding and far distant times, and by the complicated system of the law of Moses.

But again it is urged, that the distinction of creatures into *clean* and *unclean*, (Gen. vii. 2,) proves animal food to have been in use before the deluge, inasmuch as such distinction can be conceived only in reference to food. To this it has been answered by Grotius [a], that the distinction was made proleptically, as being addressed by Moses to those, who were familiar with this distinction afterwards made by the law: and again, by Jennings, (*Jew. Antiq.* vol. i. p. 151,) that such a distinction would naturally be made, from the difference observed to exist between the animals, without any reference to food; or that, though the use of them for food were held in view, the distinction might have been first made, at the time of entering the ark, when we find it first men-

[a] *De Ver. Chr. Rel.* lib. v. § 9.—See also *Spencer De Leg. Hebr.* lib. i. cap. v. § 1.

tioned, and a greater number of those that were most fit for food then preserved, merely because God intended to permit the use of them in a very short time. But reasonable as these answers may appear, may it not be thought more satisfactory, to consider this distinction as relating originally, not to food, but to sacrifice: those creatures, which were sanctified to the service and worship of God, being considered pure; whilst those, that were rejected from the sacrificial service, were deemed unfit for sacred uses, or unclean? And agreeably to this idea, the word denoting *unclean* throughout the law, טמא, is put in opposition not only to טהר, *clean*, but to קדש, *holy* [a]. The distinction, then, of clean and unclean animals before the flood is admissible upon the principle of the divine institution, or even of the existing practice of sacrifice, without supposing the permission of animal food before the time of Noah.

In conformity with the above reasoning, we find the first use to which this distinction is applied in Scripture, *is* that of sacrifice; Noah having *taken of every clean beast, and of every clean fowl, and offered burnt offerings* [b]. (Gen. viii. 20.) Besides it is to be remembered, that the distinction into *clean* and *unclean* with respect to food, was entirely a different institution from the distinction into *clean* and *unclean* with respect to *sacrifice*. (See *Patrick* and *Ainsw.* on Gen. vii. 2.) Dr. Kennicott's remark on this subject is deserving of notice. "Although the distinction of beasts into clean and unclean was not registered until we come down to Deuteronomy, (xiv. 3,) yet," he says, "this is no reason, why we should not suppose it introduced by God at the same time that he instituted sacrifice: for whoever considers carefully will find, that the law is in part a republication of antecedent revelations and commands, long before given to mankind." (*Two Dissert.* pp. 217, 218,—comp. *Ainsw.* on Gen. vii. 2.) Witsius considers the distinction of beasts into clean

[a] See *Cocceius* and *Parkhurst* on the word טמא.

[b] See *Pol. Synop.* on Gen. vii. 2; compare also Gen. xv. 9, with *Jameson's* note thereon.

and unclean so manifestly to relate to sacrifice in the time of Noah, and to have originated from divine institution, that he even employs it as an argument in support of the divine appointment of sacrifice before the flood. (*Miscell. Sacr.* lib. ii. diss. ii. § 14.) Heidegger also, though he contends for the use of animal food in the antediluvian world, yet admits the distinction of animals into clean and unclean, to have been instituted by divine authority, in reference to sacrifices before the flood. *Hist. Patr. Exercit.* iii. § 52. tom. i.

NO. LIII.—ON THE DIVINE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE.

PAGE 30. [d].—"The first use of words appears from Scripture to have been to communicate the thoughts of God. But how could this be done, but in the words of God? and how could man understand the words of God, before he was taught them?" The Apostle has told us that *faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God:* thus clearly pronouncing all knowledge of divine things, and consequently all language relating to them, to have had its origin in revelation. But it is not only with respect to things divine, that revelation appears to have supplied the first intimations of language. In terms relating to mere human concerns, it seems to have been no less the instructress of man. For in what sense can we understand the *naming of every beast of the field, and every fowl of the air, brought before Adam for this purpose by God*, but in that of his instructing Adam in the manner, whereby they were in future to be distinguished? To suppose it otherwise, and to imagine that Adam at the first was able to impose names on the several tribes of animals, is to suppose, either that he must from the first have been able to distinguish them by their characteristic marks and leading properties, and to have distinct notions [a] of them

[a] In speaking of the necessity of a distinct notion being associated to each term indicating a class or species, it is not meant to imply, that, to render generic terms significant, appropriate *abstract* notions must be annexed. That such notions cannot be entertained by the mind, or, rather, that they involve

annexed to their several appellations; or, that he applied sounds at random, as names of the animals, without the in-

a contradiction subversive of their existence, the very arguments and illustrations employed by Mr. Locke in their support and explanation are sufficient to demonstrate. See particularly *Locke's Essay*, B. iv. ch. vii. § 9. It has been fully and conclusively established by that most accurate of metaphysical reasoners, Berkeley, that what is called a *general* idea, is nothing but the idea of an individual object, annexed to a certain term, which attaches to it a more extensive signification, by recalling to the mind the ideas of other individuals, which are similar to this one in certain characters or properties. This explanation of the nature of *Universals*, which has been commonly ascribed to Bishop Berkeley, who has, undoubtedly, unfolded and enforced it in the most intelligible and convincing manner, is, however, of much earlier origin. The distinction of *Nominalist* and *Realist* is known to have been clearly marked in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, under the teaching of Roscelin, and his pupil Abelard. The Cynics and Stoics, also, of early times, maintained opinions which entitle them to be ranked of the former class: and, contrary to the assertion of Mr. Dugald Stewart, who follows the authority of Brucker in placing Aristotle among the Realists, there certainly are to be found in the writings of that philosopher the elements of those just notions concerning Universals, which have been adopted by the Nominalists.

Of Roscelin, we are told by Brucker, (*Hist. Phil.* vol. iii. p. 907,) that he maintained the position, "Universalia, nec ante rem, nec in re existere, nec ullam habere realem existentiam, sed esse nuda nomina et voces, quibus rerum singularium genera denotentur." This opinion of Roscelin, that *Universals* were merely *words* or *names*, was strenuously supported, with some small alteration not very distinctly intelligible, by his follower Abelard: and was no less strenuously opposed by the Realists, who contended, that Universals have an actual existence *in rerum naturâ*, and that their boundaries are accurately determined by appropriate essences, according to which Nature has classed the individuals of the respective species. That the authority of Aristotle was erroneously claimed by the latter; and that, on the contrary, the views of the Stagyrite were favourable to the Nominalists, Dr. Gillies has taken laudable pains to demonstrate. In his valuable Analysis of a part of the writings of that philosopher he has satisfactorily proved, that, by *general terms*, Aristotle meant only to express the result of the comparison of different individuals agreeing in the same εἶδος or appearance, without the supposition of any correspondent *general ideas* existing in the mind; or, in other words, that a general term was conceived by him, to stand as a sign for a number of individuals, considered under the same aspect, and, from certain resemblances, assigned to the same class. See *Dr. Gillies's Aristotle*, vol. i. p. 66—72.

How perfectly this corresponds with the clearest views of modern metaphysics, is manifest at a glance: and it cannot but afford peculiar satisfaction to all who feel a reverence for exalted genius to find, that, after the unworthy disparagement which for a length of time has been so laboriously cast upon the great name of Aristotle, the honourable homage of a rational coincidence in his opinions, not merely on this, but on an almost endless variety of important subjects, has been the result of the most enlightened inquiries of later days. It has been singularly the fate of the Greek philosopher, to be at one time superstitiously venerated, and at another contemptuously ridiculed; without sufficient pains taken, either by his adversaries, or his admirers, to understand

tervention of such notions. But the latter is to suppose a jargon, not a language: and the former implies a miraculous

his meaning. It has been too frequently his misfortune to be judged from the opinions of his followers, rather than from his own. Even the celebrated Locke is not to be acquitted of this unfair treatment of his illustrious predecessor in the paths of Metaphysics: although, perhaps, it is not too much to say of his well known *Essay*, that there is scarcely to be found in it one valuable and important truth concerning the operations of the understanding, which may not be traced in those writings against which he has directed so much misapplied raillery; whilst, at the same time, they exhibit many rich results of deep thinking, which have entirely escaped his perspicacity. Indeed, it may be generally pronounced of those who have, within the two last centuries, been occupied in the investigation of the intellectual powers of man, that, had they studied Aristotle more, and (what would have followed as a necessary consequence) reviled him less, they would have been more successful in their endeavours to extend the sphere of human knowledge.

To return to the subject of this note, —it must be observed, that to the two different and opposite opinions on the nature of Universals already alluded to, namely, that of the *Nominalists* and that of the *Realists*, there is to be added a third and intermediate one, that of the *Conceptualists*, so called from their distinguishing tenet, that the mind has the power of forming *general conceptions* by abstraction. This sect is represented by Brucker, as a modification of that of the Nominalists. "Nominales, desertâ paulo Abelardi hypothesi, universalia notionibus, atque conceptibus mentis, ex rebus singularibus abstractione formatis, consistere statuebant: unde *Conceptuales* dicti sunt." *Hist. Phil.* vol. iii. p. 908.—With this sect Mr. Locke is ranked by Dr. Reid, (*Essays on the Intell. Powers*, vol. ii. p. 146,) and in the justness of this allotment Mr. Dugald Stewart acquiesces: at the same time he observes, that from the inaccuracy and inconsistency of Mr. Locke's language, there is no small difficulty in assigning to him his true place; or, rather, indeed, in determining whether he had any decided opinion on the question in dispute. (*Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind*, pp. 191, 192.) It, certainly, cannot be contended that Locke has conveyed his meaning upon this subject with clearness, or consistency; yet no doubt can possibly exist as to the class to which he properly belongs. His placing the essences of the species altogether in the *abstract ideas* formed by the mind indisputably determined him to the standard of the Conceptualist; notwithstanding that the incompatibility of the elements of his abstract idea, (*Essay*, B. ii. ch. xi. § 9, and B. iv. ch. vii. § 9,) and the admitted necessity of the *name* to bestow upon the idea its *unity*, that is, in other words, its *existence* as an idea, (*Essay*, B. iii. ch. v. § 10,) marked the indistinctness of his views upon this subject; and ought, if he had examined his own notions consequentially, to have led him to adopt the party of the *Nominalist*.

From what has been said it appears, upon the whole, that the *Nominalist* and *Conceptualist*, whilst they concur in rejecting the notion of the *Realist*, "that Universals belong to things, and that general terms denote certain genera and species established in nature by appropriate essences,"—at the same time differ from each other, essentially, in this;—that whilst the one attributes universality solely to *terms*, and the other to certain *abstract ideas* expressed by those terms, the latter admits the possibility of reasoning on general subjects *without the mediation of language*, and the former maintains the indispensable *necessity of language, as the*

operation on the mind of Adam, which differs nothing in substance from the divine instruction here contended for.

Indeed, even abstracting from the information thus given in Scripture, those who have well examined this subject have been utterly at a loss to conceive any other origin of language, than divine institution. Whitby considers this so completely evident, that he thinks it forms in itself a clear demonstration, that the original of mankind was as Moses delivered it, from the impossibility of giving any other tolerable account of the origin of language. (*Sermons on the Attrib.* vol. ii. p. 29.) Bishop Williams, in his 2d Sermon, (*Boyle Lect.* vol. i. p. 167,) affirms, that though Adam had a capacity and organs admirably contrived for speech, yet in his case there was a necessity of his being immediately instructed by God, because it was impossible he should have invented speech, and words to be spoken, so soon as his necessities required. Dr. Beattie endeavours to prove the human invention of language to be *impossible.* (*Theory of Lang.*, 8vo, p. 101.) And Dr. Johnson is so decidedly of this opinion, that he holds *inspiration* to be necessary to inform man that he has the faculty of speech, " which I think,"

instrument of thought in all general speculations.

If, with Bishop Berkeley, we are obliged to deny the possible existence of an *abstract idea*, there can be no difficulty in determining to which of these two opinions we must yield our assent. In the sign alone, and in its potential application to a class of individual objects, is universality to be found; and consequently by language only, (meaning by this, the use of signs at large,) can we conduct our reasonings one single step beyond the individual object. There is, upon this subject, an excellent remark made by an elegant and perspicuous writer, which I cannot forbear transcribing: — " Whether it might not have been possible for the Deity to have so formed us, that we might have been capable of reasoning concerning classes of objects, without the use of signs, I shall not take upon me to determine. But this we may venture to affirm with confidence, that man is not such a being."——" It would be vain for us, in inquiries of this nature, to indulge ourselves in speculating about possibilities. It is of more consequence to remark the advantages which we derive from our actual constitution; and which, in the present instance, appear to me to be important and admirable: inasmuch as it fits mankind for an easy interchange of their intellectual acquisitions; by imposing on them the necessity of employing, in their solitary speculations, the same instrument of thought, which forms the established medium of their communications with each other."—See p. 190, of *Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind by Dugald Stewart.*

says he, "he could no more find out without inspiration, than cows or hogs would think of such a faculty." Mr. Wollaston contends, (*Relig. of Nat.* pp. 122, 123,) that language is the indispensable instrument[a] of thought: and even Herder, who

[a] In the preceding note, the necessity of language, as the instrument of thought and reasoning, was particularly adverted to. In the judgment of many profound thinkers that necessity is recognised. Lavoisier, in the preface to his *Elements of Chemistry*, expresses his coincidence in the maxim of Condillac, that "we think only through the medium of words;" and that "the art of reasoning is nothing more than a language well arranged." (*Kerr's Translation*, p. xiv.) Plato describes thinking as conducted by mental speech, τὸ διανοεῖσθαι λόγον, ὃν αὐτὴ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ διεξέρχεται: and in the philosophy of the Greeks, *reason* and *words* are denominated by one and the same term, λόγος.—Now, if this be just; if language be, in truth, the indispensable instrument of reasoning; is it too much to affirm, that language could not have been discovered *by* reasoning; or, in other words, that the operations of reasoning could not have effected that, by which alone its operations are conducted?

According to the Conceptualist, indeed, who holds that the mind can contemplate its own ideas independently of words, the invention of language by the exertion of thought is by no means inconceivable; since, on this hypothesis, reasoning may precede language, and therefore may minister to its discovery. And yet, when considered somewhat closely, it may not perhaps appear a very easy matter to imagine the practicability of such a process.

Reasoning, it is manifest, can be conducted only by propositions or affirmations, either verbal or mental. A proposition, affirming of any individual thing, that it is itself, or that it is not another, (could we even suppose the mind in its first stage of thinking capable of forming such a proposition,) is not to be ranked amongst the class of affirmations which belong to reasoning. The power of distinguishing individual objects pertains to the faculty of perception, and is necessary to reasoning, but can form no part of it. Nothing individual, then, being an attribute, every affirmation, which can make a part of reasoning, demands the existence of a general sign. The formation of general signs must, therefore, precede all affirmation, and consequently every exercise of the reasoning faculty. The Conceptualist, who asserts, that general signs are supplied by the general ideas with which abstraction furnishes the mind, must of course contend, that the exercise of the power of abstraction must be antecedent to every act of reasoning. Now, in the first place, it cannot but be deemed extraordinary, that the very faculty, which is pronounced to be the distinguishing characteristic of the rational species, should be called into action previous to the exercise of reason. If such a faculty can be exerted *before* the use of reason, why not exerted *without* it? And, in that case, why should not the tribes of irrational animals, whose perceptions of individual objects may be as distinct as those in the minds of men, pass from those individual perceptions to universal ideas, if such transition can be made without the exercise of reason? But again, not to dwell upon this consideration, (since it may be pretended that it is abstraction itself which in its consequence produces rationality,) if we inquire, what it is that can put an unreasoning mind upon this process of abstraction; a process allowed by all to be difficult, and represented by some in such a light as makes it appear to embrace contradictions; it will not be very easy to give an answer. In contemplating things by classes, it is true, we both ex-

has laboured to prove language not to have been of divine appointment, admits that without it reason cannot be used by man.

pedite the acquisition of knowledge, and facilitate its communication. But can these ends act upon a mind which has not yet *begun* to reason? Can the anticipations of knowledge become a motive, where it has not yet been learned what knowledge is; or, can the desire of communication constitute an incitement, where the very notion of the subject matter to be communicated has never yet been conceived? For it must be remembered, that, as we are now speaking of language as *subsequent* to reasoning, and of reasoning as *subsequent* to abstraction, we must conceive abstraction to be exerted, without any notion actually acquired either of reasoning or language, or any direction or forecast suggested by a reference to either. Abstraction, in short, in this view of the case, is a random and unintelligible movement, which is excited by no design, proposes no object, and admits no regulation. So irrational a foundation for a rational superstructure, cannot be deliberately maintained.

Dr. Price, whose system imposed on him the necessity of upholding the existence of *abstract ideas*, as "essential to all the operations of the understanding, and as being implied in every act of our judgment," felt himself, at the same time, obliged, from the foregoing considerations, to deny that such ideas can be acquired by any mental process, such as that of abstraction. "Were abstract ideas," he observes, "formed by the mind in any such manner, it seems unavoidable to conceive, that it *has* them, at the very time that it is supposed to be employed in *forming* them. Thus, from any *particular* idea of a triangle, it is said we can form the *general* one: but does not the very reflection said to be necessary to this, on a greater or lesser triangle, imply, that the general idea is *already* in the mind?" (*Review of the principal Difficulties in Morals*, p. 37.) The learned Cudworth, in like manner, speaking of the understanding, as an artificer that is to fabricate abstract notions out of sensible ideas, demands, whether, "when this artificer goes about his work, he knows what he is to make of them beforehand, and unto what shape to bring them. If he do not, he must needs be a bungling workman: but if he do, he is *prevented* in his designs, his work being already done to his hand: for he must needs have the *intelligible idea* of that which he knows or understands, already within himself." (*Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality*, pp. 220, 221.) Mr. Harris, also, is led, as he says, by the common account of the mode in which our ideas are generated in the mind, "to view the human soul in the light of a crucible, where truths are produced by a kind of logical chemistry." *Hermes*, pp. 404, 405. These writers are accordingly forced into the gratuitous supposition of a distinct faculty, for the origin of abstract ideas in the human mind. This Dr. Price pronounces to be "the faculty, whose natural object is truth." (*Rev.* p. 37.) And Cudworth, from whom he has largely drawn, and whose mysterious solution of this difficulty he does not altogether reject, ascribes the origin of our abstract ideas to a certain "perceptive power of the *Noetical* part of the soul, which, acting by itself, exerts from within the intelligible ideas of things virtually contained in its own *cognoscitive* power, that are universal and abstract notions, from which, as it were, *looking downwards*, it comprehends individual things." *Treatise*, pp. 217, 218. Mr. Harris, again, accounts for the existence of abstract ideas, by a "*connective* act of the soul, by means of which, by an energy

Now, if language be necessary to the exercise of reason, it clearly cannot have been the result of human excogitation: or, as it is put by Dr. Ellis in his *Enquiry*, &c., language cannot be contrived without thought and knowledge; but the mind cannot have thought and knowledge, till it has language; therefore language must be previously taught, before man could become a rational creature; and none could teach him but God. (*Scholar Armed*, vol. i. p. 140.) Locke's principles concerning the nature of language, although he did not see his way with sufficient clearness to lead him to the right conclusion, is shown by the last-named writer to be perfectly correspondent with the above reasoning. (*Ibid.* pp. 138, 139.) And in an able work published at Berlin by *Süsmilchius* in 1766, the same principles are successfully applied to establish the same conclusion; namely, that the origin of language must have been divine. Even Hobbes admits, that "the first *author of speech* was God himself, that instructed Adam how to name such creatures as he presented to his sight." (*Leviath.* ch. iv. p. 12.)

as spontaneous and familiar to its nature as the seeing of colours is to the eye, it discerns at once, what in *many* is *one;* what, in things *dissimilar* and *different*, is *similar*, and the *same:* " and this "*connecting* or *unifying* power" of the mind, he makes to be the same with that which discerns *truth:* and by means of this alone it is, that he considers, that individuals themselves can become the objects of knowledge; in which he seems to coincide with the mystical notions of Cudworth. See *Hermes*, pp. 360—372.

Into such extraordinary straits, and unjustifiable assumptions, have these learned and able writers been drawn, whilst they maintained the existence of universal ideas, and at the same time found it impossible to accede to the notion of their production by the process of abstraction. They would have reasoned more justly, if, from the impossibility of acquiring universal ideas by such a process, they had inferred that no such ideas do actually exist in the mind; and that the general abstract notion, which is at the same time to include *all* and *none* of the circumstances of individual existence, is a fiction which never can be realized. They would have arrived at a conclusion still more comprehensive and important, if they had drawn this farther consequence; that there is not in *nature* any *Universal* really existing; and that since no idea can be other than the *idea* of an *individual*, to *terms* alone can a *universal* or *general* nature be ascribed.—From all which it must follow as a necessary result,—that without language neither can knowledge be acquired, nor reasoning exerted, by the human intellect; and that, since language must precede these, it cannot have been discovered by them, and therefore cannot be deemed the offspring of human invention.

From the impossibility of conceiving how language could have been invented, some have been led, in opposition to all just reasoning, to pronounce it innate[a]. Many even of the ancients, totally unaided by revelation, were obliged to confess that the discovery of this art exceeded all human powers. Thus Socrates, in the Cratylus of Plato, is represented as saying, "the first names were framed by the gods:" and in the same work we are told, that "the imposition of names on things belonged to a nature superior to that of man," and that it could "pertain only to him who hath a full discernment of their several natures."—*Pol. Syn.* on Gen. ii. 19.—*Stilling. Orig. Sac.* B. i. ch. i. § 3.—and *Euseb. Præp. Evang.* lib. xi. cap. 6.

It must be remarked, that they who hold the opinion that language is of mere human invention are, for the most part, obliged to proceed on suppositions of the original state of man, totally inconsistent with the Mosaic history. Thus, amongst the ancients, Diodorus Siculus, (*Biblioth.* lib. i.,) Vitruvius, (*De Archit.* lib. ii. cap. 1, 2,) Lucretius, &c., ground their reasonings upon an idea, (derived from the atomic cosmogony of Moschus, Democritus, and Epicurus, which represented human beings as springing from the earth, like vegetables,) that men first lived in woods and caves like brute beasts, uttering only cries and indistinct noises, until *gradual* association for mutual defence brought with it *at length* conventional signs for communication. And the respectable and learned, though strangely fanciful, author of the *Origin and Progress of Language*, who is among the latest that have written in defence of this opinion, is compelled to admit that the invention of language is too difficult for the savage state of man; and accordingly he holds, that men, having been placed originally in a solitary and savage state, must have been associated for ages, and have carried

[a] See *Shuckf. Connect.* vol. i. p. 109, and also an essay of *Count de Fraula*, (*Mém. de l'Acad. Imper. et Roy.* Brussels, vol. xiv.,) in which language is represented as an instinctive quality of man, constituting a part of his very creation.

on some common work, and even framed some civil polity, and must have continued for a considerable length of time in that state, so as ultimately to acquire such powers of abstraction as to be able to form general ideas, before language could possibly be formed. Now whether such theories, in supposing a mute emergence from savage barbarism to reflecting civilization, and a continued association [a] without an associating tie, prove any thing else than their own extravagance; and whether, by the prodigious difficulty and delay which even they attach to the invention of speech, they do not give strong confirmation to the Mosaic account, which describes man as destined for the *immediate* enjoyment of society, and consequently *instructed* in the art of speech, it is for the reader to judge.

Other writers again, for example, Condillac, (in his *Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge*,) Batteaux, (in his *Principles of Literature*,) and Gebelin, (in his *Monde Primitif*,) maintain, that man is not by nature the *mutum pecus* he is represented by the Scotch philosopher: but that sounds, either excited by passions, or produced by imitation, would *necessarily* be formed so as to constitute an *inarticulate* language; which would ultimately suggest the idea, and supply the elements, of more perfect speech. The transition, however, from the simple sound to the diversified articulation is still a wide chasm in each of these solutions. And whilst the range of the passions seems, on the one hand, to present

[a] Dr. Blair, in his *Lectures on Rhetoric*, (vol. i. p. 71,) makes the following just and apposite observations:— "One would think, that, in order to any language fixing and extending itself, men must have been previously gathered together in considerable numbers; society must have been already far advanced: and yet, on the other hand, there seems to have been an *absolute necessity for speech, previous to the formation of society*. For, by what bond could any multitude of men be kept together, or be made to join in the prosecution of any common interest, until once, by the intervention of speech, they could communicate their wants and intentions to each other? So that, either how society could form itself, previously to language, or how words could rise into a language, previously to society formed, seem to be points attended with equal difficulty. And when we consider, &c., difficulties increase so much upon us on all hands, that there seems to be no small reason for referring the first origin of all language to divine teaching or inspiration."

a limit which the powers of communication, derived from that source, cannot be conceived to transcend; the various sounds and motions in nature must, on the other, be admitted to exhaust the models, which alone could draw forth the imitative powers of the human voice. So that, according to these theories, single tones, or cries, either excited by some passion, or formed in imitation of some natural sound, must in all just reasoning fill up the measure of human language. It is not easy, then, to discover any advantage possessed by these theories over that of Lord Monboddo, and the ancient Epicurean Philosophers. The latter but represent the human kind originally placed in the condition of brutes; the former seem careful to provide that it should never rise above that condition.

As it may be matter of curiosity to know in what manner these writers endeavour to explain the transition from mere vocal sounds to articulate speech, it may be proper to subjoin here a specimen taken from one of them, by no means the least distinguished in the literary world, the Abbé De Condillac. He admits the operation to be extremely tedious; for that "the organ of speech, (in grown persons,) for want of early use, would be so inflexible that it could not articulate any other than a few simple sounds: *and the obstacles which prevented them from pronouncing others, would prevent them from suspecting that the voice was susceptible of any further variation.*" Now it may be fairly asked, would not these obstacles for ever prevent any articulations, or even sounds, beyond those which the passions might excite, or other sounds suggest? How is this difficulty, which has been fairly admitted by the author, to be removed? He shall answer for himself. The child, from the pliancy of its vocal organs, being freed from the obstructions which incapacitated the parent, will accidentally fall upon new articulations in the endeavour to communicate its desire for a particular object; the parent will endeavour to imitate this sound, and affix it as a name to the object, for the purpose of communicating with the child: and thus, by repeated enlargements of

articulation in successive generations, language would at length be produced [a].

Such is the solution of the origin of language which human philosophy presents; sending us to the accidental babble of

[a] It should be remarked, that, were even all that is here contended for admitted to be practicable, language in the true sense of the word is not yet attained. The power of designating an individual object by an appropriate articulation, is a necessary step in the formation of language, but very far removed, indeed, from its consummation. Without the use of general signs, the speech of man would differ little from that of brutes; and the transition to the general term from the name of the individual is a difficulty which remains still to be surmounted. Condillac, indeed, proposes to show how this transition may be made, in the natural course of things, "Un enfant appelle du nom *d'Arbre* le premier arbre que nous lui montrons. Un second arbre qu'il voit ensuite lui rappelle la même idée; il lui donne le même nom; de même à un troisième, à un quatrième, et voilà la mot *d'Arbre* donné d'abord à un individu, qui devient pour lui un nom de classe ou de genre, une idée abstraite qui comprend tous les arbres en général." In like manner Adam Smith, in his *Dissertation on the Origin of Languages*, and Mr. Dugald Stewart, in his *Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind*, endeavour to explain this process; representing those words which were originally used as the proper names of individuals, to be successively transferred to other individuals, until, at length, each of them became insensibly the common name of a multitude. This, however, is more ingenious than solid. The name given to an individual being intended exclusively to designate that individual, it is a direct subversion of its very nature and design to apply it to any other individual, known to be different from the former. The child, it is true, may give the name of *father* to an individual like to the person it has been taught to call by that name: but this is from mistake, not from design; from a confusion of the two as the same person, and not from a perception of resemblance between them whilst known to be different. In truth, they whose thoughts are occupied solely about individual objects, must be the more careful to distinguish them from each other; and, accordingly, the child will most peremptorily retract the appellation of *father*, so soon as the distinctness is observed. The object with those, whose terms or signs refer only to individuals, must naturally be to take care that every such term or sign shall be applied to its appropriate individual, and to none else. Resemblance can produce no other effect than to enforce a greater caution in the application of the individual names, and therefore has no natural tendency to lead the mind to the use of general terms. It may be thought, indeed, that the idea of *number*, attaching to individuals of a similar appearance, might naturally lead to some general designation, whereby the aggregate of those individuals might be marked out. But it should be recollected, that the very notion of number, which seems one of the commonest and most familiar to the mind, does itself presuppose a class; since objects cannot be enumerated, unless previously referred to some one genus or class, or, which is the same thing, unless they are previously expressed by some common sign. Since, then, mere *resemblance* will not lead to the use of general terms; and since the notion of *number* actually presupposes the existence of general terms; it follows, that the transition from proper names to general terms cannot be accounted for in the way in which these writers have endeavoured to explain it.

infancy for the origination of that, which, it confesses, must exceed the power of the imagination to invent, and of the organs of the man to accomplish: inverting the order of nature, by supposing the adult to learn the art of speech by imitation of the nursling; and, in addition to all, building upon the gratuitous assumption, that the child could utter articulations undirected by any pre-existing model.—On such reasoning it cannot be necessary to enlarge.

Besides, to all those theories which maintain the human invention of language the test of experience may fairly be applied. We may safely challenge their authors to produce in their support a single *fact;* a single instance, in the whole range of history, of any human creature ever using articulate sounds as the signs of ideas, unless *taught*, either immediately and at once by God, or gradually by those who had been themselves instructed. That there have been instances of persons, who, possessing all the natural powers of mind and body, yet remained destitute of speech from the want of an instructor, there can be no question. Diodorus Siculus (lib. iii. § 19. p. 187. tom. 1. *Wessel.*) informs us of an entire nation wanting the use of speech, and communicating only by signs and gestures. But, not to urge so extraordinary a fact, Lord Monboddo himself, in his first volume, furnishes several well attested instances; and relates particularly the case of a savage, who was caught in the woods of Hanover, and who, though by no means deficient either in his mental powers or bodily organs, was yet utterly incapable of speech. Had man then been left solely to the operation of his own natural powers, it is incumbent upon these writers to show, that his condition would have differed as to speech from that of the Hanoverian savage.

As for those writers who admit the Mosaic account, and yet attribute to Adam the formation of language unassisted by divine instruction, they seem to entertain a notion more incomprehensible than the former; inasmuch as the first exercise of language by the father of mankind is stated to have preceded the production of Eve, and cannot, consistently

with the Scripture account, be supposed to have been long subsequent to his own creation. So that, according to these theorists, he must have devised a medium of communication, before any human being existed with whom to communicate: he must have been able to apply an organ unexercised, and inflexible, to the arduous and delicate work of articulation; and he must at once have attained the use of words, without those multiplied preparatory experiments and concurring aids, which seem on all hands admitted to be indispensable to the discovery and production of speech.

To remedy some of these difficulties, it has been said, that the faculty of speech was made as natural to man as his reason, and that the use of language was the necessary result of his constitution. If by this were meant, that man spoke as necessarily as he breathed, the notion of an innate language must be allowed; and then the experiment of the Egyptian king to discover the primitive language of man must be confessed to have had its foundation in nature; but if it be merely meant, that man was by nature invested with the powers of speech, and by his condition, his relations, and his wants, impelled to the exercise of these powers, the difficulty returns, and all the obstacles already enumerated oppose themselves to the discovery of those powers, and to the means by which he was enabled to bring them into actual exertion. It may perhaps add strength to the observations already made upon this subject, to remark, that the author, who has maintained this last-mentioned theory, and whose work, as containing the ablest and most laborious examination of the question, has been crowned with a prize by the Academy of Berlin, and has been honoured with the general applause of the continental literati, has utterly failed, and is admitted to have failed, in that which is the grand difficulty of the question. For, whilst he enlarges on the intelligent and social qualities of man, all fitting him for the use of language, he is obliged to leave totally unexplained the transition from that state which thus prepares man for language, to the actual exercise of the organs of speech. (See the ac-

count given of the Essay of Herder on the origin of language, in *Nouveaux Mémoires de l'Acad. Roy. &c. de Berlin*, 1771 —and again an Analysis of that work by M. Merian, in the vol. of the same *Mémoires* for the year 1781.) Enough, perhaps more than enough, has been said in answer to those theories and objections, which have been raised in opposition to that which Scripture[a] so obviously and unequivocally asserts,—namely, the *divine institution of language*.

It is not necessary to the purpose of this Number, nor does Scripture require us, to suppose with Stillingfleet (*Orig. Sac.* B. i. cap. i. § 3) and with Bochart (*Hieroz.* P. i. L. i. cap. 9) that Adam was endued with a full and perfect knowledge of the several creatures, so as to impose names truly expressive of their natures. It is sufficient, if we suppose the *use of language* taught him with respect to such things as were necessary, and that he was then left to the exercise of his

[a] In addition to the proof which has been already derived from this source, it should be remembered, that the laws given by God to the first pair respecting food for their preservation, (Gen. i. 29; ii. 9,) and marriage for the propagation of their species, (Gen. ii. 22, 23,) together with the other discoveries of his will recorded in the beginning of Genesis, (i. 28; ii. 16—19; iii. 8—12. 14—22,) were communicated through the medium of language; and that the man and the woman are there expressly stated to have conversed with God, and with each other. Besides, in what sense could it be said that a meet companion for the man was formed, if there were not given to both the power of communicating their thoughts by appropriate speech? If God pronounced it *not good for man to be alone*; if, with multitudes of creatures surrounding him, he was still deemed to be *alone*, because there was none of these with which he could commune in rational correspondence; if a companion was assigned to him whose society was to rescue him from this solitude; what can be inferred, but that the indispensable requisite for such society, the powers and exercise of speech, must have been at the same time vouchsafed?

It should be recollected, too, that this is not the only instance recorded in Scripture of the instantaneous communication of language. The diversity of tongues occasioning the confusion of Babel, and the miraculous gift of speech to the apostles on the day of Pentecost, may render a similar exercise of divine power in the case of our first parents more readily admissible: for it surely will not be contended, that such supernatural interference was less called for from the nature of the occasion, in the last-named instance, than in either of the two former.

The writer of Ecclesiasticus pronounces decisively on the subject of this Number. When *the Lord created man*, he affirms that, having bestowed upon him the *five operations of the Lord, in the sixth place he imparted to him understanding: and in the seventh, speech, an interpretation of the cogitations thereof.*—Ecclus. xvii. 5.

own faculties for farther improvement upon this foundation. But that the terms of worship and adoration were among those which were first communicated, we can entertain little doubt. On the subject discussed in this Number, the reader may consult *Morinus, Exercit. de Ling.* cap. vi. *Buxtorfii Dissertat.* p. 1—20. *Walton, Prol.* 1. § 4. *Warburt. Div. Leg.* B. iv. S. iv. vol. ii. pp. 81, 82. *Delan. Rev. Exam.* Diss. 4. *Winder's Hist. of Knowledge*, chap. i. § 2. *Barrington's Misc. Sacr.* vol. iii. pp. 8. 45. *Dr. Beattie*, and *Wollaston*, as referred to: and, above all, *Dr. Ellis's Enquiry whence cometh Wisdom, &c.*, which, together with his work entitled *Knowledge of divine Things from Revelation*, is too little known, and cannot be too strongly recommended. The former of these tracts of Dr. Ellis I have never met with, but as bound up in the collection of Tracts, entitled THE SCHOLAR ARMED.

NO. LIV.—ON THE NATURAL UNREASONABLENESS OF THE SACRIFICIAL RITE.

PAGE 30. (e).—Outram states (*De Sac.* lib. ii. cap. i. § 3) that the force of this consideration was in itself so great, as to compel Grotius, who defended the notion of the human institution of sacrifices, to maintain, in defiance of all just criticism, that Abel did not slay the firstlings of his flock; and that no more is meant, than that he brought the *choicest produce* of his flock, milk and wool, and offered them, as Cain offered the choicest of his fruits.

Indeed the *natural* unfitness of the sacrificial rite to obtain the divine favour, the total incongruity between the killing of God's creatures, and the receiving a pardon for the violation of God's law, are topics which have afforded the opponents of the divine institution of sacrifice too much occasion for triumph, to be controverted on their side of the question. See *Philemon to Hydaspes*, part 5, p. 10—15. The words of Spencer on this subject are too remarkable to be omitted: "Sacrificiorum materia (pecudum caro, sanguis effusus, &c.)

tam vilis est, et a summâ Dei majestate tam longe dissita, quod nemo (nisi plane simplex et rerum rudis) quin sacrificia plane superflua, Deoque prorsus indigna facile judicaret. Sane tantum aberat, ut ethnici paulo humaniores sacrificia deorum suorum naturæ consentanea crederent, quod iis non raro mirari subiit, UNDE RITUS TAM TRISTIS, ET A NATURA DEORUM ALIENUS, IN HOMINUM CORDA VENIRET, SE TAM LONGE PROPAGARET, ET EORUM MORIBUS TAM TENACITER ADHÆRERET." *De Leg. Heb.* lib. iii. diss. ii. cap. 4. sect. 2. p. 772.—Revelation would have removed the wonder.

LV.—ON THE UNIVERSALITY OF SACRIFICE.

PAGE 30. (f).—What Dr. Kennicott has remarked upon another subject, may well be applied to this. "Whatever custom has prevailed over the world, among nations the most opposite in polity and customs in general: nations not united by commerce or communication, (when that custom has nothing in nature, or the reason of things, to give it birth, and to establish to itself such a currency,) must be derived from some revelation: which revelation may in certain places have been forgotten, though the custom introduced by and founded on such revelation still continued. And farther, this revelation must have been made antecedent to the dispersion of Babel, when all mankind, being but one nation, and living together in the form of one large family, were of one language, and governed by the same laws and customs." (*Two Dissert.* p. 161.) For, as Sir Isaac Newton observes, all mankind lived together in Chaldea under the government of Noah and his sons, until the days of Peleg. So long they were of one language, one society, and one religion. And then they divided the earth, being forced to leave off building the tower of Babel. And from thence they spread themselves into the several countries which fell to their shares, carrying along with them the laws, customs, and religion, under which they had till those days been educated and governed. (*Chronol.* p. 186.)

And again, as Kennicott observes from Delaney, whatever practice has obtained universally in the world, must have obtained from some dictate of *reason*, or some demand of *nature*, or some principle of *interest*, or else from some powerful influence or injunction of some Being of *universal authority*. Now, the practice of animal sacrifice did not obtain from *reason;* for no reasonable notions of God could teach men, that he could delight in blood, or in the fat of slain beasts. Nor will any man say, that we have any natural *instinct* to gratify, in spilling the blood of an innocent creature. Nor could there be any temptation from appetite to do this in those ages, when the whole sacrifice was consumed by fire; or when, if it was not, yet men wholly abstained from flesh: and, consequently, this practice did not owe its origin to any principle of *interest*. Nay, so far from any thing of this, that the destruction of innocent and useful creatures is evidently *against nature*, *against reason*, and *against interest;* and therefore must be founded in an *authority*, whose influence was as powerful, as the practice was universal: and that could be none but the authority of God, the sovereign of the world; or of Adam, the founder of the human race. If it be said of Adam, the question still remains, what motive determined *him* to the practice? It could not be nature, reason, or interest, as has been already shewn; it must, therefore, have been the authority of his Sovereign: and had Adam enjoined it to his posterity, it is not to be imagined, that they would have obeyed him in so extraordinary and expensive a rite, from any other motive than the command of God. If it be urged, that superstitions prevail unaccountably in the world; it may be answered, that all superstition has its origin in true religion: all superstition is an abuse: and all abuse supposes a right and proper use. And if this be the case in superstitious practices that are of lesser moment and extent, what shall be said of a practice existing through all ages, and pervading every nation? See *Kennic. Two Diss.* pp. 210, 211, and *Rev. Exam.* Diss. viii. pp. 85—89.

It is to no purpose, that theorists endeavour to explain the practice as of gradual growth; the first offerings being merely of fruits, and a transition afterwards made from this to animal sacrifice. Not to urge the sacrifice of Abel, and all the early sacrifices recorded in Scripture, the transition is itself inconceivable. The two things are *toto cœlo* different: the one being an act of innocence; the other a cruel and unnatural rite. Dr. Ritchie's remarks on the subject of this Number are particularly worthy of attention. *Essay on the Rectitude of Divine Moral Government under the Patriarchal Dispensation*, § 53, 54.

NO. LVI.—ON THE UNIVERSALITY OF THE NOTION OF THE EXPIATORY VIRTUE OF SACRIFICE.

PAGE 30. (g).—It is notorious, as we have already seen in Numbers V. and XXXIII., that all nations, Jews and Heathens, before the time of Christ, entertained the notion, that the displeasure of the offended Deity was to be averted by the sacrifice of an animal; and that, to the shedding of its blood, they imputed their pardon[a] and reconciliation. In the explication of so strange a notion, and of the universality of its extent, unassisted reason must confess itself totally confounded. And, accordingly, we find Pythagoras, Plato, Porphyry, and other reflecting heathens, express their wonder, *how*[b] an institution so dismal, and big with absurdity, could have spread through the world.

So powerful is the inference, which this fact consequently supplies, against the human invention of sacrifice, that Dr. Priestley, labouring to support that doctrine, and, at the same time, pressed by the force of the argument, has been obliged boldly to face about, and resolutely deny the fact; contending, in defiance, as we have already shewn, of all historical evidence, that the notion of expiating guilt by the death of the victim, was not the design of sacrifice, either among the

[a] See on this also *Stanhope*, Serm. xiii. *Boyle Lect.* vol. i. pp. 790. 794.

[b] See *Kennic. Two Dissert.* p. 202, and Number. LIV. of this work.

nations of antiquity, or among such as have practised sacrifice in later times. This idea Dr. Priestley considers too absurd for heathens. Christians alone, excepting that description who have proved themselves on this head as enlightened as heathens, could have swallowed such monstrous absurdities. If, however, the *fact* appears to be against Dr. Priestley, what follows from his reasoning? A *cruel*, *expensive*, and *unnatural* practice has been adopted, and uniformly pursued, by the unaided reason of mankind for above 4000 years. It remains then for him, and the other advocates for the strength and sufficiency of human reason, to consider, whether it be that sort of guide, on which implicit reliance is to be placed; and whether it be wise to entrust to its *sole* direction our everlasting concerns.

NO. LVII.—ON THE OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE SUPPOSITION OF THE DIVINE INSTITUTION OF SACRIFICE.

PAGE 32. (b).—The principal objections to this opinion are derived from the two following considerations: 1. The silence of the sacred historian on this head; which, in a matter of so great importance, it is said, is irreconcileable with the supposition of a divine command: 2. Those passages in the Old Testament, in which God seems openly to disown the institution of sacrifice.

I. The former is thus urged by Bishop Warburton. "The two capital observances, in the Jewish ritual, were the SABBATH, and SACRIFICES. To impress the highest reverence and veneration on the *sabbath*, the sacred historian is careful to record its divine original: and can we suppose that, had sacrifices had the same original, he would have neglected to establish this truth, at the time that he recorded the other, since it is of equal use, and of equal importance; I should have said, indeed, of much greater?" (*Div. Leg.* B. ix. ch. ii. vol. 4, pp. 661, 662, ed. Hurd.)

To this it may be answered, that though the distinction of weeks was well known over all the eastern world, it is highly

probable, that the Hebrews, during their residence in Egypt, were negligent in their observance of the sabbath; and that, to enforce a religious observance of it, it had become necessary to give them particular information of the time and occasion of its first institution; but that, in a country like Egypt, the people being in little danger of losing their veneration for *sacrifices*, the same necessity for directing their attention explicitly to *their* institution did not exist. The observation of Dr. Delaney also deserves to be noticed; namely, that as the rite of sacrifice was loaded with many additional ceremonies, at its second institution, under Moses, in order to guard the Jews from the infections of the heathen, it might have been wisely designed by their lawgiver not to recall their attention to its original simplicity, lest they should be tempted to murmur and rebel against their own multifarious ritual. *Rev. Exam.* Diss. viii. vol. i. p. 94.

But, perhaps, an answer yet more satisfactory may be derived from considering the manner in which the history of the first ages of the world has been sketched by the sacred penman. The rapid view he takes of the antediluvian world, (having devoted but a few chapters to the important and interesting concerns of the creation, the fall, and the transactions of all those years that preceded the flood,) necessarily precluded a circumstantial detail. Accordingly, we find several matters of no small moment connected with that early period, and also with the ages immediately succeeding, entirely omitted, which are related by other sacred writers. Thus Peter and Jude inform us of the angels that fell from their first estate, and are reserved in everlasting chains; of a prophecy delivered by Enoch to those of his days; of the preaching of righteousness by Noah; and of the vexation which the righteous soul of Lot daily experienced, from the unlawful deeds of those with whom he lived. (2 *Pet.* ii. 4, 5. 7, 8, and *Jude* 6. 14, 15.) None of these things are mentioned by Moses: and even such matters as he has deemed of sufficient consequence to notice, he introduces only as they may be connected with the direct historic line which he

holds in view; and, whilst hastening on to those nearer events on which it was necessary for him to enlarge, he touches on other affairs, however important, but as they incidentally arise. In this way, the first mention of sacrifice is evidently introduced; not for the purpose of giving a formal history of the rite, of explaining *how* or *when* it was instituted, in which case a formal account of its origin might have been expected; but merely as an occasional relation, in the history of the transfer of the seniority, or right of primogeniture, and so the parentage of the Messiah, from Cain into a younger line, which, according to Kennicott, was a thing absolutely necessary to be known; and also, probably, of the ruinous effects of the fall, in the effervescence of that wicked and malicious spirit, which made its first baleful display in the murder of Abel. The silence, then, of the historian, as to the divine institution of sacrifice, furnishes no argument against it. See *Kenn. Two Diss.* p. 211. *Wits. Misc. Sac.* Lib. ii. Diss. ii. § 2; also *Richie's Pecul. Doct.* vol. i. p. 136.

But then, according to the Bishop's reasoning, the relation given by Moses of the institution of the *sabbath* justifies the expectation, that, had *sacrifice* arisen from the divine command, *its* origin would likewise have been recorded. But in what way is the divine appointment of the sabbath recorded? Is it any where asserted by Moses, that God had ordered Adam and his posterity to dedicate every seventh day to holy uses, and to the worship of his name; or that they ever did so, in observance of any such command? No such thing. It is merely said, that, having rested from the work of creation, *God blessed the seventh day, and sanctified it.* Now, so far is this passage from being universally admitted to imply a command for the sacred observance of the sabbath, that some have altogether denied the sabbath to have been instituted by divine appointment: and the fathers in general, and especially Justin Martyr, have been considered as totally rejecting the notion of a patriarchal sabbath. But although, especially after the very able and learned investigation of this subject by Dr. Kennicott in the second of his *Two Dissert-*

ations, no doubt can reasonably be entertained of the import of this passage, as relating the divine institution of the sabbath, yet still the rapidity of the historian has left this rather as matter of inference: and it is certain, that he has nowhere made *express* mention of the observance of a sabbath until the time of Moses.

Indeed it may be a question, whether, considering accurately the passage which describes the sacrifices of Cain and Abel, and the circumstances attending them, it does not in itself furnish sufficiently strong ground to infer the divine appointment of sacrifice. The familiar manner in which the mention of this sacrifice is introduced, joined to the peculiar force of the words מִקֵּץ יָמִים, (which, as Kennicott, supported by Fagius, shows, ought not to be translated, generally, *in process of time*, but *at the close of the appointed season*,) seems to indicate a *prior* and *stated* observance of this rite; and the manifest acceptance of Abel's sacrifice by God evinces an approbation of that pre-existing practice, which can leave little doubt respecting the source of its institution. And this advantage the case of sacrifice clearly possesses over that of the sabbath; namely, that in the patriarchal history we have repeated and explicit accounts of the continuance of the former, whilst the notices of the sabbatical observance, antecedently to the Mosaic dispensation, are obscure and infrequent. Now, were we to argue rigidly against the *continued* observance of the sabbath, from its not having been expressly recorded, we might contend, as has been already hinted, for the necessity of a more explicit statement of its divine origin in the time of Moses; whilst the unbroken tradition and uninterrupted practice of sacrifice, (a thing controverted by none that I know of, except Lord Barrington in his *Miscellanea Sacra*, vol. iii. Diss. ii. cor. 3, and by him upon grounds rather fanciful and refined,) might render it less necessary for Moses to be particular on this head.

But, in truth, the silence of the historian respecting either the sabbatical or sacrificial observance is but of little weight,

when there are circumstances in the history, from which the practice may be collected. The very notoriety of a custom may be a reason, why the historian may omit the mention of its continuance. Of this Dr. Kennicott states a striking exemplification in the case of circumcision, which, though constantly observed by the Israelites, is yet never once mentioned in the sacred history as having been practised in a single instance, from the settling of the Israelites in Canaan, down to the circumcision of our blessed Saviour; that is, for a space of one thousand four hundred and fifty years. And even of the observance of the sabbath itself, we find not one instance recorded, in any of the six books that follow the Mosaic code. What is thus applied to the continuance, will equally hold for the origin of a custom.

II. The second objection, derived from passages in the Old Testament in which God seems to disown the institution of sacrifice, is to be replied to by an examination of those passages. In the fiftieth Psalm God is described as saying, *I will not reprove thee for thy sacrifices, or thy burnt-offerings —I will take no bullock,* &c.—*Will I eat the flesh of bulls, or drink the blood of goats?*—And again in Ps. li. *Thou desirest not sacrifice—thou delightest not in burnt-offerings.*— And again in Ps. xl. *Burnt-offerings and sin-offerings hast thou not required.* Sacrifices here, it is said, are spoken of as not pleasing to God. But it is manifest, on an inspection of the context, that this is only intended in a *comparative* sense, and as abstracting from those concomitants, without which sacrifice never could have been acceptable to a holy and righteous God. This is farther confirmed by the manner in which similar declarations are introduced, in Isai. i. 11, 12; lxvi. 3; Prov. xv. 8; and Amos, v. 21, 22. If the argument be carried farther, it will prove too much; it will prove, in direct contradiction to the testimony of Moses, that the *Jewish* sacrifices had not been ordained by God. These passages, then, from the Psalms must go for nothing in the present argument.

But, then, it is said that the prophet Jeremiah (vii. 22)

furnishes a decisive proof in these words,—*For I spake not unto your fathers, nor commanded them, in the day that I brought them out of the land of Egypt, concerning burnt-offerings or sacrifices.* This, it is urged, as referring expressly to a time prior to the giving of the law at Mount Sinai, clearly proves that God did not institute sacrifices before the promulgation of the law by Moses. But this, like the former passages, is manifestly to be understood in a comparative sense only; as may easily be collected from what immediately follows: *But this thing I commanded them, saying, Obey my voice, and I will be your God, and ye shall be my people;* that is, 'The mere sacrifice was not that which I commanded, so much as that which was to give to the sacrifice its true virtue and efficacy, a sincere and pious submission to my will;' *to obey being* BETTER THAN *sacrifice, and to hearken than the fat of rams.* (1 Sam. xv. 22.) In like manner,—*I will have mercy, and* NOT *sacrifice.* (Hos. vi. 6.) *Rend your hearts, and* NOT *your garments.* (Joel ii. 13.) *Your murmurings are* NOT *against us, but against the Lord.* (Ex. xvi. 8.) *Labour* NOT *for the meat that perisheth, but for the meat which endureth to everlasting life.* (Joh. vi. 27.) The Scripture abounds with similar instances, in which the negative form supplies the want of the comparative degree in the Hebrew idiom: not excluding the thing denied, but only implying a preference of the thing set in opposition to it[a].

Dr. Blayney, indeed, thinks it not necessary to consider the words of Jeremiah in a comparative sense. The word כִּי, he says, admitting the sense of *propter*, the passage should be read, *I spake not with your fathers, nor commanded them,* FOR THE SAKE OF *burnt offerings*, &c.; that is, God did not command these purely on their own account, but as a means to some other valuable end. The sense is substantially the same. Now, if the passage be not taken in this sense, but

[a] See *Walt. Polyglot.* Proleg. Idiotism. 6. *Lowth* on Hos. vi. 6. *Mede*, p. 352. *Ken. Two Diss.* pp. 208, 209; and *Jenn. Jew. Ant.* vol. i. p. 313.

be supposed to imply, that God had not instituted sacrifices at the time of the departure of the Hebrews from Egypt, then a direct contradiction is given to the Mosaic History, which expressly declares, that God himself had ordained the slaying of the paschal lamb, not only before the giving of the law at Sinai, but before the migration of the Israelites from Egypt. And that this was really a sacrifice, and is repeatedly called by Moses by the very same term זבח, which is here applied to denote sacrifice by the prophet, has been already fully shown in Number XXXV. of this work.

Or, again, if we concur in the interpretation of this passage, as given by the Jewish doctors, Jarchi and Maimonides, and adopted by Dr. Kennicott, we may consider it as a declaration on the part of God, that he had not first commanded the Israelites concerning the sacrificial rites, after he had led them out of Egypt. The passage in Jeremiah, say they, refers to the transaction at Marah. (See particularly *Kenn. Two Diss.* pp. 153. 209.) The Jews, when they had arrived here, three days after they had left the Red Sea, murmured at the bitterness of the waters: a miracle was wrought to sweeten them; and then God made a statute and ordinance for them, and proposed to them, in exact agreement with what is here said in Jeremiah, to obey him, to give ear to his commandments, and keep his statutes, and that he would in turn be their protector. (Ex. xv. 25, 26.) Now, this having been some time before the formal institution of the sacrificial rite at Mount Sinai, and the Jews having always dated the beginning of the law from this declaration at Marah, the Jewish doctors maintain it to be true in fact, that God did not *first* enjoin their code of sacrificial observances, but commanded them concerning moral obedience: and thus they understand the form of expression in Jeremiah, as we do that of St. Paul, *Adam was* NOT *deceived, but the woman being deceived was in the transgression* (1 Tim. ii. 14); that is, Adam was not first deceived, and was not first in the transgression, but Eve. The meaning of the passage in Jeremiah would then be, that as God had not, in the first in-

stance, enjoined to the Jews their sacrificial ritual, after he had led them out of Egypt; so they were not to attach to the observance of all its *minutiæ* a superiority over moral obedience, but the contrary, the latter having been first commanded [a]. This explanation agrees in substance with the former: and from both it manifestly appears, that this passage has no relation to the *original institution* of animal sacrifice.

The whole of this subject is fully and ably treated by Mede, who sums up his entire argument in these words. "According to one of these three senses, are all passages in the Old Testament disparaging and rejecting sacrifices literally to be understood: namely, when men preferred them before the greater things of the Law; valued them out of their degree, as an *antecedent duty;* or placed their efficacy in the naked rite, as if aught accrued to God thereby; God would no longer own them for any ordinance of his; nor, indeed, in that disguise put upon them, were they." *Mede's Works*, pp. 352, 353.

NO. LVIII.—ON THE SACRIFICE OF ABEL, AS EVINCING THE DIVINE INSTITUTION OF SACRIFICE.

PAGE 32. (c).—Hallet considers this single fact as supplying so strong an argument on the present question, that he does not hesitate to pronounce it, a *demonstration* of a divine institution. "For," he says, "Abel's sacrifice could not have been acceptable, if it had not been of divine appointment, according to that obvious maxim of all true religion, *In vain do they worship God, teaching for doctrines the commandments of men.* (Mark vii. 7.) Thus Abel must have worshipped God in vain, had his sacrificing been merely a commandment of his father Adam, or an invention of his own. And, to make this matter more evident, why do we not now

[a] See *Maim. Moreh. Nev.* part iii. cap. 32. ap. fin. — *Kennicott's Two Diss.* pp. 153. 209.—and *Jenn. Jew. Ant.* vol. i. p. 312.

offer up a bullock, a sheep, or a pigeon, as a thank-offering after any remarkable deliverance, or as an evidence of our apprehensions of the demerit of sin? The true reason is, because we cannot know that God will accept such *will-worship*, and so conclude that we should herein worship God in vain. As Abel, then, did not sacrifice in vain, it was not *will-worship*, but a divine appointment. To this, the want of a *right* to slay animals before the flood, unless conferred by God for this very purpose of sacrifice, gives yet farther confirmation." *Hallet* on Hebr. xi. 4.

Dr. Richie remarks, that the *divine acceptance* is not confined to the sacrifice of Abel, but that we find it extended also to others offered under the patriarchal dispensation. Thus, God is said to have *smelled a sweet savour* (a strong expression of his acceptance) when Noah offered his burnt-offering. Job's care, likewise, to offer burnt-offerings for his children, is mentioned as an eminent effect of piety, and with particular marks of approbation. (Job, ch. i.) And the honourable mention, which is made of the sacrifices offered by other pious men in this period of the world, leaves no room to doubt of their having been likewise graciously accepted by God. It is, moreover, to be observed, that the oblation of some of those early sacrifices was expressly ordered by God himself; as the burnt-offering of Abraham, (Gen. xxii.,) and those which were offered by the three friends of Job. (Job, xlii.) Now, that it is more natural to think, that God would *order* and *accept of* the performance of a mode of worship which had been instituted by himself, than that he would thus countenance one which had been the product of mere human invention, is a thing which will not bear much dispute. See *Dr. Richie's Pec. Doct.* vol. i. pp. 149, 150. Indeed, whoever wishes to see the subject of the divine institution of sacrifices satisfactorily treated, may consult the last-named work, p. 136—151, to great advantage. See also *Barrington's Misc. Sac.* vol. iii. p. 67—71; and *Heideg. Hist. Patr. Exercit.* iii. § 52, 53. tom. i.

This last-mentioned writer considers the ἐμπυρισμὸς, or the

burning of the sacrifice by fire from heaven, a decisive proof of a divine institution: and that the patriarchs were favoured with this infallible sign of the divine acceptance of their sacrifices, the language of Scripture, he thinks, leaves us no room to doubt. That it was by this sign that it was known that the sacrifice of Abel was accepted, is the almost unanimous opinion of the fathers. And in this the Jewish doctors concur: as see *Aben Ezra* and *Jarchi* on Gen. iv. 4. Theodotion translates the verb in this verse, ἐνεπύρισεν: a translation with which even Julian was satisfied.

It is certain that this manifestation of the divine power was vouchsafed in later times. The sacrifice of Abraham, Gen. xv. 17, supplies a striking instance of it. And if Shuckford's reading of בער (to kindle) instead of עבר (to pass) be admitted, this passage becomes in itself decisive of the point. (*Connection*, &c., vol. i. p. 298.) But if we look to the period *under the law*, we shall find *this* the usual method [a] of signifying the divine acceptance of the sacrifice. Hence, to *accept* a burnt sacrifice, is called in the Hebrew, Ps. xx. 3, to *turn it into ashes*. The relics of this are to be found even in the heathen traditions. Thus Servius on *Æn.* xii. 200, says, "Amongst the ancients fire was not lighted upon the altar, but by prayer they called down fire from heaven, which consumed the offering." From these, and other arguments not less forcible, every commentator of note had been led to pronounce in favour of the idea, that the acceptance of the sacrifice was testified, from the beginning, in the miraculous manner here described [b]. That the fire which consumed the sacrifice was a flame which issued from the *Shechinah*, or glorious visible presence of God, is the opinion of Lord Barrington: see *Miscell. Sacr.* vol. iii. Dissert. 2, "On God's visible presence." But be this as it may, the fact of this divine fire consuming the sacrifice seems to be established; and the inference from

[a] See Lev. ix. 24; Judg. vi. 21; 1 Kings, xviii. 38; 1 Chr. xxi. 26; 2 Chr. vii. 1, &c.

[b] See *Fagius, Frotius, Le Clerc, Ainsw., Patrick, Jameson, Dathe, Rosenmüller*, &c., on Gen. iv. 4.

this fact in favour of the divine institution of sacrifice cannot easily be overturned.

NO. LIX.—ON THE HISTORY AND THE BOOK OF JOB.

PAGE 32. [d].—There is no one part of the sacred volume which has more exercised the ingenuity of the learned, than the book of Job. Whether it contain a true history or a fabulous relation? If true, at what time and place Job lived? And what the date and author to be assigned to the work?—These are questions, which have given birth to opinions so various, and to controversies so involved, that to enumerate all, and to weigh their several merits, would far exceed the compass of the present work. But to take a brief review of the opinions of the *most distinguished* critics, and to elicit from contending arguments the probable result, whilst necessary to the subject of our present inquiry, cannot fail to furnish matter of interesting investigation.

I. On the first of the questions above stated, there have been three opinions: one, pronouncing the poem to be a real narrative: a second, holding it to be a mere fictitious relation, intended to instruct through the medium of parable: and the third, adopting an intermediate idea, and maintaining the work itself to be dramatic and allegorical, but founded upon the history of real characters and events.

Among the many distinguished names which support the first opinion, are to be reckoned, in later times, those of Spanheim, Sherlock, Schultens, Bishop Lowth, Peters, and Kennicott: to these, perhaps, may be added that of Grotius, who, though he contends that the work is a *poetic* representation, yet admits the subject to be matter of true history. In defence of this opinion, the work is considered as supplying strong intrinsic evidence; the general style and manner of the writer betraying nothing allegorical, but everywhere bespeaking a literal relation of actual events; entering into circumstantial details of habitation, kindred, and names; and

adhering with undeviating exactness to those manners and usages, which belong to the age and country of which it seems to treat. The reality of the person of Job is also attested by the prophet Ezekiel, who ranks him with two other real and illustrious characters; and by the apostle James, who proposes him as a character particular deserving of imitation. Concurrent traces of profane history, too, supply additional confirmation, as may be seen in Dr. Gray's account of the book of Job; so that, as this judicious writer properly observes, "it has every external sanction of authority, and is stamped with every intrinsic mark, that can characterize a genuine relation."

In direct opposition to this is the system of Maimonides; which, representing the whole as a parabolical and fictitious relation, has been adopted, successively, by Le Clerc and Michaelis. The arguments of the first of these writers have been fully replied to by Codurcus; those of the second, by Peters; and those of the last have received some judicious animadversions from the pens of Dr. Gray and Dr. Gregory. The arguments commonly urged in support of this hypothesis are derived from certain circumstances of intrinsic improbability: such as, the miraculous rapidity with which the calamities of Job succeeded; the escape of precisely one servant to bear the news of each disaster; the destruction of 7000 sheep, at once struck dead by lightning; the seven days' silence of the friends of Job; the highly figurative and *poetic* style of dialogue, which never could have taken place in actual conversation. These are what Peters calls the *little exceptions* of Le Clerc to the truth of the history: and might, *some* of them, deserve attention, were we neither to admit a supernatural agency in the transactions, nor a poetic rapidity in the narrative rejecting the consideration of unimportant particulars.

An objection, however, of greater moment, is derived from the conversation of Satan with the Almighty: and to this Michaelis adds others which he claims as his peculiar invention, deduced from the name of Job; from the artificial regu-

larity of the numbers; and from internal inconsistencies and contradictions. Of these last named, perhaps, the two former might well be ranked among the *little exceptions:* the derivation of the name of Job, from a word which signifies *repentance*, being at best but conjectural; and, even were it certain, making nothing against the reality of the persons; names having been frequently given, in ancient times, from circumstances which occurred at an advanced period of life; of which numerous instances appear in holy writ: and, as to the regularity of the numbers—the years of Job's life, his children, his sheep, his camels, his oxen, and his asses, being all told in round numbers, and all exactly doubled in the years of his prosperity—it is obvious to remark, that it would ill suit the fulness and elegance of poetic [a] narration to descend to the *minutiæ* of exact numeration; and that, as to the *precise duplication*, it is but a periphrasis growing out of the former enumeration, intended merely to express, that the Lord gave to Job twice as much as he had before.

The two remaining objections require more particular consideration. And first, as to the incredibility of the conversation, which is related to have taken place between the Almighty and Satan, it may be observed, that this, and the assemblage of the celestial intelligences before the throne of God, should be considered as poetical, or, as Peters with more propriety expresses it, *prophetical* personifications, in accommodation to our limited faculties, which are abundantly authorized by God himself in holy Scripture, and are perfectly agreeable to the style wherein his prophets have been frequently commanded to deliver the most solemn and important truths. Thus, the prophetic visions of Isaiah, (ch. vi.,) of Ezek., (ch. i.,) of St. Paul, (2 Cor. xii. 2. 4,) and of St. John, (Rev. iv. 1, 2,) represent the proceedings of Providence, in like reference to our powers and modes of conception: and the vision of Micaiah, (1 Kings, xxii. 19—23,) and that of

[a] The poem, perhaps, *strictly speaking*, may be said not to begin until the third chapter; that which precedes being narration. But the narration, agreeably to the lofty style of the East, is itself of poetical elevation.

Zechariah, (ii. 13; iii. 1,) supply cases precisely parallel in every respect. Farmer justly remarks on this subject, that such "visions, or parabolical representations, convey instruction as *truly* and properly, as if they were exact copies of outward objects."[a] And, indeed, if the introduction of Satan be admitted as an argument against the truth of the history, it should lead us equally to reject the narrative of our Lord's temptation, as an unfounded fiction. If, however, the opinion of Dathe (which has also the support of Herder, Eichhorn, and Doederlein) be well founded, all difficulty arising even from this circumstance is removed; inasmuch as THE EVIL SPIRIT is not, according to his interpretation, intended; but one of the angelic ministers, whose peculiar office it was to explore and try the real characters of men, and to distinguish the hypocrite from the sincerely pious.

The objection, derived from the internal inconsistencies and contradictions of the work, is thus stated by Michaelis. —Job, who could not have been advanced in years himself, upbraids his friends with their youth (xxx. i.): yet these very men exact reverence from Job as their junior, speaking of themselves as *aged men, much older than* his *father* (xv. 10); and are expressly described by Elihu (xxxii. 6, 7) as men to be respected for their hoary age. (*Notæ et Epimetra*, pp. 178, 179.) This argument Michaelis admits to be the grand strength of his cause, and to this Dr. Gregory's reply is satisfactory, so far as the meaning of the passage (xxx. 1) is concerned; in which there certainly appears no relation to the friends of Job, but merely a general complaint, bewailing the degraded state to which himself had fallen; and contrasting with that high respect which he had in former days experienced,—when even *the* AGED *arose and stood up, when princes refrained talking*, and *the nobles held their peace*,— his present abject condition, when even those that were

[a] *Enquiry into the Temptation*, p. 164—attend to this writer's observations,—also to *Chappel. Comment. præf.* p. xiv., and particularly to *Peters's Crit. Diss.* p. 113—122, and *Taylor's Scheme of Scr. Div.* ch. xxi.

YOUNGER than he, and who were of such mean descent, that he *would have disdained to have set their fathers with the dogs of his flock*, (by which he could not possibly have intended his three friends,) *now held him in derision*. But, I apprehend, Dr. Gregory's criticism on ch. xv. 10—namely, that by the words, *with us* (בנו), is meant, *with us in opinion* —is not at all supported by the genius of the Hebrew, nor by parallel usage. I think it is evident both from this and the passage, xxxii. 6, 7, that the friends of Job, or some of them, were aged. But in the true meaning of the word ישיש, which seems to have been hit off by Chappelow alone of all the commentators, we shall find a complete solution of the difficulty. This word, as Chappelow remarks, on Job, xii. 12, and xxxii. 6, does not merely imply *age*, but the *wisdom* which should accompany age. It may, perhaps, not improperly be expressed, in our language, by the single term *sage*. Taking the word in this sense, no inconsistency whatever appears: for then the thing denied by Job to his friends, in xii. 12, claimed by themselves in xv. 10, and ascribed to them by Elihu, in xxxii. 6, 7, will be, not length of years, but those fruits of wisdom, which years should have produced. It should also be noted, that in xv. 10, the words are in the singular number; so that, in strictness, no more than one amongst them is here spoken of, as advanced in age beyond the years of Job. Indeed, an inconsistency so gross and obvious, as this which is charged against the book of Job by the German Professor, cannot be other than seeming, and founded in some misapprehension of the meaning of the original. Even admitting the poem to be fabulous, he must have been a clumsy contriver, who could in one place describe his characters as young, and in another as extremely aged, when urged to it by no necessity whatever, and at full liberty to frame his narrative as he pleased. And this want of comprehension should least of all have been objected by those critics, who, in supposing the work to have been composed in an age and country different from those whose manners it professes to describe, are compelled, upon their own

hypothesis, to ascribe to the writer an uncommon portion of address and refinement.

But, supposing the narrative to have a foundation in truth, the *third* hypothesis, which represents this as wrought up into an allegorical drama, remains to be considered. This strange conceit was the invention of Warburton. He considers Job, his wife, and his three friends, as designed to personate the Jewish people on their return from the captivity, their idolatrous wives, and the three great enemies of the Jews at that period, Sanballat, Tobiah, and Geshem. This allegorical scheme has been followed by Garnet, with some variations, whereby the history of Job is ingeniously strained to a description of the Jewish sufferings, *during* the captivity. The whole of Warburton's system, "the improbabilities of which," as Peters observes, "are by no means glossed over by the elaborate reasoning and extravagant assertions of the learned writer," is fully examined and refuted by that ingenious author, in the first eight sections of his *Critical Dissertation.*

The arguments by which this extraordinary hypothesis has been supported are drawn from the highly poetic and figurative style of the work, whence it is inferred to be *dramatic;* and from the unsuitableness of particular actions and expressions to the real characters, which at the same time correspond to the persons whom these characters are supposed to represent, whence it is inferred to be *allegorical.* But, from the first nothing more can fairly be deduced, than that the writer has not given the precise words of the speakers, but has dressed out the dialogue with the ornaments of poetry, in a manner which, as Dathe truly tells us, is agreeable to the customs of the country in which the scene is laid: it being usual to represent the conferences of their wise men on philosophic questions, in the most elevated strain of poetic diction. (See *Dath.* on Job, ch. iii.) And as to the second, it cannot appear to a sober reader in any other light than that of a wild and arbitrary fancy. Bishop Lowth declares, that he has not been able to discover a single vestige of an allegorical meaning throughout the entire poem. It requires but

a sound understanding to be satisfied, that it has no such aspect. And, at all events, this strange hypothesis rests altogether upon another; namely, that the book was written in the age of those, to whom it is supposed to bear this allegorical application. If then, as we shall hereafter see, there be no just ground for assigning to the work so late a date, the whole of this airy fabric vanishes at once.

II. The history of Job appearing now, on the whole, to be a true relation, the second question comes to be considered, —In what *age*, and *country*, did he live? As to the place of Job's residence there seems to be little difficulty. Commentators are mostly agreed in fixing on Idumæa, a part of Arabia Petræa. Kennicott (*Remarks on Select Passages*, p. 152) considers Bishop Lowth as having completely proved this point. Codurcus had long before maintained the same opinion (*Præf. ad Job.*): and Dathe and the modern German commentators give it their support. The position of the land of Uz, (see Lam. iv. 21,) the residence of Job, and of the several places named as the habitations of his friends, seems to ascertain the point with sufficient precision. *Children of the East*, also, appears to be a denomination *applicable* to the inhabitants of that region, (see *Lowth*, *Prælect.* xxxii.,) and is even pronounced by Dathe to have been *appropriate*.

The only objection deserving notice, that can be raised against this supposition, is drawn from the great distance of Idumæa from the country of the Chaldeans, who, living on the borders of the Euphrates, could not easily have made depredations on the camels of Job. And this has been thought by some a sufficient cause for assigning to Job a situation in Arabia Deserta, and not far from the Euphrates. But, as Lowth replies, what should prevent the Chaldeans, as well as the Sabeans, a people addicted to rapine, and roving about at immense distances for the sake of plunder, from wandering through those defenceless regions, and pervading from Euphrates even to Egypt? And, on the other hand, what probability is there, that all the friends of Job, residing in and near Idumæa, should be instantly informed of all that

had happened to Job in the desert of Arabia, and on the confines of Chaldea, and repair thither immediately after the transaction? Shuckford's arguments concur with these of Lowth, and are fully satisfactory on this head. See *Connect.* B. vii. vol. ii. p. 138. See also *Gray* on the book of Job, note r[1]. The LXX likewise describe the land of Uz as situated in Idumæa: and Job himself they consider an Idumæan, and a descendant of Esau. (See Append. of the LXX.) The Mohammedan writers likewise inform us that he was of the race of Esau. See *Sale's Koran*, ch. 21. vol. ii. p. 162.

With respect to the *age* of Job, one thing seems generally admitted; namely, its remote antiquity. Even they who contend for the late production of the *book* of Job are compelled to acquiesce in this. Grotius thinks the events of the history are such, as cannot be placed later than the sojourning of the Israelites in the wilderness. *Præf. ad Job.* Warburton, in like manner, admits them to bear the marks of high antiquity: and Michaelis confesses the manners represented to be perfectly Abrahamic, such as were common to all the seed of Abraham, Israelites, Ishmaelites, and Idumæans. (*Not. et Epim.* p. 181.)

Some of the principal circumstances, from which the age of Job may be collected, are these which follow. 1. The general air of antiquity which is spread over the manners recorded in the poem, of which Michaelis, as above referred to, has given striking instances. 2. The length of Job's life, which seems to place him in the patriarchal times. 3. The allusions made by Job to that species of idolatry alone, which by general confession was the most ancient, and which, as Lowth observes, (*Lectures on Sacred Poetry*, Greg. ed. vol. ii. p. 355,) is a decisive mark of the patriarchal age. 4. The nature of the sacrifice offered by him in conformity to the divine command; namely, *seven* oxen and *seven* rams, similar to that of Balaam, and suitable to the respect entertained for the number seven in the earliest ages[a]. This, though, as Mr.

[a] See *Jablonski Panth. Ægypt. Proleg.* p. 53—59. *Univ. Hist.* B. iii. ch. xxxvii. sect. 3; also *Ains.* on Lev. iv. 6, and Numb. xxxiii. 1.

Henley observes, the ancient practice might have been continued in Idumæa after the promulgation of the Mosaic[a] law, is far from being, as he asserts, destitute of weight; inasmuch as the sacrifice was offered *by the command of God;* who, although he might be supposed graciously to accommodate himself to the prevailing customs, *before* the promulgation of the Law, yet cannot be imagined, *after* he had prescribed a certain mode of sacrifice to the Israelites, to sanction by his express authority, in a country immediately adjoining, a mode entirely different, and one which the Mosaic code was intended to supersede. 5. The language of Job and his friends, who, being all Idumæans, or at least Arabians of the adjacent country, yet converse in Hebrew. This carries us up to an age so early, as that in which all the posterity of Abraham, Israelites, Idumæans, and Arabians, yet continued to speak one common language, and had not branched into different dialects[b]. 6. Certain customs of the most remote antiquity are alluded to by Job. He speaks of the most ancient kind of writing, by *sculpture.* His riches also are reckoned by his cattle. And as to the word קשיטה, which is translated a *piece of money*, there seems good reason to understand it as signifying a *lamb.*

This word occurs but in two other parts of Scripture, Gen. xxxiii. 19, and Josh. xxiv. 32, and in both of these it is applied to the purchase of a piece of ground by Jacob, who is on that particular occasion represented as rich in flocks, and as driving with him large quantities of cattle: and, accordingly, the Targum of Onkelos, the LXX, Jerome, Pagninus, and the learned Jew Aben Ezra, have all of them rendered the word *lamb*, or *sheep.* In order to force the word to the signification of a piece of money, it has been pretended, that the coin bore the impress of a lamb. Upon this *conjecture*, and a passage in Acts, vii. 15, 16, which can give it no support, is the entire interpretation built[c]. Now the notion of a

[a] See Mr. Henley's note in *Dr. Gregory's translation of Lowth's Lectures*, vol. ii. p. 356.

[b] See *Lowth, de Sacr. Poes. Præl.* xxxii. p. 311; also *Gray* on Job, note a[a].

[c] See *Cocc. Lex.—Calas. Concord.—Drusius* and *Grotius*, and *Hodge's*

stamped coin, as Dathe remarks, (on Job, xlii. 11,) is inadmissible in an age so early as that of Jacob. The way of payment in silver in the time of Abraham we know to have been by weight, or shekels uncoined: and what authority have we to pronounce that stamped money was in use in the time of Jacob? The money which was put into the sacks of Joseph's brethren seems to have been the same as in the time of Abraham, being called צרורת כסף, strictly *bundles of silver;* (Gen. xlii. 35;) an expression not likely to be applied to *coined pieces* of money. And, indeed, no expression indicating such *pieces* of money, seems to occur in any of the early books of the Bible. *Junius* and *Tremellius* on Gen. xxxiii. 19[a], speak of *sheep*, as the ancient medium of traffic; and pronounce the word קשיטה to be peculiar to the Arabians and ancient Canaanites. This, and the remark of Codurcus, "that as *pecunia* was first called from *pecus*, so *Keschita*, which first signified *pecus*, was afterwards transferred to signify *pecunia*," tend to confirm our reasoning. For if a *sheep* was the most ancient medium of traffic, and was in the earliest times expressed by the word *Keschita*, whilst its subsequent transfer to denote *pecunia* is but conjectural, there can be but little difficulty as to the conclusion. See also an elaborate dissertation on the word by *Costard:* in which he shows, that the first stamping of money with any effigies was of a date several centuries later than the time of Jacob, not having been known before the time of Cyrus. (*Inquiry into the Meaning of the Word Kesitah*, p. 12, &c.) If this opinion be right, the point is decided. At all events it should be remembered, that, if *Keschita* must signify a piece of money, the only age, beside that of Job, in which

Elihu, on Job, xlii. 11; also *Hamm.* and *Whitby*, on Acts vii. 15, 16.

[a] *Geddes* in his *Critical Remarks* truly observes, on the word קשיטה in this passage, that "most interpreters, after the Sept., have understood it of *lambs*, more particularly *ewe-lambs*. So equivalently (he adds) all the ancient versions. Some have imagined (he says) that it was a piece of money with the figure of a lamb on it: which is highly improbable, as coined money is of a much later date."

we find the word applied in Scripture, is the age of Jacob. That no such coin was known of under the Mosaic dispensation, is shewn by Hodges, in his *Elihu*, p. 242. I have dwelt thus long upon the investigation of the true meaning of this word, as well because the interpretation of it, as a stamped *piece of money*, seems to have been too easily acquiesced in by commentators in general; as because I would not presume to differ from the received translation without the most careful examination.

From the above considerations, the great antiquity of Job seems to be an unavoidable consequence. To specify the exact time at which he lived, is a matter of greater difficulty, but of inferior importance. Eusebius places him before Moses two whole ages: and in this he concurs with the opinion of many of the Hebrew writers, who (as Selden observes) describe him as living in the days of Isaac and Jacob. That the judgment of the Eastern nations does not differ much from this, may be seen in *Hottinger's Smegma Orientale*, p. 381. (See *Patrick's Pref. to Job.*) Shuckford is of opinion that he was contemporary with Isaac. (*Connect.* B. vii. vol. ii. p. 127.) Spanheim (*Hist. Job*, cap. ix. p. 285) places him between the death of Joseph and the departure from Egypt. But whoever wishes to see the most probable, and satisfactory account, may consult the table of descent given by Kennicott, (*Remarks*, &c., p. 152,) in which Job is represented as contemporary with Amram, the father of Moses; Eliphaz the Temanite, who was the fifth from Abraham, being contemporary with both. Mr. Heath agrees with this account, in placing the death of Job about fourteen years before the Exodus.

III. The third and last question now comes to be considered; namely, what date, and author, are to be assigned to the *book* of Job. That the poem is as ancient as its subject, and that Job was not only the hero but the author of the work, is the opinion of many distinguished commentators. The objections brought against this opinion are derived from

marks of later times, which it is said are to be discerned in the work, and which are copiously summed up and largely insisted on by Mr. Heath.

1. It is urged, that there is frequent allusion to the laws of Moses.—On the directly opposite presumption it had been pronounced, that the book *could not* have been written at a late period, for the benefit of the Jews; inasmuch as there is not to be found in it, "one single word of the law of Moses, nor so much as one distant allusion to any rite or ceremony of the law."[a] The instances adduced by Heath, in support of his position, are taken from Job, iii. 19, and xli. 14, and xxxi. 28; the two first of which, in speaking of *manumission*, and *eternal servitude*, allude, as he says, to the law in Exod. xxi. 2—6, concerning the release of the Hebrew servant in the seventh year, and the ceremony of piercing the ear where an eternal servitude was consented to: and the third, in describing idolatry as *a crime to be punished by the judge*, must, as he thinks, relate to the Mosaic dispensation; the laws of the Mosaic polity being the only ones in the world which punished idolatry. (*Essay towards a New Version*, p. 129.) As to the two first instances, the resemblance is so imaginary, or, rather, so truly chimerical an idea, as not to deserve an answer: if the reader, however, wish to see one, he will find it in *Mich. Not. et Epim.* p. 189. To the third, which has also the authority of Warburton and Mr. Locke, it may be replied, that Scripture decides the point; as it informs us, that Abraham was called from Chaldea on account of the increase of idolatry, to raise a people for the preservation of the worship of the true God: so that the allusion to the exertion of judicial authority against idolatry, was most naturally to be expected from a descendant of this patriarch, and, it may be added, from one not far removed. See *Lowth's Lectures, &c.*, Greg. ed. vol. ii. pp. 354, 355; also *Michael. Not. et Epim.* p. 190; and espe-

[a] See *Sherlock's Use of Proph.* Diss. ii. p. 207; see also *Lowth, Prælect.* xxxii. p. 312.

cially *Peters, Crit. Diss. pref.* pp. iii—xii., where this point receives the most ample examination.

2. It is contended that there are allusions, not only to the *laws*, but to the *history*, of the Jewish people. But these allusions, as stated by Heath, are so extremely fanciful, as in the opinion of Michaelis to require no farther refutation than the bare reading of the passages referred to. (*Not. et Epim.* pp. 191, 192.) Some of the same kind had been urged by Warburton, (*Div. Leg.* B. vi. § ii. vol. iii. pp. 494—499,) and proved to be futile and visionary by Peters, (*Crit. Diss.* pp. 28—36.) Indeed, these points have been so completely canvassed, that we may now with confidence pronounce, as Sherlock had done before, (*Use of Proph.* p. 297,) that there is no one allusion, direct or indirect, either to the *law*, or to the *history*, of the Jews, that can be fairly pointed out in the book of Job.

But, 3, it is maintained, both by Heath and Warburton, that the use of the word *Jehovah* determines the date of the book to be later than the age of Moses: God not having been known by that name, until he appeared to Moses, as he himself declares, in Exod. vi. 3. This, however, is evidently a misapprehension of the meaning of the passage in Exodus: it being certain, that God *was* known to the patriarchs, Abraham and Jacob, by the name of Jehovah; that he calls himself by that name in speaking to them; and that he is so called by them again expressly[a]. The sense of the passage then must be, not that the *name* was unknown to all before Moses, but its true *signification;* that is, the nature and properties of the *self-existent* Being, expressed by that comprehensive name JEHOVAH, which in the original signifies, according to Le Clerc, and almost all the commentators, *faithful* and *stedfast, making things to be*, that is, fulfilling all his promises, which he began to accomplish in the time of Moses. By this name, then, *in its true sense*, God certainly was not *known*, or, as Peters renders it, was not *distinguished*,

[a] See Gen. xiv. 22; xv. 2. 8, 7; xxiv. 3; xxviii. 13. 16; and xxxii. 9.

before the time of Moses[a]. This objection may, consequently, be set aside.

Nor will the 4th objection, derived from the mention of *Satan*, be found to have greater weight. The *Evil Being*, it is contended both by Heath and Warburton, was not known to the Jews in early days; and the word *Satan* never occurs until a late period of their history, as a *proper name;* in which light it is said to be here necessarily used, as being preceded by the emphatic article ה, השטן, i. e. THE ADVERSARY. But, that the doctrine of an *evil spirit* was not unknown to the Jews at an early day, is evident from the history of Ahab, in which mention is made of it as a thing familiar, and in a manner precisely similar to the present case. Indeed the history of the fall could scarcely be made intelligible to them without that doctrine; and Warburton himself admits, (B. vi. § 2. vol. ii. p. 533,) that the notion of an evil principle had probably arisen "from the history of Satan misunderstood, or imperfectly told, in the first ages of mankind." In the next place the word, SATAN[b], was clearly not unknown to the early Jews, as appears from the use of it in Numb. xxii. 22, in the story of Balaam. We find it also in 2 Sam. xix. 22; 1 Kings, v. 4; xi. 14. 23. 25; Psal. lxxi. 13; cix. 20. 29. But if it be asserted that it is used in those

[a] See *Vatablus, Dath.* and *Rosenm.* in locum—also *Peters's pref. to Crit. Diss.* pp. xii—xvi., and Bishop *Kidder's Comm. on the Five Books of Moses,* vol. i. p. 297. The last-named learned expositor, agreeably to the idea suggested above, explains the passage in Exodus thus:—"JEHOVAH denotes not only God's *eternal being*, but his giving of being to other things, and especially the performing his promise. Now Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, had received promises, but enjoyed not the thing promised. The time was now come in which God would bring to pass what he had promised; and now they should know that he is the Lord. Isai. xlix. 23; liii. 6; lx. 16. *The knowing him by his name Jehovah,* implies *the receiving from him what he had promised before,* &c. This view of the matter ought to have saved Dr. Geddes from the very laborious discussion of the point into which he has entered in his *Critical Remarks*, and finally from the necessity of pronouncing, that "we must either suppose *the writer of Exodus in contradiction with the writer of Genesis,* or allow *that the name* JEHOVAH *has been put in the mouths of the patriarchs prior to Moses, and in the mouth of God himself, by some posterior copier,* corrupting the original passages by substituting for אלהים, the word יהוה, which had in later times become the peculiar name of God among the Hebrews."

[b] See on this word *Taylor's Scheme of Script. Div.* ch. xi.

several places only as a common appellative, yet still it will not follow, that the *name* might not have been used, as the *Being* was certainly known amongst the early Jews; nor does it even appear, that the word is *here* used as a proper name; as the article may be employed only to mark out *that* adversary, or accusing spirit amongst the angelic tribe, who had undertaken the office of putting the virtue of Job to trial; so that no part of the objection is valid. See *Mich. Not. et Epim.* pp. 193. 199, and *Dath.* as referred to p. 324: and on this entire objection consult *Warb. Div. Leg.* vol. ii. pp. 530—535, and *Peters's Crit. Diss.* pp. 88—92.

But, 5, it is argued, and upon this point Heath and most other objectors principally rely, that the book of Job abounds with Chaldaisms, Syriasms, and Arabisms, which clearly prove the lateness of its production. Now, in opposition to this, we have the authority of the most distinguished scholars and critics, Schultens and Michaelis, in pronouncing that the charge of *Chaldaisms* is totally erroneous. Those Chaldaisms, on which Le Clerc so confidently relies, by which the plural termination *in* is put for *im*, Schultens asserts to be "Hebraicæ et Arabicæ dictionis, atque *vetustissimæ monetæ*" (*Dr. Gray's Job*, pref. p. xii.): and Michaelis affirms, that of *such* Chaldaisms as by their present use might evince the lateness of a Hebrew work, not one is to be discovered in this book. (*Not. et Epim.* p. 193.) The prefix of ש, in ch. xv. 30, supposed to be a Chaldaism from אשר, he proves is not so. And, even were it so used, this is shown by Kennicott (*Remarks*, &c., p. 153) to supply no argument against the antiquity of the book, that will not equally affect the book of Genesis. That expressions of *Syriac* and *Arabic* affinity frequently occur, there can indeed be no question. This stands upon the authority of the most distinguished scholars, Bochart, Pocock, Hottinger, and Walton. (See *Wits. Misc. Sac.* Lib. i. cap. xvi. § 28.) Nor is this denied by Schultens, Kennicott, and Michaelis. But from this they infer the remote antiquity of the work; since, says Michaelis, the Hebrew, Syriac, and Arabic, are not to be considered so

much different languages, as dialects of one radical language, originally common to the descendants of Abraham; and the higher we ascend, the more resemblance we shall consequently find. But, besides, Michaelis adds that one principal reason for our attributing to the book of Job, Chaldaic, Syriac, and Arabic expressions, may be its very great antiquity, and uncommon sublimity of elevation, occasioning a greater number of ἅπαξ λεγόμενα, and expressions difficult to be understood: which commentators are consequently led to explain from those several languages; not because the words strictly belong to them, but because there are more books, and better understood in those languages, than in the Hebrew; and hence it is supposed, that the expressions actually belong to those languages[a].

On this topic, perhaps, so much need not have been said, had not the high authority of Bishop Law given to the objection more consequence than truly belongs to it, by the hint conveyed in his ingenious work on the *Theory of Religion*, (p. 74,) that the subject of it had been "too slightly passed over." Since the time of the Bishop it has received more ample discussion: and from that discussion there seems to arise the strongest argument in favour of the antiquity of the book of Job. So that we may see the justness of Bishop Lowth's remark, that "from the *language*, and even from the *obscurity*, of the work," no less than from its subject, it may fairly be inferred, "to be the most ancient of all the sacred books." *Præl. Hebr.* xxxii.——But not only do these criticisms bear upon the age of the poem, but on the country of its author. For does not the mixture of foreign expressions rather prove that the author was not a Jew; and does not that of the Arabic, particularly, with which it is considered most to abound, indicate its Arabic extraction, which perfectly agrees with the supposition of Job having been its author? And it deserves to be noticed, that even Codurcus,

[a] *Mich. Not. et Epim.* pp. 194, 195. See *Peters's Crit. Diss.* p. 133—137, and 141—143; see also *Codurc. præf. ad Job*, where the necessity of consulting Targums, &c., is urged in a way which fully justifies this solution of Michaelis.

who supposes it to be the work of one of the later prophets, yet conjectures from the style, that the prophet might have been originally from Idumæa,—the very country of Job. (*Præf. ad Job.*)

6. It is objected by Codurcus, Grotius, and Le Clerc, that there are passages in the book of Job which so strongly resemble some in the Psalms and Proverbs, that we may fairly suppose them to have been taken from those writings. But to this Warburton has well replied, that "if the sacred writers must needs have borrowed trite moral sentences from one another, it may be as fairly said, that the authors of the Psalms borrowed from the book of Job, as that the author of Job borrowed from the book of Psalms:" *Div. Leg.* vol. ii. p. 499. See also *Peters's Crit. Diss.* pp. 139—141. And had the learned Bishop been disposed to exercise as unbiassed a criticism upon himself, as he has done upon Grotius and Le Clerc, he would have felt the same argument bearing with equal force against the objection which he has attempted to deduce from the supposed adoption of certain *phrases*, which are found in other books of the Old Testament. That, however, which the Bishop has not done for himself, Peters has done for him; by shewing that those few phrases, which he has instanced, have no peculiar stamp of age or country, and bear no marks whatever of being borrowed from other parts of Scripture. (*Crit. Diss.* pp. 26—29.) It should also be observed, that in opposition to the above-mentioned objection of Grotius, Le Clerc, &c., Bishop Hare has endeavoured to show, that there is internal evidence that the Psalmist has borrowed from Job, not Job from the Psalmist. And Chappelow (*Comment. on Job*, v. 16; viii. 10; and pref. p. 10) represents the passages which are common to Job with the writers of the Psalms, Proverbs, &c., as proverbial forms of speech, sentences of instruction, or מלים, *millim*, as they are peculiarly called in Job, transmitted from one age to another. It therefore is not necessary to suppose that either borrowed from the other.

I have now enumerated all the arguments deserving of any

notice, which have been urged against the antiquity of the book of Job. How conjectural, unfounded, and futile most of them are, and how inconclusive others, it is not difficult to discover. This indeed they tend to show, that the more the objections against the antiquity of this book are examined, the stronger will the arguments be found in favour of it. In addition, however, to what has appeared, there are some positive proofs which have been advanced, and which are not a little worthy of consideration. Bishop Patrick has observed, in his preface to Job, that though there is plain mention of the deluge, and the burning of Sodom, there is no allusion to the drowning of Pharaoh, and the other miraculous works attending the deliverance of the Israelites from Egypt: and that Elihu, when expressly reckoning up the different modes of revelation, takes no notice of the revelation made to Moses. These omissions, however, as well as the want of reference to any of the Mosaic rites, though they furnish a decisive proof against the late age of the book, on the supposition of the author being a *Jew*, yet do so, it must be confessed, *only* upon that supposition. But it will not be easy to account for the circumstance of the book's containing no allusion to "any one piece of history later than Moses," (*Sherl. on Use of Proph.* p. 207,) upon *any* hypothesis, that places its date lower than the age of the Jewish lawgiver.

Now, if to these considerations be added the characters of antiquity attached to the subject, the conduct, and the language of the work; some of which have already appeared in the discussion of the foregoing objections, and which are in general so strikingly obvious, as to constrain even those who contend for the late production of the work to represent it as written in imitation of early manners;—if we admit with Peters, (*Crit. Diss.* p. 143,) that there are expressions in this book, of a stamp so ancient, that they are not to be met with in the Chaldee, Syriac, or any other language at present known; and that many, which rarely occur elsewhere, and are difficult to be explained, are here to be found in their primitive and most simple forms;—if, in short, there be, on

the whole, that genuine air of the antique, which those distinguished scholars, Schultens, Lowth, and Michaelis, affirm[a] in every respect to pervade the work, we can scarcely hesitate to pronounce with Lowth and Sherlock, that the book of Job is the oldest in the world now extant. (*Præl. Hebr.* and *Use of Proph.* Diss. ii. p. 206.) Taylor draws the same conclusion from a very satisfactory though brief view of the merits of the entire argument, in the 22d ch. of his *Scheme of Scrip. Div.*, which I would particularly recommend to the perusal of the reader. It deserves also to be noticed, that a writer[b] in the *Theol. Rep.* vol. i. p. 73, who is by no means a friend to the idea of the antiquity of the book of Job, is compelled by the decided marks of the remote and primitive state of the Hebrew, everywhere discoverable in the work, to pronounce the author to have been a person of great "ability and address; who was master of *the old language*, and had given a venerable antique air to his poem, by making the persons of his dialogue, supposed to have lived in *very early times*, speak the language which was spoken in their days." Whether there was any person of *such ability and address*, it is for this writer to decide. With his admission I am content.

After what has been said, we can have but little difficulty with the systems of Grotius, Warburton, Heath, and others, who suppose the work written at a late period of the Jewish history, for the consolation either of the Edomites when carried away by the Babylonians, (which was the notion of Grotius,) or of the Jews in circumstances of similar distress, *after* or *under* the captivity: the former of which was Warburton's, and the latter Garnet's idea. What has been said of the style, and other peculiarities of the book of Job, necessarily subverts all such theories. And to bring down this sublime poem to the age of the Babylonish captivity, especially to the period succeeding it, would be, as Lowth observes, little different from the error of Hardouin, who ascribed the

[a] See *Gray's Schult. Job*, præf. p. xii.—*Præl. Hebr.* p. 310, and *Mich. Not. et Epim.* p. 195.

[b] This writer appears to be Mr. Scott, the author of the translation of Job into English verse: the paper in the *Theol. Rep.* being printed as his in an appendix to that translation.

golden verses of Virgil, Horace, &c., to the *iron age* of monkish pedantry and ignorance. (*Lect.* &c., ed Greg. vol. ii. p. 355.) Besides, all these theories are utterly inconsistent with the existence of the book of Job before the time of Ezekiel; a fact which Grotius inferred, and which, notwithstanding Warburton's denial of the consequence, Peters has shown *must* be inferred from the mention of Job by that prophet[a]. The supposition, then, that Ezra, Ezekiel, or, indeed, any person subsequent to the age of Moses, was the writer of this book, must, for the reasons that have been assigned, be entirely rejected. It remains of course, only to inquire, whether it is to be ascribed to Moses, or was written before his time. In either supposition, the antiquity, both of the history and of the book, is sufficiently established, for the purpose of my argument concerning sacrifice; but, on a subject so interesting, we are naturally impelled to look on to the end.

That Moses was the author of the book has been the opinion of many, both Jews and Christians. But the arguments which have been used to prove that the writer could not be later than the giving of the law, or the departure of the Israelites from Egypt, will equally prove, that, if the book was the production of Moses, he must have written it before the Exodus. Accordingly, Huet, Michaelis, and Kennicott, who attribute the work to him, have placed it at that early period, and thereby in a good measure escape the force of Bishop Lowth's objection, derived from the want of that allusion to the customs, ceremonies, or history of the Israelites, which he thinks must have appeared, had Moses written the book with a view to the consolation of his people at any time after the promulgation of the law. Michaelis says, that it was probably written by him, to console the Israelites under their Egyptian slavery. (*Not. et Epim.* pp. 181, 182.) And Kennicott thinks, that Moses, having lived a long time in Midian, and on the borders of Idumæa, may well be supposed the author, having there learned the story of Job's

[a] See *Div. Leg.* B. vi. § 2. vol. ii. p. 490, and *Crit. Diss.* p. 145—150.

fortunes, which was probably then recent; and that thus also may the Arabic forms of expression, which occur in the work, be easily accounted for. *Remarks*, &c., p. 152.

These writers have followed the notion of Huet, and of several of the most ancient Jewish and Christian authors, whom he enumerates. (See *Dem. Evang.* p. 226.) To this opinion, however, it has been objected by Dupin, that "the style of Job is figuratively poetical, and obscure, entirely different from that of the Pentateuch:" and Bishop Lowth, whose judgment with respect to style will scarcely be questioned, does not hesitate to pronounce the style of Job to be materially different from that of Moses, even in his poetic productions; and describes it to be of that compact and sententious kind, which is to be observed in the prophecies of Balaam the Mesopotamian. (*Præl. Hebr.* xxxii.) Michaelis also admits the force of this criticism, by seeking to account for the dissimilitude, from the supposition that the book of Job was written by Moses at a very early period of life. (*Not. et Epim.* p. 186.) But although a youthful imagination might sufficiently account for a higher degree of poetic imagery and embellishment, yet it seems a strange reason to assign for a more "compact, condensed style, and a greater accuracy in the poetical conformation of the sentences," which is the character attributed to it by Lowth, as distinguishing it from the Pentateuch.

Kennicott, however, it must be confessed, differs from the bishop so far as to affirm, that there is a striking resemblance in the construction of the poetry of Job to the song of Moses in Deut. xxxi. (*Remarks*, &c., p. 153.) But even admitting his discernment of the graces and characteristics of style to be equal to that of the elegant composer of the Lectures on the Hebrew poetry, and the sublime translator of Isaiah, yet still it remains to be inquired, whence were derived those expressions of Syriac and Arabic origin, which are not to be discovered in the Pentateuch? If it be said, as Father Simon has expressly alleged, (*Crit. des Proleg. de Dup.* lib. v. p. 514,) and as is hinted also by Kennicott, that

Moses might have learned these dialects whilst in the land of Midian, it then remains to be explained, how he came to unlearn them again, before he wrote the Pentateuch. As to one particular sameness of expression, which Kennicott thinks he discovers in the Pentateuch and Job, namely, the frequent use of the *future* for the *preterite;* if this were indeed a peculiarity confined to these [a] two parts of the sacred volume, might it not be accounted for, by supposing it to have been the usage of the language in its earliest period, and which, though it did not descend later than the writings of Moses, yet might have been common to that and the preceding ages?

But, even admitting a similarity of style, one great difficulty still hangs upon the hypothesis, that Moses was the author of the book; namely, that as he must have intended it for the Israelites, it is scarcely possible to conceive, that, although relating an Idumæan history, he should not have

[a] The learned critic has been obliged to confess, on subsequent consideration, that the conversion of the *future* into the *preterite* by the ו prefixed, is not strictly confined to the Pentateuch and the book of Job; and he himself adduces instances of a similar usage from *Judges* and *Isaiah;* and thus, in truth, does away the force of his own observation. He adds, however, in support of his first position, that "this idiom, being *seldom* found elsewhere, and being found *so often,* and within so few verses, both in the *Pentateuch* and *Job,* must certainly add some weight to the opinion that *these books came from the same writer.*" (*Remarks,* &c., pp. 153, 154.)

In the criticism here advanced, this distinguished scholar has not exercised his usual caution and research. The fact differs most widely from his assertion. For it is certain, as we have been most truly told in a late ingenious publication, that, throughout the *whole* Hebrew Scriptures, the *perfect tense* is most generally expressed by the *converted future;* so that it is clearly the *proper idiom of the language.* And it is with justice added, that this is a peculiarity of a nature so extraordinary as to be highly deserving of attention; because the *regularity* of its changes will bear the strictest examination, whereby may be demonstrated the great grammatical accuracy and propriety of expression that has been observed by *all the writers of the Hebrew Scriptures* for so many years, from *Moses* to *Malachi.* This position is substantiated by a wide range of examples in the *Letter on certain Particularities of the Hebrew Syntax,* written by *Mr. Granville Sharp,* whose acute and valuable philological inquiries as well in that and his other Letters on the same subject, as in his investigations of the Greek text, cannot be too highly commended. The labours of this learned layman reflect honour upon himself, and, what he appears to have much more at heart, light and intelligence upon the sacred text.—Lowth in his *Lectures,* vol. i. pp. 336—345, has treated of the above peculiarity of the Hebrew tenses.

introduced something referring to the peculiar state and circumstances of the people, for whose use it was destined; of which no trace whatever appears in the work. The common subjects touched upon in both, too, we should expect to find similarly handled; and yet, if Peters's remark be just, the manner in which the Creation, the Fall, the Deluge, and other points of ancient history, are treated in the book of Job, is widely different from that in which they are spoken of in the books of Moses. See *Crit. Diss.* p. 126.

There seems, then, upon the whole, sufficient ground for the conclusion, that this book was not the production of Moses, but of some earlier age: and there appears no good reason to suppose, that it was not written by Job himself. Lowth favours this idea, and Peters urges some arguments, of no inconsiderable weight, in its support. (*Crit. Diss.* pp. 123—125.) The objections against it, from Arabia being called THE EAST, (which, according to Grotius and Le Clerc, marks the writer to be a Hebrew,) and from the account given of the death of Job in the conclusion, create no difficulty. Peters has shown, that not only did other nations, beside the Hebrews, call Arabia, *the East;* but that it was customary even with the Arabians themselves: and that the writer was an Arabian, he infers, with much ingenuity, from the manner in which he speaks of the North wind. As for the addition of a few lines at the conclusion, made by some other hand, for the purpose of completing the history; this should no more invalidate Job's title to the work, than a similar addition at the conclusion of Deuteronomy, should invalidate that of Moses to the Pentateuch. See *Crit. Diss.* pp. 127, 128, and pref. p. xvi.

But, whether we suppose Job the author of the book or not, its great antiquity, and even its priority to the age of Moses, seems to stand on strong grounds. And, upon the whole, perhaps we may not unreasonably conjecture the history of the book to be this.—The poem, being originally written either by Job, or some contemporary of his, and existing in the time of Moses, might fall into his hands, whilst

residing in the land of Midian, or afterwards when in the neighbourhood of Idumæa; and might naturally be made use of by him, to represent to the Hebrews, either whilst repining under their Egyptian bondage, or murmuring at their long wanderings in the wilderness, the great duty of *submission to the will of God.* The encouragement which this book holds out, that every good man suffering patiently will finally be rewarded, rendered it a work peculiarly calculated to minister mingled comfort and rebuke to the distressed and discontented Israelites, and might therefore well have been employed by Moses for this purpose. We may also suppose, that Moses, in transcribing, might have made some small and unimportant alterations, which will sufficiently account for *occasional* and *partial* resemblances of expression between it and the Pentateuch, if any such there be.

This hypothesis both furnishes a reasonable compromise between the opinions of the great critics who are divided upon the point of Moses being the author, and supplies an answer to a question of no small difficulty, which hangs upon almost every other solution; namely, when, and wherefore, a book treating manifestly of the concerns of a stranger, and in no way connected with their affairs, was received by the Jews into their sacred canon? For Moses having thus applied the book to their use, and sanctioned it by his authority, it would naturally have been enrolled among their sacred writings: and, from the antiquity of that enrolment, no record would, consequently, appear of its introduction. This hypothesis satisfies the third query in the *Theol. Repos.* vol. i. p. 72. I have the satisfaction also to find, that this notion is not without support from many respectable authorities. The ancient commentator on Job, under the title of Origen, has handed down a piece of traditional history, which perfectly accords with it. See *Patrick's Preface to Job.* Many of the most respectable early writers seem to have adopted the same idea, as may be seen in Huet, (*Dem. Evang.* p. 226,) and, with some slight variation, it has been followed by

that learned author. Patrick also and Peters speak of it as a reasonable hypothesis. (*Crit. Diss.* pref. pp. xxxiv. xxxv.) And certainly it possesses this decided advantage, that it *solves all the phenomena.*

One observation more remains to be offered; and that is, that there is good reason to pronounce the book of Job an inspired work. Its reception into the Jewish canon; the recognition of the history, and, as Peters has abundantly proved, (*Crit. Diss.* pp. 21. 145—148,) consequently of the book itself, by the prophet Ezekiel; a similar admission of it by another inspired writer, St. James; and the express reference made to it by St. Paul, (1 Cor. iii. 19,) who prefaces his quotation from it by the words, *it is written*, agreeably to the common form of quoting from other parts of inspired Scripture;—all these fully justify the primitive fathers, and early councils, in their reception of it as a canonical and inspired book. (See *Gregor. pref. in Job.*)

The intrinsic matter of the work also strengthens this idea. Job appears, from xxxviii. 1, and xlii. 5, to have enjoyed the divine vision. In what manner, whether, as the Seventy seem to think, by some appearance of a glorious cloud, or otherwise, it avails not. That, in some way, he was honoured with one of those extraordinary manifestations of the Deity, by which the prophets and inspired persons were distinguished, and that he was admitted to immediate communication with the Almighty, is positively asserted. Now, if this did really happen,—and the whole book becomes a lying fable, and a lying fable recognised by inspired writers as a truth, if it did not,—it necessarily follows, that Job was a prophet: and as a natural consequence it must be admitted, that Job himself was the author of the work: since it cannot be supposed, that God would convey supernatural communications to one person, and appoint another to relate them. That Job was not an Israelite, cannot be urged as an argument against such an hypothesis, since we find that Balaam is expressly said to have been similarly favoured. Other instances also are given by Bishop Law in his *Considerations*,

&c., pp. 72—76. See also *Patrick's Append. to the Paraph. on Job*, and *Peters's Crit. Diss.* pp. 123—125.

Now, from admitting the prophetic character of Job, we derive two considerable advantages. First, it removes the difficulty, which otherwise must hang upon the supposition, that the words of that much celebrated passage in his writings refer to the doctrines of a Redeemer and a future state[a]: and, 2, it supplies an additional confirmation of the divine origin of those great truths concerning the Creation, the Fall, and the Deluge, as they stand recorded in the books of Moses.

If I have dwelt rather long upon this point, I trust that the interesting nature of the subject, as well as the importance of the *reality* and *antiquity* of Job, in an examination of the history of sacrifice, will supply a sufficient excuse. I have little fear that the discussion will appear unnecessarily prolix to those who are acquainted with the vast variety of opinions, and multiplicity of arguments, to which this question has given birth. My principal object in this, as in most other of the dissertations in this work, has been to combine with such illustrations as the general argument may require, useful directions to the young student in divinity, as to those leading topics and references, that may serve to assist his course of reading. This I have done on the present occasion with all possible brevity. A greater degree of compression must have led to dryness and obscurity. It will be well, if, even in its present form, this review of the question be not found chargeable with these defects.

After the full detail which has just been given of the various opinions respecting the age and country of Job, as well as the date of the poem which bears that name, I might, per-

[a] In addition to the numerous writers who are commonly known to have maintained the application of the 19th chapter of Job to the doctrine of a future state, I think it right to mention the name of *Velthusen*, who, in his *Exercitationes Criticæ in Jobi*, cap. xix. 23—29, has with much ability and critical acumen defended this idea. See also *Pfeiffer, Dubia Vexata*, 505—511.

haps, deem myself excused from making any additional remarks upon this subject, even in the face of a translation of that poem, which has lately come before the public, accompanied with observations repugnant to the resulting probabilities as they have been here deduced, but not less repugnant (as I conceive) to the truth of Scripture history and the principles of fair interpretation. These observations, however, coming from a prelate of the Established Church, acquire from that circumstance a weight, which will not permit them to be overlooked; and compel a discussion, in which I feel myself bound (however reluctantly) to engage, in defence of what I have already submitted, and of what appears to me to be equally sustained by argument, and sanctioned by Scripture. That I may not do the Right Reverend author injustice, I quote the very words, in which he has so summarily beaten down the notions hitherto so generally entertained, concerning the antiquity both of the book and of the age of Job.

"The sacred writers, in general, have been apt to ascribe to the book of Job, an origin, that loses itself in the shades of the remotest antiquity. The opinion, I believe, rested at first on the very sandy foundation of what is stated in the two concluding verses of the work, which ascribe to its hero a longevity that belonged only to the generations not far distant from the flood. Of the authenticity of those verses, I think, I have shown in my note on them, that we have every reason to be suspicious. But, if it were ever so difficult to ascertain the portion of time when the Patriarch lived, it may not be impossible, from the internal marks in the poem itself, to conjecture with tolerable certainty the era of its author. This is what I have attempted to execute. The subject is curious, and, on a close inspection of the work before us, certain notes of time have presented themselves to my observation, which appear to have escaped the diligence of all preceding critics. The reader will allow me to offer them to him here in a summary manner; referring him for further satisfaction on the point to what I have said in the notes.—

Allusions to events recorded in the five books of MOSES are to be found in this poem, ch. xx. 20, compared with Num. xi. 33, 34; ch. xxvi. 5, compared with Gen. vi. 4. 7. 11; ch. xxxiv. 20, compared with Exod. xii. 19; ch. xxxi. 33, compared with Gen. iii. 8. 12: and I shall hardly be expected to prove, that the author of the poem derived his knowledge of those events from a history of so much notoriety as that of MOSES, rather than from oral or any other tradition. Facts are not usually referred to, before the history recording them has had time to obtain currency. The inference is clear: the writer of JOB was junior to the Jewish legislator, and junior, it is likely, by some time.—A similar mode of reasoning, upon comparison of ch. xxxiii. 23, with 2 Sam. xxiv. 16; 1 Chron. xxi. 15, will, if I mistake not greatly, bring down the date of our poem below the time of King DAVID.—Lastly, ch. xii. 17, to the end, seems to point to the circumstances preceding and attending the Babylonish captivity; and chap. xxxvi. 8—12, has an appearance of alluding to the various fortunes of JEHOIACHIN, king of Judah, 2 Kings, xxiv. 12; xxv. 27.—Notes of time these, which, though not so manifest as the fore-mentioned, may deserve attention; since they add strength to the sentiment of those learned men who have been inclined to give the honour of this celebrated composition to Ezra."—*The Book of Job newly translated by the Right Reverend Joseph Stock, Bishop of Killalla*, pref. pp. v. vi.

Such is the rapid decision of the Right Rev. translator, upon a question which has occupied the attention, and divided the judgments, of the most learned and able theologians; and such are the new lights, whereby this new expositor of the book of Job is enabled to discern the erroneousness of the opinion in favour of its high antiquity, which has at all times most generally prevailed. It must be remarked, indeed, that his Lordship, in the history of his work, has stated, that the whole was executed in a period of six weeks, and that too a period of great agitation and distraction of mind; and also, that he declined the aid of the many learned

commentators, who had gone before him in the translation of this most difficult book, confining his attention to three English writers, Heath, Scott, and Parkhurst; writers, who, however respectably they may rank as compilers, cannot be named with those great and distinguished Hebrew scholars [a], whose labours his Lordship found it convenient to reject. These circumstances will abundantly account for the cursory

[a] It was particularly unfortunate, that his Lordship felt indisposed to the trouble of consulting the commentary of *Schultens:* a work, which, although its author is rather slightingly described by his Lordship as the "*Dutch* expositor," has been considered by all the later interpreters of Job, his Lordship excepted, as a mine of the most valuable learning, and particularly indispensable to such as were not acquainted with the Arabic, and what may be called the dialects of the Hebrew, in which it is acknowledged by every commentator that the book of Job abounds, and from which indeed the peculiar difficulty of that book is admitted to arise. Dr. *Gray*, in his preface, speaking of this work, terms it "*egregium opus.*" And of the benefit he derived from it in his translation of Job, he thus expresses himself:—"Quantum mihi gaudium attulerit, quantâque curâ et molestiâ liberarit elaboratissimum hocce summi viri eruditionis atque diligentiæ monumentum, facile dijudicare est. Parata, ut ait Plinius, inquisitio, nec onerosa collatio. Nempe omni isto apparatu illico jam instructus eram, quem alioquin mihi multo cum sudore undecunque conquirendum esse prævideram: unoque sub conspectu habui non tantum quicquid uspiam a doctissimis viris in hoc argumento concinnatum, sed et ordine ita accurato dispositum, eo judicio atque diligentia perpensum, ut nil aliud mihi negotii jam relictum videretur, quam exscriptoris munere perfungi."—*Liber Jobi—Ricard. Gray*, præf. p. iii.

Heath also, in his pref. p. xiii., speaks of the work of Schultens in language equally strong. "The use of the dialects in the investigation of the true meaning of the several roots in this" (the Hebrew) "language, was never carried to the height it is at present: till the late very learned ALBERT SCHULTENS, in the beginning of this" (the last) "century, bent his studies this way; and with so great success, that I think it may be truly said in his praise, that his endeavours have contributed more towards the true knowledge of the Hebrew language, than the united labours of all that went before him."

Was this the commentator, from whose "two ponderous volumes," (which, after all, are but two thin quartos,) a translator of the book of Job, who does not profess either to have any acquaintance with the Arabic, should turn away with weariness and disgust? —*Heath* pursues a different course in his version:—"I have drawn (says he) from the dialects all the light my knowledge in them would supply me with: and in this part I acknowledge myself much indebted to the valuable works of the late very learned *Albert Schultens.*" Pref. pag. xv.—Bishop Stock, on the other hand, tells us, that he had "received from SCOTT, as much information with respect to the discoveries of SCHULTENS, the *Dutch* expositor, *as he wished to possess.*" Pref. p. vii.—This surely is in every way an odd declaration. If one were only to ask, how the *quantum sufficit* could be ascertained, without the knowledge of what Schultens's book actually contains, it would be rather difficult to frame an answer.

manner in which his Lordship has treated the subject of the antiquity of the book of Job; for the errors into which he has fallen upon that important point; and also for the general air and character of the translation itself.

And, in the first instance, it is painful to remark, that, in the very first paragraph of the work, his Lordship has confounded two questions, which are altogether distinct; and, from this confusion, has been led (with a license, which might better befit such expositors as Dr. Geddes, or the Unitarian Society, than a Bishop of the Established Church) to reject the two last verses of Job, as a spurious addition to the work.

The two questions relate, one to the time at which *Job* actually lived, and the other to the time at which the *book* of Job was written. These, it is obvious, have no necessary connexion; as the history of a person, who lived in the patriarchal age, might be composed even at the present day: and, therefore, these respective dates have, at all times, been made the subjects of separate inquiry. Yet the Bishop begins by telling us, that the reason, which first induced the sacred critics to assign the *book of Job* to an era of remote antiquity, is to be found in the two last verses, which ascribe to *Job himself* a patriarchal longevity; that is, that the critics have pronounced the *book* of Job to be extremely ancient, because that book describes its subject as having lived at a very early period. Now, no critics have reasoned in this manner; nor in truth could any have so reasoned, who deserved the name. Some, indeed, have pronounced the book to be as ancient as its subject, inasmuch as they conceived it to have been the production of Job himself. But they who do not contend for this, and even those (such as Warburton and Heath [a]) who have been desirous to reduce the date of

[a] Heath, indeed, specially remarks upon the gross error of not making a due distinction between the times of *Job*, and those of the *author* of the poem: and on the whole he pronounces it as his own opinion, that the author in many parts of his work alludes to facts, which, though undoubtedly posterior to the age of Job, on account of its great remoteness, were yet anterior to his own; and consequently he holds, that no argument can be drawn from such

the book to a very late period of the Jewish state, in consequence of allusions to certain parts of the Jewish history which it appeared to them to contain, have, notwithstanding, found no difficulty in placing the existence of Job in that remote age to which the history assigns it. They have, in short, argued thus:—Job lived at an early period; but we have reason to conclude, that the history which treats of him was composed at a period considerably later. Whereas the present translator argues as if Job could not have lived early, because the history was written late. Or rather, to repeat the charge already made, two ideas totally distinct, the time of Job, and the date of the history, are manifestly confounded. And this confusion, which so inauspiciously prefaces his Lordship's work, unhappily conducts it to its close: for in the concluding note we find the following observations:—"These two last verses have every appearance [a] of being a spurious

circumstances against the antiquity of the times of Job on the one hand, nor against interpretations suited to the manners and history of the probable age of the author on the other. And, therefore, although he reduces the date of the *author of the Poem* as low as the Bishop of Killalla can desire, he yet conjectures the time of *Job* to have been earlier than the Exodus, and considers the length of life ascribed to him by the two verses with which the Bishop has quarrelled, as one of the proofs of the fact. See *Heath's English Version of Job*, pp. xix. xx. xxiv.

[a] What the circumstances are, that give to these two verses "*every appearance* of being a spurious addition to the work," his Lordship has not thought proper to mention. What do these verses contain? Simply the following words:—"After this lived Job an hundred and forty years, and saw his sons, and his sons' sons, even four generations. So Job died, being old and full of days."—Now, if all that is meant be this, that the verses could not have been written by Job himself, this undoubtedly no person will be found disposed to dispute, as it is not pretended that he rose from the grave to finish the book. But this surely cannot be the *proof* of their want of authenticity, which, in the beginning of his preface, his Lordship boasts of having discovered, and promises to produce in his note upon the verses: and, in point of fact, he does not here adduce it as a proof; but simply *asserts*, as we have seen, that the "verses have *every appearance* of being a spurious addition to the work." He goes on, indeed, to state of this addition, that it has been "fabricated by such another dealer in the marvellous, as he that has fastened his long string of fables to the close of the translation by the LXX interpreters."—Now, with great deference to his Lordship, there is not only no appearance of these verses being such a fabrication as that which winds up the conclusion of the Septuagint translation, (and his Lordship might have added, of the Syriac and Arabic also,) but there is as direct and proper evidence of the contrary as the nature of the case will admit. The difference between the two is precisely this, that the one is found in *every* MS.

addition to the work, fabricated by such another dealer in the marvellous, as he that has fastened his long string of fables to

of the original Hebrew, and the other has nothing corresponding to it in *any*: that the one has, in *all* ages, been received without question as part of the canon of Scripture, and the other *never*: that the one, in short, *is* found in the record, and the other is *not*. Such is the *similarity of appearance* between the two, from which his Lordship infers them on the view to be equally fabrications! Surely never was there a more arbitrary and barefaced attack upon the integrity of the Sacred Text. The verses have never been questioned; they appear in every MS. of the Hebrew; and they stand precisely on the same ground, as to every circumstance of genuineness, with any other verses in the entire book of Job. It must be observed, that what is said here is perfectly admissible, even on the supposition, that Job himself was the author of the poem: the argument not requiring that the two concluding verses should have been written by the same hand that composed the remainder of the work; but that they were, equally with any other verses, genuine parts of the book as it was originally received into the Hebrew canon, and not the unauthorized and spurious addition of an unknown fabricator. That the verses in question were written by Moses, at the time when the entire work was adapted by him and accommodated to the uses of his followers, may appear not improbable from what has been said at page 392 of this volume.

But, perhaps, after all, no other proof of the spuriousness of these two verses has been intended by the Right Reverend Author, than what arises from those allusions to facts later than the time of Moses, and even of David, to which his Lordship immediately after adverts. If this be the case, then in addition to the confounding together the times of Job and of the author of the Book, which has been remarked upon above, his Lordship has conducted the entire of his reasoning in a circle: having promised, in his preface, to overturn the notion of the high antiquity of the book of Job, by establishing the spuriousness of these two verses, on which he states that notion to have been founded; and having here established the spuriousness of the verses, by denying the antiquity of the book. Whatever may be the errors in the argument, his Lordship however seems to think, that all will be set to rights, by rejecting from the Sacred Text whatever does not correspond with the theory which he has adopted.

As the discussion of this subject has led to the mention of the addition made by the LXX, at the conclusion of their version of the book of Job, it may gratify the curiosity of the reader who is not conversant in these matters, to know what that addition is. Having, agreeably to the Hebrew original, stated that Job died full of days, the Greek proceeds, "But it is written that he will rise again with those whom the Lord raises up.—This is interpreted from a Syriac book. 'He dwelt in the land of Ausitis' (of Aus or Uz,) 'in the borders of Idumæa and Arabia; but his name was first called Jobab: and marrying an Arabian wife, he begot a son, whose name was Ennon; and he was himself the son of Zare, a grandson of Esau, of a mother Bosorra, so that he was the fifth from Abraham. And these are the kings which reigned in Edom, over which country he ruled; first, Balak son of Beor, and the name of his city was Denhaba; but after Balak Jobab, called Job; but after him Asom prince of the land of Theman; and after him Adad, son of Barad, who smote Midian in the plain of Moab, and the name of his city was Gethiam. And the friends who came to him, were Eliphaz of the sons of Esau, king of the Themanites; Baldad, sovereign

the close of the translation by the LXX interpreters. *The fallacy must be obvious, when we call to mind the allusions, in the poem, to facts that happened in and after the time of Moses, who lived but one hundred and twenty years, and even of David, when the age of man was reduced to its present standard of seventy years.*"

Thus then it appears, that because the translator thinks proper to bring the date of the book of Job lower than the time of David, the length of the life of Job could not exceed what was usual in that age of the world, and therefore the two verses which ascribe to him a longer period cannot be genuine, and must be discarded from the sacred text. That is, in other words, no history can ever be written of any individual who lived at a preceding period. This is certainly an unhappy specimen of antiquarian research; and a still more unhappy specimen of biblical criticism. On the same ground, on which he has rejected the two concluding verses, the Right Reverend critic might reject a very large portion of the book of Job, as a spurious addition to the genuine work: since

(τύραννος) of the Sauchæans; and Zophar, king of the Minæans.'"—With this the Syriac and Arabic, as given in the Polyglot, nearly correspond. And a fragment of Aristæas, as taken from Eusebius, (*Præp. Evang.* lib. ix. cap. xxv. tom. i. p. 430,) contains most of these particulars, referring to *Polyhistor* as his authority. On the passage in the Greek it is to be remarked, that it contains internal evidence, that the book of Job has not had the same Greek interpreters, that have rendered the other books of the Old Testament; since it expressly states, that the version was derived from a Syriac book. And, indeed, it is clear, upon inspection, that the Greek interpreters of Job have taken uncommon liberties in their translation: having, besides variations from the obvious sense of the Hebrew as it now stands, made large additions, not only here but in several other places, particularly at ch. ii. 9, to the speech made by Job's wife. See also ch. xix. 4; xxxvi. 28; xxxix. 34.—It is to be noted also, that the concluding addition to Job in the Greek is given differently by the Vatican and the Alexandrian MSS.: that it is found in Theodotion, but not in Aquila or Symmachus: and that in the Complutensian edition of the LXX it is wanting. It is said also to have been in the old Italic. At what time it was introduced cannot be conjectured; but the Greek version of Job appears to have been earlier than Philo Judæus, from his quoting it in his book *De Nominum Mutatione.* See *Wesley, Dissert.* LIII. pp. 409—413, and p. 599.—*Hod. de Vers. Græc.* p. 196; also *Drusius* and *Codurcus* on the last verse of Job, and *Carpzov's Defence*, p. 36, &c. For the sources, whence this piece of adscititious history was probably derived, the reader may turn to Gen. xxxvi. and 1 Chron. i.

everywhere throughout are plentifully scattered those indications[a] of patriarchal antiquity, for the direct exposition of which these two last verses are pronounced to be surreptitious.

But, not to dwell any longer on this unfortunate mistake, and the rash attempt at mutilating the sacred text which it has occasioned, let us proceed to consider those notes of time, attaching to the poem itself, which "have escaped the diligence of all preceding critics;" and by the discovery of which, his Lordship thinks himself enabled to pronounce upon the lateness of its production.

The first of these is said to be found in ch. xx. 20, in which we are told that the true rendering is, "Because he acknowledged not *the quail* in his stomach:" and the following remark is subjoined.—"Here I apprehend is a fresh example of the known usage of the Hebrew poets, in adorning their compositions by allusions to facts in the history of their own people. *It has escaped all the interpreters;* and it is the more important, because it *fixes* the date of this poem so far as to *prove* its having been composed subsequently to the transgression of Israel at Kibroth-hataavah, recorded in Numb. xi. 33, 34.—Because the wicked acknowledged not *the quail*, that is, the meat with which God had filled his stomach, but, like the ungrateful Israelites, *crammed and blasphemed his feeder*, (as Milton finely expresseth it,) he shall experience the same punishment with them, and be cut off בחמודו, *in the midst of his enjoyment*, as Moses tells us the people were המתאוים, *who lusted*."

The Bishop has rightly said, that the translation, which he has here given, "has escaped all the interpreters:" at the same time, as he has himself informed us that his acquaintance with the interpreters of this book has been studiously contracted to a very narrow range, it remains to be explained how his Lordship came to ascertain this fact. True, however, it is, that none of the commentators on Job, either ancient or

[a] See pp. 377, 378. 387, 388. of this volume for the proof and general admission of this point.

modern, had ever proposed such a version of the passage. Yet possibly, from this circumstance, an inference, differing widely from that which the translator would approve, might suggest itself to the reader.

But, what are the grounds, on which this unexampled signification of the passage has been adopted by the Right Rev. translator? There is but one pretended; namely, that the word שלו, which occurs in this place, has been rendered *quail* in the book of Numbers. When this has been stated, the only reason that can be assigned for this translation has been given. The phrase itself, as it is here proposed, receives no justification from any parallel passage or similarity of expression, throughout the entire body of the Scriptures. No proverbial form, such as, "*not acknowledging the quail*," has ever been heard of as in use amongst the Jews: and, even though there had been such a phrase derived from the translation recorded in the book of Numbers, it would have been peculiarly inapplicable here, where the food, with which the wicked oppressor is said to gorge himself, is not the gift of God, like the quails showered down for the Israelites, but, on the contrary, the fruit of his own fraud and violence. Besides, the phrase itself is as inconsistent with the history in Numbers, as it is inapplicable to the reasoning in Job. For we do not find that the Israelites were cut off because of their *not acknowledging the quail*, (by which, if it has any meaning, must be understood, their not receiving that food as a gift sent from God,—and in this sense it is that the Bishop has actually applied it,) but because, as both Moses and the Psalmist (Ps. lxxviii.) inform us, they had, antecedently to the grant of the quails, wantonly lusted[a] for food different from that which God had already allotted to them, and were desirous, from their want of confidence in God's power to give them *flesh* for food, to return to the flesh-pots of Egypt.

[a] The very name of *Kibroth-hataavah* was given to the place, to mark the nature of the crime: the signification of these words being *sepulchra concupiscentiæ*, "because there they buried the people that lusted." Numb. xi. 31. See on this particularly *Bochart*, vol. iii. pp. 92. 108, 109.

For these reasons it was, that punishment was inflicted; and inflicted too (so far from having been *caused* by their *not acknowledging the quail*) before the food was actually swallowed; whilst, as we are told, "it was yet between the teeth and not yet chewed." See Numb. xi. 33.

To the new version, then, here recommended, there lie these three objections: 1. That we find no instance of the phrase which it introduces, throughout the Hebrew Scriptures, nor amongst the traditions of the Jews: 2. That such a phrase could not have grown out of the transaction to which it is traced: and, 3. That, if it could, it would be totally inapplicable to the passage in question. With how little reason, upon the whole, the Bishop has departed from the commonly received sense of the text, which requires the word to be rendered in the sense of *quietness*[a], there needs but a

[a] The word שלו, which Bishop Stock here renders *quail*, is, as has been noticed above, so employed in speaking of the food miraculously afforded to the Israelites at *Kibroth-hataavah*, and occurs in that sense in four places; namely, in Exod. xvi. 13; Numb. xi. 31, 32; and Ps. cv. 40. In the various other parts of Scripture, in which the word is to be found, it is used in the sense of *quiet and tranquil enjoyment:* and from this, as its radical meaning, even its application to the bird above named is commonly explained: inasmuch as quails are conceived to be a species of birds, that seek quiet and undisturbed enjoyment in the fields of corn, where they conceal themselves in great numbers, and if allowed to enjoy rest, fatten prodigiously. See *Kircher's Concordance* and *Parkhurst* on the word. Abbé *Pluche* tells us, in his *Histoire du Ciel*, tom. i. p. 247, that the quail was, amongst the ancient Egyptians, the emblem of *peace* and *security:* and *Hasselquist* and *Bochart* both inform us, that they come into Egypt in great multitudes, in the spring, at the ripening of the wheat. *Bochart*, the whole of whose observations upon the nature and history of this bird are extremely curious, derives the name from שלה, *pacate vivere*, and thence *abundare*. They, however, who may wish to see the various meanings of the word שלו accurately detailed, and carefully deduced from the primary sense of the root שלה, will be rewarded by an examination of *Schultens's* discussion of the signification of the term, in his *Origines Hebrææ*, tom. ii. pp. 52—76. The true meaning of this root is the more important, as from it is supposed by some to be derived the Hebrew word *Shilo*, denoting the Messiah, in the well known prophecy of Jacob.

Of the various translations which have been given of this verse in Job, perhaps that of Dathe conveys the best sense:—

"Quia venter ejus explcri non poterat,
Nec quidquam cupiditatibus suis evasit."

Schnurrer, also, has in a like sense rendered this verse, (and,—with the one which immediately precedes, and the one which immediately follows it, all of which have occasioned much perplexity

slight inspection of the original to discover. And with how much less reason he has pretended to find in the version which he has substituted, a *proof* (as he is pleased to call it) that the book of Job was composed subsequently to the transaction at *Kibroth-hataavah*, will probably, after what has been said, appear no less clear.

The next passage to which the Bishop refers us for a mark of time, is ch. xxvi. 5, which he thus translates:—

> "The mighty dead are pierced through;
> The waters from beneath, and their inhabitants."[a]

amongst the commentators,—extremely well):—

> "Quoniam haud sensit quietem in ventre suo,
> Et nihil eorum, que appetiit, passus est evadere."

See *Schnurrer's Dissertationes Philologico Criticæ*, p. 256. The same sense has been given by the Vulgate.

The rendering of the Greek is a striking instance of the liberty, which that Version has so frequently taken with this book. Οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ σωτηρία τοῖς ὑπάρχουσιν, is the translation of the first clause. I know not well how to account for this rendering, unless by supposing that the Greek Interpreters, instead of בבטני, read in their MS. בביתני: for it is remarkable, that the word בטו, which they here render τὰ ὑπάρχοντα, they have in the 15th verse rendered οἰκία: now, τὰ ὑπάρχοντα and ὅσα ὑπάρχει they have occasionally used, as well as οἶκος, for בית, as see Gen. xlv. 18; Esth. viii. 1. 7; and in Esth. vii. 8, they translate ביתן by οἶκος: therefore it seems not unreasonable to suppose, that they have read the word ביתן here: that is, th for t, and a ן inserted.

It is to be remarked, however, that, amongst the various meanings ascribed to the passage by commentators, there is not one that gives the smallest countenance to the rendering of the word שלו proposed by the Bishop, and on which the whole force of his argument concerning the date of the book depends (even the pointing of the Masora opposes him): nor is there one that gives to that word any other sense than that of *quietness, safety, abundance, enjoyment*, all of which spring from the same primary idea; the Syriac only (with its copy the Arabic) excepted; which renders the word by ܚܒܠܐ signifying *his judgment, his condemnation*, or *his punishment:* see *Schaaf's Lex. Syr.* And how to reconcile any of these senses to the original שלו, I confess myself totally at a loss.

[a] May it be permitted, *in transitu*, to ask, what possible meaning can be assigned to these two lines? Is it, that the *waters* are *pierced through*, as well as *the mighty dead?* And do *their inhabitants* mean the *fishes?* And is it meant, that *they* are also *pierced through?* And what is intended by *the waters from beneath?* from beneath *what?*—It should be remarked, that, although in the reference to Scott, which is mentioned above, it seems as if the Bishop had adopted these strange phrases in common with that writer, yet the case is not so; they have nothing in common but the meaning of the word רפאים. The Bishop is original, almost throughout the whole verse, especially in the expression of *"the waters from beneath;"* the Hebrew necessarily requiring (as will appear immediately upon inspection) that the word *beneath*, whether it be construed in connexion with

And on this the only remark he thinks necessary to make, is, that he "agrees with Scott, that רפאים are *the giants*, and wicked inhabitants of the old world, who perished in the Flood, produced by breaking up *the waters from beneath*, or the fountains of the great deep, as Moses calls them, Gen. vii. 11."

Now, admitting, for the sake of argument, that the antediluvian *giants*, who with the wicked inhabitants of the old world were overwhelmed by the Flood, have been here intended by the epithet רפאים, *Rephaim;* there arises from this very circumstance a proof, that the inference which the Bishop would hence deduce, respecting the priority of Moses to the author of this poem, is a false one. For those *giants* of the old world are called by Moses נפלים, *Nephilim;* and in no one instance by the name of *Rephaim*, which is here applied. So that if we really have, in this place, an allusion to those *giants* who lived before the Flood, we must suppose the knowledge of the writer to have been derived from some source different from the writings of Moses: a conclusion, directly the opposite of that which it has been the Bishop's object to establish. His Lordship, indeed, tells us, that he expects not to be called upon "to prove, that the author of the poem derived his knowledge of events from a history of so much notoriety as that of Moses, rather than from oral or any other tradition."—But, surely, in facts so notorious as those of the Deluge, and of the existence of those giants and wicked men who preceded it, it cannot be thought too much to demand, that some marked similitude between the accounts given of them by Moses and by any other early writer should be adduced, in proof that either borrowed from the other. At all events, it is clearly too much on the other hand to expect, that this should be conceded, in defiance of a marked dissimilitude, such as has been shown in the present case to exist. And, after all, even were a resemblance

the waters or not, must precede: that is, if the two words are to be combined, it must be "*beneath the waters*," just the opposite of his Lordship's collocation.

discoverable, the question, Which was the earliest writer? would still remain exactly as before.

The Bishop, in truth, on the word *Rephaim*, is altogether at variance with himself. The phrase "mighty dead," which he here uses for *Rephaim*, is the same which (after Bishop Lowth) he has employed in Isaiah xiv. 9, for the same Hebrew word. But the explanation of the term which he has there given, he states to have originated with Rosenmüller, (or rather he should have said with Vitringa, for from him Rosenmüller has taken it,) and is altogether different from that which he has here borrowed from Scott. His words *there* are:—"REPHAIM, *the gigantic spectres.* Ghosts are commonly magnified by vulgar terror to a stature superior to the human. *Rosenm.*"—*Stock's Isaiah*, p. 40.—Thus, then, we find, that *Ghosts*, as such, are magnified by vulgar terror, and may be called *Rephaim*. And so, the appellation, "*mighty dead*," or *Rephaim*, becomes applicable to *all* the inhabitants of the invisible world. But how then can that, which is represented as a quality of the shades of *all* dead men, namely, gigantic size, or *Rephaism*, be considered in this place as designating the spirits *only of a particular class* of human beings, who, being of *actually* gigantic stature, had lived before the Flood? The two expositions meet, with such adverse fronts, that I despair of being able to reconcile them.—*Non nostrum tantas componere lites.*

It should not be suffered to pass unnoticed, that in the passage of Job, with which we are at present concerned, there occurs, besides the word רְפָאִים *Rephaim*, another term of considerable moment; to the true nature and meaning of which the Right Rev. translator has by no means paid that attention, which the office assumed by him demanded. The term I allude to is שְׁאוֹל[a] *Sheôl:* a term in whose signification is in-

[a] It had been well, if the Bishop had attended somewhat more to those learned investigations of the import of this and other difficult terms, which are to be found in Mercer, Schultens, Peters, and the other laborious Commentators, whose cautious researches have only excited his disgust. We should then not find that uncertainty of meaning, which at present attaches to his Lordship's translations of the passages in which such terms occur.

volved a question no less important than that of the early belief entertained by the people of the East, concerning the

The word, in particular, which is here referred to, has been rendered by him, in different places, with such variety and such vagueness, as to leave the reader altogether ignorant of the sense which the translator conceives most properly to belong to it. Of eight places in which it occurs in the book of Job, and of ten places in the prophecy of Isaiah, there is not one, in which the Bishop has taken occasion to give a precise idea of its true signification. Sometimes he calls it "the lower region," (Job vii. 9; xiv. 13; xxiv. 19;) at others, "hell," (Job xi. 8; Isai. xiv. 9;) again, "the grave," (Job xvii. 13. 16; xxi. 13; Isai. v. 14; xiv. 11. 15; xxviii. 15, 18; xxxviii. 10, 18;) again, in the present passage, "the lower world;" and again, Isai. lvii. 9, "the lowest pit." Amidst all this variety of application, not a single glance, that I can discover, has been taken at the radical meaning of the word, except in one passing remark, in a criticism, which is of so extraordinary a nature, that I cannot avoid quoting the whole of it, as it stands.—It is a note on Job, xx. 9.—"*Which beamed on him.* שזפתו. The reader, who shall take the pains to examine the several Hebrew roots commencing with the letter ש, will be apt to think with me, that the original sense of *by far the greatest part of them*, may best be discovered, by divesting them of this same initial letter, which stood in the place of an article or preposition, merely. Thus שמש, *the sun*, I conceive to be *the feeler*, who feeleth after and investigateth all things: שמים, *the heavens*, the place of *waters*, ש-מים, from which rain, or waters, come; שאול, *the place of the insensible*, Sheol or Hades. And thus may the verb before us, שוף, be traced to ופא, *of which we want an example, but it probably signified to* SHINE, *as from it*" (that is, from a non-existing word, observe) is *derived* יפה, PITCH."! Surely, such another perfect specimen of adventurous criticism the entire regions of conjecture can scarcely supply. In truth, this is such an exercise of the critical faculty, as, were it indulged in, must render the Hebrew Scriptures a perfect nullity, by fastening on them any sense that any guesser might think proper to affix.

That the prefix ש, as an abbreviation for the relative אשר, is not unprecedented, is well known to Hebrew scholars: but, at the same time, this is acknowledged to be a Chaldaism, which, although it is found in the later books of the O. T. composed about and after the time of the captivity, is denied to have any place in those of earlier production. (See p. 384 of this vol.) What then is to become of all those words beginning with the letter ש, in the several books preceding the captivity, which constitute by much the greater part of the Hebrew Scripture? Are all those words to be interpreted by divesting them of the initial ש, in opposition to the hitherto received opinion, that not more than *two or three* such words at the most are to be found through the entire range of those early writings? Then, indeed, it is time to set about a new translation of the whole body of the Old Testament, since so numerous a class of words have hitherto been altogether misunderstood by every interpreter of Scripture. — What, in truth, is to become of the Hebrew language? The lexicons at present exhibit, as primitives, not fewer than two hundred words commencing with the letter ש. Now to pronounce, that "*by far the greatest part*" of these are compounded, and must be divested of that letter in order to discover their true meaning; leaving it also to the conjecture of the individual to determine which words have the prefix, and which not, is surely neither more nor less than to convert the language into mere babble. One would think it scarcely

existence of the soul after death. With respect to these two important terms, it fortunately happens, that they stand so

possible to add to the extravagance of this proceeding; and yet has this not been done in the criticism referred to, when, in one of the compounds thus fancifully made up, it is admitted that one of its components has no place in the language? as in the case of יפח, *to shine*, of which the Bishop says, "*we want an example;*" and truly says so, there being no such word, in that sense, or in any sense approaching to it, either in the Hebrew of the Old Testament, or in any of the kindred languages, Chaldee, Syriac, or Arabic. But his Lordship adds, that though there *is not*, yet there *ought to be*, such a word, *because* there is such a word as יפח, PITCH. If the reader finds it difficult to give credit to this representation, I refer him to the work itself. — Or, again, is not the extravagance also heightened, though in an inferior degree, when we find in the same criticism, a sense given to one of the components, which does not belong to it? as in the word שאול, which, we are told, properly means *the place of the insensible*, being compounded of ש and אול; the latter word of course signifying *insensible*. Now it is notorious, that the word אול bears, throughout the entire Scripture, no other sense than that of *foolish;* which indeed in the Scripture use also implies *wicked:* a meaning, surely, sufficiently removed from that of *insensible;* and the more markedly so, as, in the primary sense of the word, it signifies not simply *folly*, but an *activity* in folly.

There is, indeed, it should be noticed, a source for certain Hebrew words commencing with ש, very different from that wild and arbitrary one devised by the Bishop. The *Syriac* has a special conjugation to which *Schultens* and *Michaelis* have given the name of *Schaphel*, from the prefixed ש being its characteristic, as the ה and התּ are the characteristics of the conjugations *Hiphil* and *Hithpahel* in the *Hebrew*. This is seldom used by the *Hebrew* in its verbs, but not unfrequently in nouns derived from that conjugation. Here is a legitimate source, and one which in its nature supplies a rule and a limitation. — See on this Syriac form, *Michaelis, Not. et Epim.* p. 195; also *Mich. Gramm. Syr.* p. 91. — It should be noted that the *Schaphel* of the Germans should be called *Shaphel* with us; the word being derived from the letter ש, which they write *sch*, and we *sh*.

There is another instance of the application of the new discovery made by the Bishop, respecting words beginning with ש, of a nature so extraordinary, and of which his Lordship has made so extraordinary a use, that I cannot forbear annexing it to this note. On the verb ספק in ch. xxxiv. 26, he remarks in the note: "ספק or שפק, from *unfrequent occurrence*, is not well understood; but if, *according to my rule*, we cast off ש, we shall come to a *better known verb*, פק, *to stagger*, or to tumble." Now, in the first place, (to make no remark on the exercise of *fancy* with respect to the ש, as that is his Lordship's *rule*,) the word, which is described as being from unfrequent occurrence not well understood, is found above a dozen times in the Hebrew Bible, and in such connexion as to have caused to the commentators no doubt about its meaning; for which it also derives additional confirmation from the kindred languages. And on the other hand, the word פק, (or as he should have written it, פוק,) which his Lordship pronounces to be so much *better known*, occurs only in three places, with the possibility of that sense of *stagger*, in which we are told it is so familiarly understood; and even in those places, the Greek and Latin translators do not concur in giving it that sense: so that, in truth, this word, in the application of it, may be considered as involved in some uncertainty, whilst the one which it is con-

combined in one part of Scripture as to throw light upon each other, and to leave little doubt remaining upon this most interesting article of oriental theology. If we look to Isaiah xiv. 9, we shall there find, what were the Jewish opinions upon this subject in the days of that prophet. I here subjoin the whole passage, as it is rendered by Bishop *Lowth*.

" Hades (*Sheôl*) from beneath is moved because of thee to
meet thee at thy coming:
He rouseth for thee the mighty dead, (*Rephaim*,) all the
great chiefs of the Earth:
He maketh to rise up from their thrones all the kings of the
nations.
All of them shall accost thee, and shall say unto thee:
Art thou, even thou too, become weak as we? Art thou
made like unto us?
Is then thy pride brought down to the grave; the sound of
thy sprightly instruments?
Is the vermin become thy couch, and the earth-worm thy
covering?
How art thou fallen from Heaven, O Lucifer, son of the
morning!
Art cut down to the earth, thou that didst subdue the na-
tions!"

Thus then, in like manner as *Homer*, in his *Odyssey*, sends the souls of the slaughtered wooers to *Hades*, where they meet with the manes of Achilles, Agamemnon, and other heroes; so the Hebrew poet, in this passage of inimitable grandeur, describes the king of Babylon, when slain and brought to the grave, as entering *Sheôl*, and there meeting the *Rephaim*,

jured up to supplant is involved in none. —But we have not done with this discovery yet. The true sense of פסס or פשש is made out, *by his Lordship's rule*, to signify *stagger* or *tumble;* and, accordingly, it is so rendered by him, in the passage to which this note has been attached. But then the same word occurs in *four* other places in the book of Job, xx. 22; xvii. 23; xxxiv. 37; xxxvi. 18: and in the three first of these, the idea of *clapping the hands*, which is the true one, and which the Bishop has rejected in the above criticism, is adopted by him; and in the fourth, the vague sense of *exposure* is introduced: whilst the idea of *stagger*, which his Lordship has laboured so much and so unjustifiably to establish as the true and proper sense, is completely forgotten. Surely this is too rambling.

or manes of the dead, who had descended thither before him, and who are poetically represented as rising from their seats at his approach. And as, on the one hand, the passage in the Grecian bard has been always held, without any question, to be demonstrative of the existence of a popular belief amongst the Greeks, that there was a place called *Hades*, which was the receptacle for departed souls; so this poetic image of Isaiah must be allowed, upon the other, to indicate in like manner, amongst the Jews, the existence of a popular belief that there was a region for departed souls called *Sheôl*, in which the *Rephaim* or Manes took up their abode [a].

[a] As the above is a point of considerable moment, and vitally connected with a subject which has excited much controversy and great interest, I must add a few more observations upon the meaning of the two remarkable words with which we are here concerned. And, in the first instance, the reader may not be displeased with a compressed statement of what the very learned Vitringa has given at length upon this head.—After admitting, in his remarks on the passage of Isaiah just cited, that the word *Sheôl* may be (though it very rarely is) applied in the sense of *grave* or *sepulchre*, he proceeds to argue, that in this sense it cannot have been employed in the passage under discussion; for that it would be a monstrous abuse of language, to say, that the *grave* stirred up those who were actually dead: and therefore he contends, that the whole passage must be explained, as a poetic fiction, accommodated to the existing opinions of the day, which he holds to have been these:—That the souls of men, when released from the body by death, pass into a vast subterraneous region, as a common receptacle, but with different mansions, adapted to the different qualities of its inhabitants; and that here, preserving the shades and resemblances of the living, they fill the same characters they did in life. That this entire region was called by the Jews *Sheôl*, by the Greeks *Hades*, and by the Latins *Inferi*. That these were the notions that commonly prevailed amongst the Jews, he conceives to be fully established by various parts of Scripture: and to this, he thinks, the history of the witch of Endor yields confirmation, inasmuch as, let the illusion in that transaction be what it might, it goes to establish the fact of the opinion which was then vulgarly received.—Agreeably to this hypothesis, he contends that various expressions of the patriarchs and prophets are to be explained; and to this purpose he instances Gen. xxxvii. 35; Ps. xvi. 10; xxx. 4; xciv. 17; in all of which, a place where souls, when freed from the body, were assembled, still preserving all their faculties,—is, as he thinks, plainly supposed.—From the Hebrews he conceives that this opinion passed to other people, and became disfigured by various fictions of their respective invention. Thus the doctrine of the Egyptians respecting *Hades* is given in the second book of Herodotus; where we have the history of Rhampsinitus, who, according to the traditions of the Egyptians, had visited the infernal regions, and returned safe to life. The notion, he says, was variously embellished by the Greek poets; and afterwards, being stripped by Plato of much of its poetic ornaments, was embodied by him in his philosophical system. Hence again the Latins, and the nations at large, derived their phraseology in speaking of the

The next passage to which the Bishop has referred us, (see p. 133,) is found in ch. xxxiv. 20, which in our common

state of the dead; for instances of which phraseology he refers to *Vellius*, *Livy*, *Florus*, and others.

The learned writer then proceeds to the *Rephaim*, who are here described by Isaiah, as raised from their seats by *Sheôl*, on the approach of the King of Babylon; and who must consequently be the *shades* or *manes*, by which *Sheôl* is inhabited.—But wherefore denominated *Rephaim?* By this word, he says, it appears indisputably from Isai. xxvi. 14, compared with this passage, must be meant the souls of the *deceased*. But at the same time, he observes, it appears no less indisputably from Gen. xiv. 5, and Deut. iii. 11, that the same word is employed to designate a people of *gigantic* stature among the Canaanites; and it is accordingly almost everywhere rendered "*giants*" by the LXX. and Vulgate. How to reconcile these two senses, which appear so very different, has been a difficulty with commentators. But this difficulty, he says, will be removed, if we attend to the notion which has vulgarly prevailed concerning *ghosts* or *manes;* that they appear of a stature greater than human: and hence our author thinks, that the word, which originally denoted the *shades of the departed*, came to be transferred to denote men of a gigantic bulk; and so became finally an appellation for both.—See *Vitringa in Isai.* tom. i. pp. 432, 433.

I find that *Cocceius* explains the application of the term *Rephaim* to the *giants* in Canaan, on the same principle, though not so explicitly, as Vitringa. His words are, "possit videri, eos" (gigantes, scil.) "ita appellatos, quod tanquam *manes* et *spectra* inter homines versarentur." The word itself he derives originally from רפה, *resolvere;* or as the LXX παραλύσθαι, ἐκλύσθαι: and its primary meaning he considers to be *resoluti, mortui in pulverem redacti* —hence *manes*. Michaelis has, in a way that appears not equally satisfactory, endeavoured to account for the application of the same term *Rephaim* to *giants* and *ghosts*, on the idea of the dark caverns inhabited by the former. —See *Not. et Epim.* pp. 28, 29.

The very learned and ingenious examination of the terms *Sheôl* and *Rephaim*, by *Peters*, (from p. 318 to 382,) merits particular attention. *Sheôl* he distinguishes into two parts, the upper and the lower; in the latter of which he places the residence of the wicked spirits: and to this class he applies the term *Rephaim*, as being *giants in impiety*. In this point, however, I apprehend he has carried the matter too far: for the *giants in impiety* to whom he primarily alludes are those monstrous defiers of God's authority, who lived before the Flood, and were overwhelmed by the Almighty for their enormous wickedness: and from these it is, that he transfers the term *Rephaim*, to the shades of all such as had been mighty in violence and crimes. But in doing this, he has fallen into the same error, which I have noticed in Bishop Stock and others; namely, that of supposing *Rephaim* to have been the name of those heaven-defying giants, that lived before the Flood: whereas, as was shown in p. 407, they had no such name; being known only by that of *Nephilim*. Peters, indeed, appears to me also to have followed the clue of interpretation, with respect to the term *Rephaim*, in a wrong direction altogether, by transferring the word from the primary signification of *giants* to the secondary one of *shades;* whereas I have little doubt that it was first the proper appellation of the latter, and thence extended to the former, in the manner suggested by Vitringa. At the same time I agree with *Peters* and with *Schultens*, that the word is sometimes taken in an unfavourable sense, so as to particularize the souls of the wicked.

version stands thus: "In a moment shall they die, and the people shall be troubled at midnight, and pass away; and

This I think is manifest from Prov. ix. 18; xxi. 16. And I would in the following manner explain the various acceptations of the word, which I have not been able to find has yet been satisfactorily done by any author.

From the verb רפה, signifying *resolvere*, I derive, with *Cocceius*, the word רפאים, *resoluti*; which, applied to human beings, denotes that they are *reduced to their first elements by dissolution*. *Rephaim* therefore implies the *deceased*, in that separated condition of the component parts of their nature which is produced by death: and as the bodily part moulders into dust and becomes insensible, it is consequently applied to that active principle, which retains the consciousness, and continues as it were the existence, of the man. *Rephaim*, then, imports men in that state, to which they are brought, when reduced by dissolution to the simple and essential element, the soul; and thence has been used to signify the *ghosts of the deceased*. These again, being clothed by the imaginations of the living in certain airy shapes, and magnified through terror to gigantic stature, in process of time lent their name to men of great and terrific bulk; and hence the appellation passed to *giants*, and became the denomination of certain classes of that description in Canaan. Again these *Rephaim* of the Canaanites, being distinguished amongst a people who were all odious for their crimes, and as such pronounced to be an abomination to the Lord, the idea of great wickedness, so strongly associated with the name, was by degrees reflected back upon the primitive term; so that *Rephaim*, as applied to the souls of the dead, came at length to imply also specially the souls of the guilty dead. Thus *Rephaim* becomes properly capable of these three senses, *Ghosts*, *Giants*, and *Ghosts of the Wicked*.

Again, as to the origin of the word שאול *Sheôl*, signifying, as we have seen, the region allotted to the residence of the *Rephaim*, or shades of the departed, it has been best derived from the verb שאל, *quæsivit, postulavit*, indicating its *insatiable craving*: a character which we find particularly attached to it in several parts of Scripture—see *Isai.* v. 14; *Habak.* ii. 5; *Prov.* xxvii. 20; xxx. 16.—At the same time, I confess, I cannot but think, that there has been overlooked by the Critics a particular acceptation of the word שאל, which would more adequately convey the true character and nature of *Sheôl*. The verb is known not only to signify, to *demand*, or *crave*, but to *demand*, or *crave* AS A LOAN; and therefore implies that what is sought for is to be *rendered back*. In this view of the case, *Sheôl* is to be understood, not simply as the region of departed spirits, but as the region which is to form their *temporary* residence, and from which they are at some future time to be rendered up; thus indicating an intermediate state of the soul, between its departure from this world, and some future stage of its existence. This particular acceptation of the word receives countenance in this passage of Job, especially, from the rendering of the LXX and the Chaldee, with which our common version corresponds. The word יתוללו, the former renders by μαιωθήσονται, (from μαία, *obstetrix*,) *shall be brought forth*; and the latter, by a word signifying *regenerabuntur*, *shall be born again*: both evidently explaining the Hebrew word חלל or חול, in reference to the *pains of bringing forth*; and signifying, that the *Rephaim* were to be rendered up from the place of their residence, and as it were born again into some new state of existence. Codurcus also, I find, in his explanation of *Sheôl*, describes the notion entertained of it by the Jews thus; "שאול, purgatorii locum existimant, ex quo

the mighty shall be taken away without hand."—On this passage his Lordship makes the following observations.—"The sudden death here described, its happening *at midnight*, the trepidation of the people, the removal of the *strong ones* to the other world by *an invisible hand;* what are all these but the circumstances recorded by Moses in Exodus, xii. 29, of the destruction of the first-born of the Egyptians? Pharaoh likewise is the king, to whom God is said just before to have given the title of Belial. We have here of course another *proof*, that the writer of this poem was posterior in time to Moses."[a]

redduntur superis animæ, exantlatis quibus erant obnoxiæ pœnis." (*Crit. Sacr.* tom. iii. p. 3318.)—*Windet* also mentions, that to the *Sheôl* of the Hebrews, corresponds the *Amenthes* of the Egyptians, which Plutarch, comparing it with the *Hades* of the Greeks, expounds by τὸν λαμβάνοντα καὶ δίδοντα, in his book of Isis and Osiris. (*De vitâ functorum statu*, p. 24; also *Peters*, p. 320.)—*Windet* likewise informs us, that the Jews hold *Gehenna*, or the place of perdition, to be the lowest part of *Sheôl*, the general receptacle of departed souls:—and that in order to express the great depth, to which they conceive it to be sunk, they are used to describe it as *beneath the waters:* their idea being, that the waters are placed below the earth, and that the earth floats upon them like a ship. *De vitâ functorum statu*, pp. 242, 243. *Tartarus*, in like manner, he says, (p. 245,) the Greeks made the lowest part of *Hades*.

On the Jewish notions of *Sheôl*, compared with the Greek notions of *Hades*, I would refer the reader to the entire of the last-named work; to *Peters's Crit. Diss.* as before noticed; to Bishop *Lowth's Lectures*, vol. i. pp. 156—166, (Greg. edit.,) and Mr. *Henley's* note in ditto, p. 213; to *Mich. Not. et Epim.* pp. 27, 28; and to Bishop *Horsley's Hosea*, pp. 46. 157—160. 200, 201. He may consult also with advantage the Sermon of this last writer, upon Christ's descent into *Sheôl:* and upon the same subject he will find a good discourse by *Johnson of Cranbrook*, in the 2d volume of his Sermons.

Were I now, upon the whole, to offer my own rendering of the passage in Job out of which this long discussion has arisen, I would venture the following:

The souls of the dead tremble;
[The places] below the waters, and their inhabitants.
The seat of spirits is naked before him;
And the region of destruction hath no covering.

Here I take the *souls of the dead*, and the *inhabitants of the places below the (abyss of) waters*, to bear to each other the same proportion, that is found, in the next verse, to subsist between the *seat of spirits*, and the *region of destruction:* those of the dead who were sunk in the *lowest parts* of Sheôl being placed in the *region of destruction*, or the *Gehenna* of the later Jews. So that the passage, on the whole, conveys this: that nothing is, or can be concealed from the all-seeing eye of God; that the souls of the dead tremble under his view, and the shades of the wicked, sunk to the bottom of the abyss, can even there find no covering from his sight.

[a] *Heath*, who is extremely anxious

Now, undoubtedly, if this supplies a *proof* of the point proposed, the matter of demonstration is easier than has been commonly imagined. In the original passage here referred to, it must be remembered, that the Bishop does not pretend to have discovered any one *expression*, which is to be found in the description of the slaughter of the first-born in Egypt, excepting the single term, "*midnight*." This almost total diversity of phrase is surely no part of the *proof* that the description in Job is taken from that which was given by Moses. But although there be not an identity of expressions, yet may there not be a general similarity to justify the Bishop's assertion? On the contrary, there is nothing more requisite than his Lordship's own statement of the case to overturn every idea of a reference to Moses's account of the

to lower the antiquity of the book of Job, has gone before the Bishop, in the notion that the slaughter of the first-born is here alluded to; although his Lordship has mentioned this, as one of the notes of time, which had escaped *all* the commentators. To make the reference appear more probable, that author has rendered the word יעבר, in such a manner, as to imply the *passing* on of the destroying angel, as described by Moses. In doing so, he has undoubtedly improved the resemblance to the account of the transaction in Exodus. But to make this point out, he is compelled either to violate grammar, or to pluralize the Angel. These things, however, avail nothing, as the hypothesis *must* be supported.—*Warburton*, with the same resolute determination to modernize Job, discovers, in the passage before us, not only the transaction in Egypt, but also another of a nature entirely different. The words, he says, "*plainly* refer to the destruction of the first-born in Egypt, AND *Sennacherib's army ravaging Judæa.*"—*Div. Leg.* vol. ii. p. 498.—What now becomes of that appropriate term, "*midnight*," which, with the Bishop, singled out the transaction in Egypt from every other: and of that other significant word, יעבר, "*pass through*," which has so completely satisfied Heath, that no other than that transaction could have been intended:—neither of these words being found in the history of the destruction of Sennacherib's army?—*Codurcus* has, with true propriety and good sense, suggested the use which is to be made of the two events alluded to by Warburton; namely, that they are facts, to which the mind is naturally led, as tending to exemplify and confirm the observation on the ways of Providence, which is laid down in this part of Job; and that had these events taken place before the composition of the poem, it would not be unnatural to suppose that the writer had them, with others of the same kind, in his view. These are the reflections of a sober judgment, which, it were much to be wished, was more frequently to be met with in our commentators and translators. I should mention, indeed, that *Holden* and *Scott* have taken the same judicious view of the subject. To prove how wide in its application this passage in Job has been found, I shall add only one instance more of its appropriation. The Chaldee has discovered in it an illusion to *the destruction of Sodom.*

above transaction. For, in the first place, according to that statement, God is here represented as having given to Pharaoh the title of *Belial*[a].—Now this is a piece of information, with which Moses does not appear to have been acquainted; of which at least he has left behind him no record. Again, as his Lordship reminds us, and with the additional emphasis of Italics, the passage in Job describes those who were taken away, as "*the strong ones.*" Now what does Moses tell us? That, "the Lord smote *all* the first-born in the land of Egypt, from the first-born of Pharaoh that sat on his throne, unto the first-born of *the captive that was in the dungeon; and all the first-born of the cattle.*"—In other words, he informs us, that the first-born, of both *man and beast*, was indiscriminately destroyed; and this, the Bishop thinks, is significantly conveyed by the phrase *strong ones*, or rather (as our common version more properly reads) the *mighty*. But, again, his Lordship sees plainly in "*the invisible hand*," (or, as he himself renders it, and as it ought to be rendered, *without hand*,) a marked proof of the allusion

[a] His Lordship has here created a difficulty against himself. For, as was stated above, *were* Pharaoh supposed to be in this place intended under the title of *Belial*, this would disprove the Bishop's position that the writer alludes to the history in Exodus. But that Pharaoh *is* intended here, there is not the slightest ground to imagine. In this I will be judged even by the Bishop's own translation:

"Shall even the hater of justice give laws?
And wilt thou condemn the eminently just One?
Who saith unto a king, Thou art Belial!
Ye are wicked! unto princes:
Who accepteth not the persons of nobles,
Neither is the rich man," &c.

Now where is *Pharaoh?* Is it in the word *Belial?* That name was never given to him. But he deserved such a name. Why? Is it because *Belial* implies wickedness? and was Pharaoh the only wicked king? We might also demand to be informed who were those *Princes of Pharaoh's court*, who are at the same time denominated *wicked*. In truth the Bishop's argument might on the whole be put thus: Pharaoh, it is true, is not by Moses called Belial, but he *ought* to have been so called by him, and therefore we may consider him as actually *having been* so called.—Again; Pharaoh is not named here, but as the word *Belial* is used, which denotes wickedness, Pharaoh *ought* to have been named, and therefore we may consider him as *having been* actually named. Really this is too extravagant. —N.B. the word בליעל *Belial*, simply signifies *worthless, wicked, ἀχρεῖος, nequam:* from בל *non*, and יעל *profuit*.

in this part of Job to Moses. To this it may safely be replied, that the proof is as *invisible* as the hand; for nothing corresponding to this phrase is to be found in the language of Moses.

In short, if one were seeking arguments to prove that the writer of the book of Job had *not*, in this place, his eye fixed upon the record of the transaction in Egypt which has been left by Moses, he would naturally select most of those very circumstances on which the Bishop seems so firmly to rely. For it must be remembered, that his Lordship is not content to say, that the writer of the book of Job refers to *facts*, which are related also by Moses; but he contends, particularly, that he must have derived his knowledge of those facts from the very accounts which Moses had given of them in his writings:—facts, he observes, not being usually referred to before the history recording them has had time to obtain currency; and the author of Job being, consequently, indebted to the history of Moses for his knowledge of such facts as have been adverted to by both. See p. 384.

But, in truth, not only is it manifest, that the writer of Job has not, in the passage before us, referred to the *Mosaic account* of the destruction of the first-born in Egypt, but there appears no reasonable ground for supposing that he meant to allude to that transaction at all. This will be best seen by a perusal of the entire passage in Job, as it is given in the common version, which is here subjoined [a].

[a] "Shall even he that hateth right govern?
And wilt thou condemn him that is most just?
Is it fit to say to a King, *Thou art* wicked?
And to Princes, *Ye are* ungodly?
How much less to him that accepteth not the persons of princes,
Nor regardeth the rich more than the poor?
For they are all the work of his hands.
In a moment shall they die;
And the people shall be troubled at midnight, and pass away,
And the mighty shall be taken away without hand.
For his eyes are upon the ways of man,
And he seeth all his goings.
There is no darkness nor shadow of death,
Where the workers of iniquity may hide themselves.
For he will not lay upon man more *than right*;

Now what is there here, to lead us to *the destruction of the first-born in Egypt?* Surely, if this were intended, some

That he should enter into judgment with God.
He shall break in pieces mighty men without number,
And set others in their stead.
Therefore he knoweth their works,
And he overturneth them in the night,
So that they are destroyed.
He striketh them as wicked men,
In the open sight of others:
Because they turned back from him,
And would not consider any of his ways.
So that they cause the cry of the poor to come unto him;
And he heareth the cry of the afflicted."

I cannot deny myself the pleasure of introducing, in this place, to the reader's acquaintance a translator of the book of Job, in the person of a young lady; who, adorned with all the accomplishments which distinguish her own sex, devoted herself, at the age of fifteen, to studies the most serious and intense, that are accustomed to occupy the attention of the other: and this, with such surprising success, that although self-taught, and nearly deprived of the benefit of books, she left behind her, at the expiration of her twenty-ninth year, a numerous collection of writings, so various and so valuable, as may well make many a literary man look back with a blush upon the labours of a lengthened life. — See *Fragments in Prose and Verse, by a young Lady.*

Miss Smith's translation of the book of Job, for which she had qualified herself by a close study of the Arabic and Hebrew, was completed before her twenty-sixth year, two years earlier than the date of the translation by the Bishop of Killalla. It is at this time well known to the public, by a neat edition of the work, which has, since the date of the above observations, been given by Dr. Randolph, who has enhanced its value by a variety of judicious critical observations. I annex this lady's version of the passage above referred to, as it may be to many a matter of curiosity to compare with our received translation any part of so extraordinary a production.

Shall he who hateth right govern?
And wilt thou condemn him, who aboundeth in justice?

Who saith to the King, Thou art unprofitable;
Wicked, to the Nobles:

Who lifteth not up the faces of Princes,
Nor turneth away from the cry of the Poor;
For they are all the work of his hands.

In a moment they shall die;
At midnight the people shall tremble, and pass away,
And the mighty shall be removed without hand.

For his eyes are on the ways of man,
And he seeth all his steps.

There is no darkness, and no shade of death,
To conceal the workers of iniquity.

For on no man hath it yet been put,
To walk with God in judgment.

He breaketh the mighty—they cannot be found;
And setteth up others in their stead.

Because he knoweth their works,
They are overturned in the night—they are crushed.

He striketh them like culprits,
In the place of beholders.

Because they turned from behind him,
And would not follow all his ways.

Bringing before him the cry of the poor;
And he heard the cry of the oppressed.

of the many extraordinary circumstances of so extraordinary a transaction would have been glanced at:—the slaying of the lamb;—the blood sprinkled upon the door-posts;—the destroying angel;—the preservation of the Hebrews, &c.

On a comparison with the original, this will be found more faithful, in many parts, than the received version. Particularly, in that very difficult passage in the 18th and 19th verses, in which the latter demands so large an ellipsis, as is found in Italics in the common Bible, our fair translator has, by a close adherence to the original, given excellent sense to the whole. She was not aware, that she coincided with high authorities in giving this turn to the original:—see *Schnurrer, Dissert. Philol.* p 279. —"Illum, qui regem adeo compellat hominem nequam; viros primarios, improbos? Non respicit principes," &c. &c. The LXX and Vulg. render it in like manner, "*qui dicit;*" and one MS. of De Rossi's reads האומר, fixing it in this sense. The 23d verse, too, —the difficulty of which is so great, that Schultens has reckoned up nineteen different meanings assigned to it, whilst Schnurrer has added several others, (p. 280,)—in which also our common version makes out the sense by an ellipsis, and Bishop Stock by introducing a change in the original text, (supposing עיר to be put for עול)—we have, here, rendered naturally as to the context, and simply and accurately as to the original, without supposing any change in the text, or putting any force upon the words. The sense of the entire passage may, agreeably to this translation, be now thus unfolded. — The wicked are at once and suddenly punished; inasmuch as no darkness can conceal them from the all-seeing eye: and as it has not been allotted to man to enter into judgment, and discuss the right of the case, with his God; so, without the delay of any judicial process, he breaketh the mighty at once, because without any such form of judicial discussion *he knoweth their works, &c.* A marginal reading on the 24th verse in the common Bible goes to strengthen this interpretation; "*without searching out,*" exactly expressing the absence of that formal and inquisitorial examination, which the omniscience of the Deity renders unnecessary. Perhaps Miss Smith meant this by the words, "*no search,*" which she has added as another rendering for that which she has paraphrased by the expression,—"*they cannot be found.*"

There is another line in the above extract from this lady's version, which deserves to be noticed "Nor turneth away from the cry of the poor"—verse 19. Here the word שׁוע, which in the common translation is rendered, "*the rich,*" has been taken in its ordinary and familiar acceptation, "*cry:*" and I find that *Pagninus,* in his version of the passage, has used it in the same sense. To render the original exactly, then, according to this meaning of the term, it would be, "Nor turneth away from the cry at the face of the poor."—"The cry *at the face of* the poor," for "the cry *of* the poor," certainly appears a harsh construction, but yet is not irreconcileable with the Hebrew idiom. The parallelism in the 19th verse, is undoubtedly better preserved by this translation, than by the common one: the *poor* in the second line being contrasted with the *princes* in the first; whereas, in the usual way of rendering, (שׁוע being taken to signify the *rich,*) the same description of persons that are spoken of in the first line, are again introduced into the second, so as to disturb the simplicity of the contrast, by naming twice over *one* of the subjects of the opposition.

On the contrary, the great power and impartial justice of God, in visiting, with sudden destruction, all, whether people or princes, whose crimes demand vengeance, seems to be the main thing insisted upon, without any discriminating characters to bind down this judicial exercise of his power to any one particular event. As to the circumstance of the destruction being wrought "*at midnight*," or, as it is again more generally stated, "*in the night*," it seems to connect with the idea, that "*the workers of iniquity*" could, as they imagined, "*hide themselves*" in the "*darkness*" and privacy of the night. *Grey* and *Schultens*, accordingly, explain the phrase of *night* or *midnight*, "in securitate profundissimâ." The paraphrase of *Calvin* upon this passage seems to give the justest notion of it.—"Non opus erit, ut Deus multos milites armet, &c., ad potentissimos et robustissimos evertendos: si modo insufflet, parvi et magni, puncto temporis, rapientur, et *mediâ nocte quum omnes quiescunt atque nihil minus expectant*, exterminabuntur; sine manu hominis auxiliove; quin sine conatu aut molimine ullo."—*Spanheim*, in his history of Job, gives the same explanation. *Munster*, *Vatablus*, *Clarius*, *Drusius*, *Patrick*, *Holden*, *Scott*, and *Dathe*, likewise concur in this view of the case. Upon the whole, it must be clear to every unprejudiced reader, that nothing but the creative eye of an hypothesis could have discovered, in this passage of Job, the appropriate mark of time which the Bishop and Heath have descried in it.

We pass on, then, to the next and only remaining allusion to the Books of Moses; which, his Lordship informs us, is to be found in ch. xxxi. 33, compared with Gen. iii. 8. 12. The words in Job are, "If I covered my transgressions, as Adam, by hiding mine iniquity in my bosom."—Now, independently of the probability, that the general outline of the story of Adam's transgression had been handed down so as to be generally known to those who lived near the patriarchal age,—it must be observed, that this translation is by no means generally acquiesced in, either by the ancient or by the modern interpreters of Job. The Arabic and Syriac render the

phrase כאדם, generally, "*as men.*" The LXX render, or rather paraphrase it, ἀκουσίως, "*involuntarily,*" or through the [a] *infirmity which belongs to man :*—the Vulgate, "*quasi homo :* "—Pagninus, in like manner, "*ut homo :*"—J. Tr. and Pisc. "*more hominum :* "—Mercer, "*sicut homines :* "—Tindal, "*before men :* "—Dathe, "*more humano,*" and subjoins to his translation the following remark : "Many interpreters think that אדם is here the proper name of the first man. But since, *in the whole book of Job, there is no one evident allusion to the sacred history,* I rather agree with those, who render the word כאדם, *as men, after the manner of men.*" [b]

I have enumerated these opinions, not because I think that the common version "*As Adam,*" ought to be rejected, but for the purpose of showing how little reason there is for pronouncing with confidence,—so as to build upon it any argument as to the time of the writer,—that such *must* be the sense. It is remarkable that *all* the early interpreters render the word otherwise. At the same time I cannot but confess that it appears to me to be a natural and just translation. And I will add, that there is introduced in the same verse, another expression, on which the Bishop, had he noticed it, might have laid some stress in furtherance of the argument he has advanced. בחבי [c] has for its root חבא, the same that

[a] See pp. 222, 223, for this sense of ἀκουσίως, as used by the LXX. See also, in addition to what is there said, the remarks of *Fischer* in his *Clavis Reliquiarum Versionum Græcarum,* &c., pp. 219—222. *Velthusen, Comment. Theol.* tom. iv.

[b] Miss Smith's translation of the word has run into a freedom, which seems not justified by the original—"as a *mean* man." For this no authority is adduced. The word אדם is undoubtedly to be rendered in this sense in Isai. ii. 9. But Vitringa well remarks upon that place, that when the words איש and אדם occur contrasted in the same sentence, the former signifies a man of dignity and note, the other a person of meaner condition. There is no passage, I believe, in the Old Testament, in which, without such a contrast implied in the sentence, the word is confined to the import, which has here been given to it by Miss Smith.

[c] This is commonly rendered "*in my bosom.*" I am convinced that it should be rendered, "*in my lurking place ;*" and that the whole verse should be thus translated,

> "Did I cover, like Adam, my transgression,
> By hiding, in my lurking-place, mine iniquity."

I agree also with *Peters,* (pref. p. viii.,) that this contains a reference to

is used in Gen. iii. 8. 10, to describe the *hiding* of our first parents from the presence of God. But yet, even this must

the history of the first man, and his endeavours to hide himself after his transgression. But when he joins with these words, and as part of the same sentence, "BECAUSE *I feared a great multitude, or the contempt of families terrified me*," I think he joins together incongruous ideas: for Job would in no degree have resembled Adam in hiding his transgression, had it been done through the fear of men, and to avoid the contempt of families, there being none such for Adam to fear. So that I cannot but wonder that so perspicacious a writer could have been led into such confusion. The Bishop of Killalla, in his translation, has fallen into the same mistake. Miss Smith has marked the true spirit of the connexion: "Then let me be terrified," &c.

The translation of the following verse, as it has been given by the Bishop, I cannot avoid annexing, on account of a singularity in the version which I believe is scarcely to be paralleled.

"Because I dreaded the great multitude,
And the *buz* of families scared me,"
&c.

I need not say that the word BUZ is peculiar to this version. The original expression signifies simply and plainly *contempt*, and is so rendered by all. Why then BUZ? The reader will be surprised to learn that this is the very word in Hebrew put into the English character; בוז, BUZ.—This translation is certainly *literal* in the *most literal* sense of the word. But is it not too much to pursue *such* exactness, so as to allow the *meaning* altogether to escape?

This is not the only instance afforded us by the Bishop, of this new species of *literal* translation, which is effected merely by an alteration of the character in which the original word is written, and so giving a Hebrew word in an English type. Another striking one is supplied in ch. iv. 10, and repeated in ch. x. 16; xxviii. 8,—in all which places we find the word שחל, *Shachal*, which has been by other interpreters rendered a *lion*, conveyed to us by the Bishop under the term JACKAL:—a change of the sense, for which no conceivable reason can be assigned, but the *sameness of sound*; the word *Jackal*, or *Schakal*, (the name being thus indifferently written by English zoologists, from the French *Chacal*,) coinciding exactly with the Hebrew. It is not, indeed, without reason, that the word שועל, *Shoghal*, has been considered as denoting that species of *Fox*, which is called the *Jackal*: as may be seen in Parkhurst, who has some good observations on the word; and as it is used by Geddes in his translation of Judges xv. 4, concerning the *foxes* said to be caught by Samson. But שחל, the word with which we are concerned, has, I am confident, never been so rendered by any writer but Bishop Stock; and in using the word *Jackal*, in the several passages above mentioned, the English reader will be immediately aware, on the bare perusal, how miserably the sense is degraded. But still more so will he find it, in those other parts of Scripture, where this word is to be met: viz. Psalms xci. 13; Prov. xxvi. 13; Hos. v. 14; xiii. 7:—in all of which, a fierce and powerful animal is manifestly intended. When the slothful man through pretended terror is made to exclaim, "There is a LION in the way:" what will be thought of the change, that makes him cry out, "There is a JACKAL in the way?"

Bishop Pocock and Primate Newcome have both justly remarked on the word שחל in Hos. v. 14, that it undoubtedly signifies a *species of lion*: and the latter has well explained the word in agreement with *Bochart*: "שחל, *Leo niger*, for שחר; the ל and ר being often exchanged in the Eastern

be admitted to form a very slight ground of inference, in supposing the passage in Genesis to have been referred to by the writer of Job; especially when it is considered, that the idea of *hiding* or *concealing*, is conveyed, in the same verse, in two other words, כסה and טמן; so that when the same idea was again to be expressed, some third term would naturally be employed. Besides, independently of this consideration, the mere use of so common a word, and one which has been so frequently employed throughout the poem, could of itself prove nothing.

We have now seen the full amount of the *proofs* by which the Bishop of Killalla persuades himself that he has established the priority of the writings of Moses to the book of Job. And whether those "notes of time," which (he adds) "have escaped the diligence of all preceding [a] critics," be

languages."——[N.B. On the first of the three texts in Job above cited, there is a judicious criticism made by *Pilkington*, (in his *Remarks*, p. 183,) with respect to the true pointing of the place, which I have not seen noticed by any translator of Job, and which ought not to be overlooked.]

Having noticed Bishop Stock's treatment of that noble animal, the Lion, in reducing him (under the term שחל) to the low estate of the Jackal, I cannot avoid adverting to another attack made by him upon the same animal (under the term שחצה) in the third of the texts already referred to. In the common version of Job xxviii. 8, we have, "The *Lion's whelps* have not trodden it, nor the *fierce Lion* passed by it." In the Bishop's rendering, "The *sons of the splitter* tread it not, neither passeth over it the *Jackal*."—Will not the reader exclaim, "Hyperion to a Satyr?"—But now, to discover what is meant by "*sons of the splitter*," or how such an expression could come to be substituted for "*the Lion's whelps*," must surely be left to Œdipus himself, did not his Lordship step in to relieve us from our difficulty, by a translation of his translation, in the following note.—"*The splitter.*] The lion, who *splitteth* his prey in sunder."—His Lordship then proceeds to explain how the word comes to signify the *splitter*. The word שחצה, he writes שׁ־חצה, *who splitteth*; and so, he observes, we have another instance of the mode of tracing the meaning of words that commence with שׁ;—a mode to which I have already directed the reader's attention in the note, pp. 409—411. To the instances there enumerated of the application of this strange and fanciful rule, he will be pleased to annex this new specimen of its use, which has changed "*the whelps of the Lion*," into "*the sons of the splitter!*"—N.B. "*The daughters of screeching*" (Stock's Job, xxx. 29) seem fit companions for these "*sons of the splitter.*"

[a] Of the four "notes of time," that have been discussed, there is *but one*, (that which is founded on the Bishop's novel translation, *quails*,) that has not been again and again adverted to, by different writers, as supplying *some* ground for questioning the antiquity of the book of Job; and as often either abandoned or confuted. The same is to be said of the other notes of time

sufficient to justify the inference so confidently drawn, "that the writer of Job was junior to the Jewish legislator," must be left to the reader to decide.

Indeed, were the utmost that the Bishop desires conceded to his arguments; even allowing his Lordship's flight of quails, and the destruction of the first-born in Egypt, to hold good; the poem would not thereby, of necessity, be brought *lower* than the time of Moses; but might still, consistently with this admission, have been composed during the sojourning of the Israelites in the wilderness; which (it should be observed) is one branch of the hypothesis which supports the antiquity of the poem.—See page 392.—And yet his Lordship is not content with inferring from the forementioned supposed allusions, that the writer of Job was junior to Moses, but would also deduce from them the *likelihood* of his having been "junior *by some time*."—But since "the *quail*" cannot be maintained; since the mere word "*night*," or "*midnight*," is insufficient to designate the destruction of the first-born in Egypt; since the facts of the existence of *Giants* before the Flood, (even supposing such to have been intended by the *Rephaim* of Job,) and of *Adam's* transgression and his endeavour to conceal it, (supposing these also to have been alluded to,) must have been known even to the latest date of the patriarchal age by tradition [a];—

which his Lordship has advanced, with the exception of that one which relates to the history of David, on which more hereafter. The assertion, however, which his Lordship has made, as to these notes of time having escaped the diligence of preceding critics, is easily explained by the statement which accompanies it; namely, that his Lordship declined the trouble of acquainting himself with what "preceding critics" had written. This offers, at the same time, no very satisfactory justification of the *fact*, of old wares being put forward for new. The general reader would, naturally, from his Lordship's language, have inferred, that new proofs were now adduced of the lateness of Job, and, from faith in his Lordship's authority, might imagine, that these proofs were more potent than any that had gone before; but he would little expect to find in them nothing but the shreds and refuse of former hackneyed criticisms and exploded conjectures.

[a] The great distance of time from Adam creates no difficulty respecting Job's knowledge of the transaction of the fall. It should be remembered, that the patriarchal longevity diminishes the effect of that distance. In fact we can connect Adam and Abraham by two intervening links, Methuselah and Shem: Methuselah connecting Adam and Shem, as having lived concurrently with part of the lives of both; and

it seems plainly to follow, that the "sandy foundation," on which the Bishop conceives the opinion of the antiquity of this poem to be built, belongs rather to another structure, which his Lordship has, by his own confession, a little too hastily thrown up.

On the three remaining marks of time it cannot be necessary to dwell. The reader will be easily satisfied upon the bare perusal of the passages referred to, even in the Bishop's own translation of them, that they contain no indications whatever of that reduced date which he ascribes to this book. The inference from ch. xxxiii. 23[a] which would bring it

Shem again in like manner connecting Methuselah and Abraham. The history need then have passed but through three steps, to reach Abraham from Adam; and so would naturally spread through the several branches of the Abrahamic family; from which, and not remotely, the three friends of Job, and Job himself, are supposed to have been descended.

Blair gives the lives of the four patriarchs, above named, so as to make it appear, that Methuselah was 253 years old at the death of Adam; Shem, 97 years old at the death of Methuselah; and Abraham, 150 years old at the death of Shem.

[a] It is whimsical enough, that the writers who are desirous to reduce the antiquity of the book of Job discover, in the same passages, resemblances to events entirely different. Bishop Stock sees *clearly*, in the above passage, an allusion to the destroying and interceding angels in the time of *David*, described in 2 Sam. xxiv. 16, and 1 Chron. xxi. 15.—Warburton discerns in it, "*a most circumstantial account* of God's dealing with *Hezekiah*, as it is told in the books of Chronicles and Kings." (*Div. Leg.* vol. ii. p. 497.) And Heath again pronounces of it; that it "*so plainly* describes the case of Hezekiah, when he fell sick, and the prophet Isaiah came to him with messages from God, that it is *hardly possible to apply it otherwise.*" That the application, so strenuously contended for by the two last writers, is altogether inadmissible, has been decisively shewn by *Peters*, in his *Crit. Diss.* pp. 35, 36. Were objects of allusion to be curiously sought after among the events recorded in sacred history, the intended sacrifice of Isaac might perhaps be thought an object of reference, not less likely than any that has been assigned. But, in truth, of all that have been suggested by any supposed resemblance, none has been more unhappily selected than that which the Bishop has imagined, and in which I verily believe he has not been anticipated by any preceding critic. The perusal of the passage in Job, and of the history to which his Lordship refers, will be at once sufficient to prove, not only that they do not correspond, but that they are actually repugnant. Yet his Lordship thus speaks with full confidence of the conclusion derived from this reference:—"Here is a remarkable passage, well worthy the attention of critics, who wish to *ascertain* the much disputed point, *the date* of the poem before us:" and he proceeds to point out the precise fact, to which the allusion here is made; "that of the *destroying angel*, seen by David in the act of inflicting a plague upon Jerusalem, and commanded to stay his hand, in consequence of the atonement which the *interceding angel*

down to the time of David, is, as may be seen in the note below, too shadowy to bear the touch; and the supposed allusions to events belonging to the age of the captivity, in chapters xxi. and xxxvi., the Bishop himself admits to be so faint as not to be very confidently relied on. And yet, strange to say, after making this admission, and consequently relinquishing the only pretence that existed for reducing the poem lower than the age of David, he speaks of these very passages, as "adding strength to the sentiment of those learned men, who have been inclined to give the honour of this celebrated composition to *Ezra*." That is, he abandons the premises, and at the same time holds to the conclusion:—and this, too, a conclusion, which the most ingenious critics, who have ever undertaken its support, have failed in their endeavours to maintain.

It certainly seems strange, that an hypothesis, which reduces the date of this book to the times of the Babylonish captivity, and which ascribes the production of so sublime a poem to such a writer as Ezra, should, after having been so completely exploded, be at this day revived; revived too in the face of the triumphant arguments of *Grey*, *Peters*, *Lowth*, and *Michaelis:* and without any one reason advanced for its support, or any one argument against any of the numerous and powerful objections which those writers have brought against it. All the various ingenuity and erudition of a *Warburton* had been pressed into the service of this hypothesis: all had been employed to deck out a system for its

ordered king David, by the prophet Gad, to offer unto God;"—and the correspondence of course is made to consist, in there being an *interceding* and a *destroying* angel found both in the history and in the poem. Now it unfortunately happens, that it is not quite clear that there is an *angel* spoken of in the poem at all: but, admitting that there is, it appears that we have then in this place an interceding angel only, and no destroying one; and that in the history we have a destroying angel, and no interceding one:—that is, the poem and the history are directly opposite in their characteristic features. There are other circumstances of obvious unsuitableness, on which it is unnecessary to enlarge. The answer of *Peters*, even to the application made to Hezekiah, supplies at once a refutation of this. To *Schultens*, *Grey*, *Scott*, and *Dathe*, in their annotations on the place, I refer the reader: also to *Schnurrer's* judicious view of it, *Dissert. Phil. Crit.* pp. 275—277.

support. A machinery was contrived; an allegory was dressed up; an assemblage of imposing circumstances imagined; an end devised; means suited to that end dexterously adapted; and the reader's curiosity was at least excited and amused, if his judgment was not convinced. But now, after all this machinery has been broken up; after this engaging allegory, with all its plausible accompaniments, has been *proved* to be but a splendid vision, a baseless fabric, the mere dream of a luxuriant and uncontrolled imagination,—one of those that issue from the ivory gate,—is it not too much to be called upon by a cold, dull, and cheerless *ipse dixit*, to replace the fragments of the shattered structure, to embrace the visionary theory as an established truth, and to surrender to the unsupported assertions of Bishop *Stock*, what had been refused to the learned and subtle argumentations of Bishop *Warburton*?—When I speak of the mere *assertion* of his Lordship, I desire that it may be remembered, that I allude exclusively to his reduction of the date of the poem to the time of *Ezra*. Some colour of argument I admit to have been held forth, for his lowering it to the age of *David:* but none whatever has been offered for the transition from David to Ezra. This interval of above five hundred years, including the times of all the early *prophets*, the first of whom (Jonah) was near two hundred years later than the death of David, is flung away without ceremony; and the reader, who may have been sufficiently complaisant to travel with the Bishop so far down as to the second of the Jewish kings, finds himself unexpectedly transported, at once and without notice, to a period nearly one hundred years later than the return from the captivity.

As a *translator* of the book of Job, his Lordship was more particularly called upon to discuss the probability of this last supposed era of its production, than of any other; inasmuch as many arguments advanced particularly against this era are derived from the nature of the *style* and *language* of the poem; a subject on which it is remarkable that his Lordship, whose immediate business was with the *language* of the book,

has given no opinion whatever, unless what may be conceived to be implied in the supposition, that the period of the captivity was the era of the work, and Ezra its author. Perhaps Bishop Lowth was too severe upon his rival critic Warburton, when he pronounced, upon his advancing the same supposition, that the man who could seriously entertain it must not have "read either Job or Ezra in their original, and with a competent knowledge of the language." (*Letter to Warb.* p. 74.) This admirable critic proceeds, however, at length, (from p. 73 to p. 95,) to detail those distinctive characters of style, which (he thinks) establish the truth of his positions, touching the antiquity of the composition in question,—and which it might not be disadvantageous to some modern critics to peruse. He concludes his valuable remarks on this head with the following words:—"But what is the difference between these," (namely Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel,) "in comparison of the difference between the author of the book of Job and Ezra? Let any one properly qualified to judge in this matter read the plain historical narrative in the two first chapters of Job; it is neat, concise, clear in its order and method, pure and elegant in its expression: let him then turn to Ezra, and find, if he can, a single Hebrew chapter, on which he can with a safe conscience bestow any part of this commendation. Let him moreover take into the account this last author's barbarous terms; and then let him tell me fairly, whether he does not find as much difference between these two writers, as between Sallust and William of Malmsbury. Let him next look into the poetical parts of Job, and let him compare them with any part of Ezra's undoubted writings, and I would then ask him, whether he would not as soon pitch upon Geoffry of Monmouth for the author of the Eneid, if that were a doubtful point, as Ezra for the author of the poem of Job: and I should not much doubt of his answering in the affirmative." (*Letter to Warb.* pp. 96, 97.)

Bishop Lowth does not stand single in these opinions. For the evidence supplied to the antiquity of the book of Job from the nature of its language, I refer the reader to pp.

411—419: and in the subjoined note[a], the opinions of some of the most distinguished Hebrew critics will be found in a more detailed state to yield confirmation to the above positions. In speaking of Le Clerc, who has led the way to the reduction of the date of this poem to the age of Ezra, Schultens has made the following observations.—"Dolenda est

[a] On the idea that Ezra could have written in that pure and poetic style, which is to be found in the Mosaic writings, the Psalms, and the book of Job, *Michaelis* makes the following remarks:—"Nihil Ezrâ inornatius; ut mirer, quo erroris portento Mosaica illi scripta tribui potuerint: quanquam non est, quod mirer, cum facinus simillimum ausus sit Harduinus." (*Præf. in Not. et Epim.* p. ix.) Again, "Comparet cui lubet, quæ ante et post exilium Babylonis Hebraice scripta supersunt; nec minorem invenit labem ac ruinam quam in linguâ Latinâ. Quapropter est mihi veri dissimillimum, grande ac poeticum spirantes psalmos post reditum ex Babylone scriptos fuisse—*Ezræ* certe, *cujus Hebraismo nihil est humilius et ingratius*, psalmos nobilissimos tribuere, peccato vicinum est Harduini, odas Horatianas infimæ linguæ Latinæ ætati tribuentis." (p. 196.)—Again, speaking particularly of the book of Job, he says, "Totius poematis ea est puritas, elegantia, sublimitas, quâ nihil majus perfectiusque in toto Hebraico codice superest.—Hocne poema, auream ubique linguæ Hebraicæ et Mosaicam ætatem spirans, ad ferrea illa tempora detrudamus, quæ extincto uno bono poetâ, Jeremia, nihil perfecti ac ne quidem mediocriter pulcri, fuderunt?" (pp. 187, 188.)—*Schultens* is not less strong in his remarks upon the language and antiquity of Job. "Nullus inter sacros codices tam genuinum remotissimæ antiquitatis præfert characterem.—Multo facilius Ennianæ linguæ venerandum decus et pondus, expressisset scriptor aliquis ferreæ ætatis, quam Hebræus ab exilio Babylonico redux grandissimum illud, magnificum, intemeratum, ultimæ vetustatis notâ eminentissimâ impressum, quod è sublimi hacce, tam materiâ, quam stylo, compositione relucet. *Hoc qui discernere non valet, næ ille vel dissipate, velimperite, judicare censendus.*" (Præf. * * * 3.)—Warburton, who was not suspected of very deep knowledge of the Hebrew language, was little qualified to feel, and less disposed to admit, the force of such reasoning as the above. He therefore made no reply to the arguments so powerfully pressed upon him from these sources, by Bishop Lowth in his *Letter:* although, as appears from a private communication to his friend Hurd, he found himself most sorely galled by his more critical adversary. See p. 369, of *Letters from a late eminent Prelate.*

Having adverted to these *Letters*, I cannot avoid transcribing an extraordinary passage, relating to the book of Job; as an instance of the whimsical originality, for which that extraordinary man conceived his superior talents to have afforded him a license. "Poor Job! It was his eternal fate to be persecuted by his friends. His three comforters passed sentence of condemnation upon him, and he has been executing *in effigie* ever since. He was first bound to the stake by a long catena of Greek Fathers; then tortured by Pineda; then strangled by Caryl; and afterwards cut up by Wesley, and anatomized by Garnet. Pray don't reckon me amongst his hangmen. I only acted the tender part of his wife, and was for making short work with him. But he was ordained, I think, by a fate like that of Prometheus, to lie still upon his dunghill, and have his brains sucked out by owls." Pp. 29, 30.

conditio linguarum orientalium, prout eæ a multis tractantur. Unus, alter, tertius ad summum annus iis percipiendis datur. Analysis satis prompta. Explicatio ad receptam versionem non omnino impedita. Placent profectus; et jam metam se tenere credunt, qui carceribus vix egressi.—Quid causæ? Tum alia, de quibus alias, tum hoc vel maxime, quod qui in Græcis, Latinisve, non satis subactus, sibi aliquid arroget, mox in ordinem cogatur, atque ad subsellia relegetur: qui in Orientalibus, etiam in re pauperi ditissimus, non sibi tantum, sed et reliquis, videatur, si modo ope Lexici aliquid in medium proferre, mercesque suas venditare queat." Are our Commentators of the present day *more* conversant in Hebrew literature, and *more* cautious in giving to the public their interpretations of the Hebrew Scriptures, than Le Clerc?

We have now seen how indefensible, in the opinion of the most distinguished Hebrew critics, that hypothesis appears, which, reducing the book of Job to the period of the captivity, ascribes its production to such an author as Ezra. In embracing this hypothesis, however, the Bishop of Killalla has but trodden in the steps of others. But what shall we say to that, which reduces Job himself to so late a date? This, I apprehend, is a discovery that has been entirely reserved for his Lordship: at least I know of no commentator who is entitled to dispute with him the honour, whatever it may be, that belongs to the invention. It cannot, indeed, be affirmed, that he has laboured directly and specially to establish this point. But has he not so conducted his reasoning, as that it must follow by necessary implication? In the observations which have been offered at the outset of these remarks, pp. 399—403, we have seen, that the time of Job, and the date of the Book, are treated by him as in all respects the same[a].

[a] It is possible that his Lordship may, to the justness of the assertion which I have here repeated from the place referred to, object the following words, which will be found, quoted from his preface, in p. 88. "But, if it were ever so difficult to ascertain the portion of time when the *patriarch lived*, it may not be impossible, from the internal marks in the poem itself, to conjecture with tolerable certainty the *era of its author*." I do not deny, that the

If, therefore, his Lordship has succeeded in bringing down the latter below the Babylonish captivity, he must be considered, on his own principles, as having done the same by the former. The last note of the translation explicitly affirms, that Job must have lived after the time of David. The entire scheme of the reasoning pronounces, that he must have lived in the time of Ezra.

On this result I think it not necessary to offer any comment[a]. And, indeed, it is not without some pain, that I have been led to comment upon his Lordship's work at all. There are many reasons why I could have wished to forbear; and among these not the least forcible is, the circumstance of its having issued from a member of that distinguished order in the Church, to which I feel at all times disposed, from inclination not less than duty, to pay the utmost deference and respect. This last consideration, however, upon reflection, seemed to render it the more necessary that I should undertake the unpleasing task, in which I have been engaged throughout the latter part of this Number. I had already given to the public, in a former edition of this work, those remarks on the history of the book of Job which are contained in the former part of the Number. I had, upon grounds which appeared to me satisfactory, maintained the antiquity both of the book and of its subject; and from this I had derived an argument in favour of the antiquity, and wide extent of the sacrificial rite. I had also, proceeding in a way directly opposite to that which the Bishop has, in his preface, professed to have pursued, spared neither pains nor time to acquire the best information, and from the best interpreters, before I presumed to offer my ideas to the public. Soon after I had done so, the Bishop's work appeared, carrying with it the authority of his station, and by a single *dictum*,

Bishop has here *spoken* of the times of Job himself and of the author of the book, as not necessarily connected; nor do I assert that he deliberately intended to consider them as the same: I only affirm, that in his reasoning (whether intentionally or not) they *are* completely confounded.

[a] If any were requisite on a point so perfectly untenable, the observations in the first part of this Number would abundantly supply it.

levelling the whole of my laborious structure in the dust. That my observations were not thought worthy of notice by his Lordship, could not cause, even to the feelings of an author, much uneasiness; as the works of the most learned and celebrated commentators on Job were left not only unnoticed, but confessedly unperused. What remained, under these circumstances, to be done? Silence might be construed into an admission, that what I had before advanced had been unadvisedly offered, and could not be maintained: and, on the other hand, in treating of the Bishop's performance, justice required that I should speak of it in terms remote from those of commendation. Executed with a haste that nothing can excuse; abounding with errors both of reasoning and interpretation; presuming, upon slight and fancied theories, to new-mould the original text[a]; and withal setting

[a] Bishop Stock prides himself on a list of *conjectural* alterations of the Hebrew text, contained in an Appendix to his translation:—by which it appears, as he pronounces, that there are *more than sixty* places in Job, in which the text has been *corrupted*. By much the greater number of these alterations is proposed upon the reading of a single MS., or of a couple at the most; and what deserves yet more to be remarked is, that, for not fewer than *twenty-three*, no authority of *any MS. or version whatever*, is pretended, but the name of STOCK alone is annexed, as a sufficient justification! To this, it must be remembered, that we are to add, the rejection of the two last verses of the book upon the same unsupported dictum. These, one would think, are tolerable exercises of the conjectural faculty; and yet, strange to say, they are far exceeded by one which yet remains to be noticed; and which will be found contained in the notes on ch. xli. 11, 12.

"I am strongly of opinion, that, in the original of this fine poem, the speech attributed to God ended here" (viz. end of verse 12): "not only because it forms a fuller and more dignified conclusion than that which now closes the chapter; but because it assigns a satisfactory answer to the question, With what view was this laboured description introduced, of the two formidable works of the Creator, the river horse and the crocodile? Answer that question yourselves, saith the Almighty: if ye shrink with terror before my works, how will ye dare to set yourselves in array against their Maker? But to whom then shall we ascribe the Appendix contained in the last two-and-twenty verses of the forty-first chapter? Either to the author himself of the poem, who, in his *second* but not *better* thoughts, conceived he might add something valuable to his picture of the crocodile; or, which is more likely, to *some succeeding genius, impatient to lengthen out by his inventive powers what had justly obtained possession of the public esteem.* After inclosing therefore in brackets a superfetation that might well have been spared, we will go on, however, to give light to it.—Observe how the Appendix is ushered in; [12. *I will not be silent, &c.*] Is this language for the Omnipotent? Is it at all suitable to the grandeur of conception manifested in the

the seal of Episcopal authority to the entire congeries of precipitancies, mistakes, and mutilations—a due regard to my own credit, and, infinitely more, a due regard to the cause of truth, demanded, that such a work should not be allowed to pass upon the world as a faithful exposition of a part of Sacred Writ. In my observations upon the individual defects of this work, I have not thought it necessary to travel beyond the course which the Bishop's remarks upon the date of Job unavoidably prescribed. But I cannot dismiss the subject

rest of the poem? *the thread is too visible, by which the purple patch,* of more show than utility is fastened on."

Here, indeed, is critical amputation with a vengeance. And here we have a large portion of the original at one stroke scored off, and rejected as a "*superfetation,*" (so his Lordship is pleased to call it,) exactly in the same manner as we find the history of the birth of Christ, in the beginning of Matthew and Luke, scored off, as a *superfetation,* by the editors of the *Unitarian New Testament.* Heath had, indeed, transposed the first fourteen verses of the xlth chapter, and inserted them between the 6th and 7th verses of the xliid. For this, too, he had assigned a reason not deficient in plausibility. But to reject altogether an entire portion of the book, and this upon the merely fanciful and figurative ground of a "*thread too visible*" and a "*purple patch,*" has been reserved for a Bishop of the Established Church.

Having adverted to the subject of *conjectural emendation of the Sacred Text,* I cannot but enter my protest most decidedly against the spirit, which has, of late years, so mischievously infected the translators of the books of Scripture in that particular respect. The Bishop of Killalla, unfortunately, has had no small degree of countenance in such practices. By others, and those, too, critics of no small repute, this spirit has been too much indulged. The late Bishop of St. Asaph has well observed, that considering the matter only as a problem in the doctrine of chances, the odds are always infinitely against conjecture. (*Horsley's Hosea,* pref. p. xxxiv.)—The consequences growing out of the habit of altering the original Hebrew according to conjecture, must be, that we shall cease altogether to possess a standard text, and that for the *word of God,* we shall ultimately have only the *word of man.* Bishop Pocock justly observes upon this practice, that, "every one, for introducing anywhere such a meaning as pleased him best, might alter the words as he pleased, of which there would be no end; and it would be a matter of very ill consequence indeed. We must (he adds) fit our meaning to the words, and not the words to our meaning." (*Pocock's Works,* vol. ii. p. 493.)—That the MSS. and ancient versions are not to be called in, to assist in rectifying the Hebrew text, where confusion has manifestly arisen, I am very far indeed from contending: but that, what is properly called *conjecture* should be permitted to interfere, and now especially after the immense labours of *Kennicott* and *De Rossi* in their collation of the various copies of the Hebrew, is, I think, wholly inadmissible. This is not the place to enlarge upon such a subject. I would strongly recommend to the perusal of the reader the judicious observations of Bishop Horsley, in his preface, as before referred to, and at p. xxxix. See also *Dathii Opuscula,* pp. 135—137.

finally without saying, that, in my opinion, the necessity for a new English version of the Book of Job (if any be supposed previously to have existed) has in *no particular* been diminished by that which has been given to the world by the Bishop of Killalla[a].

As a matter of curiosity, and as supplying some relief from the *tædium controversiæ*, I annex a short account of the history of Job, as it has been handed down amongst the Arabians.

Job, or Aiub, (as he is called in Arabic, agreeably to the Hebrew name איוב,) is reported, by some of their historians, to have been descended from Ishmael; it being held, that from Isaac, through Jacob, all the prophets had sprung, excepting three, Job, Jethro, (the father-in-law of Moses, called by the Arabians, Schoaib,) and Mahomet; which three had come of the line of Ishmael, and were Arabians. By others, his descent is traced from Isaac, through Esau, from whom he was the third, or at most the fourth, in succession. And in the history given by *Khendemir*, who distinguishes him by the title of *the Patient*, it is stated that by his mother's side he was descended from Lot:—that he had been commissioned by God to preach the faith to a people of Syria:—that, although no more than three had been converted by his preaching, he was, notwithstanding, rewarded for his zeal by immense possessions:—that his wealth and prosperity excited the envy of the Devil; who, presenting himself before God, charged Job with motives of self-interest in his religious obedience, and asserted, that, if the Almighty would deprive him of his substance, his boasted allegiance would not hold out for a single day:—that the Devil obtained permission to strip him of his wealth; but that Job's fidelity remained unshaken:—that having received still further permission to afflict him in his person, the Devil infused by a pestilential

[a] His Lordship was, subsequently to the publication of the second edition of this work, advanced to the See of *Waterford*. To avoid confusion, however, I have continued to designate him by the title under which he is known to the public as the translator of Job.

breath such infection, as to render Job's entire body one putrid ulcer, and of a nature so offensive, as to repel from him every attendant, and to force the inhabitants to drive him out of the city into a remote and solitary place, whither his wife carried every day what was necessary for his subsistence:—that the Devil constantly stole from her whatever she had provided for this purpose; and that having reduced her to such a condition, that she had nothing remaining for her husband's relief, he appeared to her in the form of a bald old woman, and offered, upon condition of her giving two tresses of hair that hung upon her neck, to furnish her every day with what she might require for her husband's subsistence:—that Job's wife having agreed to the proposal, and parted with the tresses, the Devil produced the hair to Job, affirming that it had been cut from his wife's head, when caught in the act of matrimonial unfaithfulness:—that Job, enraged against his wife, was led to swear, that if he recovered his health he would most severely punish her for her offence:—that the Devil, having thus got the better of Job's patience, transformed himself to an angel of light, and published to the people of the surrounding country, that Job had forfeited the favour of God, and that they should no longer permit him to abide among them:—that Job, being informed of what had passed, had recourse to God by prayer, who in a moment put an end to all his sufferings; for that the angel Gabriel descended to the place where he was, and, striking the earth with his foot, caused a fountain of the purest water to spring up, wherein Job having washed his body and drank of it, he was suddenly and perfectly restored to health:—and that, after this, God multiplied his riches in such a manner, that, to express the abundance of it, the Arabian authors say that a shower of gold fell upon him. See *D'Herbelot*, *Bibl. Orient.* tom. i. pp. 75, 76. 432. 458; also *Sale's Koran*, vol. ii. p. 162, in which latter place the story is given with some minute variations.

The reader will of course consider these fables as introduced here *principally* for his amusement. One fact, how-

ever, they unequivocally speak; the belief of the Arabians, that there was in reality such a person as Job, who lived in the patriarchal age, and was distinguished above all men by his sufferings and his patience. The reverence for the name of Job has been in truth, from the earliest times, and to this day continues to be, through all Arabia, extremely great: so that many of the noblest families among the Arabians have gloried in being descended from that patriarch. The famous dynasty of the great *Saladin* have been known by the name of *Aioubites*, or *Jobites;* their illustrious founder being called by the name of Job.—*D'Herb. Bib. Orient.* tom. i. p. 76.—The reverence for this name has, I am sorry to say, been carried still farther amongst Christians: the worship of Job being (as Broughton tells us) of great antiquity, both amongst the Greek and Latin churches; the Greeks having chosen the 6th of May for celebrating the festival of SAINT JOB, and the Latins keeping it on the 10th —*Diction. of all Relig.* vol. i. p. 538.

NO. LX.—ON GROTIUS'S STRANGE MISCONCEPTION OF THE NATURE OF ABEL'S SACRIFICE.

PAGE 33. (a).—Grotius, followed by Le Clerc, interprets the words in Gen. iv. 4, which we translate *the firstlings*, as signifying the *best*, and *finest;* and will have this to relate only to the *wool*, which is known to have been offered to the gods in later times. That, also, which we render *the fat thereof*, he considers to mean no more than the *milk*, and appeals to the Seventy, who in numerous instances have certainly translated the word חלב, here used, by γάλα.

But first, as to בכורים, it cannot be denied, that, in relation to *man* or *beast*, it is never found in any part of the Bible, in any other sense than that of *first-born*. So appropriate is this meaning, that בכור is used *absolutely*, to express *primogeniture*, and the *right* resulting from it, as in Gen. xxv. 31, 32, 33, 34, and xliii. 33. It is, indeed, applied to *first fruits*, or fruits *first ripe;* but this evidently refers to its radical

signification of *first born:* nor can any instance be adduced of the application of the term in the figurative sense of *finest* and *best*, contended for by Grotius, unless such a signification be tacitly supposed to attach in all cases to the idea of the *first*, or *earliest*, in its kind. He has, indeed, referred us to the expression בכור מות in Job, xviii. 13: to the use of the word בכורים, applied to the fruit of the fig-tree; and to the force of the term בכור, employed to denominate the species of camel distinguished for its swiftness. But none of these instances can bear him out.

The first, which he would arbitrarily render, "morbus *maxime lethalis*," is no more than *the* FIRST-BORN *of Death*, a strong poetical expression; for the more particular meaning of which see *Parkhurst* on the word, and *Chappelow* on Job, xviii. 13. The second, which he says implies "ficus *maxime fructiferæ*," is an expression peculiarly unfortunate, as the word in this application is used to denote that species of fig which is *early ripe;* insomuch that at this day the word[a] *Boccôre* (בכור) signifies, in the Levant, the *early fig*, as *Shaw* states in his Travels, p. 370, fol. As to the third instance, the reason of applying this term to the fleetest species of camel, is not the general idea of distinction and superiority, but the peculiar quality of *swiftness:* the idea of *celerity* and *prevention* being most appositely conveyed by a term, whose radical signification implied the *first*, or *earliest*. In this sense the word is explained in the kindred dialects, of the Syriac, and (particularly) the Arabic: for which see *Schindler* and *Castell.* Indeed, no lexicon whatever, so far as I can discover, supports Grotius in the *general* signification which he attributes to the word. But all concur in giving to it the meaning of the *earliest* or *first produced*, or some other flowing from, and connected with, these.

Again, with respect to the word חלב, although it is undoubtedly used in several places to signify *milk*, as well as *fat*, yet, as Heidegger remarks, (*Hist. Patr. Exercit.* v. § 20.

[a] See *Lowth's Isai.* xxviii. 4; *Blayney's Jer.* xxiv. 2; and *Newcome's Hos.* ix. 10.

tom. i.,) there is not a single passage in Scripture, in which it is applied in that sense, when sacrifice is spoken of, and the offering is said to be מחלב.

But, moreover, as to Grotius's notion, that the *wool* and *milk* were the parts of the animal, which alone were offered by Abel on this occasion, it is notorious, that neither one nor the other is ever mentioned in Scripture as an offering to the Deity, unless this single passage be supposed to supply an instance. Kennicott also contends, in opposition to Grotius, that the strict analogy of translation will not admit the possibility of his construction of this passage of Genesis. "For if," says he, "it be allowed by all, that *Cain's bringing* OF THE *fruit of the ground*, means his bringing THE *fruit of the ground*, then Abel's *bringing* OF THE *firstlings of his flock*, must likewise mean his bringing THE *firstlings of his flock*," the exact sameness in the original phrase requiring an exact similarity in the translation. (*Two Dissert.* pp. 192, 193.) The passage, indeed, needs but to be read, to prove the whimsical conceit of this comment of Grotius. Not one word is said of *wool*, or that can lead the mind to it by any conceivable reference: but yet, because he is determined not to allow the sacrifice of Abel to have been an oblation of the animal itself; and there being no part of it that could be offered, without slaying the animal, except the wool and the milk; he is therefore led to pronounce that in the offering of these, the sacrifice consisted.

Nothing, in truth, can be more strangely chimerical, than the whole of Grotius's observations on this part of Scripture. His criticisms on the words מפרי האדמה, furnishes another extraordinary specimen. "By these words," he says, "nothing more is meant, than what the Heathens in later times understood by their *Sagmen*, which was a sort of turf, cut out of sacred ground, and carried sometimes in the hand of a Roman ambassador." On this Heidegger is compelled to exclaim—"Sæpe vir, cætera magnus, ex paganis ritibus talia, obtorto collo, ad explicationem rerum sacrarum rapit; quæ,

si propius intueare, nec cœlum nec terram attingunt." (*Exercit.* v. § 19.) But to return.

With respect to the word חלבהן, it may be right to remark, that, instead of *the fat* THEREOF, (which is ambiguous,) it may with more propriety be rendered, *the fat* OF THEM, meaning thereby, *the fattest* or *best, among the firstlings.* It is well known that the word חלב is often used for the *best of its kind.* Thus חטה חלב, is the *finest* of the wheat, Ps. lxxxi. 16; cxlvii. 14. And the *fat* of the oil, the *fat* of the wine, stand for the *best* of the oil and wine, and have been so translated[a], Numb. xviii. 12. It is the more necessary to make this distinction, lest the particular mention of the *fat* might lead to the supposition that the sacrifice was a *peace-offering*, the *fat* of which was consumed upon the altar, and the flesh eaten by the priests and the person at whose charge the offering was made. This was clearly an offering of a later date. The use of animal food was not as yet permitted. And the sacrifice seems to have been a *holocaust*, the whole of which was consumed upon the altar. That the sacrifice was of this kind many arguments concur to render probable. (See p. 327; also *Shuck. Connect.* vol. i. p. 81.) But it is placed beyond the possibility of doubt, if it be admitted, with the authorities and reasons adduced in pp. 368—370, that the sign of the Divine acceptance of Abel's sacrifice was the consumption of it by fire from heaven. Porphyry, in his 2d book, *De Abstin. Anim.*, considers this a sufficient reason to pronounce the offering of Abel to have been a *holocaust*, and compares it with that of Solomon, described in 2 Chr. vii. 1, where it is said, that *when Solomon had made an end of praying, the fire came down from heaven, and consumed the burnt-offering* (or holocaust) *and the sacrifices.*

[a] See *Chrysost. Jun. Vatab.*; also *Jen. Jew. Antiq.* vol. i. p. 149, and *Kenn. Two Diss.* pp. 193, 194.

NO. LXI.—ON THE DIFFERENCE IN THE DIVINE RECEPTION OF THE SACRIFICES OF CAIN AND ABEL.

PAGE 33. (b).—To those who reject the divine institution of sacrifice, this has always proved a stumbling-block; and to remove the difficulty, various solutions have been elaborately, but unsuccessfully, devised. The difference in the treatment of the two brothers had been accounted for by ancient commentators, from the *different mode of division* of their several oblations, as if Cain's fault had consisted in not giving to God the *best* parts, or the *proper* parts of the sacrifice. This unintelligible notion, which an early enemy of revelation, Julian, failed not to urge against Christians, took its rise from the Septuagint translation of Gen. iv. 7. Οὐκ, ἐὰν ὀρθῶς προσενέγκῃς, ὀρθῶς δὲ μὴ διέλῃς, ἥμαρτες;—*If you should rightly offer, but yet not rightly divide, would you not sin?*

Others have held, that the difference arose from this, that, whilst Abel brought of the *firstlings* of his flock, Cain did not in like manner bring of the *first* or *best* of his fruits. This idea, for which there appears no farther foundation in the original, than that it is *simply* stated that Cain brought *of the fruits*, originated with Philo, (as may be seen in p. 186, of this volume,) and has had the support of several Christian commentators. See *Cyril. cont. Julian*, lib. x. p. 349, ed. Spanh. Lips. and *Pol. Synop.* in Gen. iv. 3. Hallet also, in his note (*s*) on Hebr. xi. 4, concurs in this idea, and at the same time adds, that Abel's faith *caused* him to select the choicest for sacrifice. Primate Newcome, in his new version, seems to adopt the same notion, explaining the *more excellent sacrifice* in Hebr. xi. 4, as "consisting of more *choice and valuable* offerings."

Again, the reason of the difference assigned by Josephus (*Antiq. Jud.* lib. i. c. 3) is, that "God was more pleased with the spontaneous productions of nature, than with an offering extorted from the earth by the ingenuity and force of man." This strange conceit has been confined to Josephus, and the Rabbins, from whom Havercamp affirms, and Cunæus and

Heidegger fully prove, it was derived by this author. See *Krebs. Observ. in Nov. Test.* p. 383.

Another reason assigned is the difference of moral character. But the history clearly connects the fact of the acceptance of the one and the rejection of the other, with the nature and circumstances of the respective oblations.

Again, it is said that Cain's entertaining a design against his brother's life laid the foundation for the difference of treatment. But this intention against his brother's life is expressly affirmed to have been the *consequence* of the preference given to his brother's offering.

Dr. Priestley has observed [a] (*Theol. Rep.* vol. i. p. 195) that "the actions of both the brothers" (in the offerings made by them of the flock and of the fruits) "seem to have been of the same nature, and to have had exactly the same meaning." In this I entirely agree with him. Viewed in the light of reason merely, the distinction made between them by the Deity is utterly unaccountable. Sacrifices being considered as *gifts*, or as *federal rites*, or *as symbolical actions*, expressing the dispositions and sentiments of the offerer, or in any way that *human invention* can be conceived to have devised

[a] This essay of Dr. Priestley, in which (as has been stated in p. 325 of this volume) he has laboured to disprove the divine institution of sacrifices, and to establish their mere human invention as springing from anthropomorphitical notions of the Deity, it may be curious to compare with his latest observations on this subject in his *Notes*, &c. on Gen. iv. 3. There, in treating of the offerings of Cain and Abel, he expressly asserts his belief in the *divine origin* of sacrifices. "On the whole (he says) it seems most probable, that men were *instructed by the Divine Being himself* in this mode of worship," (sacrifice,) "as well as taught many other things that were necessary to their subsistence and comfort."

This observation, together with those which have been already referred to, (pp. 321—323,) cannot be read without wonder, when it is considered, that the author of them had spent a life in the continued endeavour to refute the assertions which they contain. This, however, after all, but shows the vast difference there is between the disputant and the inquirer. The wonder is easily removed by the view already taken of this matter in p. 323. And upon the whole, there seems good reason to think, that, had Dr. Priestley been permitted, for a longer period, to enjoy that freedom from angry polemics, which was indulged to the few concluding years of his life, he would have grown into a juster acquaintance with many of the vital truths of Scripture, and would have retracted many of those noxious opinions which he had so long and so assiduously toiled to disseminate.

them; the actions of the two brothers appear to stand precisely on the same ground, each bringing an offering of that which he respectively possessed, and each thus manifesting his acknowledgment and worship of the great Author of his possessions.

But what do I infer from this? That reason cannot untie the knot; and that to revelation consequently we must look for the solution. Here the difficulty vanishes, and all appears connected and satisfactory, as I trust is shown in the account given of this matter in the second of these Discourses:—see pp. 33—37.

The words of Cloppenburg on this subject deserve to be noticed: "Etsi diversæ oblationi videatur occasionem præbuisse diversum vitæ institutum, ipsi tamen diversitati oblationis hoc videtur subesse, quod Abel pecudum oblatione cruentâ ante omnia curavit, τὸ ἱλαστήριον διὰ τῆς πίστεως ἐν τῷ αἵματι, *propitiationem per fidem in sanguine*, quo necessario purificanda erant dona Deo oblata, Heb. ix. 22, 23.—Cainus autem, oblatione solâ Eucharisticâ de fructu terræ defungens, supinè neglexerit sacrificium ἱλαστικὸν, ut eo nomine Deo displicuerit, neque potuerit obtinere *Justitiæ Dei, quæ ex fide est, testimonium*, quod non perhibebat Deus, neglecto istoc externo symbolo supplicationis ex fide pro remissione peccatorum obtinendâ. Quemadmodum ergo, in cultu spirituali, publicanus supplicans cum peccatorum ἐξομολογήσει descendit in domum suam justificatus præ pharisæo, cum gratiarum actione, Deo vovente decimas omnium quæ possidebat, Luc. xviii. 12.—sic censemus hâc parte potiorem fuisse Abelis oblationem præ oblatione Caini, quod ipse supplicationem suam pro impetrandâ peccatorum remissione testatus sit per sacrificii propitiatorii cruentam oblationem, cum alter dona sua eucharistico ritu offerret, χωρὶς αἱματοχυσίας." *Sacrif. Patriarch. Schola.* p. 15. On the subject of this Number see *Kennic. Two Dissert.* pp. 225—238, and *Barrington's Misc. Sacr.* pp. 69—71.

NO. LXII.—ON THE TRUE MEANING OF THE PHRASE, ΠΛΕΙΟΝΑ ΘΥΣΙΑΝ, ATTRIBUTED TO THE SACRIFICE OF ABEL.

PAGE 33. (d).—Dr. Kennicott's criticism on this passage combined with Gen. iv. 4, is too remarkable to be passed over in silence. The words, πλείονα θυσίαν, he contends, should be rendered a sacrifice *greater*, or *more*, in reference to *number*, rather than to *value:* for that, although πολὺς in the positive sense does sometimes signify *excellens, præstans*, yet in the other degrees of comparison it is never so used; but that πλείων has constantly the signification of *plus, amplior, copiosior*, or *numerosior:* and for this he refers to the several lexicons of Budæus, Constantine, Gesner, Hederic, Leigh, Scapula, and Stephens: and from Stephens's Concordance he says it appears, that πλείων has not the sense of *præstantior*, through the whole of the New Testament. The idea of *number*, he says, necessarily strikes us; and therefore Wickliffe's, which reads a MUCH MORE *sacrifice*, he affirms to be a just translation; and that Queen Elizabeth's version was right, in preserving the force of this by rendering the words, *a greater sacrifice.*

In conformity with these observations he suggests an interpretation of Gen. iv. 4, which, I apprehend, is peculiar to himself: namely, that Cain brought a *single* offering, of the fruits of the ground; and Abel a *double* oblation, consisting likewise of the fruits, and of an animal sacrifice besides. His principal argument in support of this novel idea is derived from the word Mincha in this place; the meaning of which, he says, is fixed precisely in Levit. ii. 1, and confined to an unbloody oblation, viz. a *meat-offering;* or, as we generally appropriate the word meat to *flesh*, more properly *a bread-offering.* This term, he argues, being here applied to Abel's oblation, and being totally inapplicable to the *animal* sacrifice which he is expressly said to have offered, it follows, that he must *likewise* have made an offering of the fruit of the ground such as Cain had brought. And this he contends, the very turn of expression in the original strongly

indicates: for that, in strictness, the passage should be rendered, "Cain brought of the fruit of the ground, a Mincha to Jehovah—and Abel brought (the same), he *also* (brought) of the firstlings," &c.; for that in the words, והבל הביא גם הוא, the particle גם cannot be joined to the verb immediately preceding, from the nature of the position, and its connexion with a second nominative case—and that, agreeably to this, the Seventy have rendered the clause, Καὶ Ἄβελ ἤνεγκε καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπὸ τῶν πρωτοτόκων.

This criticism of Dr. Kennicott seems, however, unworthy of so great a name; for even admitting, that the particle גם is to be connected, not with the preceding verb, but with the second nominative case, the inference drawn by Dr. Kennicott will by no means follow; there being no form of expression more familiar to the Hebrew, than the emphatic repetition of the persons spoken of, with this particle גם adjoined. To adduce instances of this were idle, as it is one of the most common idioms of the language. Whoever wishes for examples, however, may find them in sufficient plenty in *Nold. Concord. Partic. Ebr.* pp. 201, 202. Now, in this application of the particle, it is manifest, that the whole of Dr. Kennicott's construction falls to the ground. Again, admitting the particle to be used in the additive sense, *also*, as Dr. Kennicott's view of the passage requires, yet will not this justify his translation; since, being necessarily connected with the second nominative case by this writer's own admission, it can only mean, that Abel *also*, *as well as* Cain, brought an offering; whereas, according to Dr. Kennicott, it must signify, that he brought *also of* the firstlings, &c., i. e. he brought not only what Cain had brought, but *besides*, or *in addition to that*, of the firstlings of his flock; to make out which translation, the word *also* must be connected, not with the second nominative case הוא, or αὐτὸς, but with the following words, מבכרים, or ἀπὸ τῶν πρωτοτόκων, from which it is entirely disjoined by the intervening pronoun. Thus Dr. Kennicott becomes inconsistent with himself, having first con-

tended for the immediate conjunction of the particle with the second nominative case, and having then applied it in such a sense as to require its conjunction, not with this nominative case, but with another part of the sentence.

But he relies on the force of the word *Mincha*, which is applied only to Abel's offering: the Lord being said to have had *respect to Abel and to his* MINCHA. It is, then, of importance to ascertain the true meaning of this word; and the more so because, if this writer's sense of the term be admitted, and at the same time his theory of the *double* oblation be rejected, the necessary inference is, that no animal was slain by Abel, but that the offering must have been of the unbloody kind, and consequently that it was, as Grotius has contended, merely an offering of the milk and wool of his flock.

Now, it is in the first place to be remarked, that he explains the word *Mincha*, as applied to the offerings of Cain and Abel, by the exact definition of it, as we find it specifically used under the law, where it appears to be confined to offerings of the unbloody kind. (See *Two Dissert.* pp. 188—192.) But if Dr. Kennicott be right in explaining the *Mincha* in all cases by the strictness of the Levitical definition, then it necessarily follows, that Cain did not merely bring an offering *of the fruits of the ground*, but that he brought the *very kind* of *meat-offering*, or *Mincha* appointed in the 2d ch. of Levit., where, as Kennicott emphatically observes, the description of the *meat-offering* concludes with these words, זאת המנחה, THIS IS A MINCHA. Cain's offering, then, must have consisted of "fine flour with oil poured upon it, and frankincense placed thereon." The exact quantities also of the flour and oil, as prescribed in the law, must have been employed. This the force of Kennicott's argument indispensably requires. For he contends, that the *very definition* of the *Mincha*, as given in Leviticus, "determines the sense of the word absolutely in the five books of Moses: for that wherever the inspired author mentions the word *Mincha*,

as a sacrificial term, he must certainly use it in the same sense; the same, which had been settled upon it by God himself, before Genesis was composed."

Now, it is certain, that wherever the MINCHA, properly so called, is spoken of *under* the law, it must be understood in the sense expressly given to it *by* the law; and in this reference it is, that Buxtorf, Reland, Outram, and Jos. Mede (whom Kennicott quotes in justification of his opinion) seem to have spoken of the *Mincha*. But, surely, when applied to oblations *antecedent* to the law, the term is not necessarily to be taken in that restrained sense, to which its general signification was limited, in later times, by those appropriate circumstances attached to it by the legal institution. It is undoubtedly true, as Gussetius, who is referred to by Kennicott, remarks, that a *Mincha* presented to God signifies an unbloody oblation. But when he says, that it *always* does so, and that "there is not one instance of its being used for an animal oblation throughout the Bible;" (*Comment. Ling. Ebr.* p. 473;) he, in the first place, begs the question respecting the sacrifice of Abel, which is expressly called a *Mincha:* secondly, he forgets, that every other instance of its sacrificial application is an instance of the use of the term *under* the law, by which its original meaning had been narrowed: and, lastly, both he and Kennicott materially err in point of fact; the word *Mincha* being frequently employed even under the law, to denote *animal sacrifices*, as well as the *bread* or *flour-offerings*. Thus in 1 Kings, xviii. 29. 36; 2 Kings, iii. 20; and Ezra, ix. 4, 5, we find the morning and evening sacrifices, which, beside a bread-offering and drink-offering, included also the offering of a lamb, described by the general appellation of *Mincha*. In Judg. vi. 18, the same term is applied to the offering of a kid with unleavened cakes. And in 1 Sam. ii. 17; and Mal. i. 13, 14, it is used in relation to animal sacrifice, in a manner the most explicit and unqualified. So that, although, as Rosenmüller, on Levit. ii. 1, affirms, this word be applied *per eminentiam* to the oblation of corn, yet

even under the law we find its more general signification force its way.

This proves decisively the weakness of Dr. Kennicott's argument derived from the supposition that the words מנחה הוא (Lev. ii. 6) are to be understood in the sense, THIS IS A MINCHA, i. e. as marking the precise meaning of the term, wherever it occurred in a sacrificial relation. Indeed, the circumstances of the *various* kinds of *Bread-offerings*, comprehended under the term *Mincha*, which Kennicott himself admits to have existed, (pp. 190—192,) and of which there were not fewer than five, prove that this passage could not have been intended here as *confining* the term to the specific oblation to which it refers; and that it could only mean, that this oblation was one of those which might be included under the term *Mincha*. Vatablus renders the words, "*Munus est:* i. e. tale est munus quod offerri debet Deo." See also *Fagius*, *Vatablus*, *Castalio*, on Exod. xxx. 9.

It is certain that the true and original signification of the word, is that of *an offering presented to a superior*. Thus we find it in Gen. xxxii. 20, and xliii. 11. 15, in which places it is used for the purpose of appeasing: again, in 2 Chr. xxxii. 23, and Ps. lxxii. 10, where it is applied to offerings brought by strangers to the temple at Jerusalem: and also in 1 Kings, x. 25; 2 Chr. ix. 24; 2 Kings, viii. 8, 9, where it is used to denote the gifts sent to earthly princes. The word appears to be derived from an Arabic verb, signifying *donavit:* see *Rosenm.* and *Le Clerc* on Lev. ii. 1, and *Schindl. Lexic. Pentag.* Parkhurst derives it from the Hebrew verb נח, *quievit posuit;* and *Calasio from* נחה, *duxit*, without, however, making any change in the signification. From this it follows, that all sacrificial *offerings*, whether bloody or unbloody, must fall under the general denomination, *Mincha*. That it is taken in this large sense by all Lexicographers, Le Clerc (on Lev. ii. 1) positively asserts. See also *Castell*, and, especially, *Parkhurst*, on the word.

Drusius (on Hebr. xi. 4) affirms, that it is of greater extent

than is commonly admitted. Ainsworth observes, (on Lev. ii. 1,) that it "was *generally* any solemn gift, or present, to God, or man: *in special*, a present or sacrifice unto God: *more specially*, an offering of the fruits of the earth." Sykes also (*Essay*, &c., p. 17) uses the word in the same *general* sense, whilst he admits, that "later use has pretty much confined it to oblations of flour or meal."

How little reason, then, Dr. Kennicott had for introducing so novel and dangerous a criticism, is, I trust, upon the whole sufficiently evident. How inconsistent also it is with the ideas of sacrifice, which he holds in common with the doctrine maintained in these discourses, will appear, when it is considered, that if, in the case of Abel's oblation, the word *Mincha* be supposed to relate, not to the sacrifice of the animal, but solely to an offering of the fruits with which it was accompanied, it must follow, since God is said to have had respect to his *Mincha*, that it was not the animal sacrifice, but the offering of the fruits, which conciliated the divine regard. And thus the theory which pronounces the *animal sacrifice* to have been originally enjoined, as a type of the great sacrifice of Christ, and which ascribes to this, as the instituted expression of the true faith, the superiority of Abel's offering over that of Cain, is at once overturned. And yet to this very theory it is, that Dr. Kennicott, in his *Dissertation on the Oblations of Cain and Abel*, has given his warmest support.

Perhaps it may not be amiss here, to endeavour to fix the true meaning and value of the sacrificial terms קרבן, מנחה, and זבח, *Corban*, *Mincha*, and *Zebach*: and the more particularly, as their relative force seems not to have been stated with exactness by any late writer. The first of these terms, being derived from קרב, signifies whatever was *brought to God before the altar*; whether dismissed, as the scape-goat; dedicated to the service of the Sanctuary, as the sacred vessels, and the conductors of the sacred rites, the Levites; or offered up, as the sacrifices properly so called, which were consumed at the altar. Again, the *Mincha* was an oblation, which was

of the nature of a sacrifice, being *consumed at the altar*, whether it consisted of things animate or inanimate, although, as we have seen, the Mosaic institution in a good degree narrowed its application; confining it, for the most part, to what is called the *meat-offering*, or, as it should in strictness be denominated, the *bread* or *flour-offering*. And lastly, the *Zebach* was the oblation of an animal *slain* in sacrifice. Thus, *Corban* is the most general term, including all sorts of offerings, or dedications, to God in his temple. *Mincha* is the next in order, applying to those offerings which were consumed at the altar. And *Zebach* is the *species infima* in the scale, relating only to the animal sacrifice.

But to return to Dr. Kennicott, and the immediate subject of this note. His remark on the word πλείων, that it necessarily involves the idea of *number*, becomes now totally inapplicable. The idea of a *double oblation* in the case of Abel, which it was intended to support, has been shewn to be entirely groundless: and, indeed, his observations on the force of the word πλείων itself seem not less so. That "the notion of *number* is included in every application of the word throughout the New Testament," is so far from being true, that numerous passages may be cited, in which no such idea can possibly attach to the word. Thus, in Matt. vi. 25. *Is not the soul more* (πλείων) *than meat?*—and again, xii. 41. *Behold, a greater* (πλείων) *than Jonas is here.* Many other such instances may be seen in Stephanus's Greek Concordance, to which Dr. Kennicott has referred in support of his opinion. But the true force of the word, both in the positive and the comparative, may be best seen in Schleusner's Lexicon. It will thence appear, that the just value of the expression in the passage in Hebrews has been given in the text: a more *ample*, or *fuller* sacrifice, expressing in emphatical terms, that which partook more *largely* and *essentially* of the true nature and virtue of sacrifice. Vatablus renders the word *uberiorem*.

NO. LXIII.—ON THE NATURE AND GROUNDS OF THE FAITH EVIDENCED BY THE SACRIFICE OF ABEL.

PAGE 34. (a).—FAITH (we are informed by the apostle, Romans x. 17) *cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God.* This account of *Faith*, combined with the numerous examples exhibited in the 11th ch. of Hebrews, in illustration of its nature, can leave us at no loss to pronounce, that Abel's offering was in obedience to a divine revelation. For it must be remarked, that in the several instances, adduced in this chapter, of persons actuated by this exalted principle, the belief of something declared, and a mode of action conformable to that belief, are uniformly exhibited. In like manner, then, as Noah, Abraham, and the rest, are represented as acting in consequence of a divine command, placing an entire reliance in the promise of him who commanded; so Abel, in the sacrifice which he offered, must be supposed to have acted under the same impression,—believing what God had promised, and therefore sacrificing as God had ordered. Indeed, as Heidegger remarks, the divine revelation was in his case even more necessary, than in any other of those mentioned.

The sacred writer again informs us, at the 13th verse of the same chapter, that Abel and all the others whom he had named *died in faith*, (i. e. as Hallet paraphrases it, "retained their faith, until their death, or the time of their leaving the world,") *not having received the promises*, (not having received the completion of them: that being reserved for later times, as is intimated in the concluding part of the chapter, and is clearly expressed in Acts xiii. 32, 33: *We declare unto you glad tidings, how that* THE PROMISE *which was made unto the* FATHERS, *God hath* FULFILLED *the same* UNTO US THEIR CHILDREN)—*but having seen them afar off; and were persuaded of them, and embraced them.*

Now, that these promises included the *promise of the Messiah*, Kennicott says, is plain: "first, because this is THE PROMISE, peculiarly and emphatically so called throughout

Scripture: and secondly, because that the temporal promises, respecting the land of Canaan, cannot alone, if at all, be meant here, as the apostle speaks of *all* the patriarchs, whom he had mentioned in the beginning of the chapter: and Abraham, who is one of those mentioned, is expressly said to have *sojourned in the land of Promise;* whilst, on the other hand, Abel, Enoch, and Noah (three of the patriarchs included in the word ALL) had not received the promise of *entering the land of Canaan.* So that *some other* promise, made in the first ages, and frequently repeated, must be that to which the apostle here alludes. And what promise can that be, but *the promise of a future Redeemer* made to Adam?" —the promise, that *the seed of the woman should bruise the serpent's head:* a promise, which was to be commemorated in the patriarchal and all succeeding sacrifices, *until the seed should come.* Agreeably to this, the Homily on Faith applies this 11th chap. of Hebrews, stating, that holy men of old, although they were not named Christian, yet exercised a Christian faith; seeking, as we do, all the benefits of God the Father, *through the merits of his Son Jesus Christ;* and differing from us only in this, that whereas "they looked *when Christ should come*, we be in the time *when he is come.*"

To the fulfilment of *this promise*, then, was the faith of Abel directed; and the enjoined manifestation of this faith the apostle justifies us in pronouncing to have been the kind of sacrifice which he offered; and which, as being of the true nature of the sacrifice required of the faithful, procured from God that acceptance, and witnessing of his offerings, which was refused to Cain. See *Heideg. Hist. Patr. Exerc.* iii. § 52. tom. i.—*Shuckf. Connect.* vol. i. pp. 86, 87.—*Kennic. Two Dissert.* pp. 212—215, and *Edwards's Survey of the various Methods*, pp. 99, 100. See also *Witsius*, (*Misc. Sac.* Lib. II. Diss. ii. §§ 7—10,) who removes the objections brought by Spencer against the application of this chapter of Hebrews, here contended for; and *Jen. Jew. Ant.* vol. i. pp. 57—59, where some excellent remarks are to be found on

the difficulty which the mention of *Jephthah*, in the catalogue of distinguished believers, might appear to create.

It must be confessed, that certain commentators, among whom are to be reckoned Grotius, Hammond, Le Clerc, Rosenmüller, and Primate Newcome also, if I rightly understand him, interpret the *promises* alluded to in this chapter as *temporal;* and are consequently reduced to the necessity of confining the expression, οὗτοι πάντες, ALL *these*, in the 13th verse, to *some* of those that had been named; or of referring it to ALL *the descendants of Abraham*, of whom mention had been made in the sentence immediately preceding. Now, it is obvious, as Whitby remarks, that *all* the descendants of Abraham did *not* die in faith: and how, on the other hand, any particular individuals of those before named can be selected by an expression, which comprehends ALL, it is not easy to discover. And if *all*, who had been before named, are referred to, (as is unavoidable,) then, as we have already seen, the promises cannot have been temporal, there being some to whom no temporal promises were made, as Abel and Enoch. As to the difficulty arising from the declaration, that the persons enumerated had DIED *in faith*, when it is known that Enoch did *not die*, but was translated; this is easily removed by considering, that the stress in this clause is not laid upon the *death* of those believers, but upon their having *retained their faith through life*, as is well marked in *Hallet's* paraphrase, quoted in p. 451 of this volume, and in the common use of language would naturally be conveyed in the words here used by the apostle. See *Drusius*, in loc. who supplies several instances of a similar latitude of expression in Scripture. Hallet, Doddridge, and Whitby, deserve to be consulted upon this entire chapter. They furnish a complete answer to the arguments of those who contend for a temporal promise.

I shall only add here an observation of Elsner, on the extravagant eagerness shown by two of these commentators, Grotius and Le Clerc, in defence of the temporal solution. Having remarked, that Le Clerc condemns Hammond, for

his *mystical* interpretation of the *city which has foundations*, as implying an everlasting mansion in the heavens; and that he approves of the idea of Grotius, that Jerusalem was the city here intended: he exclaims, "Mira est viri illius τῇ ὑποθέσει δουλεύοντος imprudentia: quomodo quæso exspectasse illam urbem Abrahamus dicetur, quam post multa demum sæcula posteris suis cessurum noverat a Deo edoctus?—quomodo deinde Deus *conditor* vocabitur *Hierosolymæ terrestris*?—denique infra, v. 16, *cœlum* esse illam urbem apparet, nam *patria cœlestis* vocatur. Simplicius quoque ad Epictetum, cap. xii. p. 77, in morte reperiri τὴν ἀληθινὴν πατρίδα dixit, *de beatis sedibus*." *Observat. Sacr.* tom ii. p. 367.

NO. LXIV.—ON THE PROBABLE TIME AND OCCASION OF THE INSTITUTION OF SACRIFICE.

PAGE 34. (ᵇ).—The event, which, according to the principle of sacrifice maintained in the page here referred to, gave birth to the establishment of the rite, seems obviously to determine the *time* of its institution. The commission of sin, and the promise of a Redeemer, being the grand objects of its reference, no period seems more fit for its appointment, than that, at which Sin first entered, and the promise was first delivered: that is, the period immediately succeeding the fall. And, indeed, the *manner* in which the first sacrifice recorded in Scripture is introduced in the narrative strongly indicates the pre-existence of the rite; the words מִקֵּץ יָמִים, intimating (as Kennicott has shown in the second of his *Two Dissertations*, pp. 177—183) a *stated time* for the performance of this duty: and the whole turn of phrase marking a previous and familiar observance. See *Richie's Peculiar Doctrines*, Part ii. § 42. vol. i. p. 138.

If, then, sacrifice be admitted to have been coeval with the Fall, every argument, which has been adduced to prove that Abel offered sacrifices in obedience to the *divine injunction*, will apply with increased force to show, that Adam must have done the same. Scripture also supplies additional con-

firmation, by the fact which it relates, of the first pair having been, by the express command of God, clothed with the skins of beasts. Much as some have endeavoured to depreciate the value of this fact, it will be found, when more closely examined, to supply a strong evidence on this head. That the beasts, whose skins were allotted for covering to our first parents, had been slain, it is natural to suppose; as it is not reasonable to think that any animals had died of themselves, so soon after their creation, and without having yet experienced any severities of climate or situation. Now, there were no purposes for which they could have been slain, unless those of food, sacrifice, or covering. That they were not slain for food, has been, it is hoped, sufficiently established in Number LII. Neither can it be admitted, that they were slain merely for covering; since it cannot be supposed, that Adam would, immediately after the sentence of the divine displeasure, have dared to kill God's creatures without his permission; nor is it likely, that God should order them to be slain solely for their skins, when man could have been supplied with sufficient covering from the hair and wool; and when, the flesh of the animal not being permitted for food, there must have been an unnecessary waste of the creatures. It follows, then, that they had been slain with a view to sacrifice. This alone supplies an adequate reason. The *whole* of the animal (if the offering be supposed an *holocaust*, as there is good reason to conclude all to have been [a], until the Mosaic institution) would here be devoted to the uses of religion, except the skin, which would be employed for the purpose of clothing. And even *this* might not be without its moral and religious end, as it might serve to our first parents for a constant memorial of their transgression; of the death which it merited; and of the divine mercy by which that death was withheld. It seems also not unlikely, that from this institution was derived the appointment in Lev. vii. 8, that the priest should have the *skin* of

[a] See p. 440; also Number LXVII.

the burnt-offering. See particularly, on the subject of this number, *Kennic. Two Diss.* pp. 67—70. 227, 228; and *Wits. Misc. Sacr.* Lib. II. Diss. ii. § 12;—also *Heideg. Histor. Patr. Exercit.* v. § 16; *Delan. Rev. Exam.* vol. i. diss. viii. pp. 99—103; *Barringt. Miscell. Sacr.* vol. iii. pp. 17. 67; *Shuckf. Connect.* vol. i. b. 2, pp. 80, 81; and *Patr.* and *Ainsw.* on Gen. iii. 21.

A translation, indeed, has been given of the passage in Gen. iii. 9, which subverts the entire of the argument derived from the *skins* given to the first pair for clothing, by referring the word עור to the skin of Adam and his wife, and reading it in this sense, "that God made for them coats, or coverings of *their* skin." Cloppenburg remarks, (*Sacrif. Patriarch. Sch.* p. 13,) that the word עור is *never* to be found in Scripture in any other signification, than that of the *hide of an animal.* Kennicott also concurs in this criticism, with one slight and conjectural exception. But the truth is, there are many exceptions, which these distinguished scholars must have hastily overlooked. Exod. xxxiv. 30; Job, x. 11; xix. 20. 26, with others which may be seen in *Cocceius, Schindler,* and *Calasio,* and need not be enumerated, supply examples as strong as that which has been noticed by Kennicott, from Exod. xxii. 26. But although the word is in these several instances applied to the *human skin,* yet the form and construction of the passage before us will not admit it here. It is here introduced *absolutely,* and without any of those connecting parts of speech which might mark its relation to the persons spoken of, whilst, in the passages above referred to, the relation is always so pointed out. On the supposition that the human skin is here meant, the last-named passage, viz. Exod. xxii. 26, exactly corresponds to this, *the raiment for his skin,* in the one, agreeing precisely with the *covering for their skin,* in the other. But there the word has the preposition ל, and the pronoun suffixed to it, לעורו: in like manner, both of these, or at least the suffixed pronoun (עורם), would undoubtedly have been used here, had the skin of *the persons covered* been intended; whereas the word עור is in-

troduced absolute and unconnected. See *Kennic. Two Dissert.* pp. 68, 69. Accordingly the LXX, and all the ancient versions, except the Chaldee, have uniformly rendered the sentence in its present received acceptation.

So little deserving of serious attention did the translation which has been here discussed appear to Dr. Lardner, that, in his *Essay on the Mosaic Account*, &c., (Kippis's edit. vol. xi. pp. 239. 249,) when engaged in a direct examination of the subject, he does not condescend to notice it, at the same time that he observes upon Le Clerc's interpretation, which is scarcely less extraordinary: viz. that the word, כתנות, does not signify *coats*, but *tents:* so that the covering provided for Adam and his wife were not *coats*, but *tents*, *of skins*. In this, however, Le Clerc has nothing to support him but his own ingenuity of invention. The word כתונא, which is exactly the Greek χιτὼν, being *never* used to signify any thing but a garment. And even if it were, it seems rather extraordinary, as Kennicott remarks, that God should take care to make a tent or habitation for the first pair *in Paradise*, when, in the very next words, we read of God's turning them *out of Paradise*. This, however, is not the only instance, in which Le Clerc has indulged an arbitrary fancy [a] in his Comments on Scripture.

[a] Whoever wishes to be satisfied of the levity of Le Clerc's occasional strictures on Scripture, may consult the dissertation of *Witsius*, on the *Author of the Pentateuch*, in his *Miscellanea Sacra*, (tom. i. pp. 106—130,) in which he discusses, at considerable length and with much force, the objections urged by Le Clerc against the received opinion that the Pentateuch was the work of Moses. It is true, indeed, that Le Clerc afterwards retraced his steps, and, in the third dissertation of the *Prolegomena* of his commentary on the Old Testament, refuted the several objections which he had himself before advanced. The rashness, however, which, upon so important a subject, could have led to so wild a theory as this writer had set up, in opposition to the suffrage of all antiquity, to the authority of Christ and his Apostles, and to the plain evidence of the thing itself, is not done away, although its mischiefs may be mitigated, by his subsequent recantation. Having made mention of the objections raised against the authenticity of the five books of Moses, I think it right to direct the young reader, in addition to the dissertation of Witsius already noticed, to *Bishop Watson's Apology for the Bible in answer to Paine*, and to *Dr. Graves's Lectures on the Pentateuch*.

NO. LXV.—ON THE TRUE INTERPRETATION OF THE PASSAGE, GEN. IV. 7[a], CONTAINING GOD'S EXPOSTULATION WITH CAIN.

PAGE 36. (b).—The plain, natural, and significant interpretation, which in the page here noticed has been given to a part of Scripture, which had long exercised, but to puzzle and perplex, the commentators, was first proposed by the learned Lightfoot, (see his *Works*, vol. ii. pp. 1085. 1243,) and has since been adopted by Kennicott (*Two Dissert.* pp. 216, 217) and Pilkington, (*Remarks*, &c. p. 163.) The use of the word חטאת, *Sin*, for a *Sin-offering*, is so familiar, that it can scarcely be necessary to adduce instances in proof of it. Examples of it may be seen in Exod. xxix. 14; xxx. 10; Levit. iv. 3. 21. 24. 29; vi. 25; 2 Kings, xii. 16; Ezek. xlv. 23; Hos. iv. 8, and in numerous other passages. On this idiom, see also what has been said in pp. 156—159, of this volume, and in *Pilkington's Remarks*, pp. 163, 164.

But the translation of the passage here given receives its strongest confirmation from the peculiar force of the word רבץ, which is connected with חטאת, and which strictly implies *couching*, or *lying down as a beast*. For this see

[a] This text suggests to me the recollection of an error into which a critic of no small distinction, the Margaret Professor of Divinity, has lately fallen in one of his Lectures delivered from the Professor's chair. In his Tenth Lecture, p. 74, he has both asserted it as a fact, and deduced it as a consequence from a criticism of his upon the word JEHOVAH, that in the Septuagint the word JEHOVAH is never expressed by Θεὸς, but uniformly by Κύριος. Now, the text of Gen. iv. 4, supplies a direct contradiction to this assertion. But it is not only in this text, but in a vast number besides, of which Trommius and Biel supply not a few instances, that we find the word JEHOVAH rendered Θεὸς by the LXX. Nor is this rendering confined to them: among the Jewish interpreters, Aquila, in Exod. iv. 24, has done the same. The various fallacious applications of the word Θεὸς, lately attempted by Socinian writers, joined to the authority of Dr. Marsh's name, and the peremptory and unqualified manner in which he has made this erroneous assertion from the chair of a professor, has rendered it unavoidable that this notice should be taken of it.

Schindler and *Castell* on the word. And, indeed, all the commentators have been obliged to admit this sense of the phrase, even whilst they adopted a translation of the passage with which it seems but little consistent: the idea of *Sin* lying *couched* at the door, being, to say the least of it, a *bold* image. Yet in this sense they have been compelled to apply the term. See *Fagius, Vatablus, Clarius, Dathe*, and *Rosenmüller*. But the word *Sin-offering* being substituted for *Sin*, the whole difficulty is removed, and the peculiar propriety of the term employed instantly appears.

There is yet another circumstance of some weight which is remarked by *Parkhurst*, and is also noticed by *Castalio*, *Dathe*, and *Rosenmüller*, although they have not drawn from it the natural inference; namely, that חטאת, which is feminine, is here connected with a word of the masculine gender, רבץ; which, as Parkhurst judiciously observes, is perfectly consistent, on the supposition that חטאת denotes a *Sin-offering:* for then according to a construction common in Hebrew, which refers the adjective not to the word but to the *thing* understood by it, the masculine רבץ is here combined with the *animal*, which was to be the sin-offering. In conformity with this reasoning it will be found, that חטאת, in other parts of Scripture where it is used for a *Sin-offering*, is, though feminine itself, connected with a masculine adjunct. See Exod. xxix. 14; Levit. iv. 21. 24; v. 9, and other places in Leviticus, where the masculine pronoun הוא is used instead of the feminine היא. But in Gen. xviii. 20; xx. 9; Exod. xxxii. 21. 30, and other places, where the word occurs in its original signification of *Sin*, it has constantly the adjective connected in the *feminine*.

Dr. Geddes was either not aware of this peculiarity, or did not choose to notice it, whilst he laboured so hard in his *Critical Remarks* (p. 54) to show, that there were no authorities to justify the connecting חטאת a *feminine*, in its ordinary sense of *sin*, with a *masculine* adjunct. He has not taken the like pains to show, that such a connexion is unauthorized, in the application of the word in the sense of *sin-*

offering: in which particular application it is, that this anomalous connexion is specially contended for. He has merely contented himself with asserting, (p. 55,) that the rendering the word in *this* sense is liable to the same objections, which he has urged against its application to the sense of *sin*. This he has *asserted;* whilst it will appear, upon a single glance, that, to every objection which he has advanced, this signification of the term supplies an immediate and satisfactory reply.

The principal difficulty attending the translation of the verse in question has arisen from the apparent want of connexion between the concluding clause and those which go before. If, however, the context be well considered, the connexion becomes clear and convincing. Of Cain, who was filled with rage at the preference given to his brother Abel by the acceptance of *his* sacrifice, whilst his own was rejected, Jehovah demands the reason of his anger: "*If thou doest well* (says he), *shalt thou not be accepted?* (or rather as the margin of our Bible reads, shalt thou not have *the excellency*, or exaltation, above thy brother, which thou conceivest to belong to thy birth-right?) *And if thou doest not well, a sin-offering lieth at thy very door*, to make the due reconciliation, and restore thee to the station which thou hast lost by thy misconduct. So that in either case it depends upon thyself, that he (thy brother) shall be rendered *subject unto thee, and* that *thou shalt have the superiority over him.*" This meaning naturally and spontaneously flows from the literal rendering of the passage as it stands connected. *And the Lord said unto Cain, wherefore art thou wroth,* &c. (with thy brother)? *Is there not, if thou doest well, exaltation; and, if thou doest not well, a sin-offering lying at thy door? And thus he may become subject to thee, and thou mayest have the dominion over him.* It is apprehended that this, which is an exact translation of the original, affords, in the view of the above paraphrase, a clear, consistent, and satisfactory sense of a part of Scripture which has hitherto caused much trouble to interpreters.

The rendering by the LXX is so very different from this, and from the commonly received translation, that on the first view it would seem to have been derived from a Hebrew original, entirely dissimilar to that, which we at present possess. It therefore will not be unacceptable to the curious reader, to show how the Greek translators must have considered the text, in order to have derived from it a sense apparently so foreign from its import. They render it thus; Οὐκ, ἐὰν ὀρθῶς προσενέγκῃς, ὀρθῶς δὲ μὴ διέλῃς, ἥμαρτες; ἡσύχασον· πρὸς σὲ ἡ ἀποστροφὴ αὐτοῦ, καὶ σὺ ἄρξεις αὐτοῦ: or, as in some of Holmes's various readings,—ἐπιστροφὴ αὐτοῦ, καὶ σὺ αὐτοῦ ἄρξῃς. *Though you may rightly offered, yet if you have not rightly divided, have you not sinned? Be at rest. To you shall he submit himself, and you shall rule over him.* Now, if in the original, תיטיב שארת be construed in connexion, making שארת the infinitive mood, and expressing by תיטיב the *mode* in which the action denoted by that infinitive was performed; and if, in like manner, the words תיטיב לפתח be made to coalesce, whilst פתח is interpreted in the sense of dividing; if תטארת be considered as a verb, and רבץ also as a verb, with a stop preceding and following it;—the sense affixed by the Septuagint may be elicited. For then תיטיב שאת may be rendered ὀρθῶς προσενέγκῃς, and תיטיב לפתח, ὀρθῶς διέλῃς. תטארת also may be rendered by ἥμαρτες, and רבץ by ἡσύχασον. All this, however, it must be remembered, is to be considered rather possible than natural. For although the infinitive certainly admits such a connexion with the verb תיטיב, as to imply the *doing well*[a] that which is expressed by the infinitive, yet the use of the verb שארת for *offering sacrifice*, and of פתח for *dividing*, can scarcely be said to be authorized by any passages in Scripture. Indeed that פתח should admit the sense of *dividing*, it ought to be written פתרת, unless we suppose the word to be taken in the sense of *freely sharing, or imparting*, (which פתח is not incapable of expressing,) and that thence the Greek translators felt themselves justified

[a] Of this construction, Prov. xxx. 29; Psal. xxxiii. 3; Isai. xxiii. 16; Ezek. xxxiii. 32, and many other parts of Scripture, supply instances.

in extending it to the above signification. As for רבץ, also, it is only by a considerable latitude of figurative application that it can be interpreted as in the Greek; its literal meaning being that of *lying down as an animal.* So that, upon the whole, the version by the LXX is rather to be defended than approved: whilst the translation by Jerome, and still more that by Theodotion, presents a view of the passage much more natural as well as grammatical.

Jerome's translation runs thus, "Nonne si bene egeris, demittetur tibi? Et si non bene egeris, ante fores peccatum tuum sedebit? Et ad te societas ejus: sed tu magis dominare ejus." (*Quæst. Hebr. in Genes.*) And this, again, is thus modified in the Roman Vulgate:—"Nonne si bene egeris, recipies? Sin autem male, statim in foribus peccatum aderit? Sed sub te erit appetitus ejus, et tu dominaberis illius." In both of these the sense is nearly the same as that in our common English Bibles; except that the last clause is applied by the followers of the Vulgate, not to *Abel*, but to the *sin* just before spoken of, and is interpreted as pronouncing on the full dominion of man over his sinful desires, and asserting the uncontrolled freedom[a] of his will. The Romish writers adduce Jerome's paraphrase[b] on the text, as clearly proving this to have been his view; and also refer to the authority of Augustine, who specifically argues the point thus, "Tu dominaberis illius; nunquid fratris? absit. Cujus igitur nisi *peccati?*" On these authorities, together with that of the Jerusalem Targum, the Doway[c] translators ground a

[a] Erasmus (*Hyperaspist. Diatrib.* ii. § 96) cites the passage thus: "Sub te erit appetitus tuus, et tu dominaberis illius:" and from this unauthorized reading he deduces an argument in opposition to Luther, on the free will of man.

[b] In his *Questions on Genesis* he thus explains the text: "Quod si male egeris, illico peccatum ante vestibulum sedebit, et tali janitore comitaberis: verum, quia liberi arbitrii es, moneo ut non tibi peccatum, sed tu peccato domineris."

[c] *Ernesti*, in his *Institutio Interpretis Novi Testamenti*, p. 79, exclaims, "Quam multi errores orti sunt in Ecclesiâ ex linguæ Hebraicæ ignorantiâ! Doctrina de purgatorio, pœnitentia, fide, bonis operibus, et aliæ, ex Augustino quidem et versione Vulgatâ proferri quidem, sed adseri et defendi non possunt contra interpretem linguæ Hebraicæ gnarum."—Other reasons, however,

triumph over the *heretical* (Protestant) versions, whose object in referring the clause to *Abel* and not to *sin*, they con-

very different from mere ignorance of the Hebrew language, have been assigned for the errors in Scripture interpretation, imputable to the advocates of the Church of Rome. *Father Paul* informs us, in one of his Letters, (Letter 25,) that the Pope, complaining of Fra. Fulgentio, said, "that preaching of the Scriptures is a suspicious thing; and that he, who keeps close to the Scriptures, will ruin the Catholic faith." And, again, (Letter 26,) the Pope is made to say of him, "that, indeed, he made some good Sermons, but bad ones withal: and that he insisted too much upon Scripture; which is a book, to which if any keep close, he will quite ruin the Catholic faith."—And indeed, that the Pope had reason to complain of Fra. Fulgentio's sermons, must be admitted, when we find from *Burnet's Life of Bishop Bedell*, (p. 119,) that that father, in preaching on the words, *Have ye not read?* took occasion to tell the auditory, that if Christ were now to ask this question, all the answer they could make to it would be; *No, for they were not suffered to do it:* and thence proceeded to remonstrate, with the most animated zeal, against the restraint put on the use of the Scripture by the See of Rome.

In a work, which, within a few years, has obtained the most distinguished mark of approbation, from the highest and most learned society of a nation holding communion with the church of Rome, we meet with a detailed statement of those causes which have disqualified the votaries of that Church for the task of Scripture interpretation. After an enumeration of the advantages, derived to the literature and civilization of Christendom, from religious houses, as depositaries of the remains of ancient learning, the author thus proceeds.—"If the Churchmen preserved in this manner the faint tradition of knowledge, it must, at the same time, be acknowledged, that in their hands it more than once became dangerous, and was converted by its guardians to pernicious purposes. The domination of Rome, built upon a scaffolding of false historical proofs, had need of the assistance of those faithful auxiliaries, to employ on the one side their half knowledge to fascinate men's eyes, and on the other to prevent those eyes from perceiving the truth, and from becoming enlightened by the torch of criticism. The local usurpations of the Clergy, in several places, were founded on similar claims, and had need of similar means for their preservation. It followed, therefore, both that the little knowledge permitted should be mixed with error, and that the nations should be carefully maintained in profound ignorance, favourable to superstition. Learning, as far as possible, was rendered inaccessible to the laity. The study of the ancient languages was represented as idolatrous and abominable. Above all, the reading of the holy Scriptures, that sacred inheritance of all Christians, was severely interdicted. To read the Bible, without the permission of one's superiors, was a crime: to translate it into the vulgar tongue would have been a temerity worthy of the severest punishment. The Popes had, indeed, their reasons for preventing the word of Jesus Christ from reaching the people, and a direct communication from being established between the Gospel and the Christian. When it becomes necessary to keep in the shade objects as conspicuous as faith and public worship, it behoved the darkness to be universal and impenetrable." *Villiers's Essay on the Reformation of Luther*, p. 88—90. The same writer, in another place, thus contrasts the characters of the Protestant and Romish Churches, as to their grounds of assent to sacred truths.—"The Church of Rome said, 'Submit, without examination, to authority?'

ceive to be that of escaping from the doctrine of free will; for the hostility to which doctrine, entertained by the first

The Protestant Church said, 'Examine, and submit only to thy own conviction.' The one commanded men to believe blindly: the other taught them, with the Apostle, to reject the bad, and choose only that which is good." Ibid. p. 294. — And when the Church of Rome was, at length, obliged by the necessities of self-defence, to grant to her faithful sons the privilege of theological investigation, in what way does the same writer represent the system of studies permitted for this purpose? The theology of the Romanist, and that of the Protestant, he describes, as "two worlds in opposite hemispheres, which have nothing common except the name."—"The Catholic theology rests on the inflexible authority of the decisions of the Church, and therefore debars the man who studies it from all free exercise of his reason. It has preserved the jargon, and all the barbarous appendages of the Scholastic philosophy. We perceive in it the work of darkness of the monks of the tenth century. In short, the happiest thing which can befall him who has unfortunately learned it, is speedily to forget it. The Protestant theology, on the contrary, rests on a system of examination, on the unlimited use of reason. The most liberal exegesis opens for it the knowledge of sacred antiquity; criticism, that of the history of the Church; it regards the doctrinal part, reduced to purity and simplicity, as only the body of religion, the positive form which it requires; and it is supported by philosophy in the examination of the laws of nature, of morality, and of the relations of men to the Divine Being. Whoever wishes to be instructed in history, in classical literature, and philosophy, can choose nothing better than a course of Protestant theology." Ibid. pp. 307, 308.—Such are the observations contained in a work which has been distinguished by a prize, conferred by the National Institute of France.

Perhaps one of the most decisive proofs of the justice of this writer's remarks on the state of sacred literature in the Romish Church has been supplied by the late republication, in this country, of that wretched specimen of Scripture criticism, *Ward's Errata*. This powerless offspring of a feeble parent, which was supposed to have perished when it first saw the light above a century ago, has lately upon signs of re-animation, been hailed in Ireland with shouts of joy. And the meagre abstract of *Gregory Martin's Discovery of the manifold Corruptions of the Holy Scriptures*, a work which has itself lain for two hundred years overwhelmed by confutation, has been received by the Romanists, of this part of the Empire, with a gratulation that might well become the darkest ages of the Church. A work, condemning the Protestant translation of the Bible for using the term *messenger* instead of *angel*, (in Mal. ii. 7; iii. 1; Matt. xi. 10; Luke vii. 27, &c.,) by which the character of *angel* is withdrawn from the *priesthood*, and of a *sacrament* from *orders*:—for not rendering the words (in Hebr. xi. 21) προσεκύνησεν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄκρον τῆς ῥάβδου αὐτοῦ, as the Rhemish does, *adored the top of his rod*, and thereby surreptitiously removing one of the principal Scripture arguments for *image worship*:—for ascribing to the word מַטֶּה, in the second commandment, the meaning *graven image*, whilst the Rhemish renders it *graven thing*, which, with those who admit an *image* not to be a *thing*, will exempt *images* from the prohibition of the commandment:—for not giving to the words μετάνοια and *pœnitentia*, the sense of *penance*, but merely assigning to them their true interpretation, *repentance*, and thus doing wilful despite to the *sacrament* of *penance*:—

Reformers, they are branded by these translators with the title of Manichees. (See the *Doway Bible* on Gen. iv. 7.)

To these Romish Doctors I leave a Romish Doctor to reply. Dr. Geddes, in his *Critical Remarks*, pp. 54, 55, has endeavoured to show that Jerome's version, or that of the Vulgate, cannot be maintained. He has not, however, adduced the arguments which bear most strongly against their interpretation; namely, those which apply to the mistranslation of the concluding clause of the seventh verse, and to the violence offered even to that mistranslation in pronouncing that Cain having sinned should acquire dominion over his sinful desires, which is as much as to say, that by yielding to sin a man acquires the power of controlling it. But too much has been said upon Romish exposition.[a]

a work, I say, condemning the Protestant translations of the Bible for these, and some other *such* errors; and in all cases *demonstrating* the error by one and the same irrefragable proof,—that the Romish version is the true one, and that the Protestant version which differs from it must *consequently* be false,—is certainly not such a one, as might, in the nineteenth century, be expected to be raked up by the clergy of a widely extended communion, and exhibited triumphantly as a master-piece of critical erudition. In the opinion of many, this miserable performance did not deserve an answer; especially as every argument which it contained, had been in former times repeatedly confuted. Perhaps, however, they judged more rightly, who thought, that even the weakest reasonings should be exposed, lest they might be imagined to be strong; and that even the most hacknied arguments should be replied to, lest they might be conceived to be new. Accordingly, this work received an answer from Dr. Ryan, whose zealous exertions in the cause of religious truth are well known, and is about to receive another from the Rev. Richard Grier, of Middleton. These gentlemen, at all events, display courage in their enterprise, since the author whom they attack, backed by the whole Council of Trent, has pronounced, that whoever shall not receive the books of Scripture, *as they are read in the Catholic* (Romish) *Church, and as they are in the Vulgate Latin edition, shall be* ACCURSED. *Errata*, p. 37.

Mr. Grier's work has been published since the date of the above observation in the third edition of this work: and, by the ability with which it has been executed, seems to have completely silenced the battery which had been just opened upon the received English translation of the Scriptures.

[a] How little entitled the orthodox member of the *Romish* Church is, at this day, to expect serious consideration in the walks of sacred criticism, may be inferred (in addition to what has been said in the last note) from the description given of him by a Doctor of his own communion. "The vulgar papist rests his faith on the supposed infallibility of his church, although he knows not where that infallibility is lodged, nor in what it properly consists: it is to him a general, vague, indefinite idea, which he never thinks of analysing. He reads in his catechism, or is told by his catechist, that *the Church cannot err*

I come now to the translation by Theodotion, which, as it appears to me, does perfect justice to the original, and with which the version which I have proposed entirely coincides. Οὐκ, ἂν ἀγαθῶς ποίῃς, δεκτὸν; καὶ ἂν μὴ ἀγαθῶς ποίῃς, ἐπὶ θύρας ἁμαρτία ἐγκάθηται· καὶ πρός σε ὁρμὴ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἄρξεις αὐτοῦ. Here is an agreement in all its parts with the rendering which has been submitted; the force of ἁμαρτία like that of חטאת, extending to the *sin-offering;* ἐγκάθηται, as well as רבץ, denoting the *posture of an animal;* and αὐτοῦ the masculine decidedly marking, that the reference in the last clause was, not to ἁμαρτία[a] but to Abel. See *Theodot. apud Montefalc.*

in what she teaches; and then he is told, that this unerring church is composed only of those who hold communion with the Bishop of Rome, and precisely believe as he and the bishops who are in communion with him believe. From that moment reason is set aside; authority usurps its place, and implicit faith is the necessary consequence. He dares not even advance to the first step of Des Cartes's logic; he dares not doubt: for in his table of sins, which he is obliged to confess, he finds *doubting in matters of faith* to be a grievous crime." Such is Dr. Geddes's account of him whom he is pleased to call *the vulgar papist;* under which title he, in truth, means to include all who are sincere votaries of the Church of Rome, and whom that church would acknowledge as such: in other words, he means by this term to designate all who are actually within the pale of Popery.

And let it not be supposed that this is the testimony of an enemy in the disguise of a friend; and that the author, whilst he assumed the name of *Catholic,* was influenced by the feelings of a Protestant. On the contrary, it is manifest from the following passage that his mind remained under the powerful influence of Romish impression, and that he continued still a partisan of that faith whose errors he affected to decry. For, says he, "Is the faith of the vulgar Protestant better founded? He rests it on a book called the Holy Bible, which he believes to be the infallible word of God."—And thus he pronounces the faith of the Protestant and of the Papist to be alike implicit and alike unfounded. "If the instructor of the Protestant be asked how he knows that the book which he puts into the hand of his catechumen is the infallible word of God, he cannot, like the *Priest,* appeal to an unerring church; he acknowledges no such guide: and *yet it is hard to conceive what other better argument he can use.*" —He goes on even to pronounce, that "in the Popish controversy, the Romanists have, on this point, the better side of the question; called, by some of their controversialists, *the question of questions.*" And in what way does their superiority appear upon this question of questions? By "its never having been satisfactorily solved by the Romanists themselves: they having always reasoned in what is termed a vicious circle; *proving the infallibility of the Church from the authority of Scripture, and the authority of Scripture from the Church's infallibility.*" (Preface to *Critical Remarks,* p. v.) This must undoubtedly have given the Romanists *the better side of the question;* for what Protestant logician could successfully reply to such an argument? But the reader must be weary of this fatuity.

[a] That is, to ἁμαρτία, in the sense of *sin;* in which sense alone it is, that it

Grotius has given the passage somewhat of a different turn, and yet departs but little from the meaning which has been here assigned. He considers the force of the *si bene egeris*, as carried down to the concluding clause, so as to make the sense this: "If thou doest well, Abel as the younger shall be rendered subject to thy authority." And so makes the clause beginning with, "If thou doest not well," &c., parenthetical; of which, he says, innumerable instances are to be found in the Hebrew Scriptures. This mode of translating the passage has been adopted by Purver in his English version; and it is certainly not unworthy of commendation. At the same time, I cannot but think the view of the sentence, which I have offered to the reader, more grammatical, more consistent, and more natural[a].

NO. LXVI.—ON THE COMPARISON BETWEEN THE SACRIFICE OF ABEL AND THAT OF CHRIST.

PAGE 36. (d).—Dr. Richie judiciously observes, on this passage of Hebrews, that "it makes the sacrifice of Abel to have been of the *piacular* kind, by the comparison which it makes between the effect of it and that of the sacrifice of Christ, which without doubt *was* of the piacular kind. For, unless

has been by some made the subject of reference, in opposition to *Abel*. In the sense of *sin-offering*, it would, as we have seen, admit the *masculine* pronoun *αὐτοῦ*: but to the word, taken in that sense, the reference of the pronoun would have no meaning.

[a] The note of Ludov. de Dieu on this passage deserves to be noticed. "*An non, sive bene offeras, sive non bene, ad ostium peccatum cubat?* Quum scilicet, indigne ferret Cain, fratris sacrificium suo esse prælatum, quod non minus recte sacrificiorum ritus observasset fratre, neque quicquam, sive quoad rem oblatam, sive quoad externam offerendi rationem ac ceremoniam, dignius a fratre ac melius profectum esset, monet Deus, non esse hic ipsam oblationem respiciendam, recte ne ea secundum legem scilicet cerimonialem facta sit, an secus: sed personam offerentem, dedita ne ea sit peccato, an non. Tu peccatum perpetuo circumfers, illudque in procinctu habes, cubans quippe ante fores: itaque nihil refert, bene ne an male secundum rites legales offeras. Vel optima tua oblatio a peccato vitiatur. Non debebat appetitus tuus ferri ad peccatum, sed peccati appetitus ad te, sicut mulieris appetitus ad maritum cui subest, tuque ei dominari. —Posset etiam verti, *An non sive pulchrum quid adferas, sive non pulchrum*," &c.—*Animadv. in Vet. Test.* p. 13.—These interpretations possess much ingenuity: but are liable to the grammatical objection already urged, of taking חטאת, in the sense of *sin*, in the masculine gender.

these two sacrifices had been of the same kind, and productive of similar effects, such a comparison could not have been made, nor the *effect* of the one pronounced to have been better, or much greater, than the *effect* of the other: causes of a different nature producing effects of a dissimilar kind: and between effects of a dissimilar kind, no such comparison as that here made being admissible." *Peculiar Doctrines of Revelation*, Part II. § xlii. p. 138.

NO. LXVII.—ON THE NATURE OF SACRIFICE BEFORE THE LAW: TENDING TO SHOW ITS CONFINEMENT TO ANIMAL SACRIFICE, EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF CAIN.

PAGE 37. (a).—From the time of Abel's sacrifice to the giving of the law, we find the sacrificial offering described by no other appellation than that of עלה or זבח, the *holocaust* or burnt-offering, and the *Zebach* or immolated victim. Thus we see the *former* expression used of the sacrifice of Noah in Gen. viii. 20, and again repeatedly applied to the sacrifice of Abraham in the 22d chapter. It is also employed by Moses in speaking of sacrifices to Pharaoh, in Exod. x. 25, and again in describing the offerings of Jethro, xviii. 12. The oblations of Job, likewise, (Job. i. 5,) and of his friends, (xlii. 7, 8,) are so denominated: as are those of Balaam in the 23d ch. of Numbers. In the numerous other instances of the mode of worship by sacrifice, which occur in this early period, the expression used is either זבח, or, where the *sort* of sacrifice is not exactly specified, a word immediately derived from and clearly implying it, מזבח, which, though translated generally by us an *Altar*, and being sometimes applied to that on which *Incense* was presented, cannot, as Sykes remarks, (*Essay*, p. 246,) when used absolutely, and in its strict sense, be otherwise understood, than as signifying "that on which *slain animals* were offered."

Doctor Richie, indeed, not only maintains that none but *animal sacrifices* were offered from the time of Cain to the promulgation of the law, but that all during that period were

none other than *holocausts*, or *burnt-offerings;* the *Zebach*, or slain animal, having been uniformly offered up in that manner: and that, consequently, *all* the sacrifices of this early period were *piacular*. In this last position Sykes concurs, so far as to allow, that "all holocausts before the days of Moses were *deprecations* of wrath;" and he admits also, that, from the time of Abel until that of Jacob, there is no instance of any other sacrifice than the *burnt-offering*. But from his peculiar notions concerning the nature of sacrifice he is led to contend, that the sacrifice of Jacob, and those of Moses and Jethro, included a *peace-offering*, although he confesses, that in no one instance is there any mention expressly made of *peace-offerings* before the law.

The circumstances, on which Sykes grounds his opinion, are—1. The introduction of the word זבח: which is of no weight, because nothing prevents the *Zebach* from having been an *holocaust*.—2. The mention of the *eating of Bread* at the time of the sacrifice: from which no inference can be drawn respecting the nature of the sacrifice, as we have already seen in Number XLIX.—and, 3. The mention of both the *Zebach* and the *Holocaust*, in the cases of Moses and Jethro, in Exod. x. 25, and xviii. 12: to which Richie has satisfactorily replied, by showing that the particle ו, is to be taken, not in the sense of *and*, but in that of *even*. Indeed Dr. Richie deserves particularly to be consulted on the whole of this subject. See *Pecul. Doctr.* Part II. § 42—49. vol. i. pp. 137—144. See also *Sykes's Essay*, pp. 231—251; where, if allowance be made for the author's peculiar bias on the subject of sacrifice, considerable support will be found for the principal part of Dr. Richie's positions. But whether Dr. Richie be well founded or not in his opinion, that *all* the oblations prior to the law, excepting that of Cain, were *holocausts*, this, at least, *must* be admitted, that they were *animal sacrifices:* more than which, the present argument does not require.

Josephus, it is to be observed, expressly describes the holocaust offered by Noah, as a sacrifice of deprecation.

He states that this patriarch, under a persuasion that God had doomed mankind to destruction, and through terror of the repetition of the dreadful judgment he had so lately witnessed, offered up prayers and sacrifices to God, to *turn away his wrath*. *Antiq. Jud.* Lib. I. cap. iv. This testimony of the Jewish Historian, as to the received notions of the nature of sacrifice in his day, the reader will please to add to those which have been adduced in Number XXXIII., in reply to Dr. Priestley's remarks upon that head. It will most naturally fall in at p. 181.

NO. LXVIII.—ON THE DISPROPORTION BETWEEN THE EFFECTS OF THE MOSAIC AND THE CHRISTIAN SACRIFICES.

PAGE 41. (a).—On this subject particular attention should be paid to the observations in Numbers XXXI., XXXIV., XXXVI., and XXXVII.; especially to those contained in pp. 163, 164, and pp. 224—227, of this volume.

The following elucidation by the learned Grotius, whose unbiassed reflections are always valuable, deserves to be noticed.—Lex vetus dupliciter spectatur: aut carnaliter, aut spiritualiter. Carnaliter, quâ instrumentum fuit πολιτείας, *reipublicæ Judaicæ*. Spiritualiter, quâ σκιὰν εἶχε τῶν μελλόντων, *umbram habebat futurorum*. Hebr. x. 1. Quod ad priorem considerationem attinet, sacrificia Legis expiatoria sanctificabant ad carnis puritatem, Heb. ix. 13.—Deus enim Rex Hebræorum (quoniam Legislatori licet suam legem, præsertim pœnalem, nonnihil relaxare) in *quibusdam* delictis victimas expiatorias admisit vice ipsius peccatoris, et per illas ac non aliter peccatorem a mortis pœna (quæ juxta carnalem sensum erat sanctio Legis) liberare voluit.—In *quibusdam* ergo delictis; quod ad pœnam carnalem attinebat, admittebatur placamen, redemptio, satisfactio, compensatio denique mortis bestiæ cum morte hominis alioqui debitâ.—Victimæ pro peccato ita in Veteri Fœdere peccata expiarunt; nimirum Deum movendo, ut pœnam carnalem remitteret, idque per satisfactionem quandam.

Quod autem typi præstiterunt carnaliter, hoc ὁ ἀντίτυπος, *exemplar*, Christus præstat spiritualiter; et quod typi in quibusdam duntaxat delictis, id Christus in omnibus, Deum scilicet movendo, ut spiritualem pœnam remittat, idque per satisfactionem perfectissimam. Plus enim, non minus semper est in re typo designatâ, quam in typo; ut ratio monstrat. Commune est sacrificio expiatorio legali et sacrificio Christi illud, quod sine sanguinis effusione non fit remissio, Hebr. ix. 22. Hanc impetrationem remissionis per sanguinem ibidem divinus scriptor appellat modo ἁγιασμὸν, *sanctificationem* (13.) modo καθαρισμὸν, *expiationem*. (14. 22, 23.) Sed in Veteri Lege victimæ erant pecudes (12.), in hâc nostrâ Christus ipse non sacerdos tantum, sed et victima. (14. 26.) Legalis illa expiatio hujus cœlestis sive spiritualis ὑπόδειγμα (23.) et ἀντίτυπον[a], *exemplar* (24.) quomodo? Quia illa præstabat carni munditiem (14.) id est, reatus ablationem, non autem spiritui sive conscientiæ (9.) hæc autem ipsi conscientiæ. (14.) Quia quod in Veteri Lege erat mors temporalis, hoc in Novo Fœdere est mors æterna, Hebr. x. 29: ac proinde illic liberatio erat temporalis, hic vero αἰώνιος λύτρωσις, *æterna redemptio*, Hebr. ix. 12. Quare sicut eodem loco ab effectu legalis victimæ ad effectum hujus per spiritum oblatæ argumentum producitur, *Quanto magis*, &c., sic et nobis licet hunc in modum certissime argumentari, *Victima legalis reatum carnalem sustulit, Deum movendo ad remissionem; ergo multo magis reatum spiritualem, Deum itidem ad remissionem movendo, tollit oblata per spiritum victima.*—*Grotii Opera Theolog.* tom. iv. pp. 331—333.

The principles from which Grotius has derived his conclusion are manifestly these. 1. That the expiation wrought by the sacrifices under the Law were typical of that effected by the death of Christ: 2. That in every type there must be something of the same general nature with that which is contained in the thing typified: and 3. That, combined with this general correspondence between the type and the thing pre-

[a] Grotius has here used the word *antitype* improperly, and in a sense directly opposite to that in which he has just before properly applied the term.

figured, there should exist that disproportion which might be expected between the shadow and the substance.

These principles, indeed, are so clearly and unequivocally laid down by the apostle in his epistle to the Hebrews, that even the great fathers of the Socinian school, Faustus Socinus and Crellius, admit their evidence, and differ from Grotius only in the application. In establishing the *correspondence*, and the *disproportion*, of the Mosaic and the Christian expiation, they urge the reasoning of the apostle no less forcibly than Grotius has done; as may be seen in the treatise of Socinus *De Jes. Christ. Serv.* (*Opera*, tom. ii. pp. 157, 158,) and in Crellius's *Respons. ad Grot.* (*Opera*, tom i. pp. 204—211.) These expositors, not having been initiated into the convenient artifice, so familiar to their followers, of rejecting the authority of an apostle when it made against them, found themselves compelled by the plain language of Scripture to acknowledge the validity of these principles.

The nature of their system, however, being at variance with their admission, they were led to strain one principle to an extreme, subversive of the other; and, by urging *disproportion* within the confines of *dissimilitude*, they were enabled to escape the bearings of that *correspondence* of the two dispensations, which forms the foundation of the apostle's argument, and for which they had themselves in the first instance strenuously contended. For whilst, in professing to represent the expiation by the sacrifice of Christ as of a superior order to that effected by the sacrifices of the law, they endeavour to establish this by such a description of its nature, as divests it of every character which the Mosaic sacrifice possessed, they in truth show, that the death of Christ bore no relation whatever to those sacrifices by which they admit it to have been typified: that is, in other words, they make the Mosaic sacrifices at the same time typical and not typical of the death of Christ.—See this point well treated, though in a different manner, by Stillingfleet, in his *Discourse concerning the true Reasons*, &c., pp. 365—367.

On another fallacy in the reasoning of the above writers it

is also necessary to remark. Whilst they profess faithfully to follow the apostle's reasoning in his address to the Hebrews, they represent the expiation of the legal sacrifice as wholly typical; whereas it was not less real and effectual under its own proper system, than the sacrifice of Christ was under that by which it was succeeded; whilst at the same time it prefigured that more important expiation, which was to be introduced under the new dispensation; all the parts of which, the apostle distinctly informs us, had their corresponding circumstances in that which went before.

Upon the whole, then, briefly to sum up the present subject.—The people of the Jews being placed under a peculiar polity, whereby they stood at the same time in a civil and ritual relation to their divine Governor; their offences in these several relations exposed them to the inflictions appropriate to each. The mercy of the Legislator at the same time provided for them the means of expiation by sacrifice, whereby, in certain cases, the corporal punishment incurred by the violation of the civil law, and the legal impurities contracted by the neglect of the ritual institutions, might be done away. The entire system, however, being but preparatory for another by which it was to be superseded, was constituted in all its essential parts in such a manner as to be emblematical of that which it was intended to introduce; and the several parts of the one were, consequently, adjusted by the same proportions which were to obtain in the other.

Hence it follows, that the sacrifices under the temporal and ceremonial dispensation of the Law had a real efficacy in releasing those who were subjected to it from its temporal penalties and ceremonial disqualifications; in like manner as the one great Sacrifice under the Gospel possesses the power to release mankind at large from the everlasting penalties of that spiritual law under which all men are bound, and to cleanse the conscience from those moral impurities which forbid all access to that holy Being, who is to be worshipped only in spirit and in truth. The expiation, then, under the old law,

was no less real than that which it prefigured under the new, whilst it bore to the dispensation of which it was a part, the same proportion which that more perfect expiation by the death of Christ bears to the more perfect dispensation to which it appertains; the wisdom of the divine contrivance, in this as in the other branches of providential arrangement, rendering that which was complete and effectual for its own immediate purpose, at the same time introductory and subservient to other and more important objects.

Berriman, in treating of the typical interpretation of the Law, although leaning a little too much to the notion of its being merely symbolical, places the parallelism and proportion of the two dispensations in a just and satisfactory light. "From what" (he asks) "was the offender delivered by the legal sacrifices? Was it not from the temporal death, and the danger of being cut off from the congregation? And to what privilege was he restored or entitled? Was it not to the privilege of appearing before God, and joining in the public worship? What was the purifying or sanctification consequent upon such atonements? Was it not (as the apostle styles it) *the purifying of the flesh;* an outward and a transient efficacy, which could not reach to *purge their consciences from dead works?* And why was all this necessary to be often repeated, but because it had no solid or permanent effect, nor deserved to find acceptance of itself? But if we take it in a symbolical or typical point of view, then it leads us to acknowledge the benefit of Christ's redemption, and those invaluable privileges he has purchased for us. That temporal death, which was denounced by the Law, will denote that everlasting punishment to which sinners are exposed as such. The legal impurity, which wanted to be cleansed, will denote the defilement and impurity of sin. The outward admission to the service of the temple, will denote our spiritual privilege of access unto God, as well in the present ordinances of his church, as in the future inheritance of his eternal kingdom. And all this being performed by the

oblation of *sacrifices*, clean and perfect in their kind, will import our being *redeemed with the precious blood of Christ, as of a lamb without blemish and without spot; who through the eternal Spirit offered himself without spot to God, for a sweet-smelling savour, and entered not into the holy places made with hands, which are the figures of the true, but into heaven itself*, that *true tabernacle, which the Lord pitched, and not man*, there to plead the merit of his sacrifice, and *make for ever intercession for us.*"—*Boyle Lecture Sermons*, vol. iii. pp. 776, 777.

On the subject of this Number in general, there are some excellent remarks of Bishop Stillingfleet, to be found in his *Discourse concerning the true Reasons*, &c., pp. 315—318.

NO. LXIX.—ON THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE SACRIFICIAL LANGUAGE OF THE OLD TESTAMENT AND THAT EMPLOYED IN THE NEW TO DESCRIBE REDEMPTION BY THE DEATH OF CHRIST: AND THE ORIGINAL ADAPTATION OF THE FORMER TO THE SUBJECT OF THE LATTER.

PAGE 41. (b).—If, indeed, it be considered, that the sacrifice of Christ was the great object held in view in the appointment of all preceding sacrifices, and that *these* were primarily designed as sacramental representations of *that*, it will follow, that in reference to *it* must the sacrificial terms have been originally framed: and that, therefore, when applied by the Apostles to the death of Christ, they were adopted, not merely as being familiar to the Jews from their application to the sin-offerings under the law, but because of their original adaptation to this *one great* Sacrifice, in *consequence* of which they had been applied to the legal sacrifices ordained to represent it. For some valuable observations on this subject, see *Holmes's Four Tracts*, pp. 102, 103.

If this view of the matter be just, it then follows, that so far were the writers of the New Testament from employing the sacrificial terms in mere accommodation to Jewish notions, (an argument much insisted on by Dr. Priestley, H.

Taylor, and others, see pp. 20, 21, and pp. 163—165, of this volume,) that they must have used them as *primarily* belonging to the death of Christ, and as in strict accuracy more aptly characterizing the Christian sacrifice, than those sacrifices of typical import to which they had been applied under the law. From this also it might be expected, that a *fuller* light would now be thrown upon the nature of the Jewish sacrifice; and the true force and value of the sacrificial ceremonies and phrases be more perfectly understood. And this we find to be the case; the language of the New Testament on the subject of atonement being more precise and significant than that of the Old. Instances of this may be seen in pp. 230. 254, 255, of this volume, and are not denied by the opponents of the doctrine of Atonement, as has been already observed in the places referred to. Thus, then, we find the Old Testament and the New bestowing mutual elucidation, on this head: the rites and terms of sacrifice in the Old exemplifying and describing the leading principles and fundamental notions of atonement; and the more exact and perfect delineation of it in the New filling up the outline, and exhibiting the great work of our Redemption, in its genuine magnitude and beauty.

The train of reflection pursued in this Number leads me naturally to notice the opinions of Archbishop Tillotson, as connected with its subject. Nor is it without much regret, that I find myself compelled to notice, for the express purpose of marking with condemnation, the opinions of a prelate, whose great talents and virtues have combined to shed so bright a lustre on the annals of the English church. This distinguished writer[a], having been forcibly impressed with

[a] So highly was Tillotson esteemed as a *writer* by the celebrated Locke, that, in his treatise *Concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman*, he specifically recommends the constant perusal of the works of that prelate, as a most useful exercise for the student who is desirous to acquire the talent of *perspicuity*. So very highly, indeed, did that most excellent judge of whatever is requisite to clearness of expression, rate the Archbishop's endowments in this particular, that he has joined with him but one other writer in the English language, as exhibiting a just model for the acquisition of a perspicuous style. That writer is *Chillingworth*, whom he commends also for attain-

the many visible traces of the doctrines and truths of revelation discoverable in the mythology and worship of the Heathen world, was led to conclude, with a rashness little to be expected from such a man, that the Christian religion, whilst it was in its substance a most perfect institution, was yet, in condescension to the weakness of mankind, accommodated to the existing prejudices of the world, so far as was consistent with the honour of God, and its own great and valuable purposes. And, accordingly, he maintains, that the doctrine of our redemption by the sacrifice of Christ had its origin in the notion of sacrifices entertained amongst the Pagans.

"This notion," he says, "of the expiation of sin, by sacrifices of one kind or other, seems to have obtained very early in the world; and, among all other ways of divine worship, to have found the most universal reception in all times and places. And, indeed, a great part of the Jewish religion and worship was a plain condescension to the general apprehensions of men, concerning this way of appeasing the Deity by sacrifice: and the greatest part of the Pagan religion and worship was likewise founded upon the same notion and opinion, which, because it was so universal, seems to have had its original from the first parents of mankind, either immediately after the Creation, or after the Flood; and from thence, I mean as to the substance of this notion, to have been derived and propagated to all their posterity. And

ments of yet higher value.—"Besides perspicuity" (he says) "there must be also right reasoning; without which, perspicuity serves but to expose the speaker. And for the attaining of this, I should propose the constant reading of Chillingworth, who, by his example, will teach both perspicuity and the way of right reasoning, *better than any book that I know*; and therefore will deserve to be read upon that account *over and over again*; not to say any thing of his argument."—*Locke's Works*, vol. iv. p. 601.

Why I have so readily availed myself of the opportunity, afforded by this honourable testimony, of presenting *Chillingworth* to the more immediate notice of the student, at *this* period, and in *this* country, will not be difficult, upon reflection, to discover.—Quære: Are Tillotson, and Chillingworth, and writers of that manly stamp, those with whom the youth of the present day are most solicitous to converse, for the improvement of their reasoning and their style?

with this general notion of mankind, whatever the ground or foundation of it might be, God was pleased so far to comply, as once for all to have a general atonement made for the sins of all mankind, by the sacrifice of his only Son."—*Tillotson's Works*, vol. i. p. 440. For similar observations, see do. pp. 439. 446, 447. 451. And again, in vol. ii. p. 112, he states the matter thus :—" With these notions, which had generally possessed mankind, God was pleased to comply so far, as, in the frame of the Jewish religion, (which was designed for a type of the more perfect institution of the Christian religion, and a preparation for it,) to appoint sacrifices to be slain and offered up for the sinner," &c. And, he adds, that, afterwards, in the dispensation of the Gospel, the same condescension to the apprehensions of mankind was likewise observed, as has been already stated.

Now, it is surely much to be lamented, that when this learned Prelate had, upon a full examination of the case, been led to discover such a striking conformity between Paganism and Christianity, as must reduce the matter to this alternative, either that the Christian dispensation was framed in compliance with Heathen prejudices, or that Paganism was a corruption of those oracles which conveyed anticipations of the Christian scheme; it is much, I say, to be lamented, that he should have been drawn into a conclusion so directly at variance with history and Scripture, when one so powerfully sustained by both was immediately at hand.

The stumbling-block to the Archbishop, as an ingenious writer has justly remarked, was the supposition of a *Religion of Nature*[a], prior to and independent of revelation. Hence

[a] One of the most singular theories ever devised on the subject of *Natural Religion*, is that of Bishop Warburton; which I subjoin here the more readily, as it tends to show to what strange conceits even the greatest men may be carried, when they attempt to be wise beyond what is written, and presume to substitute their own conjectural reasonings for the solid truths of Revelation.—Man, he contends, was created mortal, in the immaterial as well as the material part of his nature, immateriality simply being common to him with the whole animal creation. But by God's breathing into his nostrils the *breath of life*, and thereby making him a *living soul*, the *life* in man was discriminated from the *life* in brutes; since by this act was communicated to

arose the assumption, that the notion of expiation for sins by sacrifice, which he found so early and so universal, was

his immaterial part a *rational* principle, which, by making him responsible for his actions, must require, according to the existing constitution of things, a *continuance of life*, and, consequently, a distinct existence of the soul after its separation from the body. In the state, in which, according to the Bishop, the first couple were placed previous to their admission into Paradise, they were subject only to the law of *Natural Religion*, the constituent parts of which religion were discoverable by the efforts of the human understanding unassisted by divine instruction. On being advanced to the Paradisiacal state, man became the subject of *Revealed Religion;* and, as the reward of his obedience to the positive precept attached to his new condition, *immortality*, (meaning thereby the perpetual duration and uninterrupted union of the body and soul,) a quality which was altogether extraneous to his original nature, was placed within his reach by the *free grace* of God. The opportunity now afforded to him of exalting his nature by the superinduced blessings of immortality was lost by his non-compliance with the condition: and at the same time the corruption, which his disobedience caused to that rational nature in which he had been made to resemble the divine image, degraded him to his first condition of mortality, and made him again liable to that total death, that complete annihilation to which his frame was originally subject. But, by the intervention of Jesus Christ, man was not only restored to the advantages of his original state, namely, the continuance of the soul after the dissolution of the body, but he was also enabled to obtain that immortality, which Adam by his obedience might have secured; with this difference however, that, in the immortality procured by Christ, death is permitted to give a temporary interruption to that existence and union of the soul and body, which, in the other case, would have been unbroken. But not only had the transgression occasioned a relapse into that state of mortality in which man had been originally created, but it also threw him back into that subjection to natural Religion in which he was at first placed. In this dispensation of *Natural Religion*, which, according to Bishop Warburton, was thus permitted to precede the dispensation of *Grace*, the aids and succours of virtue were not, however, according to his hypothesis, wanting; for, in his view of the subject, the light of revelation is by no means required to make known the efficacy of repentance, or the rewards of upright conduct. Both these points, he contends, are evidently manifest to the eye of reason, tracing the connexion that must subsist between the creature and his Maker. Such are the paradoxical, and, it must be added, unscriptural sentiments, conveyed by this learned writer in the 9th book of the *Divine Legation*. They will be found well, though briefly, treated by Mr. Pearson, in the first three sections of his *Critical Essay;* a work, of which I have already had occasion to speak, in p. 64. Dr. Graves, also, in the 4th section, Part III. of his *Lectures on the Pentateuch*, has made many valuable remarks, affecting, though not directly, these positions of the too ingenious Bishop.

It ought not to pass unnoticed, that his Lordship, in one of his Letters to his friend Dr. Hurd, speaks of this his favourite theory, as intended "to confute the triumphant reasoning of unbelievers, particularly Tindal, who say redemption is a fable: for the only means of regaining God's *favour*, which they eternally confound with *immortality*, is that simple one which natural religion teaches, viz. *repentance*. To confute this, it was necessary to show,

the mere suggestion of human apprehensions; not deduced from any express revelation concerning *the Lamb of God slain*, in decree and type, *from the foundation of the world;* not springing from any divine institution, ordained for the purpose of showing forth Christ's death, until he should himself appear in the flesh, to fulfil all that was prefigured of him, and to take away sin, and put an end to sacrifice, by the one great sacrifice of himself.

Had the Archbishop, as the same writer observes, reflected, that a religion or law of nature [a], is a mere *ens rationis;* that

that restoration to a *free gift*, and the recovery of a *claim*, were two very different things. The common answer was, that natural religion does *not* teach reconciliation on repentance; which if it does not, it teaches nothing, or worse than nothing." Of Natural Religion, then, after all that Bishop Warburton has written about it, we have his full confession, that *if it does not teach the sufficiency of repentance, it teaches even worse than nothing.*—The opponent of the notion of Natural Religion may safely allow the matter to rest upon the ground on which the Bishop has placed it. That God will accept repentance in compensation for obedience, nothing short of the word of God can ever establish satisfactorily to any reasonable mind. The consequence of this position is supplied by the author of the *Divine Legation.*

[a] To him who would wish to see, how little the *Religion of Nature*, so far as it contains any thing truly valuable to man, is strictly entitled to that name, I would recommend the perusal of the preface to *The Religion of Jesus delineated.* The observations there contained, whilst they tend to show, in animadverting upon *The Religion of Nature delineated*, how sadly deficient the scheme of natural religion is found, even at this day, although sketched by the hand of a master, and aided by the borrowed discoveries of revelation, at the same time clearly evince, that the promulger of the truths of what is called *natural religion*, in almost every case in which he advances any that are of importance to mankind, is in reality to be deemed, not Αὐτοδίδακτος, but Θεοδίδακτος. Of this, however, the fullest and most complete proof is to be derived from the invaluable work of *Dr. Ellis*, in which he may be said to have demonstrated *The knowledge of Divine Things* to be *from Revelation, not from Reason or Nature. Leland* has also abundantly established the *fact*, of the total insufficiency of human reason in religious concerns, by the view, which he has given, of the state of religion in the Heathen world, in his work on *The Advantage and Necessity of the Christian Revelation.* From *Clarke's* 6th and 7th propp. of his *Evidence of Natural and Revealed Religion*, although this author is disposed to attribute to the powers of reason rather more than their due share, the same inference may be deduced—especially from what is said, pp. 659—665, and 666—671, vol. ii. of his works.——I should be guilty of injustice to an accomplished modern writer, if on this subject I permitted to pass unnoticed Dr. Maltby's Thesis for his degree of B.D., contained in the volume of his *Illustrations of the Truth of the Christian Religion.* The following proposition, "Nequit per se humana ratio cognitione satis plenâ et certâ assequi, quo potissimum modo Deus sit colendus; quæ sint hominum

the first parents of mankind were not left to the unassisted light of reason or nature, but were, from the beginning, fully instructed by their Creator in all things necessary for them to know; that, after their fall, the way and method of their salvation was, in a certain degree, made known to them; that all religious rites flowed from the same divine source, viz. the original revelation of the redemption of the world by the sacrifice of our Lord Jesus Christ; that all the apprehensions and common prejudices of mankind, as they are called, were derived from the same fountain; that all, until the apostacy at Babel, had the same tongue, the same faith, the same Lord; that the Heathen carried off from thence the same religious rites and ceremonies, and the same sentiments concerning God and his ways with man, which, by change of language, length of time, wantonness of imagination, perverseness of human nature, and subtlety of the devil, were reduced to that corrupted state of faith and practice in which our Saviour at his advent found them;—and that, as already observed, from the first promise made to Adam, during the patriarchal and legal dispensations, all was Christianity in type and figure; so that Christianity was the *first* religion in the world, corrupted afterwards indeed by the Gentile, but preserved by the Jew in type, till Christ, the great Antitype, the reality and completion, came;—had he (this writer ob-

officia; vita denique futura sit, necne, æterna," is there treated with a justness, a succinctness, a good taste, a correctness of style, and a strength of authority, which reflect honour upon its author as a divine and as a scholar, and cannot fail to give satisfaction to the reader, who wishes to find the *substance* of what can be said upon this important question, compressed into the smallest compass, and in the best manner. The concluding observation, concerning such as at the present day repose on the sufficiency of reason for a knowledge of their duties, contains a truth, in which every reflecting mind must necessarily acquiesce. "Profecto eâdem, quâ veteres philosophi, caligine animi eorum sunt mersi: aut si quid melius sapiunt, *id omne a Christianâ religione malâ fide mutuati sunt.*" p. 355. And therefore, as the writer finally remarks, it is most devoutly to be desired, that the advocates for the all-sufficiency of reason would deeply imprint upon their minds this momentous maxim of the great Bacon:—"Causa vero et radix fere omnium malorum in scientiis ea una est, quod dum mentis humanæ vires falso miramur et extollimus, vera ejus auxilia non quæramus." p. 359.

serves) pursued this train of thinking, he would have found the reverse of his conclusion to be the truth; namely, "that Christianity was not instituted in compliance with Paganism; but that Paganism was nothing else but the great truths of Christianity split and debased into a legend of fables, such as we meet with in their mythology."[a]—*Spearman's Letters to a Friend concerning the Septuagint Translation and the Heathen Mythology*, pp. 150, 151.

The writer who has made the above observations, and whose reasonings would not have been less valuable had they taken less tincture from the Hutchinsonian school, has endeavoured, and not without success, to establish the point last adverted to; namely, the derivation of the Pagan mythology from the divine revelations.

Tillotson's idea corresponds with that which was afterwards adopted by *Spencer*. For since he admits the Jewish dispensation to have been typical of the Christian, the accommodation of the *Christian* scheme to Pagan prejudices, for which he contends, could only have been effected through the previous accommodation of the *Jewish* scheme to those prejudices; which, as we have seen in Number XLVII., falls in with the theory maintained by *Spencer*. And this theory, as we have seen in the same number, p. 317, of this volume, is satisfactorily refuted by *Shuckford*, whose work on *The Sacred and Prophane History of the World connected*, goes to establish the direct contradictory of *Spencer's* position[b]. The arguments of *Spencer* are also successfully combated by *Witsius* in his *Ægyptiaca:* see likewise the same author's *Misc. Sacr.* Lib. I. Diss. i. pp. 429—437. *Warburton* confesses truly, that *Spencer's* work is but a paraphrase and comment on the third book of the *Moreh*

[a] If this view of the case be a just one, we certainly might reasonably expect to find in the mythology of the ancients, in a much larger and more important sense, what Plutarch says of the Egyptian fables, ἀμυδρὰς τινὰς ἰμφάσεις τῆς ἀληθείας, *some faint and obscure resemblance of the truth.*

[b] The particular application of Shuckford's arguments to *Spencer's* notion will be found briefly sketched in pp. 313—317 of his first volume.

Nevochim of Rabbi *Maimonides;* and, joining forces with *Spencer* [a] in maintaining the orthodoxy of the philosophizing Jew [b], he contends, with all his might, against the arguments

[a] How little Spencer deserved to have the support of Warburton, is not only manifest, from the whole scheme of his argument, in his great work *De Legibus Hebræorum*, (which is itself unsupported by true history, and has always been resorted to by Infidel writers in order to wing their shafts more effectively against the Mosaic Revelation,) but may also be made to appear, more evidently and briefly, by the quotation of a single passage from this writer's *Discourse concerning Prodigies*. "It is," he says, "the nature of the soul to be greatly impressive to a persuasion of *parallels, equalities, similitudes*, in the frame and government of the world.—This general temper of the soul easily inclines it to believe great and mighty changes in states, ushered in with the solemnity of some mighty and analogous changes in nature; and that all terrible evils are prefaced or attended with some prodigious and amazing alterations in the creation:—Hence perhaps it is, that we generally find great troubles and judgments on earth described, especially by persons *ecstatical, prophets and poets*, (whose speeches usually rather follow the *easy sense of the soul, than the rigid truth of things*,) by all the examples of horror and confusion in the frame of the creation. The *Prophet David* describes God's going forth to judgment thus:—*The earth shook and trembled, the foundations also of the hills moved and were shaken*," &c. (pp. 70—72.)—Now can it be any defence against this irreverent attack upon the *prophets inspired by God*, which charges them with indulging in *enthusiastic visions and expressions founded only in their own fancies, and not in the truth of things;* can it, I say, be deemed any defence to urge, as Warburton has done, that, "through his sole intention to the argument, he often expresses himself very *crudely?*" (*Div. Leg.* vol. ii. p. 341.) If he be so *crude* in his expression, as to cast discredit upon Revelation, whilst his intention is to support it, he must surely be a very unsafe guide in theology. At the same time, it can hardly be imagined, that an author, possessing considerable powers and facilities of language, could, in any case, especially in one affecting the very foundation of Revealed Religion, express himself so *crudely*, as to represent himself destitute of a belief, which he *firmly, habitually*, and *reverently* maintained. At all events, it is evident, that such a writer is to be consulted with much caution, and his authorities scanned with much suspicion.

[b] For a very curious and interesting account of the circumstances which gave rise to the production of the celebrated work, the *Moreh Nevochim*, in which Maimonides first gave to the world the theory of the ceremonial institutions of the Jews here referred to, the reader may consult *Warburton's Div. Leg.* vol. ii. pp. 353, 354. He will probably, however, not be altogether satisfied, that the existing necessity of "showing to the apostatizing Jews, that the Scriptures might be defended or even explained on the principles of Aristotle; and of gratifying the inquisitive and disputatious tendencies of those, who enquired after the *reasons* of the Jewish laws, by finding out a reasonableness and convenience in their ceremonial rites," supplies a proof, that those reasons, which the philosophic Jew had thus assigned, were the true reasons which influenced the divine Legislator in the several ordinances of his Law. The parallel, which Warburton here insinuates, between the nature of his own great work and that of Maimonides, will not escape the notice of the observing reader.

of *Witsius* and *Shuckford.—Div. Leg.* Book IV. Sect. 6. To this he was urged by the necessity, which his parodoxical system had imposed upon him, of making out for the Egyptian rites and institutions an extravagant antiquity: and in defence of his dogmas he advances every thing that a powerful but perverted ingenuity, acting on a wide range of learning, could supply[a].

[a] The character of this distinguished scholar and divine, as it is portrayed by the hand of a master, I here willingly subjoin.—"He was a man of vigorous faculties, a mind fervid and vehement, supplied by incessant and unlimited enquiry, with wonderful extent and variety of knowledge, which yet had not oppressed his imagination, nor clouded his perspicacity. To every work he brought a memory full fraught, with a fancy fertile of original combinations, and at once exerted the powers of the scholar, the reasoner, and the wit. But his knowledge was too multifarious to be always exact, and his pursuits were too eager to be always cautious. His abilities gave him an haughty confidence, which he disdained to conceal or mollify; and his impatience of opposition disposed him to treat his adversaries with such contemptuous superiority, as made his readers commonly his enemies, and excited against him the wishes of some who favoured his cause. He seems to have adopted the Roman emperor's determination, *oderint dum metuant;* he used no allurements of gentle language, but wished to compel rather than persuade.—His style is copious without selection, and forcible without neatness: he took the words that presented themselves: his diction is coarse and impure, and his sentences are unmeasured."—*Johnson's Life of Pope.*

For a view of the character more favourable, but not more just, I would refer to that which Bishop Hurd, the uniform admirer and panegyrist of Warburton, has given in the life he has written of that prelate. His encomiums, on *The Divine Legation* especially, are overcharged; and the recollection that the cause of truth and of religion, no less than the reputation of his friend, was involved in the estimation of that important work, should have rendered his panegyric more qualified.

My friend Dr. Graves, in his late excellent work on the *Pentateuch*, has sketched a portrait, which, for likeness of feature and justness of colouring, seems to me to merit a place in the neighbourhood of that which has been drawn by Johnson.—Speaking of the *Divine Legation*, and having observed, that, "While its author lived, his splendid talents and extensive learning raised in his followers and defenders such enthusiastic admiration, that they could not perceive, or at least would not allow, that he had been in the smallest point erroneous: while the keenness of his controversial asperity, the loftiness of his literary pretensions, and the paradoxical form in which he too frequently chose to clothe his opinions, roused in his answerers a zeal of opposition, which would sometimes yield him no credit for the discovery of any truth:" he then proceeds: "Time should now enable us to view him in his true light: in reasoning, sagacious yet precipitate; in criticism, ingenious but not unprejudiced; his comprehensive view sometimes embraced in the process of his inquiries too wide an extent; while his quick imagination sometimes led him to combine his arguments with too slight a connexion. But when he directed, to any one grand point, his undivided

Lord *Bolingbroke* has seldom been found instrumental in correcting theological mistakes, and yet nothing can be more apposite in reply to these dangerous notions of Tillotson, Spencer, and Warburton, than his observations upon this very subject. For the weighty reasons assigned by these writers, he says, (alluding to such as held the opinions of Spencer,)—"The God of truth chose to indulge error, and suited his institutions to the taste of the age: he contented himself also to take ordinary and natural means, in a case to which they were not adequate: and whilst miracles and divine interpositions were displayed in great abundance before the eyes of the Israelites, yet Moses, under the direction of the Almighty, chose to make use of superstitions which he did not want, and which defeated instead of securing his intent; insomuch that, if the apostasies of the Israelites, after such manifestations of the one true God, can be any way accounted for, it must be by the effect of the very expedient which had been employed to prevent those apostasies." In short, he says, the whole plan of Providence seems to have been, "*to destroy idolatry by indulgence to the very superstitions out of which it grew.*"[a]—*Bolingbroke's Phil. Works*, vol. i. pp. 313—319.

What the noble Sophist had intended with no better will

and unprejudiced attention, he frequently diffused over it the radiance of genius, and discovered the recesses of truth. Happy, had his humility been equal to his talents, and had his temper been as calm and tolerant, as his understanding was luminous and penetrating. His researches would then have been conducted with more caution and impartiality, would have produced more unexceptionable conclusions, and had been attended with happier success." *Dr. Graves's Lectures on the Pentateuch*, vol. ii. pp. 209—211.

[a] On the same subject, this writer, in another place, thus pointedly, (though, as his custom is, irreverently,) expresses himself. "In order to preserve the purity of his worship, the Deity is represented as prescribing to the Israelites a multitude of rites and ceremonies, founded in the superstitions of Egypt from which they were to be weaned; and he succeeded accordingly. They were never weaned entirely from all these superstitions: and the great merit of the law of Moses was teaching the people to adore one God, much as the idolatrous nations adored several. This may be called sanctifying Pagan rites and ceremonies, in theological language: but it is profaning the pure worship of God, in the language of common sense." —*Phil. Works*, vol. v. p. 375.

to Revealed Religion itself, than to those of its advocates whom he professes to rebuke, I have, in this extract, taken such liberties in modifying, as will permit the argument to bear, only where truth would have directed it; namely, upon those mistaken interpreters of revelation, who depart from the written word of God, to follow the guidance of their own fancies in explaining the grounds and motives of the divine dispensations. Such it is impossible not to pronounce Tillotson, Spencer, and Warburton, to have been, on the particular subject now before us.

In how very different a manner we ought to pursue our inquiries, from that which these writers would propose, I have already endeavoured to enforce, pp. 31—41; also Number XLVII. and pp. 475, 476. 480, 481. And how fully we are justified in so doing, will yet more satisfactorily appear, on consulting *Dr. Graves's Lectures on the Pentateuch* (especially the two sections of Lect. vi. part iii.) and the *Eight Discourses on the Connection between the Old and New Testament;* in which latter work, the unity of the scheme of Redemption pervading the entire series of the divine dispensations has been treated with much ability by Archdeacon Daubeny; whose opinions, upon so many important points, I am happy to find perfectly coincident with those, which I have submitted to the public, throughout these pages, on the nature of the atonement.

To such as may be desirous to investigate more deeply the opinions of the three distinguished writers against whom I have found it necessary to contend in discussing the subject of the present Number, I recommend an attentive perusal of the tenth book of *Eusebius's Præparatio Evangelica:* —Book iii. chap. v. of *Stillingfleet's Origines Sacræ:*— *Bochart's Geographia Sacra:* — *Witsius's Ægyptiaca:* — *Winder's History of Knowledge:* — *Ellis's Knowledge of Divine Things from Revelation* (especially pp. 122—129): *Nichols's Conference with a Theist* (particularly vol. i. pp. 290—308, and pp. 319, 320): *Faber's Horæ Mosaicæ:* and

Dr. Woodward's Discourse on the Ancient Egyptians[a] (*Archæolog.* vol. iv.). Bishop Tomline, in his excellent *Elements of Christian Theology*, (Part i. chap. i. pp. 37—48,) has admirably summed up the argument from the concurrence of profane tradition with the Mosaic history; deducing both from the common source of revelation, disguised, indeed, and disfigured in the one by allegories and fabulous conceits, but conveyed to us by the other in its pristine and uncorrupted purity. The laborious and valuable researches of Mr. Bryant, Mr. Maurice, and, particularly, Sir William Jones, have thrown new and powerful lights upon this important subject.

As to the searching, with a curious minuteness, into the resemblances which subsist between the Pagan mythologies and the great truths of the Jewish and Christian revelations, this may, undoubtedly, be carried too far. And I agree entirely with the learned and judicious Dr. Nares, that we are not bound, in the proof of the authenticity of Revelation, to mark out its traces amidst the rubbish of absurd fables and disgusting mysteries, which compose the various religions of the Heathen world. See *Nares's Bampton Lecture*, pp. 251,

[a] An extract from this discourse I here subjoin, as particularly worthy of attention, in reply to the favourite theory of Spencer.—"Whatever might be the bent and dispositions of the Israelites, it was Moses's proper business to rectify them. He was not to indulge them in their fancies, but inform them of their duties, and direct them to what was fit, reasonable, and consistent with good morals and piety, though that happened to be never so much against their gusts and inclinations: which accordingly he everywhere did; and there are numerous instances of it through all his government of them. His doing otherwise might, indeed, have shown a great deal of *policy*, but not near so much probity and goodness, as are discoverable through his whole conduct of this great people. I can very easily allow Dr. Spencer, that this was the method that Mahomet, Apollonius Tyanæus, and some politicians, have taken: nor will I enter into any contest with him, whether the Devil makes use of the same in order to seduce mankind from the worship of God; all which he gives, I think, surely with a little too much looseness, as parallel instances in confirmation of his notion: but this I am mighty sure, Moses was on all occasions very far from it." pp. 281, 282.—Spencer had justified these observations by his strange assertions. "In eo enim eluxit sapientia divina, quod antidotum e veneno faceret, et illis ipsis ceremoniis ad populi sui utilitatem, *quibus olim Diabolus* ad hominum perniciem uteretur." And again he cites this political axiom, τὸ κακὸν τῷ κάμνοντι οὐκ ἔστι κινητέον.

252.—And yet, since these resemblances have been employed, by the pen of infidelity, to overthrow Revelation, under the pretence, that the discoveries which we ascribe to *it* had been derived from Pagan mythology, it surely must be admitted, that such inquiries of the learned as tend to reverse this position possess no inconsiderable value. The engines, designed for the destruction of Christianity, are hereby converted into instruments for its defence. The infidel, who laboured in the support of error, is thus rendered an auxiliary in the cause of truth. And it may, perhaps, not unfairly be viewed as a sort of providential retribution, that a Hume, a Bolingbroke, and a Voltaire [a], should be pressed into the ranks with the champions of Revelation, and compelled to march in the triumphal procession which celebrates their own defeat.

The latest claim, that has been set up in opposition to the Hebrew Scriptures, is on behalf of the sacred books of the

[a] Volney is not, perhaps, of sufficient calibre to be ranked with the above-mentioned discoverers of moral and religious truths. And yet he has given specimens, which prove him not wholly unworthy of such society. He has, amongst many curious matters, *discovered*, that the mysterious birth of the Messiah signifies nothing more, than the *Sun rising in the constellation of Virgo;* that the twelve apostles are *the twelve signs of the Zodiac;* and that all "the pretended personages from Adam to Abraham, are mythological beings, *stars, constellations, countries.*" *Ruins*, pp. 348. 388, 389.—Of this work of Mr. Volney, it has been well remarked by a learned writer, that it "is truly styled THE RUINS; for that, agreeably to its title, it menaces destruction to every thing that has justly commanded the respect and veneration of man: as it would rob men of the inestimable blessings of peace and good order, of the endearing ties of social connexion, and, consequently, of what constitutes both public and private happiness; and, by breaking the salutary restraints of religion, would banish peace from the human breast, and spoil it of its firmest support in life, and surest consolation in death." And to this is most properly subjoined, that "its baleful influence is not confined to these alone: that it carries in itself the seeds of its *own* ruin and confusion; and that it would almost require a volume, to enumerate the contradictory and jarring atoms, of which this chaos of confusion is composed." *An Enquiry into the Origin of the Constellations that compose the Zodiac*, p. 197.

Such are the judicious observations of a writer, whose learning has enabled him to overthrow the principal theories which have been erected by others upon the subject of which he treats; while it has not prevented the writer himself from adding one more to the numerous instances, that already existed, of the danger of adventuring into those visionary regions, in which fact supplies no solid footing, and fancy is the only guide.

Hindus. These, it has been pretended, evince not only the priority of the Indian records, but also, that Moses has borrowed from the Brâhmens much of what has been commonly ascribed to him as original, especially with regard to the creation of the world. The fallacy of such pretences has, indeed, of late years, been fully manifested by the valuable exertions of Sir William Jones, and those of his respectable fellow-labourers in the field of Indian literature. At the same time, it is to be lamented, that the admissions of that illustrious vindicator of the Hebrew writings, as well as those of Mr. Maurice, and others, respecting the antiquity of the Vedas, have been such as to furnish those who are desirous to pervert the truth with an opportunity of applying the produce of their meritorious labours to the prejudice of the Jewish records; an opportunity which was not neglected[a]. The futility of the attempt was, happily, at once, exposed by a few judicious observations in the *British Critic*, (vol. xvi. pp. 149, 150,) and has since received more ample refutation from the pens of *Mr. Faber*, and *Dr. Nares*, in their *Bampton Lecture* volumes. But, in truth, notwithstanding that, as has been abundantly proved, such admissions of the great antiquity of the Hindu records by no means justify an inference affecting the originality and priority of the Hebrew Scriptures, yet it is fairly to be questioned whether that antiquity has not been rated much above its real standard.

The astronomical tables of the Hindus, it is well known, supply the only reasonable *data* from which to judge of their

[a] See the Advertisement prefixed to the 5th volume of the *London* edition of the *Asiatic Researches:* in which, after noticing the antiquity ascribed to the Vedas by the above Orientalists, the Editors insidiously subjoin the following observation:—"We shall not take up your time, with a dissertation on the exact age of *either the* HEBREW *or the* HINDU SCRIPTURES: both are ancient: let the reader judge.—WHETHER THE HINDU BRAHMENS BORROWED FROM MOSES, OR MOSES FROM THE HINDU BRAHMENS, is not our present enquiry," p. iv. The merit of these observations, it should be noticed, belongs exclusively to the *London Editors:* the *advertisement* being altogether a fabrication of theirs; and no one part of it being to be found in the original *Calcutta* Edition, of which this professes to be a faithful copy. Such is the use to which the pure gold of Sir W. Jones would be converted by these workers of base metal!

chronology: their habitual exaggerations rendering every other source of chronological information altogether chimerical; insomuch that Sir W. Jones pronounces, (in his *Dissertation on the Gods of Greece, Italy, and India,*) "that the comprehensive mind of an Indian chronologist has no limits;" and at the same time proves his assertion by a number of the most extraordinary instances. Their astronomical calculations, therefore, having naturally become a subject of great curiosity and interest with men of science, the celebrated M. Bailly, in the year 1787, published at Paris, a volume on *the Indian astronomy,* in which he contended for its great antiquity, carrying it back to a period of more than 3000 years before the Christian era. This conclusion he founded upon the nature of certain of their astronomical tables; which, he contended, contained internal evidence that they had been formed from actual observation, and must therefore be carried up to so early a date as that of 3102 A. C. His reasoning upon this subject, in his elaborate *Traité de l'Astronomie Indienne et Orientale,* were followed by other astronomers, particularly by Professor Playfair in the 2d vol. of the *Edinburgh Transactions,* in 1789: and the *Suryá Siddhantá*[a], supposed to contain the most ancient astronomical treatise of the Indians, was also carried up to a very high date, not less than 2000 years before the Christian era.

That the reasonings, however, which led to both these

[a] Mr. Davis, who was the translator of this most ancient of the *Sastras,* thinks that he finds in it sufficient *data,* from which, computing the diminution of the obliquity of the Ecliptic at the rate of 50″ in a century, he can fairly infer the age of the work itself to be 3840 years; thereby carrying it back more than 2000 years A. C. (*Asiatic Researches,* vol. ii. p. 238.)—But, Professor Playfair, proceeding at a rate of computation, which he conceives more accurate, places the date of the work above 3000 years earlier than the Christian era. (*Edin. Trans.* vol. iv. p. 103.) He therefore thinks himself perfectly secure in adopting the interval of 2000 years A. C.: in which, also, he fortifies himself by the authority of Sir W. Jones. The demands, both of Mr. Davis and Professor Playfair, must certainly be admitted to be modest, compared with that of the Hindus themselves; who require of us to believe, that this book is 2,164,899 years old, having been at that distant period given by divine revelation.

conclusions, are erroneous, later discussions of the subject leave but little room for doubt. Mr. Marsden, in an ingenious paper in the *Phil. Trans.* for 1790, had, without attempting to impeach M. Bailly's astronomical arguments, pointed out a satisfactory mode of accounting for the apparent antiquity of the Indian tables, by conceiving the computations to be founded, not upon a *real*, but an *imaginary*, conjunction of the planets, sought for as an epoch, and calculated retrospectively. The celebrated M. LAPLACE, again, after the most accurate mathematical investigation, has not only[a] pro-

[a] I cannot refrain from giving, at full length, the opinions and reasonings of so distinguished a mathematician as M. LAPLACE on a point of such vital moment, as that of the great antiquity which it has been the fashion to ascribe to the astronomical tables of the Hindus; and on a point, also, in which the opinions of a mathematician can alone have weight.

"Les tables Indiennes indiquent une astronomie plus perfectionnée; *mais tout porte à croire qu'elles ne sont pas d'une haute antiquité.* Ici, je m'éloigne à regret de l'opinion d'un savant illustre, (M. Bailly,) qui, après avoir honoré sa carrière, par des travaux utiles aux sciences et à l'humanité, mourut victime de la plus sanguinaire tyrannie, opposant le calme et la dignité du juste aux fureurs d'un peuple abusé, qui sous ses yeux même se fit un plaisir barbare d'apprêter son supplice. Les tables Indiennes ont deux époques principales, qui remontent, l'une à l'année 3102 avant l'ère Chrétienne, l'autre à 1491: ces époques sont liées par les moyens mouvemens du soleil, de la lune, et des planètes, de sorte que l'une d'elles est nécessairement fictive. L'auteur célèbre dont je viens de parler a cherché à établir, dans son traité de l'Astronomie Indienne, que la première de ces époques est fondée sur l'observation. *Malgré ses preuves,* exposées avec l'intérêt qu'il a su répandre sur les choses les plus abstraites, *je regarde comme très vraisemblable, que cette époque a été* IMAGINÉE *pour donner une commune origine dans le Zodaique aux mouvemens des corps célestes.* En effet, si, partant l'époque de 1491, on remonte, au moyen des tables Indiennes, à l'an 3102 avant l'ère Chrétienne; on trouve la conjonction générale du soleil, de la lune, et des planètes, que ces tables supposent: *mais cette conjonction trop différente du résultat de nos meilleures tables, pour avoir eu lieu, nous montre que l'époque à laquelle elle se rapporte n'est point appuyée sur les observations.* A la vérité, quelques élémens de l'astronomie Indienne semblent indiquer, qu'ils ont été déterminés même avant cette première époque; ainsi, l'équation du centre du soleil, qu'elle fixe à 2°, 4173, n'a pû être de cette grandeur, que vers l'an 4300 avant l'ère Chrétienne. Mais, indépendamment des erreurs dont les déterminations des Indiens ont été susceptibles, on doit observer qu'ils n'ont considéré les inégalités du soleil et de la lune, que relativement aux éclipses dans lesquelles l'équation annuelle de la lune s'ajoute à l'équation du centre du soleil, et l'augmente d'environ 22′; ce qui est à-peu-près la différence de nos déterminations à celle des Indiens. Plusieurs élémens, tels que les équations du centre de Jupiter et de Mars, sont si différens dans les tables Indiennes de ce qu'ils devoient être à leur première époque, que l'on ne peut rien conclure des autres élémens en faveur de leur antiquité. *L'ensemble de ces tables, et surtout* L'IMPOSSIBILITÉ *de la conjonction quelles supposent à la*

nounced upon the recent date of the tables, but has also pointed out errors in the calculations from which M. Bailly deduced his results; and has clearly demonstrated the epoch in the tables, not to have been *real*, but *fictitious*. And, last of all, *Mr. Bentley* seems completely to have settled the point, in his two most ingenious and learned papers, in the 6th and 8th volumes of the Asiatic Researches, in which he not only contends, that, from the principles of the Hindu astronomy, the recent date of the tables can be deduced; but that also, from authentic testimony, independent of all calculations, the age of the Suryá Siddhantá can be proved to be such, as not to carry the date of its composition farther back than the year 1068. In his endeavours to establish these points, he has not scrupled to pronounce M. Bailly and Professor Playfair to have been totally mistaken in their reasonings concerning the antiquity of the Indian astronomy; and to have proceeded upon an entire ignorance of the *prin-*

même époque, prouvent au contraire qu'elles ont été construites, ou du moins rectifiées, dans des temps modernes; ce que confirment les moyens mouvemens, qu'elles assignent à la lune, par rapport à son périgée, à ses nœuds, et au soleil; et *qui plus rapides que suivant Ptolémée, indiquent évidemment que la formation de ces tables est postérieure au temps de cet astronome;* car on a vu que ces trois mouvemens s'accélèrent de siècle en siècle." — *Exposition du Système du Monde*, pp. 293, 294.

Thus has *M. Laplace*, from the evidence which the tables themselves supply, not only overturned the prevailing notion of their great antiquity, but reduced their date even lower than the first century; since he places them lower than the age of Ptolemy, who lived until 161 A. D.

Having been led to make mention of this eminent mathematician, than whom a greater name has not arisen since the days of Newton, I cannot forbear noticing, as a matter of singular curiosity, the coincidence of a remarkable astronomical epoch, as fixed by his calculations, with the year in which Archbishop Usher has placed the creation of the world, according to the chronology of the Hebrew. The epoch is that of the coincidence of the greater axis of the earth's orbit with the line of the equinoxes, at which time the true and the mean equinox were the same. This M. Laplace computes to have taken place, about the year 4004 before the Christian era; which is the very era of the creation, as chronologists have derived it from the Hebrew Scriptures.— *Traité de Mécanique Céleste*, tom. iii. p. 113.—This point I have stated merely for the gratification of the curious reader, without intending to lay upon it any particular stress. At the same time, I cannot avoid observing, that if a coincidence, equally striking, bore an aspect unfavourable to the truth of the Scripture history, it would be cried up by a certain class of literati, (who admire Mr. Brydone's lavas and such like trash,) as a circumstance amounting to a *demonstration* of the falsehood of the Hebrew Scriptures.

ciples of the artificial system of the Hindus: the nature of which he states to consist in this,—that "certain points of time *back* are fixed upon as epochs, at which the planets are *assumed* to fall into a line of mean conjunction with the sun in the beginning of Aries; and that from the points of time so assumed as epochs, the Hindu astronomer carries on his calculations, as if they had been settled so by actual observation; and determines the mean annual motions, which he must employ in his system, from thence, as will give the positions of the planets in his own time, as near as he is able to determine the same by observation." (Vol. vi. p. 542.)—He then proceeds to show by what means such fictitious epochs may be assumed, without incurring the danger of a perceptible variation from the real mean motions: and, upon the whole, he has fortified his argument in a way that renders it not easy to be shaken. The high authority of the names which Mr. Bentley has to oppose on this subject, (Sir W. Jones himself having, as well as M. Bailly and Professor Playfair, maintained the antiquity of the Indian astronomy,) may occasion some delay to the reception of his opinions. But, from the proofs which have been advanced in their support, and from the additional lights to be expected upon this subject, there seems little reason to doubt that they will ere long be generally acquiesced in.

At all events, the main foundation, on which the extraordinary antiquity of the Indian records has been built, must be given up as no longer tenable: and the decided priority of the Mosaic Scriptures cannot any longer reasonably be questioned[a]. So that, as the Chaldean, Phœnician, Egyptian,

[a] Dr. Nares, in his valuable note upon this subject, (*Bampton Lecture*, pp. 256—273,) seems somewhat reluctant to admit Mr. Bentley's results in opposition to those which could boast so many distinguished names in their support. He has, however, with great learning and ability, shown, that even from the evidence, which M. Bailly himself adduces in corroboration of his opinion, no inference can reasonably be drawn, which in any degree interferes with the truth and originality of the Scripture history. Indeed, the whole of Dr. Nares's discussion of this subject is particularly worthy of attention. Of his entire work, it may be, as it has been, most truly affirmed, that there is perhaps no other extant, which, within the same compass, brings so much argument to

Grecian, and Chinese antiquities, which at different times have been deemed irreconcileable with the truth of Scripture history, have, on a more minute inspection, contracted their dimensions to a perfect agreement with the Scripture standard; so it may without hazard be pronounced of the Indian antiquities, that the day of their exaggerated extent has nearly gone by; and that there is no longer much danger of any serious impediment, from that quarter, to the belief of the Mosaic history. That the Indians did, at a very early age, cultivate astronomy, and that to them we are indebted for that most ingenious and useful invention of an arithmetical character, possessing at the same time an absolute and a local value, cannot, undoubtedly, be denied. And yet it must be admitted, that there are such indications of gross ignorance in the very science which they have so much studied, that one scarcely knows how to give them credit for certain other discoveries which are ascribed to them. To make the circumference of the earth amount to 2,456,000,000 British miles, (*Asiat. Research.* vol. v. art. 18,) and to hold the moon's distance from the earth to be greater than that of the sun[a], are not proofs of any great progress in astronomical research. On this subject, see *Montucla's* observations, in the part referred to in the note below. In truth, from circumstances such as these, joined to the fact, of the Indians being unable to give any explanation of, or assign any reasons for, their particular tables and calculations, there seems good

bear against the various enemies of our religion from without, or against the betrayers of it from within. And, as compressing, in the best manner, the greatest quantity of important information, on all the important subjects, on which modern wisdom has attempted to assail Revelation, I most earnestly recommend it to the Theological student.—I cannot permit the very favourable mention which this author has made of my former publications on *the Atonement* to prevent me from giving a testimony which the cause of religious truth so imperiously demands.

[a] "Ils font aussi la Lune plus éloignée de nous que le Soleil, et même ils sont aussi attachées à cette opinion, qu'on l'est encore dans certaines contrées à nier le mouvement de la terre. Un Brame et un missionaire étant dans la même prison, le premier suffroit assez patiemment, que l'autre entreprît de le désabuser du culte de *Brama;* mais lorsque, dans d'autres conversations, il vit que le missionaire prétendoit, que le Soleil étoit au-delà de la Lune, ç'en fut fait: il rompit entièrement avec lui, et ne voulut plus lui parler."—*Montuc. Hist. des Mathém.* tom. i. p. 404.

reason to think that much of what has been supposed to be their own invention, has been derived to them from other sources; as has proved to be the case, with respect to the Chinese tables; and as Dr. Nares has well shown to be extremely probable, with respect to those of the Indians likewise[a]. *Bampt. Lect.* pp. 270, 271.

As to the readiness of the Indians to impose fabrications upon the Europeans, all must now be tolerably well satisfied, since the publication of Mr. Wilford's Essay in the 8th volume of the *Asiatic Researches*, (pp. 245—262,) in which he confesses, with a grief that had actually reduced him to a fit of sickness, that "his Pundits had totally deceived him, in almost all that he had written about the *Sacred Islands in the West;* having at different times, and in proportion as they became acquainted with his pursuits and his wishes, made *erasures* in the Sanscrit MSS., and on those *erasures* inserted the names, RAJATA DWEEP, for England, and SUVARNA DWEEP, for Ireland." He adds, also, that "those *frequently recurring erasures in most Indian* MSS., tended to throw a deep shade over their presumed authority." Another imposition, on a subject infinitely more important, has also since come to light. For, unfortunately, we find that the remarkable passage in the 3d volume of the *Researches*, which Sir W. Jones affirms to be an exact translation by himself, from an Indian MS., forwarded to him by Mr. Wilford, relative to Noah, under the name of *Satyavarman*, and his three sons, *Sherma*, *Charma*, and *Jyapeti*, is ALTOGETHER A FORGERY BY THE BRAHMENS. See *As. Res.* vol. iii. pp. 465, 466. 312, 313. 320.

I cannot forbear annexing to this Number a passage from an old translation of a work of the celebrated *Amyraut*. It has a close connexion with the principal topics under dis-

[a] Will not this supposition throw some light upon that extraordinary acquaintance with certain Trigonometrical principles, laid down in the *Suryá Siddhantá*, which have excited Professor Playfair's wonder in *Edinb. Trans.* vol. iv.?

cussion; and the singular value of its contents will, I trust, justify its insertion.

"Furthermore, whereas it was well said by one, that things of greatest antiquity are best; and the philosophers themselves, when they treat concerning God and religion, extremely cry up antiquity, and attribute much to the dictates of their ancestors; as if nature itself had suggested to them, that there was a source of all these things, from which they, that were nearest it, drew the purest and sincerest waters; whereas, accordingly as they are derived through several minds, as so many several conduit pipes, they become corrupted and tinctured with extraneous qualities, and contract impurity. If there be found a doctrine that has all the marks of antiquity, and there appears nothing in the world that equals it, it ought not to be doubted, but that the same proceeded from Him that is more ancient than all, as being Author of all things. If the language in which it was revealed be as the mother and stock, from which others, though very ancient, are sprung; if it describes the history of the world, and of men, and their propagation upon the earth; if it affords the demonstration of times, and that without it the knowledge of chronology would be more intricate than a labyrinth; if it deduces its history from point to point with an exact correspondence; if it clearly and certainly relates histories, that are as the body of the fabulous shadows that we see in the writings of the most ancient authors in the world; who will doubt, but all which they have is taken from thence, and that we ought to refer what is therein depraved and corrupted thereunto, as to its principle, and have recourse thither to learn what we are ignorant of?—If there be found a religion, all whose parts accord together with an admirable harmony, although it has been propounded at several times, and by several persons, in several places; if there be a discipline, a doctrine, a book, a society, in which God himself speaks to men in a style and manner agreeable to the eminence of his majesty, displays his justice to them most

terrible in its appearance, discovers his power in its highest magnificence, and gives them to sound the breadth and length, depth and height, of his infinite mercies: lastly, if examples of an incomparable virtue be found therein, with incitations and instructions to piety; such as are not to be paralleled any other where in the world; 'tis an indubitable argument, that they are proceeded from some other than the human mind, or the school of MAN."

In referring to the authors who have illustrated the primary subjects of this Number, I ought not to omit the name of Mr. *Lloyd*, who, in his valuable treatise on *Christian Theology*, has so justly propounded, and so impressively and eloquently enforced, the leading doctrines of the Christian religion. Were not this Number already carried to an unreasonable length, I should add to it some extracts from his 1st and 2d chapters, which could not fail to enhance its value. From his remarks in the 1st chap., (particularly pp. 6—10,) *On the proper provinces of Natural and Revealed Religion*, and from those in the 2d, *On the unity of divine truths displayed in the Jewish and Christian dispensations*, I can promise the judicious reader much satisfaction and instruction.

IN bestowing upon *Lord Bolingbroke* the epithet of SOPHIST, in the preceding number, at p. 485, I feel, upon second thoughts, that I have not been strictly correct in the application of the term. Ingenuity, exerted under a subtle show of reasoning, for the purpose of misleading and over-reaching the controversial opponent, is the distinguishing attribute of the character so denominated. His Lordship, however, has not condescended to deal in this treacherous manner with those whom he combats in argument. His magnanimity, and his candour, are both at war with such mean and petty artifices. The one raises him above the little forms of logical and exact ratiocination; and the other inspires him with the disdain of concealing from his oppon-

ent any vulnerable part. His argument is, accordingly, of that elevated quality, that deals in lofty language and privileged assertion; and of that intrepid character, that fears not, as occasion may demand, to beat down the very positions, which, when other occasions demanded, it had been found convenient to maintain. The noble writer, in short, too courtly to associate with the antiquated followers of Aristotle, and too free to be trammelled by the rules of a precise and circumscribing dialectic, passes on fluently in one smooth and gentlemanly tenor, undisturbed by any want of connexion between premises and conclusion, and at perfect liberty to relinquish either, or both, just as his lordly humour may happen to direct.—To these ingenuous qualities, which exalt his Lordship's *reasoning* above the pedantic exactnesses of *logic*, is superadded an easy freedom which releases his Lordship's *history* from the troublesome punctilios of fact. So that, upon the whole, there is scarcely any writer, who, in a flowing and copious vein of declamation, possesses in any degree comparable to his Lordship, the art of arriving at whatever conclusion he pleases, and by whatever route: not merely overwhelming the astonished adversary, by a rapid succession of movements the most unexpected, but displaying still greater argumentative powers, in overturning those very dogmas which had just before been rendered impregnable to all but himself, and thereby defeating the only antagonist worthy to be opposed to so illustrious a disputant.

To be serious, there is no writer of any name, Voltaire perhaps alone excepted, whose attempts upon Christianity are more impotent and contemptible than those of Lord Bolingbroke. The bare enumeration of the positions he has maintained, throughout his *Letters on History*, and what are *called* his *Philosophical Works*, would be an exposure of ignorance and imbecility, sufficient not merely to satisfy truth, but to satiate malice. It was, therefore, scarcely necessary that his deistical productions should have been submitted to the careful dissection of *Clayton*, *Warner*, and *Leland*, and the powerful and merciless lacerations of *War-*

burton[a]. They must soon have done the work for themselves. Having little more than their impiety and their viciousness to recommend them, they must inevitably, excepting only with those to whom impiety and vice are a recommendation, have ere long reached that oblivion, to which, save only with such persons, they are now, I may say, almost universally consigned. On their first publication, it was proposed, as the best mode of counteracting their mischievous design, to collect the contradictory passages, and merely arranging them mutually confronted in opposing columns, so to leave them without comment to the reflections of the reader: and, if I mistake not, this idea was acted on by one writer, in a work, entitled an *Analysis of the Philosophical Works of the late Lord Bolingbroke.* This work I have not seen: but so exact a specimen of this nature is supplied by the very part of this writer's works, to which I have had, in the foregoing Number, occasion to refer, that I cannot refuse to produce it for the reader's satisfaction.

Being anxious to prove, in opposition to the received opinion, that the idolatries of the Gentile world could not have been derived from the corruptions of an original Revelation, he peremptorily asserts, that, "it is *impossible* for any man in his senses to believe, that a tradition" (namely, that of the unity of God) "derived from God himself, through so few generations, was lost among the greatest part of mankind; or that Polytheism and Idolatry were established on the ruins of it, in the days of Serug, before those of Abraham, and so soon after the deluge." (*Philos. Works*, 8vo Ed. vol. i. p. 299.) At the distance of less than two pages, we find it as peremptorily asserted, by the same extraordinary writer, that "Polytheism and Idolatry have the *closest connexion* with the natures and affections of rude ignorant

[a] See the *View of Lord Bolingbroke's Philosophy in Four Letters to a Friend*, in which all that fervid vigour and burning severity, for which its author is so distinguished, are overpoweringly exerted for the purpose of laying bare to the public eye the miserable deficiencies of his Lordship, as a philosophical writer, under the several heads of *ingenuity*, of *truth*, of *consistency*, of *learning*, and of *reasoning*.

men:" and in less than half a page more, that "the vulgar embrace them *easily, even after the true doctrine of a divine unity has been taught and received*, as we may learn from the example of the Israelites: and that superstitions grow *apace*, and spread wide, even in those countries where Christianity has been established and is daily taught, as we may learn from the examples of the Roman churches," &c. —But this is not all. We find this same writer again, in vol. ii. pp. 200—210, both deny the *fact*, that the divine unity had been taught to the Israelites and soon forgotten by them, (which is the very *example* he builds upon in the above passage,) and also the *application* of that fact to the case of other nations (which application is the very use he has himself made of that fact).—And then, after all this, and almost in the same breath in which he has made these assertions, he draws back again in part, and says, "I do not *so much deny* the truth of the facts, as I oppose their application." (p. 210.) That is,—I cannot resist the recapitulation,—our author first denies a certain fact as *impossible:* then establishes its strong *probability* upon general principles of human nature, supported by an *example* drawn from the case of the Israelites, and *applied* to that of mankind at large: then he both denies the truth of that very *example*, and the justness of its *application* (both of which are his own undisputed property): and then again he admits them both, in certain (but different) degrees; since he does *not so much deny the one, as he opposes the other.* What does all this mean? Is it, or is it not, nonsense? Have we not here, then, (to use the sort of pleasant and sportive phrase, that might not improbably have been used by such writers as his Lordship,) in beating about for game, sprung a whole covey of contradictions, which, after winging their tortuous course in all directions, have at last sought shelter, by taking flight into the impenetrable thickets of nonsense? Now what is to be done with such a writer as this? The author of the memoirs of his life, whilst he speaks in terms much too strong of his qualities as a statesman, remarks, in alluding to the excur-

sions which, as an author, he had ventured to make beyond his proper sphere: "I should be sorry, that you took your politics from priests; but I should be in more pain if I thought you in danger of receiving your religion from a politician." *Memoirs of the Life of Lord Bolingbroke*, p. 232.

In truth, to sum up all in a word, my Lord Bolingbroke was no more than a coxcomb in literature, and a pretender in science. Nor has religion, though the principal object of his hostility, so much to complain of his bungling attempts as philosophy: at the same time that both have experienced more of malevolence, than injury, at his hands. With him, the great sages of antiquity have been as much the objects of lordly contempt, as the Prophets and Apostles; and the maxims of ancient wisdom have been held as cheap as the established doctrines of Revelation. Whatever, in short, is not Lord Bolingbroke, is not sense. All, whether ancient or modern, who have trod the same ground before him, historians, chronologists, moralists, philosophers, divines, all are either blockheads or impostors. And even Locke and Newton dwindle into drivellers, where they have presumed to meddle with those subjects, which the *Viscount* condescends to illustrate.—(*Phil. Works*, vol. ii. Essay 3, ubique, especially p. 160.)

The treatment which the truly wise and learned, both of ancient and modern times, constantly receive at his Lordship's hands, naturally calls to mind the sarcasm of Crito in Berkeley's *Alciphron*.—"I tell you, Euphranor, that Plato and Tully might perhaps make a figure in Athens or Rome: but were they to revive in our days, they would pass but for underbred pedants, there being at most coffee-houses in London several able men who could convince them they knew nothing, in what they are valued so much for, morals and politics." And Lysicles immediately subjoins, "How many long-headed men do I know, both in the court-end and the city, with five times Plato's sense, who care not one straw, what notions their sons have of God or virtue!"—*Berkeley's Works*, vol. i. pp. 369, 370. The versatility, also,

with which this noble writer can, at one time, affect grave and learned research, and at another, as it may suit his purpose, profess to hold all such pedantic argumentation in contempt, is most happily illustrated, in the same admirable treatise, by the picture which is there drawn, of the Proteus shiftings and modifications of the free-thinking tribe. — "When one of these has got a ring of disciples around him, his method is, to exclaim against prejudice, and recommend thinking and reasoning; giving to understand that himself is a man of deep researches and close argument, one who examines impartially and concludes warily. The same man, in other company, if he chance to be pressed with reason, shall laugh at logic, and assume the lazy supine airs of a fine gentleman, a wit, a railleur, to avoid the dryness of a regular and exact enquiry. This double face of the *Minute Philosopher*, is of no small use to propagate and maintain his notions. Though to me it seems a plain case, that if a fine gentleman will shake off all authority, and appeal from religion to reason, unto reason he must go." (pp. 460, 461.) But the truth is, as the same writer again remarks, (p. 639,) "that in the present age thinking is more talked of but less practised than in ancient times; and that, since the revival of learning, men have read much and wrote much, but thought (comparatively) little: insomuch that, with us, to think closely and justly is the least part of a learned man, and none at all of a polite man. The free-thinkers, indeed, make great pretensions to thinking, and yet they show but little exactness in it. A lively man, and what the world calls a man of sense, are often destitute of this talent, which is not a mere gift of nature, but must be improved and perfected by much attention and exercise on very different subjects; a thing of more pains and time than the hasty men of parts in our age care to take."

What time *our* man of parts employed for this purpose may easily be inferred from the circumstance, of his having *commenced* his philosophical investigations at the age of *forty*, after a youth revelled in the most voluptuous and dissipating

enjoyments, and a manhood distracted by the most tumultuous political agitations. But it is full time to have done with him: I shall therefore only add to what I have said upon so unworthy a subject, by referring the reader, who can have any curiosity to know more of such a man, to the characters that have been given of him, by Chesterfield and by Blair. The latter concludes a very qualified commendation of his *style*, by observing, that in his *matter* there is "hardly any thing to commend; that in his reasonings, for the most part, he is flimsy and false: in his political writings, factious; in what he calls his philosophical ones, irreligious and sophistical in the highest degree."—*Blair's Lectures on Rhetoric*, vol. i. Lect. xix. p. 282. See also the observations in Lect. xv. p. 211 of the same volume. The former gives such an account of him, upon the whole, as must be edifying, particularly, to the young reader; who will thereby be completely let into the secret of such men, by one of themselves; and will have the benefit of observing how much even a libertine, when in cold blood, can be shocked by libertinism. One or two passages I cannot avoid transcribing, as proving how greatly, even from the testimony of his warmest admirer, Lord Bolingbroke is found deficient in every thing that is truly valuable, either in a philosopher or in a man. His noble panegyrist, in recommending to his son to study the *manner*, that would best enable him "to seduce and to impose," proposes to him Lord Bolingbroke's style and mode of writing, for his imitation, in direct *opposition* to works of learning and sound reasoning, which he particularly decries: and, after pressing upon him, again and again, the repeated perusal of Lord Bolingbroke's writings, he assigns as his reason for so doing, that he wishes him "to lay aside all thoughts of all that dull fellows call *solid*, and exert his utmost care to acquire what people of fashion call *shining*."—*Chest. Letters*, vol. iii. p. 151. And in another place, where he speaks of the whole of that unhappy Lord's character, he is obliged, though with much softening, to describe him as "a most mortifying instance of the violence of human pas-

sions, and of the weakness of " (what he chooses to call) "the most exalted human reason."—"His youth (he says) was distinguished by all the tumult and storm of pleasures, in which he most licentiously triumphed, disdaining all decorum. His fine imagination has often been heated and exhausted with his body, in celebrating and deifying the prostitute of the night; and his convivial joys were pushed to all the extravagancy of frantic Bacchanals. Those passions were interrupted but by a stronger, ambition. The former impaired both his constitution and his character, but the latter destroyed both his fortune and his reputation." Vol. ii. p. 328.

Such was the Pythagorean institution of this great philosopher, who was to be qualified, by these intense lucubrations, to communicate new lights to mankind, and to improve the world by a juster set of notions in morals and philosophy. The noble characterizer, after glossing over these hideous enormities, and contrasting with them what he is pleased to represent as splendid qualities, is compelled, after all, to conclude, in words no less applicable to the insincere and unprincipled writer, than to his subject: "Upon the whole, of this extraordinary man, what can we say, but, Alas, poor human nature!"—Poor, indeed, when it presumptuously rejects those aids which Heaven designed to minister to its weakness, and to rectify its corruption.

In a course of observations, in which I have insensibly been drawn to enlarge at so much length, upon the subjects of free-thinking and scepticism, it is impossible to forget *David Hume*. The ideas suggested in the progress of it bring into view, by necessary association, this chief of modern sophists; who, whether the precedence be determined by the boldness of impiety, the contempt of truth, the perplexities of disputation, or the inconsistencies and contradictions in reasoning,—is undoubtedly entitled to the first place in the list of British infidels. The leading subject also of the discussion, in which we are at present engaged, naturally summons him to our tribunal. For, as his philosophic forerun-

ner, Bolingbroke, has bestowed much unprofitable labour on the questions of polytheism and the divine unity, the same questions solicit the minutest investigations of this author, especially in his treatise upon the *Natural History of Religion*[a]; a title, which, as has been remarked, contains a form of expression much as proper as if he had spoken of the *Moral History of Meteors*. And here, having positively pronounced, that "Polytheism MUST have been the first, *and most ancient*," (which certainly *may* be admitted, if it was the *first*,) "religion of mankind:" (*Essays*, vol. ii. p. 402:) and having affirmed it be an *incontestable fact*, that about 1700 years back *all* mankind were Polytheists; (p. 403;) and that, *as far as history reaches*, mankind appear *universally* to have been Polytheists; at the same time that he does not pretend to be ignorant, that about 1700 years back, there was in existence such a book as the Old Testament, and such a history as that of Josephus; and that he himself informs us, (p. 433,) that it appears from Herodotus, that "the Getæ were genuine Theists and Unitarians:"—having, I say, thus dogmatised as became a sceptic, and falsified as became an historian, he proceeds, in a manner perfectly his own, to show what never had been dreamt of before, not even in the craziest reveries of a Bolingbroke, that the notion of the *Divine Unity* had sprung up from the blundering conceptions of THE VULGAR, and that it demanded the reasoning powers of THE PHILOSOPHERS to restore again the old system of a *plurality of Gods!*

This will hardly be credited. Let the reader therefore turn to the precious original, (p. 435,) where he will find the manner fully described, in which this notion takes its rise

[a] On this treatise Warburton makes the following observations, in a letter to his friend Hurd. "The Essay is to establish an atheistic naturalism, like Bolingbroke: and he goes upon one of Bolingbroke's capital arguments, that idolatry and polytheism were before the worship of the one God. It is full of absurdities. They say this man has several moral qualities. It may be so. But there are vices of the mind as well as body: and a wickeder heart, and more determined to do public mischief, I think, I never knew." *Letters of a late eminent Prelate*, p. 239.

amongst *the vulgar;* for of these it is that he has been speaking throughout the preceding page. "Men's exaggerated praises and compliments still swell their idea upon them; and elevating their deities to the utmost bounds of perfection, at last beget the attributes of *Unity and Infinity, simplicity* and *spirituality*." Thus, then, the ONE, INFINITE, UNCOMPOUNDED, and SPIRITUAL *first Cause*, springs, as we see, out of the tendencies of the *vulgar* to *praise and panegyric*. But, immediately after, we find, that this is a height too giddy for those who have thus risen to it, and that it is necessary that they should be quietly let down again to the firmer and more peaceful footing of Polytheism. For, "such refined ideas, being somewhat disproportioned to VULGAR COMPREHENSION," (although having *grown naturally* out of vulgar conception,) "remain not long in their original purity; but require to be supported by the notion of inferior mediators or subordinate agents, which interpose between mankind and their supreme Deity. These demi-gods, or middle beings, partaking more of human nature, and being more familiar to us, become the chief objects of devotion, and gradually recall that idolatry which had been formerly banished by the ardent prayers and panegyrics of timorous, indigent mortals." —See also pp. 429, 430, or rather the whole of the extraordinary reasoning upon this subject in the 6th, 7th and 8th sections.—Thus, then, we see, that the *vulgar*, in their high flights of *praise* and *panegyric*, rose to the discovery of a *first Cause;* while a set of *wiser men*[a] we must suppose

[a] In truth, Mr. Hume himself seems entitled to rank amongst those *wiser men*, as he has been able to discover many advantages in the scheme of polytheism. "For," he says, "if we examine, without prejudice, the ancient heathen mythology, as contained in the poets, we shall not discover in it any such monstrous absurdity, as we may at first be apt to apprehend. Where is the difficulty in conceiving, that the same powers or principles, *whatever they were*, which formed this visible world, men and animals, produced also a species of intelligent creatures of more refined substance, and greater authority than the rest? That these creatures may be capricious, revengeful, passionate, voluptuous, is easily conceived; nor is any circumstance more apt among ourselves to engender such vices than the licence of absolute authority. And, in short, the whole mythological system is *so natural*, that, in the variety of planets and worlds contained in this universe, it seems *more than probable*,

called in to restore the mob of middle deities to their pristine honours, since the purpose is to suit the objects of worship to *vulgar comprehensions*. And so we find, that, under the direction of this wonder-working χορηγὸς, the philosophers and the people are made at once to change sides, and act each other's parts; the *people* taking to themselves the *discovery of the first Cause*, and the *philosophers*, in return, the *discovery of demi-gods and middle beings*. Unless, indeed, as Bishop Hurd says, the *people* are supposed to have done both; "discovered the *unity* in their *blind, timorous*, and *indigent* state; and, when they were so *well informed*, struck out, in a lucky moment, their gross system of *Polytheism*." [a]

that somewhere or other it is really carried into execution." *Essays*, vol. ii. p. 242.—Thus the cautious investigator, whose scepticism will not yield to the proofs of the existence of *one* God, sees no difficulty in admitting it as *more than probable* that there are *many*. In this system of polytheism, also, our philosopher finds many advantages. For "where the Deity is represented, as infinitely superior to mankind; this belief, though altogether just, when joined with superstitious terrors, is apt to sink the human mind in the lowest submission and abasement, and to represent the monkish virtues of mortification, penance, humility, and passive suffering, as the only qualities which are acceptable to him. But where the gods are conceived to be only a little superior to mankind, and to have been many of them advanced from that inferior rank, we are *more at our ease* in our addresses to them, and may even, without profaneness, aspire sometimes to a rivalship and emulation of them: hence activity, spirit, courage, magnanimity, love of liberty, and all the virtues which aggrandize a people." Ibid. p. 440. Our author has forgotten to add, that in our aspirings to a rivalship with these nearer gods, that he proposes as the objects of our addresses, we might rise also to that capriciousness, revengefulness, passionateness, voluptuousness, and other such qualities with which he has been pleased to invest them, and which qualities seem in the view of himself and Mr. Gibbon to be the principal ingredients in that "*elegant mythology*," which they would so strongly recommend to our admiration. It has been well remarked, by an eloquent and interesting writer, that anti-christian writers, while they are giving us their opinions, may in truth be giving us more; may be discovering their *morals*, while they mean to teach us only their *creed*: and thus may carry, like Bellerophon, their own condemnation, while they imagine they are, graciously, conveying intelligence and new light to mankind. So that the old proverb, *Bellerophontis Literæ*, may be a proper motto for the learned labours of them all.—*Young's Centaur*, p. 29.

[a] *Diderot*, indeed, in his execrable *Systême de la Nature*, has completed the view of this subject, that had been so imperfectly sketched by *Bolingbroke* and *Hume*. He has manfully undertaken to prove, not only that Polytheism must have been, in the early ages of the world, the necessary result of men's observation of nature; but that it must be much more so *now, that the course and progress of philosophy has tended to remove men's prejudices!*—This completely relieves Hume's argument from all its perplexities.

On this, and the whole monstrous assemblage of falsehoods, inconsistencies, and nonsense, with which this extraordinary *Essay*[a] is stuffed, I would refer the young reader to the *Remarks on Mr. David Hume's Essay on the Natural History of Religion*, in which[b] Dr. Hurd has so successfully employed the weapons, with which his friend Warburton had, just before, transfixed the brother-infidel, Bolingbroke.

Yet such writers as these, such writers as *Hume* and *Bolingbroke*, (at least until their ignorance, falsehood, and absurdities, had become sufficiently notorious to expose their followers to the like imputations,) it had been the fashion to extol and admire. How such writers could ever have obtained followers, may at first sight, indeed, appear difficult to explain. The difficulty, however, admits a satisfactory solution; and one which has been so justly given by a late respected writer, that I shall content myself with the mere repetition of what he has said upon the subject. Having remarked, that, in his *Treatise of Human Nature*, Mr. Hume's vain love of singularity had led him to endeavour to involve even the fundamental principles of *geometry* in confusion; but that, finding it impossible by his paradoxes on such a subject to rouse the attention of the public, he turned himself to *moral paradoxes;* this writer goes on to show, that Mr. Hume in doing so had calculated rightly, for that these, "when men begin to look about for arguments in vindication of impiety, debauchery, and injustice, become won-

[a] Dr. Nares, in his admirable collection of sermons, preached at the Bampton Lecture, in 1805, pronounces, respecting this extraordinary production, that, if he wished to satisfy any person of the indispensable necessity of a divine Revelation in the first ages of the world, upon the infidel's own view of things, he would refer him at once to *Mr. Hume's Natural History of Religion.* (*Nares's Bampton Lectures*, p. 485.) And Dr. Maclaine says of the same work, in his *Letters to Mr. Soame Jenyns*, that perhaps no book is more adapted to show the unspeakable advantages of a divine Revelation.

[b] This work has been here, agreeably to the hitherto commonly received opinion, ascribed to Bishop Hurd. But, from the Letters of Bishop Warburton lately published, it now appears, that it was the production of his own pen, and received only some additional colouring from his literary friend. See a curious account of this transaction in the *Letters of a late eminent Prelate*, pp. 239, 240.

derfully interesting, and can hardly fail of a powerful and numerous patronage. The corrupt judge; the prostituted courtier; the statesman, who enriches himself by the plunder and blood of his country; the pettifogger, who fattens on the spoils of the fatherless and widow; the oppressor, who, to pamper his beastly appetite, abandons the deserving peasant to beggary and despair; the hypocrite; the debauchee; the gamester; the blasphemer;—prick up their ears when they are told, that a celebrated author has written a book full of such comfortable doctrines as the following:—That justice is not a natural but an artificial virtue, depending wholly on the arbitrary institutions of men, and previous to the establishment of civil society not at all incumbent:—that moral, intellectual, and corporeal virtue, are all of the same kind; in other words, that to want honesty, to want understanding, and to want a leg, are equally the objects of moral disapprobation, and that it is no more a man's duty to be grateful or pious, than to have the genius of Homer, or the strength and beauty of Achilles:—that every human action is necessary, and could not have been different from what it is:—that when we speak of power as an attribute of any being, God himself not excepted, we use words without meaning:—that we can form no idea of power, nor of any being endued with any power, *much less* of one endued with infinite power: and that we can never have reason to believe that any object or quality of an object exists, of which we cannot form an idea:—that it is unreasonable to believe God to be infinitely wise and good, while there is any evil or disorder in the universe; and that we have no good reason to think that the universe proceeds from a cause:—that the external material world does not exist; and that if the external world be once called in doubt as to its existence, we shall be at a loss to find arguments by which we may prove the being of God, or any of his attributes:—that those who believe *any* thing certainly are fools:—*that adultery must be practised, if men would obtain all the advantages of life; that if generally practised, it would soon cease to be scandalous; and that, if practised secretly and*

frequently, it would by degrees come to be thought no crime at all[a]:—that the question concerning the substance of the

[a] "My inquiry concerning the *Principles of Morals* is of all my writings, historical, philosophical, or literary, incomparably the *best*." *Hume's Life*, p. vii.—The passage, referred to above, affords an excellent specimen of the writer's qualifications as a *moral* instructor. And yet it is of *such a man as this*, that *such a man as Adam Smith* has delivered the following testimony:—"I have always considered Mr. Hume, both in his lifetime and since his death, as approaching as nearly to the idea of a PERFECTLY WISE AND VIRTUOUS MAN, as perhaps the nature of human frailty will permit."—*Letter from Adam Smith, LL.D., to W. Strahan, Esq.*, annexed to *Hume's Life*, and prefixed to the late edition of *Hume's History of England*.—For the reception which such a declaration as this so amply merited, I refer the reader to Bishop Horne's *Letter to Dr. Adam Smith:* in which, as well as in the *Letters on Infidelity* at large, he will find the ablest and most incontestable confutation of Hume and his infidel associates.

In truth, the extract from Hume on the subject of adultery appeared to me so monstrous, that, with some doubts of Dr. Beattie's accuracy, I turned to the original to ascertain its fairness, and there found the following justification of the reporter:—"It is needless to dissemble. The consequence of a very free commerce between the sexes, and of their living much together, will often terminate in intrigues and gallantry. *We must sacrifice somewhat of the useful, if we be very anxious to obtain all the agreeable qualities; and cannot pretend to reap alike every advantage.* Instances of licence daily multiplying will weaken the scandal with the one sex, and teach the other by degrees to adopt the famous maxim of La Fontaine, with regard to female infidelity; *that if one knows it, it is but a small matter; if one knows it not, it is nothing.*" (*Hume's Essays*, vol. ii. p. 394.) Again (p. 255) he contends, that the necessary "combination of the parents for the subsistence of their young is that alone which requires the virtue of chastity or fidelity to the married bed. Without such a utility, it will readily be owned (he asserts) that *such a virtue would never be thought of.*" And, this being a favourite subject with this writer, whose inquiry concerning the *Principles of Morals*, is boasted of by himself as his best work, he proceeds to enlarge upon it in an additional note, (p. 490,) in which he calls in the aid of Greek to sustain him in his philosophic profligacy, and, referring all notions of virtue and vice to *public utility*, asks, with an air of final triumph,—"And indeed *to what other purpose than that of utility do all the ideas of chastity and modesty serve?*"—This is the PERFECTLY WISE AND VIRTUOUS MAN of Adam Smith.

Dr. Aikin's remarks (in the *General Biography*) on this extraordinary language of Dr. Smith, although not pressing upon the parts of Hume's writings here adverted to, deserve to be noticed. "We may (he says) reasonably demur to Dr. Smith's moral estimate, in attributing the perfection of virtue to a man, whose *leading principle* was, by his own confession, SELFISH, (the acquisition of literary fame,) and who never seems to have made any of those sacrifices of interest and inclination to public good, in which virtuous action chiefly consists. Further, whatever degree of freedom of discussion may be justifiable, with the benefit of mankind in view, it may be doubted whether a mere fondness for speculation, or a love of philosophic applause, will morally excuse a writer, for sporting with opinions which are commonly held of the highest importance to human welfare."

soul is unintelligible:—that matter and motion may often be regarded as the cause of thought:—that the soul of man becomes every different moment a different being: so that the actions I performed last year, or yesterday, or this morning, whether virtuous or vicious, are no more imputable to me, than the virtues of Aristides are imputable to Nero, or the crimes of Nero to the man of Ross."—*Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth, by Dr. Beattie*, pp. 111—113. See also pp. 315, 316, where many other doctrines equally rational and valuable are to be found, together with the references to those parts of Mr. Hume's works in which they are contained.

But this is not all. Mr. Hume had not done enough, it seems, for the extinction of religion and the subversion of morals; but, with a zeal bespeaking his fidelity to the master whom he served, he left behind him blasphemies to be published after his death, which even *he* was afraid to publish whilst he lived. So, indeed, his great admirer tells us, in his *Apology for the Life and Writings of David Hume:* whose posthumous papers, he says, would probably "carry his philosophy still nearer to THAT POINT, which he might not think it DISCREET to *push too vigorously* in his lifetime." What THAT POINT was is but too evident on a single glance at the works which he thus bequeathed for the public benefit. The *Dialogues on Natural Religion*, and the *Essay on Suicide*, are standing monuments of a heart as wicked, and a head as weak, as ever belonged to any man who pretended to the character of a philosopher and a moralist. To leave deliberately, as a legacy to mankind, a recommendation of SELF-MURDER, and an assurance that there is NO GOD, at the very moment when he was himself about to appear before the bar of that dread Being; and, whilst thus occupied for the destruction of his fellow-creatures, to amuse himself with pleasant conceits about *Charon* and his *ferry-boat*, (as his biographer informs us he did, when he was almost dropping into his grave,) has something in it so frightful, that one naturally recoils from the thought of it with horror. It seems

to be equalled only by the hideous impiety of Diderot, who adduces it as a decisive proof of the non-existence of a God, that he was permitted to write a work filled with blasphemies against his nature, and arguments against his being.[a]

Having, however, made mention of this valuable bequest of Mr. Hume, I cannot deny the reader the satisfaction of knowing somewhat of the precious materials of which it consists. And first, as to his *Dialogues*. He there exhibits various modes, in which the world may have been produced; all of which he pronounces to be to the full as satisfactory, as that of a creation by the will of the Deity. *Generation* or *vegetation*, he says, will answer the purpose: and the latter process, which he prefers, he thus particularly explains: "In like manner as a tree sheds its seed into the neighbouring fields, and produces other trees, so the great vegetable, the world, or this planetary system, produces within itself certain seeds, which, being scattered into the surrounding chaos, vegetate into new worlds. A comet, for instance, is the seed of a world: and after it has been fully ripened, by passing from sun to sun, and star to star, it is at last tossed into the unformed elements which everywhere surround this universe, and immediately sprouts up into a new system." (*Dialogues*, p. 132.) But, as this process of vegetable production supposes a mother vegetable already in existence, or a world already in being, so accurate a reasoner could not but account for the formation of the first world, from which all others are to sprout. And this he does in two ways, that he may the better satisfy all descriptions of readers. Either such a process has been going on from eternity; or a world might have been formed originally thus:—"A finite number of particles is only susceptible of finite transpositions: and it must happen in an eternal duration, that every possible position must be tried.—The continual motion of matter, there-

[a] "Si ce Dieu tout puissant est jaloux de ses prérogatives,—comment permet-il, qu'un mortel comme moi ose attaquer ses droits, ses titres, son existence même?" Vol. ii. p. 60 of *Système de la Nature;* a work which was published under the name of *Mirabaud*, but is supposed with good reason to have had the atrocious *Diderot* for its author.

fore, in less than infinite transpositions, must produce order; and order, when once established, supports itself." (*Dialogues*, pp. 146. 149.)—Now must not *Ephraim Jenkinson*, and his *cosmogonies*, hide their diminished heads, on a comparison with this *Philosopher* and his *sublime inventions?* How far inferior also was the object of the former sage to that proposed by the latter! The one but sought to cheat the honest *Vicar of Wakefield* of his horse, but the other looks to the more glorious attainment, of cheating mankind of their trust in a God, and their hopes of a futurity.—How meagre and unphilosophical is the first chapter of Genesis, compared with such lofty speculations as these of Mr. Hume!

If we turn, now, to that other valuable performance, the *Essay on Suicide*[a], there we find truths no less momentous, and reasonings no less acute, than those which the former had exhibited. He informs us, that the whole scope of man's creation is limited to the present life: that the life of a man is of no greater importance than that of an oyster:—and as it is admitted that there is no crime in diverting the Nile or the Danube from their courses, so he contends there can be none, *in turning a few ounces of blood from their natural channel:* and so, upon the whole, he peremptorily concludes in favour of self-murder! He goes farther: and, to satisfy the conscience of the *Theist*, he maintains, that, on the supposition of a God, we are acting under the *direction* of Providence, when we put an end to our existence: and, again, to satisfy the conscience of the *Christian*, he endeavours to evince the *lawfulness of suicide under the Christian dispensation*. The last point, indeed, it has been remarked, it is not difficult to make out, provided the liberty of putting two texts together be permitted:—thus, *Judas de-*

[a] Some of Mr. Hume's admirers became so much ashamed of this monstrous and absurd performance, that they were led to deny that it ever came from his pen. Whoever wishes for a complete proof of his being the author, may consult the Monthly Review for 1784, vol. lxx. p. 427.

parted, and went and hanged himself.—Go and do thou likewise. Mr. Hume's arguments are little better.

So much for this *paragon of modern metaphysicians;* this *deep thinker* and *acute reasoner*, whom it was at one time so much the fashion with witlings and libertines to extol. As to certain advantages of style, Mr. Hume, no doubt, possessed them; but as to his *reasoning*, nothing under that name can be more contemptible. This, indeed, seems now pretty generally admitted: and few, who have any regard for the opinion of men of sense, would, at this day, venture to support the paradoxes, and adduce the arguments, of David Hume. By the species of reasoning adopted by that writer, Dr. Beattie has well remarked, it would be easy to prove any doctrine: and to evince this, he supplies the following RECIPE, as conveying the whole mystery of the manufacture of *his* metaphysical paradoxes. "— Take a word (an abstract term is the most convenient) which admits of more than one signification: and, by the help of a predicate or copula, form a proposition suitable to your system, or to your humour, or to any other thing you please, except truth. When laying down your premises, you are to use the name of the quality or subject, in one sense; and, when inferring your conclusion, in another. You are then to urge a few equivocal facts very slightly examined (the more slightly the better) as a further proof of the said conclusion; and to shut up all with citing some ancient authorities, either real or fictitious, as may best suit your purpose. A few occasional strictures on religion as an unphilosophical thing, and a sneer at the *Whole Duty of Man*, or any other good book, will give your dissertation what many are pleased to call a *liberal turn;* and will go near to convince the world, that you are *a candid philosopher, a manly free-thinker, and a very fine writer.*" (*Essay on Truth*, p. 309.) This gives by no means an exaggerated idea of Mr. Hume's mode of conducting his metaphysical disquisitions; so that, what has been said of his *Dialogues*, may be applied, with truth, to almost all his rea-

sonings on moral or religious subjects:—namely, that they cannot possibly hurt any man of a philosophical turn, or even any man of common sense: that they may serve, indeed, to confirm the giddy, the profligate, and the unprincipled, in their prejudices against religion and virtue, but must be despised by every man who has the smallest grain of seriousness or reflection.

Gray's estimate of his character I cannot prevail upon myself to suppress, not only because it comes from a man of real genius, learning, and reflection, but because it must be admitted to be altogether untinctured with the supposed prejudices of a divine.—"I have always thought David Hume a pernicious writer, and believe he has done as much mischief here as in his own country. *A turbid and shallow stream often appears to our apprehensions very deep.* A professed sceptic can be guided by nothing but his present passions (if he has any) and his interests; and to be masters of his philosophy we need not his book or advice, for every child is capable of the same thing, without any study at all. Is not that *naïveté* and good humour, which his admirers celebrate in him, owing to this, that he has continued all his days an infant, but one that unhappily has been taught to read and write? That childish nation, the French, have given him vogue and fashion, and we, as usual, have learned from them to admire him at second hand." (*Mason's Gray*[a], vol. ii. pp. 249, 250.)

[a] For some admirable and beautiful remarks by the same author, on the *Materialists* and upon *Lord Shaftesbury*, and particularly on *Lord Bolingbroke* and his *Philosophical Works*, see the same volume, pp. 118—125. With respect to *Hume*, we are informed by Mr. Ritchie, that he was particularly stung by the severe animadversions of *Gray*. For, as the biographer adds, "notwithstanding the eulogium which he sometimes bestows on the equanimity of his own temper, it is known, that he felt the attacks on his literary reputation with exquisite sensibility: and although he persevered in the resolution of writing no answers to his antagonists, (except in the single case of his quarrel with Rousseau,) he did not always receive the criticisms of others with the apathy he professes." *Account of the Life and Writings of David Hume*, p. 301. Indeed, if we yield credit to the account given of him in the *London Review* for 1777, we shall pronounce him one of the most choleric, instead of being one of the calmest, of philosophers. His *Treatise of Human Nature* having experienced considerable severity of criticism in a publication entitled, *The Works of the Learned*, the author (as the Review states) be-

There are two striking features in the character of Hume, which have not been adverted to in the sketch here drawn of him by Gray:—his *disingenuousness* and his *bigotry*.

To couple the term *bigot*[a] with the name of *David Hume*, may at first sight appear to partake of his own paradox. But it should be considered, that bigotry is not necessarily connected with religious belief; and that it is no less possible to display its invincible prejudices, by an irrational and intolerant zeal against, than for, religion. Now, undoubtedly, in this sense, no man has proved himself more of a bigot than Hume. Far from being the calm and philosophic inquirer which he pretends to be, he is evidently influenced by an insatiable zeal for the propagation of his Atheistical tenets; and his intolerant and persecuting spirit against those who oppose the adoption of his infidel creed is everywhere manifested by his furious abuse of all who are tenacious of their Christian hopes, but more particularly of the clergy, and these, too, of every religious persuasion, without distinction. Of this, abundant proofs are to be met with in almost every part of his writings; but more especially in his 21st Essay, on *National Characters*, (*Essays*, vol. i. p. 215,) where, and in the annexed note T, he pronounces "priests of all religions to be the same," and goes on laboriously to prove, that a PRIEST, *as such*, MUST *be destitute of every virtue, and possessed by almost every vice.* How strongly Horace Walpole, (whom I particularly name, as not having any undue leaning towards Revelation, and as being, it must be supposed, tolerably free from that *odium theologicum*,

came so highly provoked, that "he flew into a violent rage to demand satisfaction of Jacob Robinson the publisher; whom he kept, during the paroxysm of his anger, at his sword's point, trembling lest a period should be put to the life of a sober critic by a raving philosopher." —It is well known, also, that his resentment against Dr. Beattie was so violent, that he could hardly put upon it any decent restraint.

[a] I find, indeed, from an anecdote in *Ritchie's Life of Hume*, that I have his own authority for this epithet. For, as his biographer informs us, his reply to a friend, who jocularly threatened him with writing an account of his life and character, was, that as to his character he would himself give it in a single sentence; "candid and liberal with respect to the prejudices of others, *bigoted* with respect to his own."

which our author so plentifully charges against the clergy,)—how strongly, I say, he condemns this intolerant zeal in this man of pretended moderation and philosophic calmness, may be seen on looking into his works[a].—Now, surely, this is a most unreasonable intrusion into what our author so willingly admits to be the exclusive province of the clergy. There is some excuse for warmth, in the man who perceives an attempt to rob him of what he holds most precious; but there is none for the man, who makes that attempt, flying into a passion, because it is resisted.

Again, as to the *disingenuousness* of Hume; this is sufficiently manifest on the inspection of his works. The instances adduced by the various writers who have taken the trouble to expose his flimsy sophisms are so multiplied, as to render it unnecessary to dwell upon this subject. Of these writers, in addition to the authors of the well-known answers to his *Essay on Miracles*, (an essay which but for adventitious circumstances could not have deserved an answer,) I would particularly recommend to the young reader, *Dr. Beattie*, and Bishops *Hurd* and *Horne*, who have, in the works already alluded to in this Postscript, exhibited this imposing and deceitful infidel in his true colours. Nor is it only in matter of *reasoning*, but in matter of *fact*, that he stands convicted of dishonesty. No writer, perhaps, has established this more clearly than Dr. Elrington, in his *Donnellan Lec-*

[a] Lord Orford, indeed, omits no opportunity of expressing his dislike and even contempt of the common run of what are called *Geniuses*, and *Philosophers*, in modern times. "No *Genius* I have known (says he) has had common sense enough to balance the impertinence of their pretensions. THEY HATE PRIESTS, BUT LOVE DEARLY TO HAVE AN ALTAR AT THEIR FEET: for which reason it is much pleasanter to read them than to know them." (*Lord Orford's Works*, vol. v. p. 421.) This observation, though immediately directed against Rousseau, who was at this time introduced into England by Hume, was manifestly not designed exclusively for him. And although Hume is frequently spoken of in terms apparently favourable, yet even in his Lordship's letters to Hume himself, (vol. iv. pp. 260—265,) the cutting sarcasms and contemptuous sneers against authors and philosophers of a certain class, sufficiently intimate in what light the noble author really viewed the Scotch as well as the French philosopher.

ture Sermons, to which I refer particularly at pages 233, 234, and 296—302.

It is but fair, however, to confess, that Mr. Hume has not confined altogether to religious subjects his talent of disingenuous representation. His unfaithfulness, and gross partiality, as an *historian*, have been long pretty generally acknowledged: and it has been pronounced by judicious and candid writers, upon the subject of English history, that the History which Mr. Hume has given to the world is a most injurious work to put into the hands of the British youth, in order to give them just ideas of the history or constitution of England. Dr. Towers, in his *Observations on Mr. Hume's History*, says, that "fidelity, accuracy, and impartiality, are requisite in an historian: and that in these Mr. Hume is greatly deficient."—Dr. Gilbert Stuart also points out, in his *View of Society in Europe*, (see particularly pp. 320. 323. 326,) many gross and wilful errors in the *Historian*:—and, at p. 327, he fully demonstrates how unfit Mr. Hume was for the task which he undertook.—"Mr. Hume, (he says,) struck with the talents of Dr. Brady, deceived by his ability, disposed to pay adulation to government, or willing to profit by a system, formed with art, and ready for adoption, has executed his history upon the tenets of this writer. Yet, of Dr. Brady it ought to be remembered, that he was the slave of a faction, and that he meanly prostituted an excellent understanding, to vindicate tyranny, and to destroy the rights of his nation. With *no less pertinacity*, but with an air of greater candour, Mr. Hume has employed himself to the *same purposes:* and his history, from its beginning to its conclusion, is chiefly to be regarded as a plausible defence of prerogative. No friend to humanity, and to the freedom of this kingdom, will consider his constitutional inquiries, *with their effect upon his narrative*, and compare them with the ancient and venerable monuments of our story, without feeling a lively surprise, and a patriot indignation." Mr. Fox also, in his late celebrated work, speaks of the continual dis-

play, in Hume's History, of his "partiality to kings and princes, as intolerable. Nay, (he adds,) it is, in my opinion, quite ridiculous; and is more like the foolish admiration which women and children sometimes have for kings, than the opinion, right or wrong, of a philosopher."—And a set of writers, whose national partialities would not indispose them to Hume, agree fully in this sentiment. "Few things (they say) seem more unaccountable, and, indeed, absurd, than that Hume should have taken part with *high church* and *high monarchy* men. The persecutions which he suffered in his youth from the Presbyterians may, perhaps, have influenced his *ecclesiastical partialities*. But that he should have sided with the Tudors and the Stuarts against the people, seems quite inconsistent with all the *great traits of his character*." (*Edinb. Review*, vol. xii. p. 276.)—What great traits of character? We have already seen what *they* amount to. No, no: the man who is not influenced by a love of truth must be destitute of principle. And, in such a character, inconsistencies must abound. Where there is no standard to refer to, no anchor to hold fast, what can be expected but perpetual vacillation? The man who laboured to traduce Scripture would not fail to falsify history. He, who could be blind to the grandeur and glory of the Christian dispensation, could not easily discover the beauty and sublimity of the British constitution. And we need not be surprised to find the same man a renegade in religion, and a slave in politics.

The mischievous and dishonest uses, also, to which Hume perverts his history, should not pass without observation. Mere historic falsehood had lost much of its interest in the breast of this writer, had it not been made subservient to his favourite object, the subversion of moral and religious truth. The picture, which has been already drawn of the historian in this light, is sketched with such justness and good taste by the masterly pencil of Mrs. H. More, that I cannot do better than present it to the reader's view as it has come from the hand of that admirable woman.

"There is a sedateness in his manner, which imposes;

a sly gravity in his scepticism, which puts the reader more off his guard, than the vehemence of censure, or the levity of wit; for we are always less disposed to suspect a man who is too wise to appear angry. That same wisdom makes him too correct to *invent* calumnies, but it does not preserve him from doing what is scarcely less disingenuous. He implicitly adopts the injurious relations of those annalists who were most hostile to the reformed faith[a]; though he must have

[a] Villers, in his *Essay on the Reformation*, (Mills's translation, p. 107,) offers the following observations, which go to support the above allegation, and deserve to be particularly attended to.—"It is well known with what fury the rage of party pours out calumny upon eminent men. Upon Luther, above all men, it has been discharged in torrents. Among other causes, it has been found out, that his zeal arose only from the discontent of the Augustins, who beheld, it is said, with envy the Dominicans invested by the Pope with the commission of preaching Indulgences. That Maimbourg should have picked up such a story is nothing wonderful. But it is inconceivable, that Voltaire and Hume should have repeated it as a certain fact." This author then proceeds to expose the falsehood of the calumny, and refers to a note of Dr. Maclaine on Mosheim's Ecclesiastical History, in which, he says, is "proved, beyond dispute, the absurdity of the imputation." The translator, pursuing the same subject, goes on thus:—"The credit of Voltaire is now so low in this country, that no means, however base, of forwarding a favourite object will be thought beneath him. He is now detected; and his authority is of very little value. But Hume, who through the whole course of his history lies in wait for an opportunity of throwing discredit upon the cause both of religion and of liberty, who possessed a rooted enmity against all the best interests of mankind, and whose actions exhibit more of deliberate misanthropy than those of any other man perhaps that ever lived, still enjoys a reputation and authority which he by no means deserves; and his writings contribute strongly to corrupt the public sentiments. Dr. Maclaine's note, referred to by Villers, is a full exposure, more full perhaps than was necessary, of one of those instances of bad faith with which his history abounds. If any one were to publish an edition of his history, with notes, pointing out the eagerness with which he has used not only lawful but poisoned arms against religion and liberty, exposing the unfounded assertions, the weak reflections, and the barbarous phraseology which he so often employs, he would abate that false admiration so long attached to his works, and confer a great obligation upon the public." These charges against Hume may possibly not be sufficiently temperate and measured: but they contain in them much of truth; and the principal charge, that of historical bad faith, is undoubtedly made out by Dr. Maclaine, in the note alluded to; which note I here subjoin, not merely because it establishes the point at present under consideration, but because it so completely rescues the author of the Reformation from the unfounded calumnies which Hume had contributed to circulate, and which of late days an interested zeal has propagated in this country with more than usual industry.

"Mr. Hume, in his history of the reign of Henry the VIIIth, has thought proper to repeat what the enemies of the Reformation, and some of its dubious

known their accounts to be aggravated and discoloured, if not absolutely invented. He thus makes others responsible

or ill-informed friends, have advanced, with respect to the motives that engaged Luther to oppose the doctrine of Indulgences. This elegant and persuasive historian tells us, that the *Austin friars had* USUALLY *been employed in* SAXONY *to preach Indulgences, and from this trust had derived both profit and consideration; that* ARCEMBOLDI *gave this occupation to the Dominicans; that* MARTIN LUTHER, *an Austin friar, professor in the University of Wirtemberg, resenting the affront put upon his own Order, began to preach against the abuses that were committed in the sale of Indulgences, and, being provoked by opposition, proceeded even to decry Indulgences themselves.* It were to be wished, that Mr. Hume's candour had engaged him to examine this accusation better, before he had ventured to repeat it. For, in the *first* place, it is *not true*, that the *Austin friars had been* USUALLY *employed in Saxony to preach Indulgences.* It is well known, that the commission had been offered alternately, and sometimes jointly, to all the Mendicants, whether *Austin friars, Dominicans, Franciscans,* or *Carmelites.* Nay, from the year 1229, that lucrative commission was principally intrusted with the *Dominicans;* and in the records which relate to Indulgences, we rarely meet with the name of an *Austin friar,* and not one single act by which it appears that the Roman Pontiff ever named the friars of that order to the office under consideration. More particularly it is remarkable, that for half a century before *Luther,* (i. e. from 1450 to 1517,) during which period Indulgences were sold with the most scandalous marks of avaricious extortion and impudence, we scarcely meet with the name of an *Austin friar* employed in that service, if we except a monk, named *Palzius,* who was no more than an underling of the papal questor *Raymond Peraldus:* so far is it from being true, that the *Augustine Order* were exclusively, or even *usually* employed in that service. Mr. Hume has built his assertion upon the sole authority of a single expression of *Paul Sarpi,* which has been abundantly refuted by *De Priero, Pallavicini,* and *Graveson,* the mortal enemies of *Luther.*

"But it may be alleged, that, even supposing it was not *usual* to employ the *Augustin friars* alone in the propagation of Indulgences, yet *Luther* might be offended at seeing such an important commission given to the *Dominicans* exclusively, and that, consequently, this was his motive in opposing the propagation of Indulgences. To show the injustice of this allegation, I observe, *secondly,* that, in the time of Luther, the preaching of Indulgences was become such an odious and unpopular matter, that it is far from being probable, that *Luther* would have been solicitous about obtaining such a commission either for himself or for his order. The princes of Europe, with many bishops and multitudes of learned and pious men, had opened their eyes upon the turpitude of this infamous traffic: and even the *Franciscans* and *Dominicans,* towards the conclusion of the 15th century, opposed it publicly, both in their discourses and in their writings. Nay, more, the very commission, which is supposed to have excited the envy of *Luther,* was offered by *Leo* to the General of the *Franciscans,* and was refused both by him and his order, who gave it over entirely to *Albert,* bishop of Mentz and Magdeburg. Is it then to be imagined, that either *Luther,* or the other *Austin friars,* aspired after a commission, of which the *Franciscans* were ashamed? Besides, it is a mistake to affirm, that this office was given to the *Dominicans* in general; since it was given to *Tetzel* alone, an individual

for the worst things he asserts, and spreads the mischief without avowing the malignity. When he speaks from him-

member of that order, who had been notorious for his profligacy, barbarity, and extortion.

"But, that neither resentment nor envy were the motives that led *Luther* to oppose the doctrine and publication of Indulgences, will appear with the utmost evidence, if we consider, in the *third* place,—That he was never accused of any such motives either in the edicts of the pontiffs of his time, or amidst the other reproaches of the contemporary writers, who defended the cause of Rome, and who were far from being sparing of their invectives and calumnies. All the contemporary adversaries of *Luther* are absolutely silent on this head. From the year 1517 to 1546, when the dispute about Indulgences was carried on with the greatest warmth and animosity, not one writer ever ventured to reproach *Luther* with these ignoble motives of opposition now under consideration. I speak not of *Erasmus, Sleiden, De Thou, Guicciardini*, and others, whose testimony might perhaps be suspected of partiality in his favour: but I speak of *Cajetan, Hogstrat, De Prierio, Emser*, and even the infamous *John Tetzel*, whom *Luther* opposed with such vehemence and bitterness. Even *Cochlæus* was silent on this head during the life of *Luther*; though after the death of that great Reformer he broached the calumny I am here refuting. But such was the scandalous character of this man, who was notorious for fraud, calumny, lying, and their sister vices, that *Pallavicini, Bossuet*, and other enemies of *Luther*, were ashamed to make use either of his name or testimony. Now, may it not be fairly presumed, that the contemporaries of *Luther* were better judges of his character and the principles from which he acted, than those who lived in after-times? Can it be imagined, that motives to action, which escaped the prying eyes of *Luther's* contemporaries, should have discovered themselves to us who live at such a distance of time from the scene of action, to *M. Bossuet*, to *Mr. Hume*, and to other abettors of this ill-contrived and foolish story? Either there are no rules of moral evidence, or *Mr. Hume's* assertion is entirely groundless."—*Mosheim's Eccles. Hist.* cent. xvi. sect. i. chap. 2. vol. ii. pp. 17, 18.

Dr. Maclaine has very properly observed, that the cause of the Reformation (which must stand by its own intrinsic dignity, and is, in no way, affected by the views or characters of its instruments,) can derive no strength from this inquiry, but as it may tend to vindicate the personal character of a man, who has done eminent service to the cause of religion. In truth, so far from looking for selfish and ignoble motives to account for Luther's zealous opposition to the publication of Indulgences by Tetzel, one has only to read the account given by Mosheim of this transaction, to have his astonishment excited, that Luthers did not start up in thousands to raise their voices against it.—"This bold and enterprising monk," he says, speaking of *Tetzel*, "had been chosen, on account of his uncommon impudence, to preach and proclaim in Germany of those famous Indulgences of *Leo X.* which administered *remission of all sins, past, present, and to come, however enormous their nature*, to those who were rich enough to purchase them. The frontless monk executed this iniquitous commission, not only with matchless insolence, indecency, and fraud, but even carried his impiety so far, as to derogate from the all-sufficient power and influence of the merits of Christ." The translator adds, in exemplification, that, "in describing the efficacy of these Indulgences, *Tetzel* said, among other enormities, *that even had any one ravished the mother of God, he* (Tetzel) *had wherewithal to efface*

self, the sneer is so cool, the irony so sober, the contempt so discreet, the moderation so insidious, the difference between Popish bigotry and Protestant firmness, between the fury of the persecutor and the resolution of the martyr, so little marked; the distinctions between intolerant frenzy and heroic zeal so melted into each other, that though he contrives to make the reader feel some indignation at the tyrant, he never leads him to feel any reverence for the sufferer. He ascribes such a slender superiority to one religious system above another, that the young reader, who does not come to the perusal with his principles formed, will be in danger of thinking that the reformation was really not worth contending for. But, in nothing is the skill of this accomplished sophist more apparent, than in the artful way in which he piques his readers into a conformity with his own views concerning religion. Human pride, he knew, naturally likes to range itself on the side of ability. He therefore skilfully works on this passion, by treating with a sort of contemptuous superiority, as weak and credulous men, all whom he represents as being under the religious delusion. To the shameful practice of confounding fanaticism with real religion, he adds the disingenuous habit of accounting for the best actions of the best men, by referring them to some low motive; and affects to confound the designs of the religious and the corrupt, so artfully, as if no radical difference existed between them." (*Mrs. H. More's Hints for a Young Princess*, vol. i. pp. 156—158.) Thus does this elegant writer describe the pernicious tendencies of Hume's History, which, as possessing at the same time many of the beauties of style, she happily characterizes in a word, as "a serpent under a bed of roses." (p. 155.)—And thus we see, that in no occupation of Mr. Hume, whether exercising himself as the light Essayist, the deep Philosopher, or the grave Historian,

his guilt. He also boasted, that he *had saved more souls from hell by these Indulgences, than St. Peter had converted to Christianity by his preaching.*"—Yet Hume could discover no cause for Luther's resistance of such Indulgences, but that he had lost the sale of them himself.

does he ever lose sight of the one great warfare, in which he had enlisted himself, against truth, virtue, and religion.

In this Postscript to the foregoing Number, I have wandered far, indeed, from my subject; but by no means from my object: for, if I shall have the good fortune of impressing any one of my youthful readers with a just opinion and abhorrence of such writers as Bolingbroke and Hume, I conceive I shall have done no small service to the cause of truth, of virtue, and of religion.

END OF VOL. I.

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